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STUDIES 
Tamás Sárközy The Present State and the Future Work 
of Hungarian Economic Legislation 
1. Hungarian Economic. Law Compared with Other 
Former Socialist Countries 
1.1. Traditions have a rather great role to play in legal development. As Rabel used to 
point out, the goals are determined by the traditions of society and the means by those 
of legal dogmatics. Although the evolutionary process of the pre-1945 period was broken, 
the past kept awakening. Hungarian socialism with its "tamed" complexion similarly had 
peculiar traits of its own, which of necessity operated to determine the possibilities for 
the development of economic law in 1 lungary. Most important in this context was the fact 
that, in contrast to the Soviet Union and the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, 
which have had to lay the foundations of a new economic legal order after 1990, 
Hungary arrived at the change in its political, social and economic systems with a 
relatively developed system of law that was partially equipped of the requirements even 
of a market economy, one that was serviceable, and it did work, once stripped of its 
attributes of socialist ideology. 
The first very essential feature is that Hungarian civil law belongs to the so-called 
German group of law (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) so far as concerns its system of 
concepts, characteristics of legal dogmatics, and peculiarities of legislation and law 
enforcement. The fundamental role in its information is reserved of legislation, with 
comparatively little importance attached to judicial development of law and to customary 
law, but with comparatively great importance assumed by jurisprudence and legal 
ideology, as in the case with the so-called German Professorenrecht. Obviously, account 
should be taken of the practice of modem American commercial law (Western Europe 
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did not remain intact either), but we cannot adopt the methods of common law (e.g. the 
lack of formal requirements for companies). 
Before World War Two Hungary had neither a written constitution nor a comprehen-
sive code of private law. Much more developed was its commercial law, with its under-
lying Commercial Code (Act XXXVII of 1875) drafted on the German model. That Code 
governed the status of the commercial community, commercial associations (unlimited 
partnerships, limited partnerships and companies limited by shares as well as cooper-
atives) and the major commercial transactions. It was developed on a continuing basis, 
and the limited liability company, one of the most fashionable commercial association 
even today, came to be covered by Hungarian commercial law in 1930. 
Formally the Commercial Code was not repealed after 1948, but it was rarely applied 
under the Stalinist economic system. While the economic enactments of 1988-89, mainly 
the Companies Act, adopted several of the Code's time-honoured provisions, they repealed 
a large part thereof, but some of its articles (e.g. on public warehousing) are still operative. 
Nevertheless, the operation of Hungarian economic law continues to be influenced 
by the imperfect pattern of bourgeois development prior to 1945. Not all-embracing legal 
culture of commerce had evolved despite a noteworthy record of results. Considering the 
additional effects of 40 years of a Soviet-type socialist system working as it did against 
commercial culture as well, this situation unfortunately acts to complicate in large 
measure our present transition to a modem bourgeois society, for legal practice follows 
only with difficulty the forward-oriented provisions of economic law. 
1.2. The period 1945-49 found in Hungary a coalition government during which 
the legislative activity favouring a bourgeois society (the land reform doing away with 
the feudal system of land tenure, Act VI of 1945 abolishing large estates) was 
increasingly displaced by enactments laying the basis for a totalitarian communist 
regime (e.g. Acts XIII of 1946 and XXV of 1948 on nationalization). The adoption of 
a Soviet system of commercial law was completed in effect after the Stalinist type of 
Constitution had been promulgated by Act XX of 1949. Its substance may be summed 
up as follows. 
(a) The basic form of property was state property, with the State becoming the 
"single and indivisible" owner of the overwhelming majority of national wealth and 
representing the unity of the qualities of "public power and owner". (This was legally 
sanctioned by the Civil Code (Act IV of 1959, see Art. 174.) The primary enterprise 
form in the economy was thus constituted by state enterprises founded and managed 
as legal entities mostly by ministries (and, to a lesser degree, by local councils) (see 
Law-Decree No. 32 of 1950). In Western terminology, the state enterprise practically 
conformed to the legal structure of public-law institute (öffentliche Anstalt, the Soviet 
predpriyatie). 
(b) The cooperative system was a subsidiary socialist form of social property. 
However, cooperatives lost their former features of commercial association. The principal 
form of the cooperative was the collective farm of the Soviet kolkhoz type (Law-Decree 
No. 7 of 1959). At the same time, unlike the Soviet Union, Hungary did not nationalize 
arable land, which was to offer numerous advantages. 
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(c) The Constitution and the Civil Code placed considerable restrictions on private 
property, recognizing artisans' and petty traders' right to ownership of their own means 
of production to a limited extent (Arts. 91 and 92 of the Civil Code), prohibiting the so-
called profit-oriented capitalist property and related "associations leading to exploitation" 
(Art. 571 of the Civil Code). 
(d) Economic guidance was basically provided by administrative acts (government 
and ministerial decrees, ministerial ordinances) rather than laws, with even plan targets 
appearing as administrative fiats. 
(e) Inter-enterprise contractual relations were governed by the so-called plan con-
tracts functioning as means of executing and breaking down plans and controlling plan 
fulfilment (Chapter XXXV of the Civil Code). Lawsuits between enterprises were re-
moved from the jurisdiction of courts and were referred to the so-called arbitration 
boards of an administrative nature (Decree No. 51/1955. (VIII. 19.) of the Council of 
Ministers). 
It should be noted, however, that this Stalinist model of the economy was always of 
limited application in Hungarian law, owing to its relatively short period of introduction 
(1949-53) and the so-called "gulyás" [goulash] communism, or the soft dictatorship of 
the Kádár regime, which emerged after 1956, civil rights and enterprise powers being 
a priori of a wider scope than in the Soviet Union or other peoples' democratic countries. 
Legislation played a larger role in state life and in the economy (apart from the functions 
of the Civil Code of 1959 as mentioned above, Act IV of 1957 regulated administrative 
proceedings, and certain areas of economic state administration were also governed by 
legislative enactments, such as Act IV of 1960 on Mining, Act II of 1964 on Posts, Act 
III of 1964 on Constructions, Act IV of 1964 on Water Management). 
1.3. Launched on 1 January 1968, the Hungarian economic reform was an experiment 
seeking to reduce the role of the State in the economy and to increase enterprise 
autonomy without effecting a political reform (albeit through a relative softening up of 
the socialist political system). The reform was intended to create the so-called socialist 
market economy in which inter-enterprise commodity relations were to be governed by 
the state apparatus through reliance chiefly on the so-called indirect economic regulators 
and legislative activity. The 20 years of cyclical process, marked as it was by setbacks 
(consider the mid-1970s), failed to score a decisive success and to prove the possibility 
of a "socialist third road" different from the Soviet model, mainly for foreign policy 
reasons and due to ideological limitations, but it can claim great credit for having 
established the basic institutions of a market economy in Hungary, thereby largely 
facilitating a transition to a "bourgeois" market economy and a constitutional State when 
international conditions were ripe for it to force its way. As the science of civil law has 
always been linked up with the level of development of commodity relations, the Hungarian 
economic reform led, thanks primarily to the school of Gyula Eörsi, to a notable 
development in the theory of Hungarian economic law, which devised and improved market 
economy institutions, adapting them to concrete conditions, and tried to bring Hungarian 
legal development into line with the world trends of international commercial law 
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(emergence of comparative jurisprudence). The major institutions, still making their effects 
felt, of the law of the Hungarian economic reform may be listed as follows. 
(a) The primacy of state property as declared by the Constitution and the Civil Code 
was upheld with slight changes, but the exclusive objects of state property and state 
monopoly came to be significantly reduced in number and scope, respectively, during the 
1980s, whereas expanding the autonomy of state enterprises vis-à-vis the central state 
apparatus was a basic principle of the economic reform in Hungary, as was laid down 
for the first time in Government Decree No. 11/1967. (X.13.) and—following the 
amendment of the Constitution by Act I of 1972, which declared enterprise autonomy— 
in Act VI of 1977 on State Enterprises. 
A conclusively decisive change in the status of state enterprises was brought about 
by a supplementary article to the Enterprise Act (Law-Decree No. 22 of 1984), which 
introduced an enterprise management reform in 1984-85. A subject even of subsequent 
heated debate, with its significant merits and demerits, this innovation, closely similar as 
it was to the Yugoslav self-management system, left as little as some 20% of state 
enterprises under administrative supervision, while the remaining 80% were transformed 
into self-governing enterprises, where almost all of the State's proprietary rights were 
actually transferred to the State enterprises and enterprise management was determined, 
not by the outside owner, but by the enterprises themselves. At the vast majority of self-
governing enterprises, proprietary rights were exercised by the so-called enterprise 
council and, at a smaller part thereof, direct self-management by workers was established 
(enteiprises managed by the general assembly or/and delegates' assemblies—10%). (This 
arrangement based on enterprise autonomy is fading away now, and the legislation of 
1992 on the new public sector and privatization will cause the self-governing—self-owned 
enterprises to vanish from Hungarian economic life.) 
In like manner, the Labour Code promulgated by Act II of 1967 (and operative until 
mid-1992) considerably expanded the autonomy of enterprises as well as workers in the 
regulation of employment relations. It delegated the collective agreement to the enterprise 
level, enlarged trade union rights, increased the freedom of notice, etc. 
(b) Act II of 1967 on Cooperative Farms greatly increased the autonomy of cooperative 
fanns and secured semi-private) household plots for farm members, while (Land) Act IV 
of 1967 opened room for creating independent cooperative land ownership. Cooperative 
schemes in industry, trade, house maintenance, savings banks and other areas were gaining 
ground rapidly as forms of common private activity. Unique in the East European countries, 
a consolidated cooperative law (Act III of 1971) emerged in Hungary as early as 1971, 
while the Constitution as amended in 1972 declared the equality of state and cooperative 
property. (This was not, of course, fully translated into practical terms.) Further restrictions 
were lifted by the amendments to the Cooperatives act in the 1970s and 1980s (although 
farm members had stopped becoming owners because the socialist ideological dogma of 
indivisible cooperative property still prevailed), and there came into being new and more 
flexible forms of cooperatives (auxiliary enterprises of cooperative fanns, small cooper-
atives, specialized cooperative groups, which can be seen as forerunners of private under-
takings in later times). The Land Act (Act I of 1987), was abolishing pennanent land use 
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and the distinction between personal and private property as well as by lifting many 
restrictions on property, made further progress towards the institutionalization, at least 
partial, of private property. 
(c) It was from the 1960s that the Company Law evolved, separately and first, in the 
cooperative sector (from 1961) and later in the public sector (from 1967). The so-called 
economic associations established by enterprises and cooperatives inter se were regulated 
for the first time by Law-Decree No. 9 of 1970 and then by Law-Decree No. 4 of 1978, 
not as traditional commercial associations, but as new entities like joint enterprises 
operating with liability assumed by members as surety and unions performing 
coordinative functions. (These still exist as forms of association; see Chapters IV and V 
of Act VI of 1988.) Setting up of joint ventures with western companies was allowed as 
early as 1972 (Decree No. 28/1972. (X. 3.) of the Minister of Finance), such ventures to 
take the form of the traditional companies limited by shares or limited liability company 
as regulated by the Commercial Code (but in practice joint ventures with Western 
companies were mere exceptions until about 1985). 
(d) Private undertakings of a non-cooperative type did not play any significant role 
except in the last stage of the Hungarian economic reform. In effect, they saw their 
institutional environment created in the period 1979-81, when, separated from the so-
called socialist sector, they constituted ancillary-subsidiary forms of economic activity 
(contracting out of shops and catering establishments, rental of enterprise units, use of 
civil-law societies for business purpose partnership; see Law-Decrees No. 16 of 1981 and 
No. 7 of 1982, Decree No. 30/1981. (IX. 14.) of the Council of Ministers, Law-Decree 
No. 15 of 1981). 
(e) Also in certain partial aspects of economic management, numerous enactments 
deviated from the traditional socialist model without, of course, going beyond the 
frameworks of the socialist order of society. Outstanding among them was Act VII of 
1972 on National Economic Planning, which abolished compulsory plan targets. The right 
of enterprises to engage directly in foreign trade was laid down in Act III of 1974 on 
Foreign Trade, and Act IV of 1972 which abolished the arbitration boards and integrated 
the economic courts into a single judicial organization. 
(f) The system of plan contracts was formally abolished by Act IV of 1977 streaming 
from the Civil Code on a comprehensive scale (in point of fact, those contracts had 
become an exception as early as the end of the 1960s) and suiting inter-enterprise 
contracts to the market model. Among economic contracts, however, the contract for 
delivery and the contract of locatio-conductio operis remained prevalent. Act V of 1923 
on Acts of Unfair Competition was revived by government decrees after 1968, cartels 
were prohibited, and the institution of economic court was introduced. This area was 
uniformly covered by Act IV of 1984 prohibiting unfair economic activities (and seen as 
the forerunner of a modern law of competition which was adopted in 1990). 
(g) The germs of legislative coverage of economic representative organizations 
likewise appeared, framed mostly in other enacunents. Accordingly the trade unions were 
covered by the labour Code and the national and territorial federations of cooperatives 
according to the Cooperatives Act. The Hungarian Chamber of Commerce became, in 
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several stages, the representative organization of state enterprises, chiefly larger ones, in 
the early 1980s (albeit with open and voluntary membership; see Decree No. 62/1980. 
(XII. 28.) of the Council of Ministers and Law-Decree No. 11 of 1985). 
The foregoing perhaps goes to show that Hungary entered the process of change in 
the social system with much more developed and market-oriented system of economic law 
than the rest of East-European countries did. With minor modifications, a large part of 
the laws and regulations referred to above was transitorily suitable, even after the 
systemic change, to subserve a new bourgeois market economy. 
2. Evolution of Economic Law during the Transition Period (1988-1993) 
2.1. It is a characteristic of the economic law resulting from the systemic change in 
Hungary that the transformation of legislation began before the change in the political 
system. The first wave of laws and regulations resulting from the systemic change can 
be said to have occurred between the summers of 1988 and 1990. 
The first and foremost law resulting from the change in the economic system was 
Act VI of 1988 on Economic Associations (Companies Act), which entered into force 
on 1 January 1989. The Act put an end to the sectoral fragmentation of the company law, 
placed nationals and foreigners on an equal footing in respect to conditions for joining 
associations, legitimized private undertakings while opening practically unlimited 
possibilities to them. Although a few ideological restrictions (e.g. a ceiling of 500 
workers for private companies, which a private person could nevertheless evade easily 
by founding several one-man limited liability companies) were retained, most of them 
were eliminated early in 1990. The Companies Act has modernized the traditional 
companies forms and its intendment being incorporated both the development results of 
the Hungarian company law and the universal development trends of international trade, 
particularly the company law of the European Communities. Also, it employed new 
legislative techniques which may become a general feature of codification in a 
constitutional state, namely it contains no enabling provisions for enforcement calling for 
administrative regulations, the majority of its rules are permissive, etc. (The Companies 
Act has since undergone minor modifications several times, but it has essentially retained 
its basic structure.) 
The Companies Act was followed up by a wide range of "supplementary " laws and 
regulations having the main elements as discussed below. 
(a) As early as 1 January 1988 there came into force a modern western system of 
taxation (Act V of 1987 on Personal Income Tax, Act IX of 1988 on business Profit 
Tax), which was adjusted to the Companies Act with effect from 1 January 1989 and 
then has been refined annually in response to West European trends (e.g. introduction of 
a two-rate general sales tax in 1992). 
(b) Enter into force concurrently with the Companies Act with provisions of financial, 
labour and customs law. (With minor modifications, it is still in force.) 
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(c) The registry court and liquidation proceedings were brought into line with the 
provisions of the Companies Act (the former by Law-Decree No. 23 of 1989 and the 
latter by Law-Decrees No. 11 of 1986 and No. 26 of 1988 no longer in force; Act IL of 
1991 currently in effect will be discussed later) and have since been modified. 
(d) Act XIII of 1989 on Transformation came into force in mid-1990. It governed 
transition from one form of association to another (e.g. transformation of a limited 
liability company into a company limited by shares) on the one hand and, operating as 
the first enactment on quasi privatization, transformation of state enterprises into 
companies limited by shares or limited liability companies on the other. (The Act ceased 
to have effect in summer of 1992.) 
(e) A modification of the Act on Cooperatives (by Act XV of 1989) broke the earlier 
dogma of indivisible cooperative property and made the first step towards bringing 
members into a position of part-owners and approximating cooperatives to commercial 
associations. (This regulation was in force until 1992.) 
(0 Act V of 1990 on Private Undertaking, which placed individual entrepreneurs (in 
small-scale industry, commerce, etc.) on an equal footing with associations in respect of 
conditions while creatively influencing regulations on associations, was passed in January 
1990. It requires professional qualifications only for performance of activities, not for 
entrepreneurship itself, lifted the requirement of personal contribution also in the case of 
associations formed by citizens, and allows private undertakings to hire labour without 
a numerical limit (the ceiling was 30 from 1981 to 1988 and 500 from 1 January 1989 
and ceased as of March 1990). 
(g) The basic rules on securities were incorporated (by Act XXV of 1988) into the 
Civil Code. Act VI of 1990 on Issue of Securities and the Stock Exchange entered into 
force on 1 March 1990. Against this background the Stock Exchange began functioning 
in Budapest, and the Exchange Rules were adopted in summer of 1990. 
(h) Act VII of 1990 set up the State Property Agency, a central organization 
representing the State as owner, to enhance privatization, while Act VIII of 1990 on 
Protection of State Property entrusted to state enterprises determined, taking into account 
the existence of the Agency, the procedures to be followed when state enterprises sell or 
lease out part of their property or contribute it to companies. (These enactments were in 
force until the summer of 1992.) 
This review makes a detailed analysis only of economic legislation, but I should also 
mention the highly important activity of Kálmán Kulcsár and Géza Kilényi in the field 
of public law-making mainly in 1989, which created the constitutional ground works for 
the transition to a bourgeois democracy, a multi-party system, and a state governed by 
the rule of law. In addition to the constitutional amendments of 1989 and 1990, reference 
may be made to Act XXXIV of 1989 opening the way for pluralist elections, Act П of 
1989 on the Right of Association, Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court, Act 
XXXVIII of 1989 on the State Audit Office, etc. 
2.2. Of course, neither social consciousness, commercial culture, legal expertise, an 
adequately trained team of experts (commerci?' lawyers, commercial judges and notaries 
public, auditors, assessors of property, etc.) nor an appropriate infrastructure of physical 
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facilities (registry court building, record-keeping, enterprise balance-making and 
accounting systems based on computer technology) were available to support and to keep 
pace with the extremely rapid and vigorous political transformations, which were 
gathering, increasing momentum as indicated above. As legislative activity was forging 
ahead without reliance on sufficient physical facilities and personnel, the positive 
tendencies necessarily came to be (and still are) attended by numerous anomalies, 
malpractices, and other negative phenomena. The sharpening political rivalry since 1989 
has been an added contributory factor to manifestations of undue impatience in society 
and mass communications, with cases of abuse overstated and repoliticalized. It is 
difficult to appreciate that the price of inexperience has to be paid and disadvantages 
have to be suffered in the process of transition to a market economy. Since 1989 
Hungary has also witnessed the unfolding of a political-scientific debate about the need 
(a) to transitorily endure malpractices while continuously improving the necessary set of 
conditions for eliminating them ("Liberal" view mainly...) characteristic of the Németh 
Government formed in autumn 1988) or (b) to take an immediate and administrative 
measure against anomalies ("etatist) trend mainly characteristic of Antall Government in 
power from May 1990). 
Mention should also be made of a marked process of economic deregulation which 
Hungary pushed ahead between September 1989 and May 1990 in an effort to dismande 
the former socialist "administrative State" (with the support of the World Bank). There 
were repealed about 6000 government and ministerial decrees (lower-level legislation) 
and, in March 1990, there passed a law on deregulation (Act XXII of 1990). Unfortunate-
ly Antall Government stopped the deregulation program, which required the ministries 
to present estimates of costs to be incurred and of ripple effects to be produced even by 
future laws and regulations. (This I consider to have been a significant error, and more 
will be said about the related aspects at a later stage.) 
2.3. The legislative activity in 1990 of the Hungarian Democrats' Forum) led 
government coalition, which came to power after the pluralist elections in May 1990, had 
in fact three distinctive features. 
(a) The economic legislation of Németh's Government was continued, with the 
submission of a Bill, previously drafted by Tamás Schagrin, on preliminary privatization 
in home trade and catering industry (Act LXXIV of 1990) and a Bill, excellently 
prepared by Ferenc Vissi and Imre Vörös, to prohibit unfair conduct on the market 
(Act LXXXVI of 1990, or the Act on Competition) and with the adoption of a price 
act (Act LXXXVII of 1990). 
b) There were modified certain partial elements of earlier laws in favour of state 
intervention with more vigour. Thus, Act LIII of 1990 considerably extended the powers 
of the Property Agency, a state delegate was ordered (by Government Decree No. 
20/1990 (VIII. 3.) to sit on the enterprise council at each self-governing state enterprise, 
and the Acts on Transformation and Enterprises were modified (by Acts LXXI and 
LXXII of 1990) to considerably reduce enterprise prerogatives, scale down the 
availability of legal remedies, and cut back enterprise sharing in the proceeds of 
privatization. With a view to protection against abuse, the Land Act was emended (by 
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Acts XLI and XXXVIII of 1990) to place in effect a moratorium on sales of state-owned 
immovable property by requiring the permission of territorial committees for property 
protection for the sale and lease of immovables, contribution of them in economic 
associations, etc. 
(c) Legislation in the field of public law (e.g. enactments on self-governments called 
for by the self-governments elections of 1990) took precedence temporarily over economic 
legislation, and a struggle concerning political legislation got under way in Parliament; in 
this context, reference may be made to compensation of persons wronged mainly after 
1945 (four independent acts and one supplementary act on compensation have been 
adopted to date), to Act XXXII of 1991 on Church Immovables, or to different protracted 
legislative initiatives for having "offenders" of the former regime called to accounL 
A new program for economic legislation was adopted after Mihály Kupa had become 
Minister of Finance. Its first phase embraced the period from spring to autumn of 1991 
and its second phase was implemented in the first part of 1992. While the year 1991 was 
a period more of economic enactments of a "financial" nature, the year 1992 saw the 
emphasis placed on norms governing the status of subjects at economic law. 
Among the financial acts of 1991 I would mention Act IL of 1991 on Final 
Settlement as well as on Bankruptcy and Liquidation Proceedings; Act XVIII of 1991 
on Accounting, which incorporated Directives 4 and 7 of the European Community; 
Act LXIX of 1991 on Banking Institutions and commercial Banks; Act XV of 1991 on 
the Hungarian National Bank; Act LXIII of 1991 on Investment Funds, and, continuing 
the list of these, Act XXXVIII of 1992 on State Finances. 
The first enactments on the legal status of economic organizations included Act I of 
1992 on Cooperatives and Act XXII of 1992 (Labour Code). Then, in summer of 1992, 
three enacunents on the State's business property virtually made a new law governing the 
public sector (Act LIII of 1992), consolidating statutory provisions in the field of 
privatization (Act LIV of 1992), and incorporated the regulations on transformation of 
economic associations into the Associations Act (Act LV of 1992). 
2.4. From 1993 there appeared three tendencies in economic legislation (and will 
continue during the period 1994-98 as well): 
(a) redrafting of sectoral economic laws (Acts on, e.g., Posts, Railways and Water 
Management), or streamlining of outdated enactments mostly of the 1960s; 
(b) legislation "supplementing" economic regulations from the "human" aspect This 
process was set in action by the Social Welfare Act at the end of 1992, and it includes 
plans for the adoption of a Labour Safety Act or an Act on Environmental protection, 
whereas the amendment in 1993 of the Civil Code was intended to substitute, as it were, 
for a "non-profit" law by introducing the institutions of corporate body and public 
foundation. The Bills on the Chamber of Commerce and occupational chambers also 
naturally fall in this category; 
(c) increased efforts were being made for partial amendments to laws newly adopted 
in 1988-93 (see legislation on securities, the Stock Exchange, bankruptcy, banks, etc.). 
Such amendments were motivated in part by primitive technical errors committed "in the 
rush of legislation", in part by daily political goals. 
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How many of the large volume of bills already submitted to parliament will be passed 
into law before the elections of 1994 is a hard question to answer (considering the 
renewed emphasis on public law legislation (acts on national defence, the police, secret 
agents, etc.) and the electoral campaign now getting under way). On the other hand, a 
large part of the year 1994 is unfortunately likely to be lost on account of the elections 
for the adoption of "completely new" economic laws. The new government will have to 
review the legacy of its predecessor, to remove the etatist elements from the existing 
legislation, and to revise the bills not yet passed. In addition to the fundamental material 
requirement of adjustment to the new government program, the review of substantive 
elements will have to make allowance for the fact that 
(a) a number of economic bills have long been shelved in Parliament They include 
those on which professional consensus has been reached, but which no one has had an 
interest in dealing with (e.g. regulation of a Commodity Exchange). These bills should 
be pushed through soon; 
(b) at the other extreme there are numerous "rough" bills, practically drafts prepared 
at clerical levels, which are totally unelaborated professionally and represent no more 
than formal, administrative execution of some government decision. 
3. Analysis of Hungarian Economic Law and Its Expected Evolution 
in Some Fields 
3.1. Commercial (economic) law evolved as a mixed branch of law at the end of the last 
century. Its precise definition is questionable even in Western Europe. Under the present 
set ol Hungarian conditions, the following fields of law may be classed in this branch: 
(a) law of private undertaking; 
(b) law of economic association; 
(c) law of state enterprises; 
(d) law of privatization of state enterprises; 
(e) law of cooperatives; 
(f) company law; 
(g) law of competition, cartels, control of monopoly and merger, and concerns; 
(h) law of banks and insurance; 
(i) law of securities and stock exchange; 
(j) law of bankruptcy and liquidation; 
(k) law of commercial accounting; 
(1) law of commercial transactions. 
It is to be noted on this score that 
(a) certain elements of commercial law are deeply embedded in civil law (e.g. 
economic associations are legal entities at the same time, commercial transactions are 
civil-law contracts, transformation of state enterprises into associations amounts to joint 
succession of title under civil law); 
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(b) there appear, on the other hand, a good number of public-law provisions in 
commercial law (e.g. supervision over banks, insurance and securities; measures of the 
Office of Competition); 
(c) substantive law is intermingled with a considerable number of procedural rules 
(e.g. registry court proceedings); 
(d) lastly, economic law in the broad sense includes—along with the law of 
accounting, banks, insurance, securities, and stock exchange, which represented the 
borderline area of commercial law—the law of budget and taxes (fees), foreign exchange 
and customs, and individual and collective labour law (collective agreements, right to 
strike) as well as the legal institutions destined for conciliation of economic interests. The 
law of immovable property (land) is also closely related to commercial law, so it 
deserves a brief discussion in this review. 
Some partial provinces of commercial law will obviously disappear or change at 
longer term. Thus, for instance, the law of privatization will be of interest until 
completion of privatization in an institutional setting, and, with privatization completed, 
little will remain of the separate law governing the public sector, since state enterprises 
will be transformed into commercial associations, and the cooperatives will presumably 
merge with economic associations in the long run. 
The aforementioned fields of commercial law are not the whole, even in the West, 
become objects of the commercial code; it is mainly the law of competition or the law 
of banks that is usually covered by separate legislation. In many countries (Switzerland, 
Italy, etc.) there are no separate commercial codes at all, or the different forms of 
economic association companies limited by shares, or limited liability company, etc.) are 
regulated by separate laws independently from the Commercial Code (e.g. in Germany), 
whereas commercial transactions are covered by a uniform law of obligations in the Civil 
Code (e.g. in Switzerland and several other countries). 
3.2. Hungarian economic (commercial) law has virtually developed outside the 
domain of the Civil Code before as well as after 1945, the laws of association, 
competition, bankruptcy, securities, etc. are embodied in separate enactments, while these 
separate provinces have been referred by a few definitive legislative provisions back to 
the Civil Code (see, e.g., Arts. 52 to 56 on associations, Art. 338/A-B-C on securities). 
This means also that the parts of the Civil Code dealing with the subjects at law and 
ownership have virtually been renewed, although by separate enactments (the only area 
that is not covered essentially for political reasons is a modem law of immovable 
property, with a new land act yet to be framed in the first place, but its adoption has so 
far been prevented by sharp conflicts of political and economic interests). On the other 
hand, a comprehensive reform still has to be effected in respect to contracts, which 
constitute a larger part, even in terms of articles, of the legal material in the Civil Code. 
The part dealing with obligations—primarily the types of contract in the special part on 
the law of obligations, but, to some extent, even the general rules governing contracts-
are hopelessly outdated and are inept for satisfying the requirements of modem business 
transactions. (The partial modification in 1993 of the Civil Code can do very little to 
solve this problem.) 
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In the current situation two tendencies can be observed in the domain of commercial 
transactions. In the first place, practice relies on the permissive rules of the law of 
obligations for paving the way by creating innominate or mixed contracts (such as 
contracts of syndicate preliminary to contracts of association, contracts for leasing of 
machinery and motor cars, stock exchange transactions with securities, contracts of 
factoring, model contracts of franchise which are gaining more and more ground). On 
the other hand, separate provisions of law establish types of contracts like contracts of 
casino or contracts of gambling automats as introduced by the Games of Hazard Act, or 
the so-called contracts of leasing connected with privatization as recognized by legislation 
on privatization (see Art. 68 of Act LIV of 1992), or contracts for property management, 
use, services and portfolio (Arts. 76 to 78 of Act LIV of 1992), not to mention the 
contracts of concession possessing public-law elements, but practically representing a 
civil-law institution (introduced by Act XVI of 1991). 
Yet this is not enough, for an urgent modification by a legislative enactment of the 
part of the Civil Code on contracts is inevitable, especially in the light of requirements 
for harmonization with the European Community. If a relatively full-scale and satis-
factory reform of the Civil Code can be completed by 1996, there will be no need for a 
separate Commercial Code. If, however, the demands of extra-economic areas (law of 
personality, law of inheritance, etc.) retard the accomplishment of this goal, it is indeed 
the view held by most jurists in civil law branch, the need will arise for a new Hungarian 
Commercial Code to be drafted with urgency, and in that case the Code might also 
embrace the law of individual firms and partnerships, the law of cooperatives, the law 
of securities and banks, the law of accounting, and perhaps even the law of competition. 
This question may be answered by the Government in late 1994 or in early 1995. In 
theory, preserving the unity of the Civil Code would be the better solution, but if 
progress in this direction continues to be as slow as it has been until now, we may have 
no choice but to have commercial transactions regulated by a separate law. 
3.3. The situation with regard to certain fields of economic law may be summed up 
in its main essence as follows. 
(a) The status of private undertakings in substantive law in my view, is basically 
resolved, and the existing problems concerning incentives for small businesses are more 
in the nature of economic policy (taxation, availability of credit, book-keeping etc.). In 
effect there are three legal forms available: "simple" undertaking subject to possession 
of entrepreneur's certificate and with liability extending to all private property; individual 
registered firm likewise with full liability; and finally one-man limited liability company 
or one-man company limited by shares under the Companies Act (foundation by private 
persons of one-man firm was allowed by Act LV of 1992). The relevant legislation 
started, quite appropriately in my view, from one's subjective right to entrepreneurship 
and requires professional qualifications only for launching and actually carrying on a 
business. (This arrangement should be upheld despite attacks from proponents in the 
National Alliance of Craftsmen of the traditional guild—system artisanship—consider the 
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impact produced on individual businesses by the proposal to establish a chamber of 
craftsmanship). 
(b) The law of foreign investments and foreigner's right to participate in companies 
have, in their basic aspects, been put on the right track by Act XXIV of 1988: there is 
no separate act on joint ventures, and foreigners are subject to the uniform Hungarian law 
of association. Some provisions of the Companies Act disfavouring foreigners to have 
been abrogated, and the legal status of companies with foreign participation (including 
customs-free zone and off-shore companies) has been settled. In this respect, too, the 
uncertainty of economic policy conditions (extent of tax relief, degree of differentiation, 
etc.) should be eliminated by partial modifications; this would call primarily for a new 
customs law and a foreign exchange code of a new spirit, which in turn cannot be 
expected until the full convertibility of the forint has been achieved, i.e. hardly before 
1996, so in the interim we unfortunately must rest satisfied with piecemeal minor 
modifications of the foreign exchange and customs law in an effort to update them. 
Stimulation of foreign investments being a vital question for us, the relevant enactment 
should increase benefits for investors by an order of magnitude so as to maintain our 
competitive position in Eastern Europe. It would also be necessary for the legal status of 
the off-shore companies and special economic zones to be clearly defined by law. 
(c) Act VI of 1988 on Economic Associations (Companies Act) has stood the test 
both of the systemic change and of practical verification, while being fundamentally in 
harmony with the law of the European Community. Apart from some slight technical 
modifications, no essential change is needed in this domain, but certain refinements are 
called for by practical experience mainly in the chapter on corporations. The available 
forms of association offer a basically sufficient assortment; in fact there is no need for 
the so-called public utility companies (although these are not a nuisance), and the most 
to be done would be to allow wider scope for silent partnerships. (The rigid regulation 
of civil-law society was rightly relaxed by the amendments of the Civil Code in 1993.) 
The growing mingling of types among forms of association can be handled for the time 
being by the permissive nature of the Act, whereas economic partnerships and intra-
enterprise business partnerships (economic partnerships operating with liability assumed 
by legal entities) are slowly going out of existence (and the joint enterprise can be 
supposed to follow suit). What the new government will have to do in the first place is 
to eliminate from the Companies Act the etatist excesses—namely the ceiling on 
contributions to corporations and limited liability companies; the completely wrong 
regulation, contrary to the Civil Code, of the invalidity of contracts of association; 
etc.— which found their way into the Act during the Antall Government (mainly at he 
end of 1991). 
(d) The rules of company law (and the law of registry court procedure) have often 
changed over the past period, but once computer-based modernization is completed, the 
time will probably come to promulgate a uniform company law to supersede Law-Decree 
No. 23 of 1989 with effect from 1 January 1996.1 maintain that registration of economic 
subjects may be left with the registry courts (should not be referred to public-law 
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Chambers on some western models), but registration proceedings should be considerably 
expedited, for instance by the agency of company commissioners without judicial 
qualifications. 
(e) The rules on final settlement and liquidation are in effect serviceable, and the 
provisions on change in status (transformation, merger, demerger) have been greatly 
refined recently, facilitating decentralization and control over mergers. The regulations 
on bankruptcy as embodied in Act IL of 1991 are also basically satisfactory and are in 
line with European norms. However, it is a different matter that, owing to the distorted 
market conditions of Hungary, ringwise debts, etc., the application of the modern rules 
of bankruptcy law is attended by numerous anomalies in respect to Hungarian 
undertakings. The amendment of 1993 brought the Act closer to Hungarian realities, but 
in the ongoing process of debt and credit consolidation one cannot unfortunately preclude 
the need for additional amendments to the Act 
(f) The law of concerns embodied in Act LXXXVI of 1990 and that relating to 
corporations in the Companies Act will need closer aligning in future, but, apart from 
this, the law of enterprise groupings is in the making in Hungary as well and is, on the 
whole, not less developed at the present stage than the West European average (law of 
participatory, contractual and factic concerns; mutual, sizable and majority participation; 
law of holding, law of merger control). 
(g) Our law of accounting practically meets the European requirements; its harmony 
with the law of association has been strengthened and the pressure for adaptation by 
Hungarian enterprises increased by the modifications of 1993 (e.g. in respect to 
consolidated balance-sheets). We must not back away from related requirements, which 
serve to promote progress but Hungarian enterprises find it hard to comply with, and we 
must do our utmost to give effect to the relevant Act in practice. 
(h) Our law of competition is also basically on modem lines and conforms to EC 
norms. The existing problem lies mainly in that, on the one hand, the organizational 
concentration inherited from the socialist period hinders the normal operation of the law 
of competition and that, on the other, the present practice, unaccustomed as it is to 
competition, is unsure of what to make of modern regulations (e.g. on concerns). Actual 
legal practice needs time to grow equal to legal regulations moving ahead to fast in 
adaptation to European norms (Act LXXXVI of 1990). It appears advisable to have the 
Act slightly modified in the light of practical experience during 1994-95. 
(i) The recent period has witnessed a rapid development of the law of securities and 
stock exchange, but the tune will come by 1995 for the first major refinement of the Act 
of 1990 on the basis of practical experience. That opportunity should also be seized to 
fill existing gaps (concerning warehouse certificates, compensation bonds, cooperative 
securities, and certain aspects of the bill of exchange and change law not covered by 
international treaties). The basic provisions of the Civil Code on the law of securities should 
be aligned with the requirements of modem transactions, and the existing contradictions 
between the law of association, securities and stock exchange should be removed. 
(j) A political battle in the cooperative sector flashed up in 1992 mainly in connection 
with Act II of 1992 on Transition. The significant political struggle—revolving around the 
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transformation of cooperatives from old-type into new-type ones, specification of members' 
property, and encouragement of members' withdrawal an dissolution of cooperatives (efforts 
at covert destruction of cooperatives)—has greatly degraged the Act on Transition from a 
lego-technical point of view. While efforts had been undertaken to modify that Act before 
it was published in Hungarian Official Journal (and proposals for addimenta, one more 
absurd than the other, have continued to be presented ever since), the real Cooperatives Act 
(Act I of 1991) met with unworthy (but perhaps beneficial) silence, although, framed in a 
structure similar to that of the Companies Act, it borough cooperatives much closer to 
economic associations, making the cooperative form suitable for investments. Unfortunately, 
for the time being, only cooperatives may transform into companies limited by shares or 
limited liability companies, the road "backward" not being unlocked (just as state enterprises 
may not transform into cooperatives, although numerous state ventures operated in 
cooperative form prior to 1945). It is to be hoped that the process of foundation of new, 
modem cooperatives will get under way in the near future and that the cooperative as a 
specific economic association operating on cooperative principles may form an integral part 
of the law of association in the more distant future (about 2000). The first steps in this 
direction may be taken by a minor modification of the Cooperatives Act before the end of 
1994 (e.g. permission of votes proportional to property). 
(k) The traditional state enterprise of socialism amounted, in the terminology of 
commercial law, essentially to a public-law institute (enterprise under supervision by state 
administration). The forms of so-called self-governing-self-owned enterprise (enterprise 
council, general assembly, delegates' assembly), which were introduced in Hungary in 
1984, were, in my view, progressive in comparison with the traditions of socialist 
hierarchy in the mid-1980s, but were obviously obsolescent under conditions of a 
bourgeois market economy and cannot be brought into line with the EC pattern of 
enterprise forms. Precisely for this reason, it is sound policy for Acts LIII and LIV of 
1992 to allow transformation, practically over the space of two years, of state enterprises 
into forms of commercial association. (Act VI of 1977 on State Enterprises can be 
repealed subsequently.) Similarly, one may concur with the endeavour to abolish, during 
a longer a period up to 1997, all outdated forms of "institutional" enterprise (e.g. 
subsidiary company, association covered by the Civil Code). As can be seen, this 
represents considerable progress. 
It is a different matter that such transformations are intended by the two Acts 
mentioned above to be effected in a state-centred and overcentralized manner, virtually 
on the basis of discretionary government decisions, i.e. largely in the absence of 
normative regulations (thus allowing so-called political privatization, or bringing political 
adherents of the Govenunent into economic position before the elections of 1994) and 
in a uniform way. These Acts proceed from the unrestricted proprietary power of the 
State and, doing away with the guarantees provided for enterprise autonomy after 1968, 
treat the legal personality of state enterprises as a purely technical category (contain 
provisions on the State's business property rather than state enterprises), thereby virtually 
exceeding the scope of legal personality (which represents the triumph of property law 
over separate status inherent in legal personality). 
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The property remaining in the State's permanent ownership was determined in too 
wide range (about 35% of the public sector, which is strikingly high) and the corporations 
transformed from state enterprises came undifferentiatedly under the control of the State 
Holding Company, a super-holding of the State. 
Act LIV of 1992 is in fact a uniform law on privatization, which-considering the 
different legal and economic policy approach of the three earlier acts on partial 
privatization (on transformation, protection of state property, and the status of the State 
Property Agency) and their lack of transparency due to frequent amendments—may be 
viewed as a significant unification of law. Under the hallmark of the Antall Government's 
privatization policy since 1990, it codified the invariably state-guided course of 
privatization, but in certain aspects it made some refinements (e.g. conversion of 
enterprise property bonds to workers' shares, involvement of self-governments in 
privatization), provided a legal basis for the so-called self-privatization of enterprises 
(privatization techniques of greater flexibility, e.g. privatization—related leasing—which is, 
of course, insufficient but, at any rate, represents a point of departure). It should be noted 
that in 1993 the Government introduced several "privatization techniques" (?) for which 
the legislation of 1992 provides no legal ground (so-called mass privatization based on 
small investors' shares, buy-out managers). 
I maintain that institutional privatization should be completed urgently after the 
elections, for a sound operation of a bourgeois market economy cannot be secured by 
means of the State's actual proprietary majority, transformation should not merely mean 
formal, or "legal" privatization, i.e. a "bogus" one from an economic-sociological point 
of view, and state shares in new associations should be abolished, while rapid 
privatization is presumably more viable if carried out in a decentralization should be 
modified substantially before the reorganized and amalgamated into a single State 
Property Agency Corporation, i.e. the top organ of privatization should function in the 
form of corporation. Also, effective privatization of banks is absolutely necessary, which 
implies the need for certain amendments to the Act on Banking Institutions. Insurance 
companies have actually be privatized, and the Insurance Act to be passed by all means 
in 1994 should be based on this background. 
Part of the swollen "treasury" property should likewise be privatized, with the 
requirements of a substantive budgetary reform to be satisfied in this non-business portion 
of state property, the proposed Act on Treasury Property, delayed for years, should 
therefore be adopted at long last, although it is possible that this area might in point of 
fact be covered by the State Finances Act. In pursuance of this goal it would be 
particularly necessary to refrain from out-of-date arrangements incurring superfluous costs 
(e.g. there is no need for Treasury Directorates of Legal Matters). 
(1) Act XXII of 1992 finally consigned to oblivion the former Labour Code, which 
had perhaps been the most obsolete of "socialist" legislations. In my judgement, the new 
Act did well to place individual employment relations on a purely contractual basis along 
modem lines. I think that in respect of individual labour contracts there is no place for 
any significant restrictions to the detriment of workers' as has been suggested by 
representatives of international companies operating in Hungary. The truth cannot be 
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questioned of the assertion that it is impossible to enjoy human rights in the western way, 
to consume in the western way, and to work in the Eastern (or, if you like, "socialist") 
way. Nevertheless, Hungarian workers have already come under much greater social 
pressure than existed before, while privatization brings added pressure on them to come 
to terms with the new realities. Irrespective of the Act on Strike, which guarantees really 
excessive rights, there has so far been no major wave of strike, and it has been possible 
to maintain social peace, thanks indisputably to the moderate policy of trade unions, an 
achievement which it would be unwise to call into question by amending the Labour 
Code soon after the new government takes office. At joint ventures, a greater intensity, 
more efficient performance and more advanced standards of work, combined with higher 
wages and other benefits, can be ensured anyway. 
The vulnerable spot of the new Labour Code is the regulation of collective 
employment relations, since this unquestionably was rush-and-ready work. Yet no 
satisfactory regulation of collective employment relations can be legislated until a system 
of employers' and workers' representative organizations adequate to a bourgeois market 
economy has been devised in Hungary and an institutional process of conciliating 
economic interests between employers, workers and the government has been set in train. 
Institutionalization of legal entities under public law in accordance with liberal principles 
(public-law bodies, chambers, public institutes, public funds and legal distinction between 
political parties, trade unions, economic representative organizations, and lobby 
associations could be made suitable by a modification of Act II of 1989 for providing a 
stronger underpinning for the collective right to work. (This notwithstanding, the laws on 
"conciliation of interests" and on non-profit organizations will definitely be needed in 
1994—95). 
(m) Stabilization of agricultural production will be a key issue of the new 
government's economic policy, and it will call for both a revision of the Act on the 
Administration of Agriculture and an early adoption of a new Land Act radically different 
from that of 1987 and governing not only arable land. The most appropriate solution 
would be to draft a comprehensive real estate code applicable to all immovables. (In 
connection with it, a thorough reform of real estate registration is equally necessary, in 
particular through reintroduction of the institution of the real estate register kept by 
courts, as has already been suggested.) 
A real estate code would be needed as early as possible, but not later than 1995. If 
the HDF-led coalition government succeeds in pushing through the Act on Arable Land 
before the elections of 1994, the Act will have to be modified immediately after he new 
government takes office. Unfortunately, legal logics would have dictated adoption of the 
Land Act before the Cooperatives Act and the Compensation Act, but this order was 
reversed for political reasons. The basic idea of the new real estate law should be to get 
rid at last of the outdated institutions of both the socialist and the pre-1945 real estate 
law. Thus, there is no need for the "management" right of state enterprises, and it is 
generally ill-advised to have ownership and leasehold institutionally separated. Such 
"transitional" institutions as the so-called proportional landed property of cooperative 
farm members, which has been introduced recently, should also be aligned with the 
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fundamental civil-law institutions (in our case, with common property to be established). 
In like manner, associations in general should be brought into a proprietary position, 
subject to specific conditions as stipulated in contracts of syndicate, in respect of state 
property in their use. 
I do not believe it necessary to place a ceiling on land possession and to restrict 
acquisition of immovable property by foreigners, regardless of whether such restriction 
is consistent with the Constitution at all. In recent years there has been no evidence of 
masses of foreigners seeking to acquire arable land, and the possibility of abuse on 
account of the rather low market price of arable land can be ruled out by setting the 
lowest official price in accordance with the Price Act now in force. What should be 
disallowed is not acquisition of property by foreigners, because Hungarian agriculture is 
in need of capital, while any significant volume of capital investments can only be 
expected from abroad, and to expect a larger volume of investments without property, 
e.g. on lease, is a mere illusion. Rather it would be necessary to impose obligations for 
cultivation of land and employment of labour above a certain limit of possession to be 
fixed by law or contracts of syndicate, as is the case in several countries of the West. 
Individual land property acquired by virtue of the Compensation Acts or otherwise 
should naturally be respected and, where realistic conditions exist, individual fanning 
should be supported by the State. It is clear, however, that in 1990-94 a large number 
of land possessions were procured on which the owners do not want to engage in fanning 
or which are strip holdings on which farming is destined to be unprofitable according to 
international comparative figures. Legislation should make allowance for this and permit 
interested parties to keep together, subject to their voluntary option, such areas of land 
as cannot be utilized except on a large scale. Unless the possibility of independent 
cooperative landed property is reopened, our cooperative farms will be transformed en 
masse into companies limited by shares or limited liability companies. 
Also, a modem real estate code will leave room for development in several related 
fields like streamlining in the Civil Code of lien or mortgage serving as security for bank 
credit, or refraining of laws governing property in forests and pastures (held by 
associations), hunting, fishery or water management. (No doubt, this legislative process 
will unfortunately last until 1996.) 
(n) In conclusion, I would make a few remarks about the need for modifications 
of the Acts on Taxation and Social Insurance. As related questions (e.g. family 
taxation) depend heavily on the economic policy of the new government, there is not 
much to say from a legal point of view at this time. At any rate, one should obviously 
count on important amendments to the Acts on Taxation and Social Insurance in 
relation to legislation on the supplementary budget in summer of 1994 or on state 
finances for 1995. 
Then, however, efforts should be undertaken, in connection with the reform of state 
finances and the system of economic regulators relative to undertakings and to ensure 
that entrepreneurs will be informed of absolutely necessary modifications not later than 
1 October of each year, namely at least 3 months before modifications usually take effect 
on 1 January of next year. Obviously enough, no absolute constancy can be promised in 
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a process of social transformation going on in such a wide scale as this and in the face 
of so strong an economic recession as this, but the government must do all it can be done 
for the sake of entrepreneurs' relative legal certainty. 
4. A Program of Economic Legislation and Remarks 
on the Technique of Law-Making 
4.1. From the foregoing it may have become clear that about 80% of the primary 
economic laws governing a market economy have been passed by 1994. This is a 
significant result in which the Antall Government and the HDF-led government coalition 
can also claim a share despite all criticism. (In possession of sufficient power it is 
relatively easy to create a dictatorial state by coercive measures, but it is extremely 
difficult to dismantle it by way of reforms and by methods of a constitutional state.) A 
shortfall is basically observed in respect of the so-called secondary laws governing 
special fields and supplementing economic regulations in the human aspect. ( I think that 
the situation is similar in the fields of public-law legislation, which is not a subject of this 
analysis, the lag being more noticeable in the so-called human areas.) 
While the volume (quantitative indicators) of the legal material is in the main 
satisfactory as a result of some 5 years of development process, the quality of the legal 
material, i.e. the professional standard of legislation, is clearly unsatisfactory, meaning that 
— laws and regulations are insufficiently elaborated in conceptual terms and contain 
a great deal of inner contradictions; 
— laws and regulations are insufficiently elaborated in technical terms and contain 
numerous errors of codification (structure, wording, etc.); 
— laws and regulations lack appropriate synchronization, being often in conflict; 
— the legal material is marked by ebbs and flows, some enactments outpacing others 
(e.g. the law of securities and the law of banks keep ahead and the law of insurance lags 
behind); 
— the "secondary" old and outdated legal material (chiefly earlier decrees) is in 
conflict with the new primary law (market economy legislation) now in the making, 
giving rise to constant problems of constitutionality; 
— the legal material is unstable, amendments for short-term political reasons (im-
patience, aggressive lobbying, etc.) to new enactments being unjustifiably great in 
number. 
Of course, these shortcomings have been almost inevitable. The relatively low level 
of quality is a typical phenomenon of the transition objectively resulting from unsettled 
social, economic and political circumstances and the demand for accelerated legislative 
activity (rush of legislation). Yet there are a few "subjective" causes, too, which should 
be eliminated in future. 
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(a) In the process of transition Hungary has lost virtually all of its codifiers of 
economic law, a team of experts formerly prominent in Eastern Europe, and its current 
team is professionally inefficient. To change this situation within 2 or 3 years would call 
for general as well as special training (explicitly in codification) with the help of the 
European Community. 
(b) The order of the codification process has been upset, there is no appropriate 
scientific substantiation, preparatory work is unsystematic and hasty, planned and 
organized coordination of laws and regulations is lacking. 
(c) Both public administration and MPs (most of whom have had no pre-training in 
state organization and codification; a self-employed lawyer cannot codify automatically) 
are totally inexperienced in the legislative technique of a pluralist parliament. Neither the 
Government nor the Parliament have an appropriate apparatus capable of doing this work, 
improvisations are legion, political debates on bills are often hysterical and chaotic, 
hundreds of self-centred and low-standard motions for amendment presented by MPs 
make bills impossible to review, hence motivations to Acts are often contrary to wording, 
etc. (This is an added reason for discontinuing the practice of publishing motivations in 
the Hungarian Official Journal, which is in tum a notable hindrance to application of 
law.) In many cases the text of an act is almost impossible to be established after plenary 
session of Parliament, which explains frequent delays in promulgation, recurrent 
rectifications in the Hungarian Official Journal, the large number of "misprints". 
4.2. I think that the task of codification during the period from suimner of 1994 to 
early 1997 will be threefold. 
(a) The primary acts on a market economy that are still lacking should be passed. 
(b) A mass of secondary and supplementary acts (governing special fields, etc.) 
should be adopted. 
(c) The existing legal material should be modified on an institutional basis so as to 
— reduce undue state intervention and strengthen the liberalism of Hungarian 
economic law, which was upheld in its basic aspects during the period 1990-94 as well; 
— eliminate contradictions and lack of hannony within and between laws and 
regulations and remove technical errors of codification; 
— verify by 4 or 5 years of practical application the fundamental laws on a market 
economy (associations, securities, competition), which were drafted on a purely 
theoretical or comparative basis (since it was not possible for a domestic practice to 
develop under conditions of socialism) and infuse positive practical experience into 
legislation. 
If this triple set of tasks is accomplished and full-scale harmonization with the law 
of the European Communities is concurrently effected, we shall be able to develop an 
integrated system of economic law of an appropriate standard by mid-1997. This is in 
line with the conceptions that 
(a) Hungary's economic growth can be expected to pick up momentum in 1997 and 
may be considerably promoted by a uniform system of law consistently oriented to a 
market economy and based on private property; 
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(b) government policy is supposed to undergo a radical change in terms of both 
leadership line-up and working method in early or mid-1977 (because economic revival 
needs other personalities than crisis management does, "politically worn" leaders should 
be replaced, and a new offensive strategy should be formulated as part of the preparations 
for the elections of 1998); 
(c) a new Constitution, the elaboration of which should be started after the new 
Parliament has assembled, may be envisaged for 1997. There should be set up a broadly 
based constituent committee headed by the President of the Republic, its vice-chairmen 
to be the President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Minister of Justice 
and its members to be appointed by the President of the Republic from among MPs, 
scientific authorities, and public figures. 
As regards the substance of codification during the next years, attention should also 
be drawn to the following. 
(a) Economic legislation in Hungary has so far necessarily run ahead of the actual 
situation ("core" legislation, program-giving laws) with institutions often introduced 
without the required objective and subjective conditions (e.g. registry court supervision 
over all associations with registry courts hardly functioning, adoption of a western-type 
accounting law without qualified auditors and assessors of property, or of a stock 
exchange law without appropriate actors at the Stock Exchange). This has given rise to 
constant conflicts between legislation and practice. It should be a basic principle to 
resolve such collisions by ending the Hungarian "misery" rather than "adjusting 
backward", under the pressure of practice, such laws and regulations as keep ahead of 
the underlying circumstances. A modem government should wait patiently during the 
period of transition. At the same time, however, the work of codification after 1994 
should aim to narrow, also from the aspect of codification, the yawning gulf between 
legislation running ahead in response to modem international trends and an unduly old-
fashioned application of law. The subjective and objective conditions for a modem 
application of law should be created, awareness of this need should be promoted, the law 
enforcement agencies should be awakened to the need for efforts to enforce laws and 
regulations by observing legality yet applying them in a creative way with a view to 
refining them. The pressure of judges and lawyers for unduly casuistic law-making should 
be resisted despite the great pressure of practice. Too detailed laws and regulations tend 
to increase the convenience of law enforcement agencies, to make them shy of accepting 
responsibility, and to cause legislation to become dysfunctional. A market economy is 
best served by a "well-aired" legislation "embracing" it, but imposing no unjustified 
restrictions on the freedom of enterprise. 
(b) Harmonization with the law of the European Community should be on a full 
scale. Related efforts are under way, but 
— work is not sufficiently organized and planned (is fragmentized among different 
government organs); 
— while the primary market economy laws (acts on associations, competition, 
accounting, etc.) have been effectively harmonized with the European Community, no 
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comparative analyses are generally made of secondary sectoral economic laws and their 
harmonization is neglected (e.g. media laws); 
— the laws drafted by "German" and "British" techniques are in conflict (the law of 
association and the law of competition are governed by German dogmatics, but the law 
of banks, the law of securities, etc. follow British dogmatics). 
Future harmonization with EC should embrace the entire legal system, and setting up 
a "Ministry of European Affairs" could be of great use in this process. The Act on 
Legislation should be amended to provide that conformity with EC must be stated in 
general motivations to all major enactments. (Of course, it is possible to deviate from EC 
law and to opt for national solutions, but the reasons for deviation must be stated 
explicitly. Harmonization with EC will thus be consistent with the protection of national 
interests as well as with respect for the traditions of national law.) 
(c) The economic legislation mainly of 1988-90 sought to reinforce undertakings, and 
less attention was given to legislation on the protection of creditors and consumers, 
another side of a modem market economy. This lost ground must be made up not later 
than 1995. Also of relevance is naturally the fact that the economic possibilities, which 
have opened up suddenly, have of necessity generated tendencies to crude capitalism 
which may at first be combated legislatively within limited frameworks, for it is not 
desirable that creation of legal sanctions against a few cases of abuse should raise 
obstacles to establishment of hundreds of healthy undertakings. Manifestations of unfair 
conduct have in recent years cried for excessive state intervention (increased control, 
etc.). Legislation should continue to exercise caution in preventive protection from abuse 
or else it may even stifle healthy undertakings. This does not affect the need for 
appropriate sanctions, however. Thus, for instance, it is advisable to give consideration 
to quasi criminal-law actions against organizations, since anti-social acts in the economic 
domain are committed mostly by legal entities (organizations). (As a matter of fact, there 
is practically little possibility to give effect to personal responsibility in this sphere, but 
severe fines arc apt to bring a greater influence to bear on the behaviour of organiz-
ations.) 
4.3. The next government will have to draw up a realistic program of legislation 
(including laws and government decrees alike) for each year and to present it to 
parliament for its information not later than 15 October of the preceding year. The draft 
program should be debated by parliament at a one-day sitting, and the program eventually 
modified by the Government pursuant to the outcome of the debate should take the form 
of government decision and be published in the Hungarian Official Journal. The program 
should be a realistic and realizable one (the Government's current program of legislation 
contains a large number of bills which are unlikely to come up for debate). 
The year 1994 is a special one. At a time of change in government a review should 
be made of the draft laws left behind by the present Government. It is against this 
background that it will be necessary to draw up 
(a) a four-year general proposal for the full term of the Government (to be treated 
as an internal document, which can be translated into concrete terms mostly until the 
adoption of a new Constitution in 1977); 
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(b) a concrete annual program for 1995 (to be submitted to Parliament), with an 
indication of the organs in charge and the target dates; 
(c) an operative plan for the rest of 1994, which should be prepared before the 
elections. It is highly important that the draft laws envisaged should be submitted to 
Parliament immediately after the new government has been formed. 
In addition, there are two more comprehensive packages of draft legislation to be 
prepared and/or submitted at the end of 1994 and in spring of 1995. 
(a) The bills on the content of which there is professional and political consensus 
(e.g. the Bill on the Commodity Exchange already mentioned), but which have so far 
been relegated because of bills of greater political urgency should be selected from the 
economic bills already submitted to parliament and should be supplemented with motions 
for minor amendments (e.g. to the Competition Act) which are also professionally ripened 
and have no particular political substance. All of these should be debated as a matter of 
urgency. 
(b) There should be drafted, with the cooperation of ministries, a comprehensive law 
and a government decree on deregulation, similar to those of 1990, to repeal superfluous 
laws and regulations adopted during the past four years, thereby allowing wider scope of 
action (their substance will be discussed in detail at a later point). 
4.4. It will no doubt be necessary to change the organization and methods of 
legislation. In the light of the foregoing, it would be advisable to devise an organizational 
system under which preparatory work would be done 
(a) by ' the Prime Minister's Office regarding complex economic and public 
administrative laws and regulations of paramount importance; 
(b) by the Ministry of Justice, mostly with the involvement of a team of outside 
experts, regarding traditional large codes; 
(c) by ministries regarding special departmental regulations. 
Under this arrangement, coordination of preparatory work would be the responsibility 
of the Prime Minister's Office rather than the Ministry of Justice. 
I believe that this organization of codification can be more differentiated and more 
efficient than a core group of 100 to 150 specialists which, conceived in the Ministry of 
Justice, has in my view no reality in terms of professional expertise, and it may perhaps 
have a better organizational underpinning than the similar device to be headed by a 
government commissioner for legislation as proposed by József Torgyán, for this idea is, 
in my way of looking at it, better suited to the present pattern of governance through a 
prime minister and to the reality of the available staff of experts. Otherwise it would be 
for a government decision to assign, under the adopted program of legislation, respon-
sibility for the preparation of concrete items of legislation to competent departments, the 
Ministry of Justice and the Prime Minister's Office. 
It stands to reason that the Prime Minister's Office cannot take charge of preparing 
but a small number of complex laws of paramount importance and of socio-economic 
relevance (e.g. real estate code, companies law, law of cooperatives). Yet at the "central" 
level there is a greater chance to have them elaborated more efficiently and adopted more 
26 Tamás Sárközy 
quickly, since the Prime Minister's Office takes care of coordinating economic and social 
interests and securing representation in Parliament, so the bills concerned are more 
managable in this manner. Of course, the overwhelming majority of laws and regulations 
governing special fields should continue to be drafted by departments, and the Prime 
Minister's Office should not but coordinate preparatory work (but, given the present 
pattern of government organization, it is nevertheless more suitable than the Ministry of 
Justice for this task). 
Preparations for codification in respect to the traditional large codes (Civil Code, 
Criminal Code, procedural laws), which represent "pure" branches of law, would 
invariably be within the purview of the Ministry of Justice. However, these codes can no 
longer be drafted in that Ministry as the necessary staff of experts cannot be lured back 
to public administration any more. In effect, the Ministry of Justice should undertake to 
perform "secretarial" functions of a working group composed mostly of outside 
collaborators (experience shows that research scientists as well as practical specialists 
willingly contribute to impressive codification efforts), should guide the working group, 
should attend to coordination at administrative, political and representational levels, etc. 
As not even preparations for large-scale codification can last forever, greater efficiency 
of work should be sought 
Codification is a profession. Preparation of laws, their entire fabric, structure and 
language are subject to professional criteria, which must be observed and the Government 
must have observed. It is therefore advisable to bring it into line with the new political 
regime and to substantiate it professionally. An added requirement for legislative acts is 
to leave sufficient time of transition for putting regulations into effect and enabling 
practice to apply them. Laws should have substantive motivations. As enforcement of 
economic laws is conditional on relative professional consensus regarding their 
substance, such consensus must not be distorted by political improvisations and short-
term considerations of power. Political debates both with political parties and within the 
Government should be centred on regulatory concepts, wording itself not to be a subject 
of political debate so far as possible (at present, discussions in first and second "readings" 
at government meetings often indicate that a legislative concept or a given wording is not 
yet settled). 
Finally, the possibility of amendment must not be misused. Constant demands for 
modification (see the Cooperatives Act or the Land Act) tend to create legal 
uncertainty. It is better to tolerate even misplaced articles for a few years than to keep 
modifying laws. It is an old truth that a "bad" stable law is better than one in flux. 
After a lapse of about three years, however, every major legislative enactment should 
be subjected to ordinary review, with provisions that have proved faulty to be corrected 
concurrently. 
Since deregulation has a basic function to fulfil under a pro-business government, but 
this institution is attended by numerous misunderstandings in Hungarian practice, I will 
conclude by a brief survey of deregulation as a new basic technique of modern 
legislation. 
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5. Organization of Deregulation 
5.1. In a scientific sense, deregulation is resorted to on two planes: 
(a) deregulation ex post, which serves to sort out the legal material in force in order 
to repeal, in a planned manner (at certain intervals), administrative-bureaucratic pro-
visions of law that have become outdated in the meantime, impeding economic and social 
self-initiative, every new legislative enactment carries out some deregulation automati-
cally (repeal and modify old rules), but what we have here is a separate, institutional and 
comprehensive scheme of deregulation, or revision of laws and regulations; 
(b) deregulation ex ante, which is intended to estimate in advance the direct and 
indirect costs to be incurred in connection with the application, as well as the socio-
economic implications and ripple effects, of every law of socio-economic relevance (a 
decision on this should be made when preparation of laws is started, and related work 
may exceptionally cover even legislative provisions of a lower hierarchical order than 
law). Deregulation of this type is the responsibility of the organ in charge of preparing 
legislation. Its methodology (mathematical method!) has been elaborated by the so-called 
Chicago school (Posner) in the USA and has made its way into Western Europe as well. 
Both planes of deregulation are of equally great importance to a modern liberal State. 
Deregulation ex post is aimed at streamlining the legal system, keeping it "in repair", 
while deregulation ex ante enables politics to see in advance the consequences of the 
legislator's decisions. To avoid any misunderstandings, politics and parliament may 
introduce a new institution regardless of considerable financial implications, but 
deregulation helps them develop an awareness in advance of the costs and other 
consequences of a particular legislative act. Deregulation is disliked by politicians guided 
by emotions as well as by the traditional apparatus of public administration, the latter 
seeing sizable extra work in it (and in mathematical legislation unfamiliar to them) and 
the former being loath to hear of such mundane things as costs. 
5.2. The introduction of deregulation in Hungary unfortunately coincided with the term 
of office of the last "communist" government (summer of 1989) and was therefore easy 
to discredit "on the cheap". Nevertheless, some lessons were offered even by that abortive 
attempt. Decree No. 1103/1989. (VII. 25.) of the Council of Ministers was the first to 
adopt a program of deregulation oriented to a comprehensive revision and modernization 
of the system of economic law. That measure envisaged restricting state intervention in the 
business of the actors of the market, removing bureaucratic regulations impeding economic 
activities, widening the scope of self-regulation by economic actors, and reducing the 
administrative burdens on entrepreneurs. In addition, synchronization with the law of the 
Economic Communities had also to be considered (a task which was then a plus to 
deregulation in the narrow sense, but which can now be accomplished separately). 
In pursuance of these goals, the Council of Ministers set up a Council of Economic 
Deregulation in summer of 1989. Headed by a government commissioner and composed 
of legal and economic experts appointed by the Prime Minister, that body was entrusted 
with drawing up its program of deregulation, formulating its conceptual criteria, taking 
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a stand on keeping in force, abrogating or streamlining economic laws and regulations, 
commenting on new draft legislation in the work of deregulation among departments. 
Economic deregulation began on 15 September 1989 and was subject to two main 
requirements. 
(a) On the one hand, departments had to revise decrees and decisions of the Council 
of Ministers, ministerial decrees and secretary of state orders as well as ordinances and 
legal directives issued prior to the above date and affecting their respective areas. 
(b) On the other hand, they had to transmit new draft laws and regulations to the 
government commissioner and the Council for their comments on deregulation. In case 
of differences of opinion, the position taken on deregulation was discussed by the Council 
of Ministers, which decided on implementation. 
After deregulation had been embarked upon, Government Decree No. 1143/1989. 
(XI. 26.) instituted a scheme of deregulation in public administration under the guidance 
of a separate government commissioner, so revision and modernization of legislation 
progressed on two lines. However, that separation of work was relative and transitory, 
and clearly wrong from a theoretical point of view. At that period it was justified by the 
fact that the economy needed a larger measure of state devestiture. Economic deregula-
tion was focused on streamlining the legal material regulative of relations between the 
State and economic organizations, whereas deregulation in public administration was 
aimed at implementing the deregulatory principles in respect to laws and regulations 
affecting citizens and their organizations in other than economic aspects. 
The economic departments concerned revised the laws and regulations in their 
respective fields by 31 December 1989, proposing the abrogation of 130 decrees of the 
Council of Ministers and 417 departmental regulations, initiating the updating of 300 
regulations, and undertaking to rescind some 1300 ordinances and legal directives. The 
Council studied those proposals and advised repeal of additional 400 enactments at the 
Council of Ministers and department levels. 
As a result of coordination there were repealed, by the deadline of 1 May 1990 as 
fixed in Decree No. 103/1989. (VII. 25.), 257 Council of Ministers decrees and decisions 
as well as 709 ministerial decrees, or a total of 966 legislative acts. In addition, the 
departments rescinded a total of 1250 normative ordinances and legal directives (Act 
XXII of the economy). On the other hand, the laws and regulations modified according 
to the criteria of deregulation numbered some 300. The final result was the disappearance 
from the legal system of nearly one-third of about 3000 laws and regulations falling 
within the scope of economic deregulation. 
5.3. The prime goal of the revision in 1989-90 was to cut back on bureaucracy, and 
in this sense it undoubtedly allowed greater leeway for entrepreneurs, but in terms of 
economic substance this series of measures could not make but little headway in 
deregulation, lack of time and the unpreparedness of the apparatus did not leave much 
room for analysis of socio-economic costs. Moreover, it was not possible to repeal a 
number of outdated aministrative norms, because 
— the economic policy concept of streamlining (e.g. social insurance, accounting) had 
not been sufficiently elaborated; 
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— administrative norms emanated from laws, but new enactments could not be passed 
before the elections (this made it necessary to postpone the revision of regulations on 
labour safety, statistics, customs, foreign exchange, etc.). 
With a view to meeting the requirements of deregulation ex ante as determined in 
the advanced western countries and to evolving a uniform practice, the Council of 
Economic Deregulation issued for departments detailed Guidelines for drawing up 
draft regulations, with a request to prepare motivations to the drafts. (Formulated by 
András Sajó, the Guidelines were found by foreign experts to be of an appropriate 
standard.) According to the Guidelines, motivations to new legislative enactments 
amply cover 
— the reasons for deregulation, also indicating why a particular field cannot be left 
to self-regulation by the market; 
— verification of the legal source of regulations (existence of statutory authorization, 
etc.); 
— foreign arrangements concerning the subjects of regulations and the reasons for 
eventual deviations from them: 
— the effects of regulations on conditions for participation in economic competition; 
— changing in conditions influencing actions on the market; 
— probable impacts of regulations on state responsibilities (powers, administrative 
staff size, system of sanctions); 
— budget outlays to be incurred, burdens to be imposed on entrepreneurs, and 
material, social and moral gains to be yielded by regulations. 
The experience of deregulation concerning new legislation were unfortunately 
unfavourable in 1989-90. There was no way of enforcing efforts at preparing the ground 
for a real deregulation. The intervening factors included lack of previous practice and 
inexperience in cost-benefit analysis. Often the criteria of deregulation could not be met 
under pressure of time brought on by hasty preparatory work which the rapid pace of 
socio-economic transformations dictated. However, last but not least, the apparatus of 
public administration was preoccupied at the end of 1989 with their place in the new 
regime and were reluctant to expend energy on deregulation. 
The start-up of a deregulation scheme was envisaged in the Agreement of 1989 
between the World Bank and the Hungarian Government, which secured a foreign 
currency fund from the so-called Programme for Industrial Restructuring for that purpose. 
In 1989 a course of training in the appropriate methods was organized for lawyers and 
economists working in the ministries, but it was discontinued in spring of 1990. 
5.4. That short period of deregulation in Hungary terminated on 1 June 1990, when 
the two government commissioners were relieved of office and the councils of 
deregulation were abolished. 
The reasons for the discontinuance of institutional deregulation were in effect the 
following: 
(a) resistance by the apparatus of public administration, who found it easy to pursue 
such a course of conduct under the new and inexperienced government, which had a base 
nowhere but in the Ministry of the Interior to rely upon for reforming public administra-
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tion, yet the professional leaders of the Ministry scented some sort of a rivalry in 
economic deregulation and assisted in rolling it back; 
(b) intensification of etatism by the Antall Government claiming to respond to the 
needs of the transition and the systemic change. In fact, understandably from that point 
of view, the Government was up to making regulations (rather than engaging in 
deregulation). Moreover, the earlier deregulation had abrogated numerous laws and 
regulations which would in effect have been suitable to interfere with economic 
processes, and indeed it was the Government itself which was annoyed to accept the fact 
that those tools were no longer at hand (e.g. legality control over enterprises and 
cooperatives had been transferred from the ministries to the registry courts). This is how 
the view came to gain currency that deregulation was some sort of "a dirty trick of 
communism" invented by former communists to undermine the new government 
This is a misconcept, of course, for the socialist State is precisely a "public 
administrative State" of which the lower-level legal material of public administration 
(primacy of legislation by decree) is a dominant feature. In a modem bourgeois State 
governed by the rule of law—particularly in a liberal pro-business one—, legislation should 
resort to deregulation ex post and ex ante as an interdisciplinary technique without which 
a modem State cannot function with success. It comes only natural that even massive 
deregulation has some percentage of error, as hundreds of enactments which it was sound 
policy to abrogate may happen to include one or two that are proved by later practice to 
be needed nevertheless. There is a way of subsequent remedy in such cases: the 
provisions of law involved should be adopted again. 
5.5. For this reason I believe that the new government should take the following 
approach to deregulation. 
(a) The institutional obligation to comply with the requirements relative to the 
objectives of deregulation, in particular to analyze to costs and benefits as well as the 
ripple effects of legislation, should be laid down in the Act on Deregulation. In the case 
of deregulation ex ante, such analysis should be made, and its result evaluated in the 
general motivation or annex should be presented to parliament, by the Minister submitting 
bills. 
(b) There should be devised a uniform (administrative-economic) organization of 
deregulation, which may in theory be attached either to the Government or to the 
Parliament, with differing advantages and disadvantages. 
Attachment to the Government is basically warranted by the fact that most bills will 
continue to be submitted by the Government and that part of the laws will continue to 
be followed by government or ministerial decrees on enforcement In case of subordina-
tion to the Government there are in effect two conceivable arrangements; 
(a) deregulation is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of the 
Interior; 
(b) implementation of deregulation is organizationally linked to the government 
office, e.g. in such a way that the organization of deregulation (which would in this case 
be made up of the Council of Deregulation, consisting mostly of outside experts on the 
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previous model and of an office unit with a small staff) function under the chairmanship 
of the Prime Minister's Office. 
Variant (b) is better because in the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of the Interior 
deregulation would intermingle with different types of tasks and would even give rise to 
conflicts of interests in certain cases. Under this arrangement, deregulation would be 
separated from harmonization of law (a task to be attended to by the Ministry of 
European Affairs (or, should it not be established, by the Ministry of Justice). 
Subordination to the Parliament, which is recommended mainly by the fact that 
legislation is based on the active involvement of MPs and parliamentary committees. It 
is therefore conceivable to form a team of impartial experts independent of party 
functions, whose professional assistance could be requested by any committee and MP. 
(The legal section of the Office of Parliament is obviously unable to discharge this task 
alone.) In this case the organization of deregulation (an office organization of deregula-
tion (an office organization with a small staff and with outside experts) would be attached 
to the President of the National Assembly and would function in close working 
relationship with the parliamentary committees concerned. Under this arrangement, 
deregulation of lower-level administrative norms would be the responsibility of the 
Ministry of the Interior. (An evident disadvantage of this lies in the organization of 
deregulation falling apart. Therefore I think that as from 1994 the organization of 
deregulation should belong the Prime Minister's Office.) 
On the other hand, the Government should issue for its organs legal policy guidelines 
according to which 
— laws should be drafted in such a way that, as a general rule, they may not be 
followed up with enforcement decrees and that multi-level or fragmentized enforcement 
(by government decree + ministerial decree or several ministerial decrees) may only be 
exceptional. Multi-level legislation should be subject to the consent of the organization 
of deregulation, disputes to be settled by the Prime Minister; 
— the permissive type of rules of economic laws—the freedom of economic actors to 
depart from general rules, or self-regulation by agreement—should be extended to as many 
areas as possible. 
The organization of deregulation should revise, not later than March 1995, the laws 
and regulations passed between 1988 and 1994 and make a proposal for a comprehensive 
Act on Deregulation and, in respect to lower-level regulations, for a government decree 
on deregulation. Also, by making use of international resources available to the 
Government, it should elaborate a two-year program by the end of 1994 for providing 
training in deregulation for staff members of the organs concerned with preparation of 
laws and regulations. 
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and International Crimes 
The concept of international crime had lent itself to various interpretations in the 
course of history, but a fundamental change in interpretation was introduced by the 
Nuremberg Trial. 
The term "crime against the law of nations" is to be found in the Constitution of the 
United States as well, but related acts are punishable under the municipal criminal law 
of that country. This term only served to refer to the minimum standards postulated by 
international law for criminal law: the criminal law of a State was required to provide 
protection for life, freedom and property. Piracy and war crimes were liable to 
punishment under customary international law. According to the traditional view, 
international law granted to States criminal jurisdiction to administer criminal justice 
under their own municipal law. Since there existed no supranational legislative body, one 
could not speak but of exercise of a delegated function.1 
According to the rules evolved by customary international law concerning piracy and 
war crimes, every State is under an international obligation to punish such acts within its 
own territorial jurisdiction. The obligation to punish piracy is so strong that failure of a 
State to fulfil it may even entail forfeiture of its own international personality in an 
extreme case. Action against piracy is therefore an internationally prescribed rule of 
municipal criminal law, one emanating, on the one hand, from an interest vested in the 
freedom of the seas and, on the other, from the interest of every State in assuming 
1 SCHWARZENBERGER, G.: The problem of an international criminal law, in: Current Legal Problems, 
1950, p. 269. 
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jurisdiction over pirate ships. The rules of warfare have evolved partly in international 
treaties, partly in customs, and to observe them is an obligation of every belligerent party. 
From this it followed that if members of armed forces observing these rules happened 
to fall into the enemy's hands, they were only liable to treatment as prisoners of war, but 
were immune from personal responsibility for other hostile acts committed by them. If, 
however they transgressed the rules of warfare, customary international law authorized 
the enemy State to punish such individuals as war criminals.2 
By contrast, a different approach prevailed when States acted under an international 
treaty rather than customary international law. The slave trade was treated as piracy by 
bilateral and multilateral treaties. On 8 February 1815 the Congress of Vienna denounced 
the slave trade as being repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality. 
A multilateral treaty of 20 December 1841 declared the slave trade to be piracy and 
authorized the contracting parties to detain such vessels and their crews and to apply their 
own municipal criminal laws of them. That treaty vested the contracting States with an 
exceptional jurisdiction for the search of suspected ships, but responsibility was governed 
by the rules of municipal criminal law. The fact that this provision was only applicable 
to the signatory States is shown by the British view that it would be illegal to authorize 
the British fleet to capture on the high seas Turkish ships transporting slaves, because the 
Ottoman Porte was not a party to the treaty.3 
As seen by Schwarzenberger, the law applied by the Tribunal in the Nuremberg Trial 
was customary international law with regard to war crimes and a new treaty law with 
regard to crimes against peace and humanity. It is indisputable that the Occupying Powers 
had a right to act on the strength of the fact of occupation and that unlimited application 
of international law against the Germans was ensured by customary international law 
relating to warfare. 
In its Resolution of 11 December 1946 the United Nations General Assembly 
reaffirmed the principles of international law embodied in the Charter and Judgement of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal. According to Schwarzenberger, the legal significance of that 
Resolution can be stated to consist in the future impossibility for the member states of 
the United Nations to contest that the aforementioned principles formed part of the rules 
of international law. This means that the exceptional jurisdiction of the belligerent parties 
over war crimes is to extend in future to crimes against peace and humanity committed 
in connection with the war.4 I shall return to the significance of the General Assembly 
Resolution at a later stage, but the contention that the Nuremberg principles only apply 
to crimes committed in connection with the war is equally open to question. 
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal defined the following acts as 
constituting crimes against humanity: "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the 
2 
3 
4 
SCHWARZENBERGER, G.: op. cit., p. 270. 
SCHWARZENBERGER, G.: op. cit., p. 286. 
SCHWARZENBERGER, G.: op. cit., p. 291. 
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war (here followed a comma in the English and French texts); or persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law 
of the country where perpetrated". 
A comparison of the English and French texts with the Russian revealed that the 
former had a semi-colon and the latter a comma. By the Protocol signed in Berlin on 
6 October 1945, the English and French texts were amended. The correction had as a 
consequence that crimes against humanity could only be tried if connected with any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, i.e. they formed a category of crimes 
accessory to crimes against peace and war crimes.5 By contrast, the Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law refers to the fact that Control Council Law No. 10 of December 
1945 deleted the category of accessory crimes from the definition of the crimes in 
question.6 As against this, both definitions specified that such acts were punishable 
regardless of the municipal law of the place of perpetration. 
In Jescheck's view, while the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 
11 December 1946 affirmed the Charter and Judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
it neither intended nor was in a position to formulate generally applicable rules of 
international law. Instead it confined itself to rendering a judgement of moral value for 
world public opinion in this respect. Again, Jescheck pointed out that the concept of 
international crime was difficult to formulate because the post-World War Two trend 
introducing the responsibility also of State organs for an international crime had dis-
continued and that there was no generally accepted criterion for the content of and 
limit to the concept of international crime. Under the circumstances it appears 
appropriate to give a conceptual definition as narrow as possible, and even it should 
establish a connection with the generally recognized basic conceptions of criminal law. 
For that matter, the term "international crimes" should be replaced with a more precise 
notion, namely the designation of "crimes against international law". This definition 
should fulfil at least three conditions. First, the relevant norm of criminal law would 
have to emanate directly from treaties concluded under international law or from 
customary international law and to bind individuals without intermediate provisions of 
municipal law. In this case liability to punishment for certain specified acts could be 
established without any further need for a relevant penal provision of municipal law. 
Although in the eyes of Anglo-American lawyers criminal liability may emanate 
directly from international law, as is indeed reflected in numerous declarations, the 
continental system of law makes criminal liability conditional on the pre-existence of 
a provision of municipal law relative to the act involved. Second, international law 
should determine the organ vested with powers to try punishable acts, i.e. an inter-
5 PARRY and GRANT: Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law (Oceana Publications, Inc., New 
York, London, Rome, 1986), p. 81. 
6 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 8, Human Rights and the Individual in International Law. 
International Economic Relations (North-Holland, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1985), p. 108. 
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national criminal court or a municipal court acting on the principle of universal 
jurisdiction, while specifying the mode of prosecution itself. Third, a treaty establishing 
acts as crimes against international law would have to be adopted by a great majority of 
States, for that would be the only way of assuring the international status of the relevant 
penal provision.7 
O. Triffterer gives Jescheck special credit for having established, after World War 
Two, the criteria for demarcating criminal international law (Völkerstrafrecht) from the 
fields of criminal law with international implications. He stressed that the demarcating 
criterion of criminal international law consisted in criminal responsibility emanating 
directly from international law. Criminal international law should contain norms operating 
directly, without the agency of municipal criminal law, i.e. without any need for 
municipal criminal law to establish appropriate statutory penal provision. Criminal 
international law and criminal law under the law of nations (Völkerrechtliches Strafrecht) 
are synonymous concept and profoundly differ from municipal (state-created) criminal 
law. In Triffterer's opinion the function of criminal international law is to protect objects 
that are insufficiendy protected by municipal criminal law. In effect, the Nuremberg 
crimes indicated that each of them had been committed either on behalf of the State or 
at least with the connivance thereof. This presents a need for a criminal law forming part 
of international law, one that is doubly subsidiary, partly because the interests of the 
international community should be protected in this way in cases where means other than 
those of criminal law are inadequate, partly when municipal criminal laws fail to afford 
due protection. Although rule of law requires precise formulations of penal provisions, 
customary law cannot at present be disregarded as a source of criminal international law, 
and there is no need for recognition by a great majority of States to be used as a criterion 
of definition.8 
For his part, Schwarzenberger points out that while the member states lose some of 
their sovereignty within the frameworks of the United Nations, they do so to no equal 
measure. The United Nations has powers to use coercive means, but there exist States 
enjoying a privileged position not only in fact, but also in law. With the right of veto 
upheld, these States have ensured that nothing but paper swords can be used against 
them. International criminal law would presuppose an international power above States, 
since an international criminal code would not be applicable against the Soviet Union or 
the United States except in war. It will be possible for an international criminal law to 
be created when the international community has grown strong enough to exercise 
universal criminal jurisdiction.9 
7 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 8, Human Rights and the Individual in International Law. 
International Economic Relations (North-Holland, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1985), pp. 333-334. 
8 TRIFFTERER, O.: Völkerstrafrecht im Wandel? (Festschrift für Hans-Heinrich Jescheck zum 70. 
Geburtstag, Herausgegeben von Theo Vogler /Zweiter Haiband/ Dunker & Humblot, Berlin, 1985), p. 1479. 
9 SCHWARZENBERGER, G.: op. cit. p. 295. 
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The binding force of the Tribunal10 set up by a resolution of the Security Council 
can be traced back to the Charter of the United Nations, and the definition of its 
jurisdiction rules out its actions against the great powers. As can be seen, what was 
created by the United Nations was not an international criminal court as demanded for 
decades. Still, the Resolution of the Security Council has a no negligible role in defining 
the concept of international crime. The Statute of the International Tribunal enumerates 
in four articles the crimes that are within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 
Article 2 lists grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1949, namely acts against 
persons or property protected under the relevant provision of the Geneva Convention: 
(a) wilful killing; 
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; 
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; 
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; 
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile 
power; 
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular 
trial; 
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement or a civilian; 
(h) taking civilians as hostages. 
Article 3 exemplifies cases of violation of the laws or customs of war: 
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause 
unnecessary suffering; 
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by 
military necessity; 
(c) attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, 
dwellings, or buildings; 
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to, institutions dedicated to 
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of 
art and science; 
(e) plunder of public or private property. 
Article 4 defines as genocide the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such: 
(a) killing members of the group; 
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group of another group. 
10 Security Council Resolution No. 827 (1993). 
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Also punishable, in addition to consummated acts of genocide, are conspiracy to 
commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, and direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide. 
Article 5 defines as crimes agains humanity the following acts when committed in 
armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any 
civilian population: 
(a) murder; 
(b) extermination; 
(c) enslavement; 
(d) deportation; 
(e) imprisonment; 
(0 torture; 
(g) rape; 
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i) other inhumane act. 
The latest draft criminal code of the United Nations, which contains definitions of 
international crimes other than those committed within a limited time and territory, is not 
entirely governed by the aforementioned approach. It links crimes to types of perpetra-
tors. Crimes that can be committed by leading personalities include aggression, threat of 
aggression, intervention, colonial domination and apartheid. Defined as crimes that can 
be committed by agents or representatives of a State are recruitment and use of, financial 
support for, and training of, mercenaries, and international terrorism. Qualified as crimes 
that can be committed by any person are genocide, systematic or mass violations of 
human rights, exceptionally serious war crimes, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, and wilful 
and severe damage to the environment." 
From the Code as a whole in general and from the content of Art 2 in particular12 
it becomes clear that this Code has incorporated international crimes as understood today 
in the narrow sense. Lying at the basis of this category of crimes are indisputably the 
Nuremberg crimes, to which were added further crimes in accordance with the criminal 
policy view prevalent in the International Law Commission at the time of drafting. The 
Code creates a legal possibility also for state courts to apply it, but, considering the 
perpetrators of the crimes involved, it will be necessary to wait with its practical 
application until "a change of régime" or there is an "internal upheaval"13 allowing the 
case to be tried by the national court of the offender. 
11 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (UN General Assembly A/CN. 4/L. 471, 
6 July 1992). 
12 The characterization of an act or omission as a crime against the peace and security of mankind is 
independent of internal law. The fact that an act or omission is not punishable under internal law does not affect 
this characterization. 
13 THIAM, D. D.: First Report on the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 
UN General Assembly A/CN. 4/364. 29 April 1983, p. 24. 
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Despite the different wordings, the crimes listed in the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and in the Statute of the International Tribunal, set up by the Security Council, 
and included in the United Nations draft code should be regarded as crimes violating 
international law and are subject to the statement in the resolution of the XlVth Inter-
national Congress on Penal Law that individual criminal responsibility flows directly 
from international law. 
In order to make International Criminal Law as effective as possible, international 
crimes should be divided into two categories, international crimes stricto sensu and largo 
sensu. 
a) The first category should be defined as follows: 
— Such crimes shall be recognized by the international community according to the 
rules generally accepted for the creation of international law. Accordingly, direct criminal 
responsibility of individuals is based only on this recognition; 
— International crimes stricto sensu should be limited to violations of the highest 
values of the international community. 
If these requirements are met, other international crimes of the first category may be 
recognized in addition to those existing already. 
b) The second category (international crimes largo sensu) could embrace international 
crimes which are recognized by rules of the international community not necessarily 
generally accepted and which deal with violations of values, the protection of which 
requires the cooperation of the states concerned. 
The responsibility for such crimes is based on domestic law.14 
Customary international law authorizes States, on the basis of the principle of 
universal criminal jurisdiction, to prosecute certain acts, but when those acts were 
covered by an international convention, it became a duty of States to institute criminal 
proceedings. The 1958 and 1982 Conventions on piracy and the Geneva Conventions 
concerning war crimes may be regarded as cases in point. For that matter, the latter 
required States to incorporate in their own legal systems appropriate penal sanctions for 
the punishment of the crimes involved. At the same time, however, they affirmed 
individual responsibility under international law. 
When criminal responsibility under international law is given effect by domestic law, 
judgements usually rest upon the principle of universal jurisdiction, but they do not, in 
my view, when the Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind is 
applied. In case of the Code's application by domestic law, proceedings which ensure that 
domestic courts try also cases of which they would not otherwise take jurisdiction take 
place under delegated jurisdiction. The European Convention for transfer of criminal 
procedure may be seen as a model of this.15 
14 Internationale Strafrechtsgesellschaft, Kongressakten. XIV. Internationaler Strafrechtskongress, Wien, 1-7. 
October 1989 (Herausgeber Landesgruppe Österreich der AIDP), p. 331. 
15 E. T. S. No. 73. 
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Concerning the relationship between the Code and domestic law, I should emphasize 
the following point. On account of domestic law codifying identical or similar facts, 
international crimes in the narrow sense do not lose their character that individual 
responsibility flows from international law. Should that be possible, it would be no use 
distinguishing two categories of international crimes, because responsibility would be 
based on domestic law in respect to both. This too makes it necessary for crimes under 
international law or covered by international treaties to be distinguished by the use of 
different terms as well. For codification to make sense in the context of Art. 2 the crimes 
referred to in the Code should obviously be regarded as crime under international law. 
From the foregoing it follows that the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 
11 December 1946 and the Conventions refer the crimes under international law are not 
intended to serve as a subsequent justification for the Nuremberg trials. These international 
documents function as customary international law for purposes of individual responsibility 
and, in that status, are examples the relevant articles of the Human Rights Conventions.16 
Once individual responsibility under international law is accepted, rule of law does 
not require domestic legislation to apply criminal international law, but exercise of 
domestic jurisdiction calls for a sovereign State decision as criminal procedure is a 
manifestation of state sovereignity.17 The type of act by which the State expresses its 
sovereign decision is a national constitutional matter. Such act may be taken by 
Parliament or by the government as liable for prosecution, or even by the judiciary as an 
independent branch of power. Concerning acts committed during a certain period, this 
decision of Hungary is embodied in Act XC of 1993, but the contents of the relevant 
Constitutional Court decision18 are of general applicability. 
Since binding the view that municipal criminal law is a "world criminal code" may 
be said as dominant and "whoever" used as subject in the criminal provision could be 
anyone. With a murder or a robbery used as examples, even the object of protection was 
seen to be of general application in the majority of criminal laws. This led to drawing 
the conclusion that the provisions concerning the scope of application of a criminal code 
restrict rather than extend criminal jurisdiction when determining applicability. 
In this judgement handed down in the Lotus Case19 the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice likewise supported this statement by expressing that the criminal juris-
16 Art. 15, para. (1), of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Art. 7, para. (1), of the 
European Convention on Human Rights cover crimes under international law. 
17 GRÜTZNER, H.: International Judicial Assistance and Cooperation in Criminal Matters, in: A Treatise in 
International Criminal Law (M. C. Bassiouni and V. P. Nanda, eds., 1973), V.l., II. p. 180. 
18 Decision No. 53/1993. (X- 13.) of the Constitutional Court. Relevant parts of it see Appendix I. 
19 In 1927, when it considered the Lotus Case, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) stated that 
customary international law did not require absolute application of the territorial principle in the domain of 
criminal law. Sovereign States were under no obligation to limit their jurisdiction to acts committed in their own 
territories and to their own nationals. Furthermore, they were free to exercise jurisdiction over criminal offences 
committed by aliens abroad. SCHWARZENBERGER, G.: International Law as Applied by International Courts 
and Tribunals, Volume I, Internationa] Judicial Law (Stevens and Sons Limited, London, 1986). 
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diction of the State was not restricted by international law. Concordant with this was the 
fact that the following two questions were inseparable as long as the judge applied the 
domestic law only. One is whether in a particular case municipal criminal law can be 
applied and the other concerns which provision of municipal criminal law is to be 
applied. However, these two questions can be kept separate ever since transboundary 
traffic has increased. First it was to be decided whether domestic criminal jurisdiction 
could be assumed at all and, for an affirmative answer, it was also to be examined 
whether the traffic regulations of domestic law or of the law of locus delicti should be 
applied. 
The modern view has fixed the scope of jurisdiction by the protected objects of law. 
It was commonly known that the State did not in general protect the interests of other 
States and that, save as expressly so provided for by law, offences committed by or 
against public officials, financial offences and offences against administration of justice 
were punishable only if directed against the State's own objects of law. First it was in 
connection with traffic that it became more common practice for a State to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over breaches of administrative regulations of another State as well. 
Other examples of protecting alien objects of law are the legislative provisions of NATO 
powers concerning protection of their armed forces stationed in Germany and the 
EURATOM Agreement, which accords protection to the Organization's secrets in 
accordance with the rules governing state and official secrets.20 
According to Cornils, the wording that nothing but German Law shall apply 
"whatever the place of perpetration" cannot be construed to mean that the foreign legal 
system prevailing in the place of perpetration would be fully disregarded. The provisions 
of foreign law are considered in examining the facts of cases connected with preliminary 
questions of civil or administrative law. In this respects, application of foreign law is in 
keeping with the principles of both criminal and constitutional law. Application of the 
normative elements of the provisions varies according as they refer to private law or to 
public law. It is necessary to consider the conflict rules of private international law in the 
former case and to respect foreign sovereignty in the latter. In the case of definitions of 
the offences only indirectly complemented with provisions of the legal system the 
question of when a foreign law may be applied should always be examined in view of 
the concrete facts rather than the general rules.21 
Formerly the administration of criminal justice formed part of jealously guarded state 
sovereignty, but the changes in modern times have generated a new approach to legal 
assistance in crimial cases as well. The possibility of rapid and unhampered travel from 
one country to another has opened room for perpetration of crimes abroad. Such travel 
facilities have allowed offenders to go abroad after the commission of crimes. 
20 VOGLER, T.: Geltungsanspruch und Geltungsbereich der Strafgesetze, in.: Geburtstaggabe für Heinrich 
Grützner, zum 65. Geburtstag. (Herausgegeben von Dietrich Oehler und Paul-Günter Pötz. Rv. Decker's Verlag, 
G. Schenck, Hamburg, 1970), p. 153. 
21 CORNILS, K.: Die Fremdrechtsanwendung in Strafrecht (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York), p. 122. 
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This has been coupled with changes in the purpose of punishment and the task of 
enforcing punishments. In this respect the focus is now placed on the offender's 
resocialization, which in turn accentuates the importance of the offender's place of 
residence rather than to the place of perpetration, for the goal of resocialization can be 
attained where the offender has intensive contacts, understands local language, and his 
conditions of life are secured. All these aspects are, as a rule, connected with the place 
of residence rather than the place of perpetration. 
The legal nature of the new institutions is far from clarified. There are those who 
challenge that transfer of procedure and enforcement could be included in the concept 
of legal assistance. Since, in point of fact, a State transfers its own functions to another 
by the transfer of procedure and enforcement, it is more accurate to speak here of 
cooperation in criminal cases. In support of this view it is argued that a procedure 
transferred is no special procedure, as legal assistance is generally held to be, but that 
judgement is passed under an ordinary, or regular procedure.22 
Transfer of enforcement of punishment may take place in exequatur proceedings, 
meaning that a foreign judgement is made enforceable by a decision based on 
domestic law. While the principle of judicial independence must also prevail in such 
proceedings, an exequatur decision is virtually two-faced. Internationally it is a form 
of legal assistance intended to facilitate the enforcement of a foreign judgement, but 
domestically it is a measure deprivative of liberty in relation to which the court would 
have undertake responsibility because, in accordance with the principles governing a 
constitutional state, deprivation of liberty may not be based except on court order. On 
the basis of material evidence concerning culpability, judicial proceedings apply the 
principle of in dubio pro reo as well, whereas the law of legal assistance is governed 
by the principle of formal evidence, and a foreign judgement cannot be revised in 
exequatur proceedings as regards either the establishment of facts or legal appraisal 
or basically the imposition of penalty. So there is no question of révision au fond. 
The preconditions of substantiave and constitutional law for meeting out a sentence 
deprivative of liberty are accordingly absent from exequatur proceedings. All this 
leads Vogler to conclude that, from the point of view of a constitutional state, transfer 
of enforcement of a foreign judgement is not identical with enforcement of imprison-
ment under domestic law. Deprivation of liberty on the basis of transfer is imprison-
ment only in form and is legal assistance in substance, because the exequatur 
procedure is not an act of German criminal justice (Strafgerichtsbarkeit). Vogler 
maintains that the law-maker shut his eyes, out of humanitarian considerations, to 
possible damage to the principles of a constitutional state. What was built into the law 
22 SCHULTZ, H.: Das Ende der Ausliseferung? in: Geburts'aggabe für Heinrich Grützner, zum 65. 
Geburtstag. (Herausgegeben von Dietrich Oehler und Paul Günter Pötz. Rv. Decker's Verlag, G. Schenck, 
Hamburg, 1970), p. 141. 
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of legal assistance was a foreign body traceable to the principle of volenti non fit 
injuria.™ 
I believe that the few conceptions outlined above suffice to prove that in our days 
one cannot adhere to the view that a decision to exercise criminal jurisdiction is 
necessarily coincidental with application of domestic criminal law, because 
consideration should be given to foreign law in this and other cases.24 Beside crimes 
under international law, criminal cases with a foreign element (persons, objects of 
law, etc.) are increasingly frequent, and foreign law may also be applied to them. On 
the other hand, application of international law is inevitable in the trial of crimes 
under international law. 
Several provisions of international law impose restrictions on the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction by States, but also widen its scope in connection with the 
trial of crimes under international law. It is therefore not accidental that present-
day theory mentions international law before domestic law in enumerating the sources 
of criminal law.25 The mentioned decision of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court26—except for the case of statutory limitation—is fully in keeping with this 
approach. 
The view which recognizes the possibility for domestic law to establish indepen-
dent rules on statutory limitation also in respect of crimes under international law 
leaves room for States to punish these crimes subject to different periods of 
limitation. This seems to contradict the concept under which crimes committed in 
violation of international law should be punishable irrespective of the rules of 
domestic law.27 The non-applicability of statutory limitations to such crimes is seen 
by the Convention as a principle. Therefore I think that the significance of the New 
York Convention lies mostly in that the States, by signing it, undertook to prosecute 
the crimes referred to therein, for, in the absence of an obligation under international 
law, they are free to decide whether to exercise or not their criminal jurisdiction in 
respect to certain crimes. 
23 VOGLER, T.: Rechtshilfe durch Vollstreckung auslandischer Strafurteile in: Festschrift für H. H. Jeschek, 
zum 70. Geburtstag (Herausgegeben von Theo Vogler. Zweiter Halbband. Dunker & Humblot, Berlin, 1985), 
p. 1383. 
24 Jurisdiction over offences with a foreign element in: A treatise on international criminal law. Volume II, 
Jurisdiction and Cooperation (ed. M. Ch. Bassiouni, V. P. Nanda, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Springfield, 
Illinois, 1973), pp. 5-64. 
25 International law, the United Nations Covenant, the European Convention on Human Rights, and regional 
agreements are mentioned by Belgian criminal law as sources of law. Sources of Criminal Law, in: Inter-
national Encyclopaedia of Laws (Gen. Ed.: R. Blanpain Kluwer. Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, 
Boston, 1993), pp. 59-62. 
26 Further details of it in Appendix II. 
27 The Preamble to the Convention, which Hungary promulgated by Law-Decree No. 1 of 1971, recognizes 
that it is necessary and timely "to affirm in international law, through this Convention, the principle that there 
is no period of limitation for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and to secure its universal application". 
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Appendix I 
IV. Distinctive Features of War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity 
1. A war crime and a crime against humanity are ones which were not created by 
domestic law, but are regarded as such, and their provisions are determined by the 
community of nations. 
In accordance with the development of international law, which has grown into a 
determinant factor since the time of World War Two, these crimes are not simply acts 
that are prosecuted by most States under municipal criminal law as well. (Consequently 
the murder cannot in themselves be declared to constitute a crime agains humanity.) An 
element of their international status is their standing above national laws, being grounded 
either in natural law (invocation of their conceptual basis transcending positive law is a 
guarantee even in international law against eventual arbitrary treaties) or in defence of 
the "foundation of the international community" or in their threatening mankind, their 
perpetrators being "enemies of the human race". Thus their importance is too essential 
for their punishability to be dependent on their recognition by individual States or on the 
criminal policies of States at any one time. 
2. War crimes and crimes against humanity are prosecuted and punished by the 
international community, partly through international court, partly through the 
requirement for States wishing to be members of the international community to under-
take their prosecution. 
International criminal jurisdiction was introduced, and the case for it substantiated, 
by the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Tribunals. Following their track, the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide similarly 
envisaged establishing an international criminal court, which was not set up, however. 
States undertook in international conventions to punish such crimes. During the past 
10 to 15 years the practice of international organs (committees and courts) watching 
over the implementation of the various comprehensive human rights convention has 
shown a more marked tendency to censure States failing to meet this obligation in their 
domestic law. (It is mainly the decisions of the Inter-American Human Rights Court and 
Committee that bring into clear relief the obligation of States under international law 
concerning criminal prosecution, which cannot be evaded even by recourse to amnesty.) 
International administration of justice was again suggested in connection with the Gulf 
War, and recently the Security Council has set up an international tribunal to punish 
persons responsible for grave violations of international humanitarian law in the territory 
of former Yugoslavia since 1991 (Security Council resolutions 808 (1993) and 827 
(1993). In resolution 808 the Council requested the Secretary-General to prepare the 
necessary material for the implementation of the resolution; this consists practically in 
the Statue of the International Tribunal and its detailed motivation (Report). 
Criminal Jurisdiction and International Crimes 45 
The special significance of the Statute and the Report (3 May 1993) is due to the fact 
that, precisely in view of the postulate of nullum crimen sine lege, Arts. 2 to 5 of the 
Statute detail and embody the substantive rules of international law which "form part of 
customary international law without any doubt, so the problem does not even arise that 
numerous but not all States are parties to certain conventions" (para. 34 of the Report). 
Consequently the applicable law is independent of the domestic law of individual States, 
and the fact that the Tribunal stands above national courts in the punishment of crimes 
within its jurisdiction is consistent with this principle. While national courts are 
encouraged by the Secretary-General's Report to institute proceedings, the Statute 
provides that the International Tribunal may take jurisdiction of criminal cases in any 
phase of proceedings. Also, the principle of ne bis in idem operates to the extent that an 
offender internationally punished may not be tried again by a national court, but the 
reverse is not true inasmuch as the International Tribunal may institute new proceedings 
if a national court dealt with a crime against humanity as an ordinary offence, or if a 
national trial was not impartial, independent or fair, or it was held in order to evade 
international justice (Art. 10). 
3. Thus a State prosecuting and punishing war crimes or crimes against humanity acts 
on the mandate of the community of nations under the conditions specified by 
international law. Occasionally the community of nations even resorts to review by 
international organs of national practices failing to comply with the requirements of 
international law. 
The criminal jurisdiction of the community of nations is not exercised under the same 
conditions and within the same limits as that of individual States is, the differences 
arising from the distinctive feature of the crimes prosecuted by the former, particularly 
from the dangers posed by them to mankind as a whole, which caused these crimes to 
be lifted out of national qualification of their status. 
4. Prosecution and punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity under 
international law are subject to statutory guarantees, for it would be a self-contradiction 
to protect human rights without them. These guarantees, however, cannot be replaced or 
substituted for by those of national law. 
The guarantees of nullum crimen sine lege is conceived of as applying to international 
rather than to national law. "Customary international law", "the legal principles 
recognized by civilized nations", "the legal principles recognized by the community of 
nations" constitute the lex which makes the given forms of behaviour subject to 
prosecution and punishment by the community of nations (through international 
organizations or States belonging to the community), regardless of whether or not the 
national law contains similar crimes or individual countries have the appropriate 
conventions incorporated in their national laws. The gravity of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, namely the threat they pose to international peace and security or to 
mankind itself, is inconsistent with making their punishability dependent on national 
laws. The fact that the definition of crimes against humanity is independent of national 
laws was spelled out by Art. 6, para. (1), of the Charter of the Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunal: the crimes listed therein are regarded as crimes committed against 
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humanity, "whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated". This clause is likewise included by the New York Convention of 1968 
in the definition of crimes against humanity: ..., "even if such acts do not constitute 
a violation of the domestic law of the country in which they were committed". 
Similarly, the Principles of Cooperation (in the prosecution and punishment of war 
criminals) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1973 provide for the 
punishment of crimes against humanity, "wherever they are committed". In determining 
the substantive law applicable by the International Tribunal which was set up for the 
punishment of crimes committed in violation of international humanitarian law in 
former Yugoslavia the proposal was explicitly rejected that the Tribunal should also 
consider domestic laws which have even incorporated customary international 
humanitarian law, because the rules of international humanitarian law, having 
undoubtedly grown into customary law, "provide" as such "a sufficient basis for 
substantiating the object of jurisdiction" (para. 36 of the Report). This too serves to 
affirm the principle of treating the two legal orders as separate domains. 
Article 15, para. (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—which 
is similar in content to Art. 7, para. (1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights—requires the States Parties to strictly observe the principles of nullum crimen sine 
lege and nulla poena sine lege. The reference to a criminal offence defined by 
international law ("No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any 
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or interna-
tional law, at the time when it was committed") is considered by literature to apply solety 
to criminal offences which are undoubtedly punishable under national law or by virtue 
of ratification or direct application of the Covenant. 
As is provided by Art. 15, para. (2) of the Covenant, "Nothing in this article shall 
prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the 
time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law 
recognized by the community of nations". [Article 7, para. (2) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights is similar in content, save for the use of the phrase 
"civilized nations" instead of "the community of nations".] It is this exception which 
allows the States Parties to prosecute the sui generis crimes under international law as 
described above even if the provisions and punishability thereof are not a part of 
domestic law. From this it clearly follows, moreover, that the relevant Conventions 
allow these acts to be prosecuted and punished under the conditions specified by 
international law. Therefore, paras. (2) obviously break through the criminal law 
guarantees of domestic law as required by the Conventions as well, all the more so 
since Art. 15, para. (2) of the Covenant and Art. 4, para. (2) of the European 
Convention require strict enforcement of the nullum crimen and nulla poena guarantees 
even in time of war and emergency. For States which have incorporated in their 
domestic law the norms of international law concerning war crimes and crimes against 
humanity after the commission of these crimes, para. (2) is tantamount, from the point 
of view of domestic law, to authorizing criminal legislation with retroactive effect. It 
was for international law, not for domestic law, to declare these acts punishable at the 
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time when they were committed. [Az Alkotmánybíróság 53/1993 (X.13) AB határozata. 
Magyar Közlöny (Hungarian law reports) 1993/147. sz. 8795-97 p.] 
Appendix II 
V. Crimes under international law and the Constitution 
1. The provisions of war crimes and crimes against humanity as well the conditions 
for their punishability are also determined by international law; these crimes are 
prosecuted and punished by the community of nations either directly or by requiring 
States to do so. The rules relative to the punishment of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity are jus cogens norms of international law, because these crimes threaten 
mankind and international coexistence in their foundations. A State refusing to undertake 
this obligation may not be a member of the international community. 
The rules on war crimes and crimes against humanity undoubtedly form part of 
customary international law and of the general principles recognized by the community 
of nations, or, in the terminology of the Hungarian Constitution, of "the generally 
recognized rules of international law". These rules are "accepted" by Hungarian law, as 
is stated in the first sentence of Art. 7, para. (1) and are therefore part, without transform-
ation or adaptation, of the "obligations under international law", with which domestic law 
must be in harmony by virtue of the same Art. (second sentence). 
The international obligation to punish war crimes and crimes against humanity runs 
through the entire jus cogens material of international law. Consequently it cannot be 
undertaken by Hungarian law without also accepting the conditions for punishability as 
determined by international law. Again, should Hungarian law give a different 
interpretation of any rule relative to war crimes and crimes against humanity and clearly 
forming part of customary international law, these crimes prosecuted by domestic law 
would cease to be such under the terms of international law. For that matter, a similar 
act of the Hungarian State would not affect in the least either the relevant imperative of 
international law and the obligation of the State or the offenders' responsibility under 
international criminal law. 
2. The provisions of international law concerning war crimes and crimes against 
humanity disregard the application by domestic laws of the principle of nullum crimen 
in ordering the punishment of these crimes irrespective of whether or not they are 
punishable under domestic laws. This seems to be a contradiction only if we were to 
ensure harmony between international and domestic law by adjusting international law 
to the requirements of domestic law. In this particular case, however, the question is 
not simply one of municipal criminal law making an exception to the peremptory rule 
of nullum crimen sine lege in respect of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Thus 
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the question cannot be confined to whether the specific rule on crimes committed in 
violation of international humanitarian law can be fitted into the framework of Art. 57, 
para. (4) of the Constitution. The problem of constitutionality has to be formulated and 
decided by taking into consideration that in this case, by virtue of the express provision 
of Art. 7, para. (1), certain rules of another legal system, those of international law, are 
mandatorily applicable at the same time. Application of international law to these 
crimes is a condition for participation in the community of nations, one that, as can be 
seen, the Constitution recognizes by express terms, orders its application and the 
harmonization of domestic law with it, and a different treatment of which by domestic 
law would not change international obligation and responsibility in the least. An 
attitude of detachment from international law would be contrary to Art. 7, para. (1) of 
the Constitution as it would limit the principle of nullum crimen to domestic law rather 
than break it. Within its own system, international law requires that the crimes in 
question should, at the time when they are committed, be regarded as war crimes or 
crimes against humanity on the basis of the general principles recognized by the 
community of nations, i.e. under the rules of what has been termed above as customary 
international law. In the case of these crimes it is in effect the criminal jurisdiction of 
the international community that is exercised through that of the Hungarian State under 
the conditions and with the safeguards specified by the community of nations. The 
national law is applicable to the extent to which it is explicitly prescribed by 
international law (as is the case with, for instance, the scale of punishments). The 
national law cannot be applied against an explicit and jus cogens rule of different 
content laid down in international law. 
There may be various ways of bringing domestic law into harmony with international 
criminal law, and it is possible to establish express rules on the independence of the two 
legal systems. Such rules were laid down by the Covenant and the European Convention 
on Human Rights in their respective fields by spelling out that the international obligation 
to give full effect to the nullum crimen rule in domestic law is not broken by applying 
the rules of international law to war crimes and crimes against humanity, namely that 
domestic law is no bar to application of those rules. The permissive rules of the European 
Convention and the Covenant facilitate the incorporation of this international law rule in 
domestic law, namely the creation of "harmony" as referred to in the Hungarian 
Constitution. Of course, these instruments can be of help in relation only to international 
law; the "harmony" of domestic law with it has to be created by that law. In the absence 
of permissive or interpretational rules similar to those of the aforementioned instruments 
(those contained in, e.g., the Portuguese Constitution), room for this is left by an 
interpretation of the Constitution having regard to international law as well. Such 
interpretation is also a constitutional obligation in accordance with Art 7. 
Pursuing this train of thought, one finds no contradiction between Art. 57, para. (4) 
and Art. 7, para. (1) of the Constitution, but has to interpret the two articles in relation 
to each other. The rules of international criminal law concerning war crimes and crimes 
against humanity are applicable by virtue of Art. 7, para. (1) in addition to Art. 57 
guaranteeing strict observance of the nullum crimen principle by domestic law. 
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A distinctive feature of war crimes and crimes against humanity lies in their 
punishability whether or not they violated the law of the country where they were 
committed. 
Accordingly the question of whether the Geneva Conventions were formally 
promulgated or the Hungarian State fulfilled its obligation to apply them before the period 
corresponding to that of the Act's applicability, i.e. before 23 October 1956, is devoid of 
significance. The offender's responsibility existed regardless of this, and any subsequent 
domestic legislation may give effect to his responsibility within its original scope. 
... and Art. 2 of the Act did not but fall within the wider compass allowed by the 
binding force of the Decision of the Constitutional Court for the constitutional 
applicability of the Geneva Conventions, whatever the legislative action that might be 
taken subsequently. 
IV. 4/b. No single instrument determining substantive or procedural international law 
contains any statutory limitations with respect to the punishability of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. After the conclusion of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, 
however, States practically prosecuted war crimes under their domestic law, and, as the 
periods of limitation as defined by domestic laws were nearing expiration, certain 
domestic laws either extended the period of limitation or excluded statutory limitations. 
The purpose of the New York Convention of 1968 was precisely to eliminate uncer-
tainties and eventualities of domestic laws in this respect, and it provided that "no 
statutory limitation shall apply" to war crimes and crimes against humanity, "irrespective 
of the date of their commission". The Preamble to the Convention makes it evident that 
"ordinary crimes" in domestic laws and war crimes or crimes against humanity cannot 
be treated similarly. 
The New York Convention was concluded at a time when the idea of "common", or 
international prosecution of crimes against humanity was receding. The States Parties to 
the Convention undertake to ensure that "statutory or other limitations shall not apply to 
the prosecution and punishment" of the crimes referred to therein "and that, where they 
exist, such limitations shall be abolished". 
In principle, Art. 7, para. (2) of the European Human Rights Convention and Art. 15, 
para. (2) of the Covenant allow the States Parties not to apply the rules of domestic law 
on statutory limitation to the crimes determined by the community of nations. In contrast 
to these permissive provisions, the New York Convention has established an obligation 
in this respect, and the Convention is explicitly of retroactive effect. 
The Convention was practically ratified only by Third-World countries and the 
former socialist States, but that fact, concomitant as it was of the political situation of 
the time, did not affect the otherwise topical need to regulate the non-applicability of 
statutory limitations. The European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes was drawn up by the Council 
of Europe and opened for signature in 1974. It covers, in addition to crimes against 
humanity as referred to in the Genocide Convention and to breaches of the law of war 
as defined by the Geneva Conventions, "any comparable breach" of the law of war, 
namely it does not extend the scope of crimes against humanity. As a general rule, the 
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non-applicability of statutory limitations refers to acts to be committed after the entry 
into force of the Convention in respect to individual States. Its retroactive effect is 
limited to the expiration of the periods of limitation, namely the European Convention 
does not but extend those periods. The Convention was ratified solely by the 
Netherlands (1981), and its only additional signatories were France (1974) and Belgium 
(1984). 
The majority of European States regulated the non-applicability of statutory 
limitations to war crimes in their respective domestic laws. 
V. 3. The international conventions and documents which define war crimes and 
crimes against humanity and which undoubtedly lay down the generally recognized 
peremptory rules of international law contain no provisions on statutory limitations. 
Therefore, those States which prosecute these crimes under customary international law 
may apply their own domestic law concerning the period of statutory limitation for 
punishability or punishment and are not required to spell out the non-applicability of 
statutory limitations to them. The 1968 New York Convention on the Non-Applicabil-
ity of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity and the 
European Convention of 1974 on the same subject-matter cannot be considered to form 
part of customary international law or to embody generally recognized rules of 
international law, but the States which ratified either of the two Conventions assumed 
an obligation under international law to consider the war crimes and crimes against 
humanity referred to therein as being subject to no period of limitation with retroactive 
effect. 
Hungary promulgated the New York Convention by Act I of 1971, thereby not only 
undertaking an international obligation concerning the non-applicability of statutory 
limitations, but also recognizing a wider range of crimes against humanity in 
international law than is "generally" covered by international law, for the Convention 
applies even to apartheid and to eviction by armed attack or occupation. 
In deciding whether in the interpretation of Art. 57, para. (4) of the Constitution 
the obligation under the Convention should be considered on the same footing with the 
general rules of international law importance is attached to the fact that the rules on 
the non-applicability of statutory limitations are closely linked to the nature of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity and that in this respect one may speak of a 
process of international legal development marked by a clear trend but yet to reach its 
final stage. International law itself makes no provision for a period of limitation, and 
all the New Convention does is make this situation in international law unambiguously 
clear in its Preamble, while ruling out determination by the domestic laws of the States 
Parties of any period of limitation. As can be seen, the Convention extends the 
independence of punishability of domestic laws, a distinctive feature of the rules of 
international law concerning these crimes, to the period of punishability as well. If it 
was possible to establish no case of unconstitutionality in respect of the basic question, 
namely the application of the sui generis requirements of international law in parallel 
with domestic law, then the same reasoning holds for this commitment of similar and 
only accessory nature. Indeed, in its Decision No. 11/1992 (III. 5), the Constitutional 
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Court gave a uniform interpretation of all constitutional requirements of criminal 
responsibility under the domestic law, and it took the same approach with respect to 
criminal responsibility under international law. [Az Alkotmánybíróság 53/1993 (X. 13) 
AB határozata. Magyar Közlöny (Hungarian law reports) 1993/147. sz. 8798-8801 p.]. 
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Observations de lege ferenda 
From April 12, 1961 up to the present 299 persons—nationals of 26 states1—par-
ticipated in manned space flight. This number is relatively not too high but the space 
activity carried out by nearly 300 astronauts in many aspects yielded results of major 
importance in space research and peaceful uses of outer space. In the future manned 
space activity will play a more intensive role in the field of space activities. All the more 
is the criticism justified that while space conventions contain some sporadical provisions, 
the legal framework for manned space flight remains unclear in many important aspects2 
and international law has been lagging behind the tendency of internationalization of 
manned space undertakings.3 
The principles derived from positive international space law rules give a certain aid 
for future law-making. These concern the rights and duties—in general: the legal status 
of astronauts. Sources of de lege ferenda considerations also may be the municipal space 
laws. In the U.S. legislation the relevant rules of the National Aeronautics and Space Act 
1 In chronological order: USSR (From January 1, 1992 Russia), U.S.A. Czechoslovakia, Poland, G.D.R. 
(from January 1, 1989 Germany), Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, Cuba, Mongolia, Rumania, France, F.R.G., 
India, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Holland, Mexico, Syria, Afghanistan, Japan, Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Italy. 
2 Manned Space Flight. Legal Aspects in the Light of Scientific and Technical Development. Ed. by 
BÜCKSTIEGEL, К. H.: Proceedings of an International Colloquium, Cologne, May 20-22, 1992. (Cologne 
Proceedings) p. 7. 
3 KOLOSSOV, Y. M.: International Regulation of Human Beings' Presence in Outer Space. Cologne 
Proceedings, p. 37. 
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(1958) and NASA regulations promulgated in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR 
Title 14).4 Recently the Russian Federation enacted a comprehensive regulation named 
Law of the Russian Federation of Space Activities (August 20, 1993). The most 
important undertaking of preparing the codification of the law of manned space flight is 
at present the Draft for a Convention on Manned Space Flight (hereinafter: Draft). The 
authors respectively the institutes represented by them. Professors Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, 
Vladlen Vereshchetin and Stephen Gorove had the primary objective "to initiate and 
promote international discussions in appropriate form in the hope that eventually they will 
lead to negotiations between interested States either in the U.N. Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) or elsewhere).5 This paper attempts to be a 
modest contribution to the first part of above intentions by some observations concerning 
the legal notion of space crew. 
Manned Space Flight 
The Draft (Article 1) defines manned space flight as 
a flight of a space object with person or persons on board from Earth to outer 
space or in outer space 
manned space object as 
a space object on which a person or persons effect a space flight. 
Professor S. E. Doyle referring to a current trend in the legal literature supports the 
use of sexually neutral language in connection with space activities involving men and 
women equally. A sexually neutral terminology in his opinion even demands a revised 
title: Convention on Human Flight in Outer Space instead of Manned Space Right. In the 
same way Professor S. E. Doyle suggests that the term "manned" be suppressed 
throughout the Draft in favour of the term "crewed".6 
For a foreign author it could be pretentious to intervene in a question of English 
terminology. My modest remark is only that for me the term "manned space flight" never 
associated the idea of a space undertaking carried out only by men. In a German-
speaking area is not meaningless to refer to the difficulty of neutralization of correspond-
ing terms "bemannter Raumflug" "bemanntes Raumobjekt". 
The Hungarian term "emberes űrrepülés" is in this respect neutral "ember" means 
namely "human being". Otherwise the term "űrrepülés" = space flight itself does not meet 
4 NASA-Act see Space Law Basic Legal Documents. Ed. by K.-H. BÖCKSTIEGEL and M. BENKŐ. Vol. 
2/1 E. III. 1. C. F. R. see United States Space Law. Ed. by S. GOROVE: National Regulation I. A. 3. Release 
85-1. Relevant rules cited by S. E. Doyle: Astronauts and Cosmonauts in Internationa] Cooperation: a View of 
Uie American Experience. Cologne Proceedings, p. 43-66. 
5 BÖCKSTIEGEL, K. H.: op. cit., p. 7. 
6 DOYLE, S. E.: op. cit., p. 39. 
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the scientific requirements. "Űr" means emptiness. Though everybody knows that outer 
space is not empty, this traditional term cannot be extirpated from the language of space 
sciences.7 
The same is true for "astronaut". The German "Raumfahrer" or the Russian Cosmonaut" 
are more precise. Astronauts do not fly to the stars-at least today. 
This term, however, has been accepted by the Space Treaty and other space law 
instruments. For future law-making de lege ferenda I would generally accept it and 
"manned space flight" for the activity to be regulated.8 
Back to the definition of manned space flight: the Draft would define "manned space 
object" and "manned space flight" in their mutual interdependence without stating what 
is a space object. It would be useful also to add the legal meaning of space object to 
Article I. Definitions of the Draft Without attempting to formulate such a definition I 
refer only to my idea launched 21 years ago at the XVth Colloquium of our Institute in 
Vienna, namely that it should be based on a functional element, i.e. the activity of the 
object realized by orbital movement9 
Otherwise the Draft provides that "space flight" should extend to the embarkation, 
launch, in orbit deorbit, re-entry, landing and disembarkation phases. I share the opinion 
of Professor S. E. Doyle: the definition should be limited to mean the entire conduct of 
the flight sequence from launching to landing or "from lift-off' to touch—splash-down" 
excluding activities on the surface of the Earth prior to and following the conduct of the 
flight10 
"Envoys of Mankind" 
Rules of international space law do not differentiate between members of the crew 
and other persons on board. All participants of the manned space flight are considered 
as astronauts independently of the circumstance whether they have duties in the technical 
realization of the space activity or not. Consequently the provisions of the space law 
treaties and conventions concent every person on board a manned space object. They are 
all "envoys of mankind". (S. T. An. V. 1.) 
I agree with the majority of authors, representing the view that this principle may be 
interpreted as a moral qualification of human beings in outer space only. Unfortunately 
the mankind does not constitute a political unity, it is no subject of international law. 
7 The Hungarian term "világűr" (empty space) has belletristic roots. It became general under the influence 
of the famous drama of Imre Madách "Tragedy of Man" (1860). 
8 KOLOSSOV, Y. M.: op. cit., p. 39. 
9 GÁL, G.: Space Treaty and Space Technology: Questions of Interpretation. In: Proceedings of the Fifteenth 
Coll. Vienna 1972. p. 105. Idem: Space Law 1969, p. 208. The definition based on Article VIII (jurisdiction) 
of the S. T. "object launched into outer space" (DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, I. H. Ph.: An Introduction to Space 
Law. Deventer-Boston 1993, p. 9) may be completed by this element. 
10 Op. cit. Cologne Proceedings, p. 62. 
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Conclusions that this general clause by international agreement transfers rights of envoys 
under international law to the astronauts would be absurd. 
Professor V. Vereshchetin correctly states also that the status of being envoys of 
mankind in outer space neither causes the recognition of astronauts as subjects of 
international law or their deprivation of nationality nor acquisition by them of a suprana-
tional status." On the other hand the legal rights and obligations laid down in basic 
space law instruments constitute the materialization of this moral principle. 
The main stipulations concerning the legal status of astronauts are: 
— they have to render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties; 
— in case of an accident, distress, emergency or unintended landing states shall take 
all possible steps to rescue them in territory under their jurisdiction or extend 
assistance in search and rescue operations in any other place; 
— they shall be safely and promptly returned; 
— any person on the Moon shall be regarded as an astronaut within the meaning of 
S. T. Art. V and as part of the personnel of a spacecraft within the meaning of the 
Rescue Agreement; 
— states shall adopt all practicable measures to safeguard the life and health of 
persons on the Moon; 
— states shall offer shelter in their stations to persons in distress on the Moon. 
According to generally accepted view in respect of these all persons on board in 
sense of today positive space law should be considered as "astronauts". The Draft in 
conformity with this interpretation of Art. V of the Space Treaty provides that 
States shall regard any person in outer space as an astronaut within the meaning of 
Art. VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and as part of the personnel of a space-craft 
within the meaning of Art. VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Rescue 
Agreement. (Art. 6, para. 6.) 
At the present stage of manned space flights I hold attempts to bind this EoM quality 
on any subjective, therefore questionable conditions to be dangerous.'2 
11 VERESHCHETIN, V.: Legal Problems of Man's Flights into Outer Space (in Russian). Moscow 1986, 
p. 7. Cited by Y. M. Kolossov in Cologne Proceedings, p. 41. Prof. Y. M. Kolossov, however, concluded 
from above clauses that astronauts "enjoy a special legal regime of a most favored human being". 
12 LORZA PITT, R.: Commentary in Cologne Proceedings, p. 207. He would confer the privilege of EoM 
only to astronauts participating in space missions conducted for the good of all mankind. In this respect die 
definition of E. Kamenetskaya deserves attention "cosmonauts are people who carry out professional space 
activities in accordance with principles and rules of international space law". "Cosmonaut" ("Astronaut") an 
attempt of International Legal Definition. Proceedings of the Thirty First Coll. Bangalore 1988, p. 177. 
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Air crew and space crew 
Persons on board in general and crew or operating crew in air law are treated 
differently. Flying personnel includes anyone "who normally performs his duties during 
the flight and whose presence on board throughout the flight is essential: the commander, 
the copilot and flight attendants". (I. H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor).13 
Passengers having concluded an air transport contract have nothing to do with duties 
and regulations binding only members of the personnel except one element: of the right 
of the commander to issue orders to them in special situations. 
International air law (Chicago Convention and bilateral agreements) contains the strict 
obligation that every aircraft engaged in international navigation has to carry appropriate 
licenses for each member of the с r e w. (Ch. С. Art. 29.) 
Per analogiam: the 299 astronauts who participated in manned space activity till 
today—were they all members of space crews?'4 
First of all, the lexical meaning of crew is confined to a restricted circle: "persons 
who have duties on an aircraft in flight"15 "the body of persons manning a ship, aircraft 
etc".16 Consequently the term would not cover indiscriminately all persons named in 
international space law instruments 
— astronauts 
— personnel of a space object 
— personnel conducting activities on the Moon 
— persons on board of a space object 
— persons on the Moon. 
Municipal space laws give the impression that this difference between crew members 
and other persons on board on national administrative level has been already accepted, 
consequently in future law-making it should be taken into consideration. 
In the United States after January 1986 concerning non-NASA astronaut flights 
NASA declared in statement at 14 CFR V. § 1214. 303: 
All Shuttle flights will be planned with a minimum NASA crew of five astronauts 
(commander, pilot and three mission specialists). When payload or other mission 
requirements define a need and operational constraints permit, the crew size can be 
increased to a maximum of seven. 
(4) NASA policy and terminology are revised to recognize two categories of persons 
other than NASA astronauts, each of which requires separate policy treatment: 
13 DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, I. H. Ph.: An Introduction to Air Law. Antwerp-Boston-London-Frankfurt, 
1983, p. 25. 
14 In the publicism this term has been accepted generally even after die appearance of "non-pilots" on board. 
15 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. Springfield, Massachusetts, 1983, p. 306. 
16 Tlte Oxford Reference Dictionary. Oxford, 1986, p. 198. 
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(i) Payload specialists, redefined to refer to persons other than astronauts (com-
manders, pilots and mission specialists), whose presence is required on board the 
Space Shuttle to perform specialized functions with respect to operation of one or 
more payloads or other essential mission activities. 
(ii) Space flight participants, defined to refer to persons whose presence on board the 
Space Shuttle is not required for operation of payloads or for other essential mission 
activities, but is determined by the Administrator of NASA to contribute to other 
approved NASA objectives, or to be in national interest. 
For Space Transport Systems CFR rules make a distinction between the crew and 
personnel on board. Former consists of the commander, pilot and mission specialist(s), 
latter refers to astronauts or other persons during any flight phase of an STS flight 
including any persons performing extravehicular activity associated with the mission. 
(1214. 701b, f.) 
In the Agreement on Space Station Freedom the crew appears as "qualified 
personnel" provided by the partners to serve on an equitable basis as crew members. 
(Article 11. 1.) 
Finally we refer to a brand-new product of national space law legislation: the Russian 
Space Act of 1993. This Law on Space Activities clearly differentiate between crew and 
persons not belonging to it: 
The commander of the crew of a manned space object is responsible for the safety 
of the crew and other persons participating in the flight. (Article 20-3/1.) 
Under Art. I, para. 6 of the Draft 
The term "crew" means persons who effect professional activities during a space 
flight 
Though the intention of the authors was obviously directed to differentiation, by this 
definition persons effecting professional activities e.g. as scientists, which have nothing 
to do with the technical completion of space flight would belong to the crew. 
To my mind the restriction of professional activities to "mission-specific and 
registered professional activities" (Rafael Lorza Pitt)17 is not satisfying. 
I would prefer a definition of crew only covering persons charged with technical tasks 
essential for the safe completion of space flight. 
Jurisdiction 
The Draft confirms that pursuant to Art. VIII of the S. T. the State on whose registry 
the manned space object or flight element is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control 
over such object and any persons thereof while in outer space or on a celestial body or 
anywhere beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of any state. 
17 Cologne Proceedings, p. 206. 
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As a logical consequence under Art. IV, para. 1 
the preparation of the manned flight, determination of composition and functions of 
the crew and participation of other persons as well as their rights and obligations fall 
within the competence of the State exercising jurisdiction and control. 
This principle prevails in municipal laws. 
The U.S. NASA Act authorized NASA (Section 203) to make promulgate, issue and 
amend rules and regulations governing the manner of its operations. Under these 
provisions NASA has established the rules to govern the selection and training and 
conduct of astronauts.18 
In the Russian Federation this right is vested in the Russian Space Agency and the 
Ministry of Defense while rights and duties of the cosmonauts will be fixed in contracts. 
The citizens of the Russian Federation who expressed their wish to participate in 
space flights and qualify to the established professional and medical requirements are 
chosen on the basis of competition for training and performing space flight (Art. 20, 
para. 1). 
The order and terms of the competition are determined by above authorities. 
The determination of rights and duties of astronauts and rules of conduct during the 
space flight and their qualification as well sometime will demand unification by 
international agreement and a kind of international standardization. Law-making in this 
field will follow common denominators of national rules. 
Commander of the manned space object 
The parallel between the legal status of the aircraft commander and rights and 
duties of the commandant of a space object is obvious. To this comparison Professor 
V. Vereshchetin twenty years after the first manned space flight correctly observed that 
in view of the extraordinary conditions of cosmic flight the executive power of the 
commander of a spacecraft cannot be less than that of the commander of an aircraft or 
ship." 
The U.S. Code of Federal Legislation (§ 1214, 702) the Russian Law on Space 
Activities (Art. 20, para. 3) and the Draft (Art. IV, 2-7) in this respect more or less are 
based upon generally accepted air law rules. To my mind this circumstance would make 
international law-making more easy for legal status of the spacecraft commander than any 
other issues of legal aspects of manned space flight. 
The commander of the manned space object is the "brevi manu" executor of 
jurisdiction of the State of registry on board. 
18 DOYLE, S. E.: op. cit., Cologne Proceedings, pp. 44-45. 
19 VERESHCHETIN, V. S.: On the Elaboration of the Law of Manned Space Rights, Proceedings of the 
twenty-fourth Coll. Rome 1981, p. 145. 
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His main rights and duties from the sources mentioned above may be summarized: 
absolute authority to make action necessary to enforce order and discipline, provide for 
the safety and well-being of all personnel on board, provide for the protection of the 
space object and any payload. He has the right to use any reasonable means including the 
use of physical force to achieve this end. He is responsible for the fulfilment of the flight 
program within the limits of his powers.20 
U.S. space law and the Draft extend the authority of the commander to all persons 
participating in the same flight: "whether or not hey are U.S. nationals" and "irres-
pectively of their nationality". The Russian Space act is more extensive providing that 
the citizens of foreign states undergoing training for a space flight in the Russian 
Federation or participating in a flight on a board manned space object of the Russian 
Federation are bound to comply with the legislation of the Russian Federation if 
otherwise is not provided for by international treaties of the Russian Federation (Art. 
20-5). 
The authority of the commanders, however, should be different in relation to the crew 
and all other persons on board. Members of the crew namely contrary to other persons 
have their duties in the safe completion of the space flight. Directions of the commander 
to the crew consequently differ from orders rightly given to other persons on board not 
being involved in the technical performance of the space flight 
Space passengers 
Professor V. Kopal in his commentary on Art. VI, para. 6 of the Draft refers to the 
possibility that still other persons than members of the crew may appear on board the 
space object, not only members of other crews e.g. rescued astronauts or participants of 
other missions but also simple passengers who will enjoy the space travel. He puts the 
question: all this persons should be entitled to be considered as astronauts sharing their 
special treatment?21 I would answer, yes they should be—mutatis mutandis... 
Today space flight demands special training but no doubt the time will come when 
space passengers will board a spacecraft without special preparations. Then it will be 
obvious that law-making should differentiate between the crew ("flying personnel") and 
other persons: "space passengers" on board a spacecraft. In this respect the realization of 
the aerospacecraft will be the decisive landmark of a new development in air and space 
legislation. Coming generations of space lawyers will be faced with this biggest challenge 
since the first space flight 32 years ago. 
20 See: VIDELA ESCALADA, F. N. V.: Aeronautical Law. Alphen aan den Rijn 1979, p. 199 et seq., 
MATEESCO MATTE, N.: Treaties on Air-Aeronautical Law. Montreal-Toronto 1981, p. 193, DIEDERIKS-
VERSCHORR, I. H. Ph.: op. cit., pp. 22-24. 
21 KOPAL, V.: Some Problems Relating to the in-flight Personnel Regime of Manned Space Objects. 
Cologne Proceedings, p. 88. 
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Annex I 
Astronauts in chronological order^natne, country, number of flights 
1 Gagarin, J. A. SU 01 39 Chonin, G. S. SU 01 
2 Titov, G. S. SU 01 40 Kubassov, V. N. SU 03 
3 Glenn, J. H. USA 01 41 Filipchenko, A. SU 02 
4 Carpenter, M. S. USA 01 42 Volkov, V. N. SU 02 
5 Nikolaev, A. G. SU 02 43 Gorbatko, V. V. SU 03 
6 Popovich, P. R. SU 02 44 Bean, A. L. USA 02 
7 Schirra, W. M. USA 02 45 Swigert, J. L. USA 01 
8 Cooper, L. G. USA 02 46 Haise, F. W. USA 01 
9 Bikovski, V. F. SU 03 47 Sevastianov, V. SU 02 
10 Tereskova, V. V. SU 01 48 Shepard, A. B. USA 01 
11 Komarov, V. M. SU 02 49 Roosa, S. A. USA 01 
12 Feoktistov, K. SU 01 50 Michell, E. D. USA 01 
13 Yegorov, B. B. SU 01 51 Rukavishnikov, Ny. SU 03 
14 Beliayev, P. I. SU 01 52 Dobrovolski, G. SU 01 
15 Leonov, A. A. SU 02 53 Paoaev, V. I. SU 01 
16 Grissom, V. I. USA 01 54 Worden, A. M. USA 01 
17 Young, J. M. USA 06 55 Irwin, J. B. USA 01 
18 McDivitt, J.A. USA 02 56 Mattingly, T. K. USA 03 
19 White, J. A. USA 02 57 Duke, C. M. USA 01 
20 Conrad, C. USA 01 58 Evans, R. E. USA 01 
21 Borman, F. USA 02 59 Schmitt, H. H. USA 01 
22 Lövell, J. A. USA 04 60 Kerwin, J. P. USA 01 
23 Stafford, T. P. USA 04 61 Weitz, P. J. USA 01 
24 Armstrong, N. A. USA 02 62 Garriott, O. K. USA 02 
25 Scott, D. R. USA 03 63 Lousina, J. R. USA 02 
26 Ceman, E. A. USA 03 64 Lazarev, V. G. SU 01 
27 Collins, M. USA 02 65 Makarov, O. G. SU 03 
28 Gordon, R. F. USA 02 66 Carr, G. P. USA 01 
29 Aldrin, E. E. USA 02 67 Gibson, E. G. USA 01 
30 Eisele, D. F. USA 01 68 Pogue, W. R. USA 01 
31 Cunningham, R. W. USA 01 69 Klimuk, P. I. SU 03 
32 Geregovoi, G. T. USA 01 70 Lebedev, V. V. SU 02 
33 Anders, W. A. USA 01 71 Artjumin, J. P. SU 01 
34 Satalov, V. A. SU 03 72 Sarafanov, G. V. SU 01 
35 Volinov, В. V. SU 02 73 Djomin, L. S. SU 01 
36 Yeliseyev, A. S. SU 03 74 Gubarev, A. A. SU 02 
37 Chrunov, J. V. SU 01 75 Gretshko, G. M. SU 03 
38 Schweickart, R. USA 01 76 Brand, V. D. USA 04 
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77 Slayton, D. K. USA 01 120 Fabian, J. M. USA 01 
78 Zholobov, V. M. SU 01 121 Ride, S. K. USA 02 
79 Aksyonov, V. V. SU 02 122 Thagard, N. E. USA 04 
80 Zudov, V. D. SU 01 123 Alexandrov, A. P. SU 02 
81 Rozhdestvenski, V. SU 01 124 Brandenstein, D. C. USA 04 
82 Glazkov, J. N. SU 01 125 Bluford, G. S. USA 04 
83 Kovalyonok, V. V. SU 03 126 Gardner, D. A. USA 02 
84 Rumin, V. V. SU 03 127 Thornton, W. E. USA 02 
85 Romanenko, J. SU 05 128 Shaw, В. H. USA 03 
86 Dshanibekov, V. SU 01 129 Parker, R. A. R. USA 02 
87 Remek, V. cz-s 02 130 Lichtenberg, В. К. USA 02 
88 Ivantchenko, A. su 02 131 Merbold, U. FRG 02 
89 Hennashevski, M. PO 01 132 Bigson, R. L. USA 04 
90 Jahn, S. GDR 01 133 McCandless, B. USA 02 
91 Lianhaov, V. A. SU 03 134 McNair, R. E. USA 01 
92 Ivanov, G. 
ВС. 01 135 Stewart, R. L. USA 02 
93 Popov, L. I. su 03 136 Soplovyov, V. A. SU 02 
94 Farkas, В. H 01 137 Atjkov, O. J. SU 01 
95 Malishev, J. V. su 02 138 Shanna, R. I 01 
96 Pham, Tuan V 01 139 Scobee, F. R. USA 01 
97 Tamayo, Mendez eu 01 140 Hart, T. J. USA 01 
98 Kizim, L. V. su 03 141 Van Hoften, J. USA 02 
99 Strekalov, G. M. su 04 142 Nelson, G. D. USA 03 
100 Savinih, V. P. su 03 143 Volk, I. P. SU 01 
101 Gurragtohaa, Zh. MO 01 144 Coats, M. L. USA 03 
102 Crippen, R. L. USA 04 145 Resnik, J. A. USA 01 
103 Prunariu, D. R 01 146 Hawley, S. A. USA 03 
104 Engle, J. H. USA 02 147 Mullane, R. M. USA 03 
105 Truly, R. H. USA 02 148 Walker, С. D. USA 03 
106 Fullerton, C. G. USA 02 149 McBride, J. A. USA 01 
107 Berezovoy, A. N. SU 01 150 Sullivan, K. D. USA 03 
108 Chretien, J. L. F 02 151 Leestma, D. C. USA 03 
109 Harsfield, H. W. USA 03 152 Garn eau, M. CAN 01 
110 Serebrov, A. A. SU 04 153 Scully-Power, P. D. USA 01 
I l l Savitskaya, S. J. SU 02 154 Walker, D. M. USA 03 
112 Overmyer, R. F. USA 02 155 Fisher, A. L. USA 01 
113 Allen, J. P. USA 02 156 Shriver, L. J. USA 03 
114 Lenoir, W. B. USA 01 157 Onizuka, E. S. USA 01 
115 Dobko, K. J. USA 03 158 Buchli, J. F. USA 04 
116 Musgrave, F. S. USA 04 159 Payton, G. E. USA 01 
117 Peterson, D. H. USA 01 160 Williams, D. E. USA 02 
118 Titov, V. B. SU 02 161 Seddon, R. R. USA 02 
119 Hauck, F. W. USA 03 162 Hoffman, J. A. USA 03 
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163 Griggs, S. D. USA 01 206 Alexandrov, A. BG 01 
164 Garn, E. J. USA 01 207 Polyakov, V. I. SU 01 
165 Gregory, F. D. USA 03 208 Mohmand, А. A. A 01 
166 Lind, D. L. USA Ol 209 Krikalyov, S. K. SU 02 
167 Wang, T. G. USA Ol 210 Gardner, G. S. USA 02 
168 Van Den Berg, L. USA Ol 211 Shepherd, W. M. USA 03 
169 Creighton, J. O. USA 03 212 Blaha, J. E. USA 03 
170 Lucid, S. W. USA 03 213 Springer, R. C. USA 02 
171 Nagel, S. R. USA 04 214 Bagian, J. P. USA 02 
172 Baudry, R F Ol 215 Lee, M. C. USA 02 
173 Al-Baid, S. S. SAUD Ol 216 Richards, R. N. USA 03 
174 Bridges, R. D. USA Ol 217 Adamson, J. C. USA 02 
175 England, Л. W. USA Ol 218 Brown, M. N. USA 02 
176 Henize, K. G. USA Ol 219 McCulley, M. J. USA 01 
177 Acton, E-W. USA Ol 220 Baker, E. S. USA 02 
178 Bartoe, J.-D. F. USA Ol 221 Carter, M. L. USA 01 
179 Covey, R. O. USA 03 222 Thornton, К. С. USA 02 
180 Lounge, J. M. USA 03 223 Wetherbee, J. D. USA 02 
181 Fisher, W. F. USA Ol 224 Ivins, M. S. USA 02 
182 Vasyutin, V. V. SU Ol 225 Low, G. D. USA 03 
183 Volkov, A. A. SU 03 226 Balandin, A. N. SU 01 
184 Grobe, R. J. USA 04 227 Casper, J. H. USA 02 
185 Hilmers, D. C. USA 04 228 Thuot, P. J. USA 02 
186 Pailes, W. A. USA Ol 229 Manakov, G. M. SU 02 
187 Dunbar, B. J. USA 03 230 Cabana, R. D. USA 02 
188 Furrer, R. ERG Ol 231 Melnick, B. E. USA 02 
189 Messerschmid, E. FRG Ol 232 Akers, T. D. USA 02 
190 Ockels, W. J. NL Ol 233 Culbertson, F. L. USA 02 
191 O'Connor, B. D. USA 02 234 Gemar, C. D. USA 02 
192 Cleave, M. L. USA 02 235 Meade, C. J. USA 02 
193 Pring, S. C. USA Ol 236 Durrance, S. T. USA 01 
194 Ross, J. L. USA 04 237 Parise, R. A. USA 01 
195 Neri Vela, R. МЕХ Ol 238 Afanasyev, V. M. SU 01 
196 Bolden, C. F. USA 03 239 Aki j ama, T. J 01 
197 Chang-Diaz, F. R. USA 03 240 Cameron, К. D. USA 02 
198 Cenker, R. J. USA Ol 241 Godwin, L. M. USA 01 
199 Nelson, W. C. USA Ol 242 Apt, J. USA 02 
200 Laveykin, A. I. SU Ol 243 Hammond, L. B. USA 01 
201 Viktorenko, A. S. SU 03 244 Harbaugh, G. J. USA 02 
202 Faris, M. A. SYR Ol 245 McMonagle, D. R. USA 02 
203 Manarov, M. H. SU 02 246 Veach, C. L. USA 02 
204 Levtchenko, A. S. SU Ol 247 Hieb, R. J. USA 02 
205 Solovyov, A. J. SU 03 248 Arcebarsky, A. P. SU 01 
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249 Sharman, H. P. GB 01 
250 Guttierez, S. M. USA 01 
251 Jemigan, T. E. USA 02 
252 Gaffney, F. D. USA 02 
253 Huges-Fulford, M. USA 01 
254 Baker, M. A. USA 02 
255 Rightier, К. S. USA 01 
256 Aubakirov, T. SU 01 
257 Viehbock, F. AU 01 
258 Hendricks, T. T. USA 03 
259 Voss, J. S. USA 03 
260 Runco, M. USA 02 
261 Hennen, T. J. USA 01 
262 Oswald, S. S. USA 02 
263 Readdy, W. F. USA 02 
264 Bondar, R. CAN 01 
265 Kaleri, A. J. RUS 01 
266 Flade, K. D. FRG 01 
267 Duffy, В. USA 02 
268 Foale, С. M. USA 02 
269 Frimout, D. BE 01 
270 Chilton, К. P. USA 01 
271 Bowersox, K. D. USA 01 
272 Delucas, L. J. USA 01 
273 Trinn, E. H. USA 01 
274 Avdeyev, S. V. RUS 01 
275 Tognini, M. F 01 
276 Allen, A. M. USA 01 
277 Nicollier, C. S 01 
278 Malerba, F. I 01 
279 Brown, С. L. USA 01 
280 Davis, N. J. USA 01 
281 Jemison, M. C. USA 01 
282 Mohri, M. J 01 
283 Maclean, S. G. CAN 01 
284 Clifford, M. USA 01 
285 Hehns, S. J. USA 01 
286 Polishtchuk, A. RUS 01 
287 Cockrell, K. D. USA 01 
288 Ochoa, E. USA 01 
289 Precourt, C. J. USA 01 
290 Harris, В. A. USA 01 
291 Walter, U. FRG 01 
292 Schlegel, H. W. FRG 01 
293 Sherlock, N. J. USA 01 
294 Wisoff, F. J. K. USA 01 
295 Cibliyev, V. V. RUS 01 
296 Haignere, J. P. F 01 
297 Hewman, J. H. USA 01 
298 Bursch, D. W. USA 01 
299 Walz, С. E. USA 01 
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The New Act on Hungarian 
Nationality 
The past decade has witnessed the adoption of new nationality laws or a process of 
new regulations is still continuing in Europe. The changes have affected three typical 
aspects in Western Europe. 
The equality of women in nationality law is spelled out with a long lag behind its 
constitutional declaration. Marriage with a foreign male has ceased to entail an automatic 
change in the wife's nationality, women being entitled to retain their original nationality. 
The formerly exclusive hold of the principle of ius sanguinis a patre is yielding to that 
of ius sanguinis a matre, i.e. the child follows the mother's nationality as well. 
Another feature of the new regulations is consisted in affording special grounds for 
facilitated acquisition of nationality by such children of immigrants who were born, or 
have been educated for a specified period of time, in the host country (Germany, Italy, 
Belgium). 
Finally, the West European countries are changing their approach to dual nationality. 
After the revision of the Strasbourg Convention of 1963 aimed at reducing cases of plural 
nationality, national traditions are becoming prevalent in the states members of the 
Council of Europe, which, having traditionally tolerated dual nationality, are lifting 
restrictions emanating from the Convention. 
However, in some countries like Germany, Austria or Sweden, which have placed 
restrictions on dual nationality from the beginning of the earliest regulations, no change 
can be expected to occur in this field. 
In Eastern Europe the successor states of the disintegrated aggregates of political 
entities adopt their own laws on nationality or, as the Baltic countries do, return to their 
old legislations which were operative up to the 1940s. The new legislations of Eastern 
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Europe cannot be likened to the general European regulations, for the former have to 
resolve specific problems. In addition, they design special solutions for certain questions 
(e.g. "authorization" of dual nationality). 
The need for reregulating the Hungarian nationality was formulated in 1989-90. 
The European motive forces as outlined above are not a distinctive feature in 
Hungary, because the equality of women and the principle of ius sanguinis a matre were 
already implemented by Act V of 1957. Hungary was not characterized by an influx of 
immigrants in the classical sense, for a large number of foreigners taking up their 
permanent residence here were of Hungarian origin, whereas dual nationality has been 
traditionally accepted by Hungarian law. The East European problems are not 
encountered in this country. 
Act V of 1957 is apparently based on modem, stable principles. Yet, what has 
warranted a rethinking of questions relating to Hungarian nationality? 
The mentality of Act V of 1957 is unacceptable under the present-day socio-political 
conditions, when viewed superficially, the norms of the Act governing the grant of 
nationality are loose and permissive, stipulating no essential conditions. At the time the 
Act was passed its provisions had to be applied in conjunction with the unpublished rules 
and the occasionally arbitrary practice concerning emigration and immigration as well. 
By the end of the 1980s, with the gradual recognition of human rights, the phantom 
rules had faded away and nationality proceedings had found themselves in a vacuum, 
meaning that, in theory, a foreigner was in a position to acquire Hungarian nationality 
sooner and with greater ease than his immigration was authorized. 
A well-defined and culturally appropriate transformation, responsive to the reality 
and needs of society, of the rules for acquisition of nationality, with their discretionary 
character preserved, brooked no further delay, while a review of the range of persons 
enjoying preferential treatment in naturalization was likewise justified. 
The mode of and conditions for termination of nationality had to be changed in 
their entirety in the spirit of the relevant international treaties and the Hungarian 
Constitution. 
Deprivation of nationality, the statutory conditions for which were difficult to grasp 
and left room for abuse, was an institution of evil memory in the Hungarian nationality 
law, for it was used in pursuance of covert political and economic goals. Acts XXVII and 
XXXII of 1990 already contained provisions for terminating the nationality-law 
consequences of deprivation, and deprivation as a ground for termination of nationality 
is therefore unknown to the new legislation. 
Release from nationality is seen by Act V of 1957 as a favour granted by the State. 
The introduction by the new Act of renunciation of nationality has radically changed that 
approach: existing Hungarian nationality and disposition thereof within the frameworks 
of the law are recognized as a matter of subjective right, and, where the conditions for 
renunciation are satisfied, there is practically no possibility of rejecting such applications. 
The new Act has incorporated the provisions on rehabilitation as contained in the 
legislative enactments of 1990 and has extended the range of beneficiaries to include 
persons who were formerly forced to apply for release as well as ethnic Germans who 
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were expatriated from Hungary between 1945 and 1948 and thereby lost their Hungarian 
nationality. 
In accordance with the principles of modem legislation, the new Act regulates in 
detail the special nationality proceedings and lays down basic rules for the protection 
of data and personality rights. Before reviewing the main provisions of the new Act we 
shall pinpoint the questions that are usually covered by legislative enactments on 
nationality. 
As a rule, the range of persons regarded by a given State as its nationals as well as 
the principles, conditions and procedural rules governing acquisition and termination of 
nationality are determined by a nationality law. Given the importance and public-law 
nature of nationality, the constitutions of several states, including that of Hungary, lay 
special emphasis on certain basic principles (Art 69). 
The so-called citizenship rights (and duties) associated with nationality are spelled 
out, not in the Nationality Act, but primarily in the Constitution. 
Perhaps it will not be out of place to recall the international treaties that must be 
observed by Hungary in respect of nationality. We shall not discuss here the peace 
treaties and the agreements related thereto. 
The first such international norm is the New York Convention of 1957 on the 
Nationality of Married Women, which gives preferential treatment in naturalization to 
women who are married to nationals of states parties. However, this provision by no 
means implies an obligation to grant unconditional and immediate naturalization. 
On more remark should be made about the Convention in question. When the 
Convention was adopted, the equality of women in nationality law was far from general. 
There were states under the laws of which the wife automatically followed the nationality 
of her husband, namely a foreign woman automatically acquired the nationality of her 
husband, or if a woman married an alien, she automatically lost her original nationality. 
Other states regulated the equality of sexes along more modem lines, with account taken 
of the equality of women, and the fact of marriage did not affect the nationality of 
spouses. The different regulations by states may have caused women married to aliens 
to become stateless. Elimination of such cases was the reason for the conclusion of the 
New York Convention. 
Today even the most conservative systems of nationality law in Europe break with 
regulations of a patriarchal approach, and the Convention of 1957 has receded into the 
past We have discussed this question at so great length for the only reason that during 
the parliamentary debate on the Bill there was tabled a motion to grant women marrying 
Hungarian nationals special treatment in acquiring Hungarian nationality. Any 
discriminative treatment of women, albeit positive, would be a step backward even by 
comparison to Act V of 1957, which accorded such benefit to spouses in general, 
regardless of sex. However, unconditional and immediate naturalization is in no way 
justified and is not required even by international instruments. 
Another convention to be observed is the Geneva Convention of 1951 relating to the 
Status of Refugees, which similarly provides for the grant of facilitated naturalization to 
applicants recognized as refugees. 
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Our current Constitution, incorporating a provision of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, prohibits arbitrary deprivation of nationality and of the right to change 
one's nationality. This rule also figures among the basic principles of the new Act on 
Nationality. 
Separate mention should be made in relevance to nationality of the multilateral 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, it is a very important aspect concerning the rights 
of children to a nationality. This right has traditionally prevailed in Hungarian law: if a 
child does not acquire nationality by descent (ius sanguinis), he will become a Hungarian 
national by reliance on the subsidiary principle of birth in Hungarian territory (ius soli). 
In connection with the rules on oath or affirmation, more will be said of other relevant 
provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was promulgated by Act 
LXIV of 1991. 
With the general questions of theory considered, let us proceed to a detailed 
discussion of the new Act on Hungarian Nationality, the structure and logic of which 
differ considerably from those of the three legislative enactments on nationality which 
obtained in Hungary before. 
Given as short the wording of the Act, its discussion by chapters would be 
unwarranted as the headings refer to different objects of regulation, which are the 
following: general principles, Hungarian nationals, acquisition of nationality by operation 
of law, acquisition of nationality by naturalization, termination of nationality, certification 
of nationality, proceedings, data protection, and final provisions. 
1. The act lays down the basic principles of regulation and of the nationality law in 
general, a method formerly not customary in Hungarian legislation on nationality, but not 
unknown to foreign legislations. The arrangement of basic principles under a separate 
heading indicates the importance of the Act and its special object of regulation pertaining 
the domain of public law. The Act formulates principles declarative of constitutional civic 
rights related to the nationality law on the one hand and the traditional principles of 
nationality law which have crystallized by today on the other. 
Which are the principles that the law-maker deems it necessary to emphasize in 
particular? 
Without discrimination and from the moment when nationality is acquired, Hungarian 
nationals have all the rights and duties emanating from nationality. This can be regarded 
as a traditional principle, for in Hungarian legal history there is only one instance of 
discrimination, namely in Act L of 1879, which required the lapse of 10 years from 
naturalization for a naturalized person to become a member of the legislature. 
Modem nationality laws apply no such discrimination. 
Reference has already been made to the principle prohibitive of arbitrary deprivation 
of nationality and of the right to change one's nationality. 
The following principles are embodied in the substantive-law rules of the Act 
— Unity of the nationality of the family, with respect to the free will of the 
individual. The Act recognizes the importance of close and lasting family ties by 
affording facilities for naturalization. This principle is supported by the provision 
allowing family members to submit joint application for nationality. At the same time the 
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Act leaves scope for the free will of the person by not requiring him to follow the 
nationality of the spouse or parent 
— Reduction of cases of statelessness. Ever since this question became a concern of 
the law both Hungarian and universal nationality laws have sought to prevent the occurrence 
of statelessness. Although Hungary is not a party to any international treaty governing cases 
of statelessness, it gave effect to this principle even in its earlier legislation. 
— Protection of personal data. Data concerning nationality and shown in related 
documents enjoy special protection, and the manner and extent of releasing information 
are strictly defined. 
The Act contains the classical principle of regulating nationality and the most 
important one of law enforcement, namely it has no retroactive effect. It does not affect 
the existing status, i.e. the possession of nationality acquired or lost under earlier 
enactments. 
2. Of course, there is no change in determining the range of Hungarian nationals. A 
person who at the effective date of this Act possesses Hungarian nationality acquires it 
by virtue of this Act, or becomes a Hungarian national through a fact constitutive of 
Hungarian nationality is considered by the Republic of Hungary as its national. Such a 
person must be regarded as a Hungarian national until his nationality is terminated under 
the provisions of this Act. 
After determining the range of nationals the Act defines the status of persons holding 
dual nationality. It does not intend to change the traditional principle of Hungarian 
nationality permitting Hungarian nationals to acquire the nationality of another State 
while retaining Hungarian nationality, or it recognizes the possibility and fact of acquiring 
dual or plural nationality. At the same time, following the international practice, it 
subjects Hungarian nationals possessing another nationality to Hungarian jurisdiction 
unless the law contains provisions on the contrary. 
3. Under the heading "Acquisition of Nationality by Operation of Law", the Act 
specifies the cases in which Hungarian nationality is automatically acquired by virtue of 
law. Acquisition of nationality is linked to birth. As has been noted earlier, it is a 
fundamental human right of every child to acquire nationality by birth. The foremost 
regulatory principle of our nationality law governing acquisition of nationality is ius 
sanguinis, by virtue of which the child acquires the nationality of his parent at birth. The 
fact that acquisition of his nationality is independent of his origin provides protection for 
the rights of the child. Regardless of whether or not his parent live in marriage, the child 
may become a Hungarian national after either his mother or his father. 
The principle of descent is absolute as being independent of the place of birth. 
Acquisition of nationality on the strength of a fact of family law is related to birth. What 
we have here is a child born of a foreign parent with his family status settled after birth; 
his other parent must be deemed to be a Hungarian national under the provisions of 
family law in force from time to time. His Hungarian nationality may be acknowledged 
from his date of birth. 
As has already been mentioned among the basic principles, for avoiding statelessness 
the law relies on the so-called territorial principle (ius soli) in the case of children whose 
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parents are unknown or stateless, namely who cannot acquire nationality on the basis of 
ius sanguinis. Such children become Hungarian nationals by birth in the national territory. 
Nevertheless, this provision is a presumption (praesumptio juris) that can be refuted if 
the child's parent who was believed stateless proves to possess the nationality of any 
State. 
4. Acquisition of Hungarian nationality by naturalization or renaturalization. On this 
ground, nationality may be acquired as a result of nationality proceedings instituted on 
application by a foreign or stateless person (non-national). 
Act V of 1957 determined the period of permanent residence in Hungary, along with 
declaring a state interest involved, as the only condition for naturalization. In formulating 
the rules of naturalization the new Act makes allowance for the situation created by the 
processes of migration over recent years, the national interests, the requirement of 
preserving the prestige of nationality, and the general European practice. 
Under the Act, naturalization is subject to the following basic conditions: 
— The applicant must have lived in Hungary for at least 8 years before submitting 
an application for naturalization. 
Under the rules on notification of address, a foreigner whose immigration has been 
authorized or who has a registered address in the country is deemed to be living in 
Hungary. (In its final provisions the Act defines the term "place of residence".) 
The additional and general conditions for naturalization are these: 
— The applicant must show his clearance of criminal record under Hungarian law 
and that he is not subjected to criminal proceedings before Hungarian courts. 
— The applicant must also certify that he has a livelihood and a shelter secured in 
Hungary. Livelihood can be regarded as secured if the applicant derives an income from 
a legal relationship established for performance of work, draws a pension, or is supported 
by someone. A secured shelter may be either a dwelling owned or leased (subleased) or 
lodging in a private home. Enumeration in the Act of facts supporting the existence of 
these conditions is unnecessary and would of a barring nature. 
— Naturalization must not be contrary to the interests of the State. The Minister of 
Interior is empowered by procedural rules to request the opinion of the police, the aliens' 
control office and the organs of national security in matters of nationality. 
— Examination involving the command of Hungarian language and a basic 
knowledge of the Constitution required as a condition for naturalization is a new 
institution of Hungarian law, but is common in international practice. A person wishing 
to become a national of Hungary can rightly be expected to be in possession of such 
knowledge. The details of the examination are regulated by the Government Decree 
enforcing the Act. 
Let us now consider the range of persons receiving facilities for naturalization, 
namely exemptions from the requirement of 8 years of residence in Hungary. 
The first group of beneficiaries may apply for naturalization primarily on the basis 
of close family ties with a Hungarian national. Family ties can be supposed to entail a 
more thorough knowledge of the country's culture and customs and to facilitate a more 
intensive integration into society. 
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The benefit consists in 3 years of residence in Hungary required for submission of 
an application for naturalization. On this ground, naturalization may be granted to a 
person 
— whose spouse is a Hungarian national and whose marriage has subsisted for at 
least 3 years or has been terminated by the spouse's death, namely the applicant is a 
widow or a widower; 
— whose minor child is a Hungarian national; 
— who is a foreign child adopted by a Hungarian national; 
— who is a refugee recognized as such, for whom Hungary has, by signing the 
Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, undertaken to facilitate 
naturalization. 
The requirement of 3 years of residence may be waived, on request, in the case of 
a child adopted by a Hungarian national. This provision of the Act allows the child to 
have his nationality status settled as soon as possible and to obtain his adopter's 
nationality, thereby also being assisted in integrating himself into his new family as early 
as possible. 
A similar benefit is enjoyed by a minor who is included in his parents' application 
for naturalization and who, by reason of this age, cannot satisfy the requirement of 8 or 
3 years of residence in Hungary. 
A separate group of beneficiaries is that of applicants of Hungarian origin. A person 
who declares himself to be of Hungarian nationality and has a Hungarian national among 
his ascendants is deemed by the Act to be of Hungarian origin. During the debate on the 
Bill there were made sharp remarks about the point of time, perhaps that of King 
Matthias, to which one may go back in tracing his Hungarian ascendants. There is no 
need for such exhaustive genealogical research. The legal institution of bourgeois 
nationality has existed in Hungary since 1880. Act L of 1879, which became operative 
in that year, and made a clean sweep of nationality, but its details will not be discussed 
now. 
The applicant may certify the Hungarian nationality of his ascendant, but the Interior 
Ministry's department considering the application and preparing a decision must always 
check whether the ascendant invoked was really a Hungarian national. 
A foreigner of Hungarian origin may apply for naturalization if he has resided in the 
country for at least one year. 
Each of our mentioned nationality laws has afforded special facilities to applicants 
belonging to the Hungarian nation and obviously attached to it more strongly than aliens. 
Yet they must satisfy the general conditions for naturalization, including an examination 
in the fundamentals of the Constitution. 
Another new rule of the Act affords exceptional facilities for a foreigner's naturaliz-
ation involving a special interest of the Republic of Hungary. The requirements 
concerning 8 years of permanent residence, secured livelihood and accommodation, and 
an examination in the fundamentals of the Constitution may be waived by virtue of this 
provision, which is common in international practice, but is in fact of exceptional 
applicability. 
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Renaturalization is in effect a special case of naturalization. By it, Hungarian nationality 
may be acquired by persons who once possessed but have lost his/her Hungarian nationality. 
The Act makes no distinction as to the period and duration of the applicant for the 
Hungarian nationality or even the grounds on which his nationality has ceased. 
Compared with the provisions concerning rehabilitation, however, the Act lifts out 
of that category the range of persons whose nationality was terminated by deprivation, 
release or, if of German origin, relocation to Germany. Thus, in practice, consideration 
may be given to such grounds for losing one's nationality according to peace treaties, 
absence, conclusion of marriage, legitimation, and bilateral interstate agreements. 
Applicants for renaturalization are also required to show the existence of general 
conditions for naturalization, except taking a nationality examination. 
Applicants have no subjective right to naturalization or renaturalization, the grant or 
rejection of applications being a discretionary right of the Head of State, who decides 
within the frameworks of law on a proposal by the Minister of Interior. The nature of this 
legal institution allows no appeal from decisions. 
The Act upholds the institution of oath or affirmation of nationality. A naturalized 
or renaturalized person must solemnly declare, before the mayor of competence by his 
place of residence, to be loyal to the Republic of Hungary, promising to observe the 
Constitution as well as other laws and regulations. 
The decision becomes effective upon the oath or affirmation by the applicant. An 
applicant of full or limited disposing capacity swears an oath or makes an affirmation in 
person or, if he is incapable of action, a declaration on his behalf is made by his legal 
representative. 
Acquisition of Hungarian nationality by naturalization or renaturalization is certified 
by a document issued by the President of the Republic and showing the fact and date of 
oath or affirmation as entered by the mayor of the settlement concerned. It is a traditional 
rule that a naturalized person who, after the decision of the Head of State, dies before 
swearing an oath or making an affirmation or is prevented by his condition from making 
a declaration must be deemed to have acquired Hungarian nationality on the day on 
which the document was issued. 
5. As noted earlier, the new Act has considerably changed the rules for termination 
of Hungarian nationality, replacing release and deprivation by the legal institutions of 
renunciation and revocation. 
With the statutory conditions prevailing, a Hungarian national living abroad may 
renounce his nationality. In order to prevent statelessness, the person concerned is 
required to prove that he holds the nationality of another State or has already applied for 
it or has a promise of receiving it. An added condition is that the person renouncing his 
Hungarian nationality must fulfil his obligations towards the Hungarian State, paying his 
taxes and other public charges, and that the Hungarian State must have no claim against 
him under criminal law. 
Subject to proof of the existence of statutory conditions, renunciation of nationality 
is a "subjective right", unlike release under Act V of 1957, namely it is not contingent 
upon the discretion of the decision-making organ, the only administrative task consisting 
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virtually in verifying the existence of statutory conditions. This new approach is "also 
manifested in the structural pattern of renunciation proceedings. Within a period of 6 
months, the Minister of Interior must examine the existence of conditions for renunci-
ation, namely whether the applicant is really a Hungarian national, or he is of Hungarian 
national but living abroad, and whether the conditions as specified by the Act are present 
If the applicant has satisfied the conditions, the Minister of Interior proposes to the 
President of the Republic to accept renunciation. Otherwise he takes a decision, contestable 
before the court, to the effect that the conditions for renunciation have not been met. 
Hungarian nationality ceases by renunciation on the day on which the document of 
acceptance is issued. 
The other way of terminating Hungarian nationality is the legal institution of 
revocation as introduced by the new Act Act V of 1957 empowered the President of the 
Republic to deprive a Hungarian national living abroad of his nationality on the ground 
of disloyalty or commission of a grave crime. That regulation failed to rule out the 
possibility of arbitrary deprivation in a satisfactory manner. 
The new Act has abolished the entire institution of deprivation. At the same time, 
the special nature of nationality calls for a legal institution which serves to penalize, also 
in terms of nationality, unlawful acquisition of Hungarian nationality. Hungarian 
nationality may be revoked in cases where it was acquired in violation of law, e.g. 
through presentation of false data or concealment of facts or data, i.e. by misleading the 
authorities. Revocation of nationality does not naturally exclude criminal responsibility 
for a course conduct serving as a basis for revocation. In addition, the regulation of 
revocation is apt to have a preventive effect 
As a rule providing a safeguard, the fact invoked as a ground for revocation is 
established by decision of the Minister of Interior, such decisions being contestable before 
the court. Thereupon the Minister presents his proposal to the President of the Republic. 
The President's decision must be published in Magyar Közlöny (Hungarian Gazette), 
Hungarian nationality is to be ceased on the day of publication. 
6. The Act spells out mandatory acceptance by the entire legal system of Hungary 
of the documents having probative force concerning Hungarian nationality. As a rule, 
Hungarian nationality may be proved by a valid identity card and a valid Hungarian 
passport. 
Also, in specified cases, the Minister of Interior issues a nationality certificate 
attesting to possession of Hungarian nationality by the person indicated thereon, to the 
fact of its loss or termination, or to the fact that the bearer is not a Hungarian national, 
it is necessary to limit the period of validity of the nationality certificate, which, given 
the duration of nationality proceedings, is one year. 
In addition to natural persons, different Hungarian and foreign authorities—in 
performing their tasks during proceedings before them—may need to ascertain the 
nationality status of persons parties to proceedings, to satisfy themselves that the latter 
are or are not Hungarian nationals, for the personal law of citizens, the jurisdiction of 
Hungarian or foreign organs, the powers of proceeding authorities depend on the 
nationality status. 
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Data concerning the nationality of affected persons are released by the Minister of 
Interior at official requests as well. 
7. The new Act has at last determined the place occupied by nationality proceedings 
in the legal system, removing them from the scope of the Act on Administrative 
Procedure and regulating them as separate, sui generis proceedings. This is for the 
following reason. 
In its character and in some other aspects, only the issuance of the nationality 
certificate resembles administrative proceedings. The decision-making power of the 
President of the Republic in the case of naturalization, renaturalization, renunciation, etc. 
a priori excludes resort to administrative proceedings, whereas the purpose of preparatory 
procedure is not typically one to settle an administrative matter. 
Nationality proceedings are instituted on application by the person concerned or at 
the request of an authority or other organ. 
An application concerning nationality is one for naturalization or renaturalization 
aimed at acquiring Hungarian nationality, for making a declaration renouncing Hungarian 
nationality, or for issuing a nationality certificate. A declaration seeking recovery of 
Hungarian nationality and presented by a person once deprived of or released from 
Hungarian nationality or relocated to Germany must also be regarded as an application 
for nationality. 
An application for nationality may be submitted in person to the registrar of the 
mayor's office of the local government competent in the place of residence or, abroad, 
to the consul of Hungary. Following from the nature of application and from the statutory 
conditions, applications for naturalization or renaturalization may only be submitted to 
the registrar of competence by the place of residence in Hungary, while declarations 
renouncing Hungarian nationality may only be presented to the competent consul of 
Hungary. Applications for issuing a nationality certificate may be submitted either to the 
registrar or the consul, depending on the domicile of the person concerned. Specimens 
of the printed forms to be used for applications concerning nationality are published in 
the Government Decree enforcing the Act 
The Act specifies the lata to be shown in applications, the facts to be proved and 
the documents to be used in general for that purpose. Since nationality is a legal 
institution based primarily on lineage, consideration of applications depend on the 
registration data of the persons concerned and their ascendants. In some cases, certificates 
may also be required showing one-time domiciles and the length of periods of residence 
in Hungary. 
Applications for naturalization and renaturalization must be accompanied, along with 
registration certificates, by documents attesting to compliance with statutory conditions, 
such as certificates showing absence of criminal record, domicile and means of 
subsistence in Hungary (e.g. good-conduct, employment, pension or similar certificates). 
Enclosed with declarations renouncing nationality must be a document certifying 
foreign nationality or the probability of its acquisition as well as a certificate of the 
Hungarian state or self-government tax office to the effect that applicants have paid taxes 
and other public charges. In certain cases it may be necessary for applications for issuing 
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a nationality certificate to be accompanied by documents attesting to the Hungarian 
nationality of applicants who emigrated decades before (e.g. old Hungarian passports or 
certificates, contemporary nationality documents, including of course such documents of 
ascendants). 
Applications must be accompanied by documents of originals or certified or by 
certified copies thereof and, if issued in foreign language, together with Hungarian 
translations. 
Submission of applications in person is a special aspect of nationality proceedings. 
Expression of an intention to acquire or to terminate Hungarian nationality may not be 
entrusted to the legal representative, just as a marriage may not be contracted through a 
representative. Nevertheless, the notion of submission of applications in person embraces 
cases in which an applicant living abroad and has his signature verified and his identity 
certified by the authority empowered thereto in his place of residence and sends his 
application to the consul of Hungary. 
It would be unjust to require persons living at a distance of several hundred or even 
a thousand kilometres from a Hungarian foreign representation to appear in person. 
The situation is different in the case of applicants residing in Hungary, because there 
is a self-government in every settlement. However, apart from submitting the application 
and swearing an oath or making an affirmation, there is no bar to a representative 
participating in proceedings. 
An application for nationality by a person having limited or no disposing capacity 
is submitted by his legal representative. An application for acquiring or terminating 
nationality is subject to an act of will by the applicant having limited disposing capacity 
(an added means by which the law-maker gives effect to the provisions of the 
international Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
Under the Act, the consent of the legal representative is insufficient, and the 
agreement of both parents is required, for presentation of a declaration renouncing 
Hungarian nationality. Considering the interests of the child, a declaration by the parent 
exercising parental supervision is subject to the consent of the other parent living 
separate. 
In view of the specific nature of nationality, spouses or parents may, together with 
their minor children, submit a joint application for naturalization or renaturalization and 
present a joint declaration renouncing Hungarian nationality. 
The procedure for swearing an oath or making an affirmation is regulated by the Act 
among the procedural questions. In naturalization or renaturalization proceedings the 
related document is, together with the applicant's registration certificates, transmitted by 
the Minister of Interior to the local mayor after the President of the Republic has handed 
down his decision. 
Naturalized persons are invited by the mayor to swear an oath or make an 
affirmation of nationality. The oath must be sworn or the affirmation made within 2 
months from service of the summons. The time-limit may be prolonged by the Minister 
of Interior in justified cases, but the decision loses effect if the naturalized person fails 
to swear an oath or make an affirmation within one year. 
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The Act establishes time-limits for actions by the Minister of Interior. 
As has been discussed in some detail, the Minister of Interior must take a position 
within 6 months in matters of renunciation. He must issue nationality certificates and 
communicate facts at requests by authorities within 3 months. 
The time-limit starts running from the date at which the application is received by 
the Ministry of the Interior, because applications may be submitted, not directly to the 
proceeding authority, but to the self-government or, abroad, to the foreign representation 
of Hungary. 
Well-founded consideration of applications would be impeded if the period of their 
transmission from the aforementioned organs to the proceeding authority were to shorten 
the time-limit fixed for action by the Minister. The time-limit may be prolonged. 
At another place the Act provides that the registrar must forward applications for 
nationality to the Ministry of Interior within 8 days from receipt thereof, while the consul 
must do so as soon as possible. 
8. The Act seeks to comply with the requirements of data protection, which has 
recently received great emphasis. Nationality documents as well as related registration 
and other data are afforded the special protection of personality rights. Therefore they 
may only be inspected by the persons concerned and, after their death, their lineal 
relatives, as well as by the judicial, prosecuting and national security organs in matters 
within their competence. 
After swearing an oath or making an affirmation of Hungarian nationality, 
naturalized persons are notified of the acquisition of Hungarian nationality by the 
registrar of the self-government competent by the place of residence. 
Termination of Hungarian nationality is communicated by the Minister of Interior 
to the registries concerned. 
In matters of nationality the Minister of Interior may inspect registration documents, 
aliens'control and police files, request data from records of citizens' personal data and 
addresses, and refer applications to the national security organs and the aliens' control 
office for their views. 
Nationality documents must not be discarded, because nationality is "inherited" 
through generations and data on certain nationality-related facts are not contained in other 
authentic registers or files. 
Following from the principle of descent, the Ministry of Interior relies continuously 
on documents of older date and takes care of their safekeeping and filing. 
9. The provisions of the Acts of 1990 repealing decisions on deprivation of 
Hungarian nationality are incorporated in the final provisions of the new Act, which 
allows persons formerly deprived of or forcefully released from Hungarian nationality as 
well as ethnic Germans relocated to Germany to recover Hungarian nationality through 
simplified proceedings. 
Nationality law is one of the most static branches of the legal system. The long 
periods of applicability of nationality laws are exemplified by both Hungarian and 
universal legal history. The new Act on Nationality is the fourth adopted by Hungary to 
date, and hopefully there will be no exception. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 
1993 35 № 1-2 , pp. 77-82 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest 
Jozo Cizmic The Legal Services Act of the Republic of 
Croatia—a Guarantee of the Advocates' 
Independence and Autonomy 
I. Introduction 
The Legal Services Act of the Republic of Croatia (Zakon о odvjetniStvu Republike 
Hrvatske, henceforth referred to as "the Act") came into force on 18 February 1994 
(Narodne novine 9/94).' The Act regulates the organization and function of legal services 
as an independent and autonomous institution whereby advocates and authorized to 
represent natural and legal persons before courts and give them legal assistance in 
achieving their rights and interests (Art. 1). The provisions of the Act are based on the 
best solutions from the centuries-long Croatian tradition of law practice,2 as well as the 
1 In Croatian law, the term "legal services" refers to all types of legal work performed by an advocate 
(odvjetnik) for clients (advocacy in courts and tribunals, giving of legal advice aad drafting of legal documents). 
In Croatian law, the term "advocate" (odvjetnik) is not the same as "lawyer" (pravnik). Namely, all law school 
graduates acquire the academic title of "pravnik" ("lawyer" in the sense of Bachelor of Laws). Afterwards they 
can be employed as lawyers in the public service or in industrial and commercial firms where they may only 
perform legal functions related to the status and activities of such firms. In order that a lawyer becomes an 
advocate duly admitted to practice and authorized to perform all types of legal services for clients, he has to 
complete the required period of practical work and pass the prescribed bar examination. Legal services 
performed by advocates in Croatian law correspond approximately to the functions performed separately by 
barristers and solicitors in English law, and are similar to those performed by attorneys at law in the American 
legal system. 
2 In Croatian regions the legal profession was first mentioned in the Croatian legal document Vinodolski 
zakonik (The Code of Vinodol) of 6 January 1288. The Code of Vinodol speaks of the role of advocates who 
were not communal officials but were chosen by the parties themselves from a number of literate people learned 
in the law. In 1868, the so-called Advocates'Order (Advocaten Ordnung) was established in Dalmatia (a 
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solutions established by legislation and practice in the West-European and Middle-
European countries. The Act also incorporates some well-established solutions from the 
former law on legal services (Narodne novine, 53/72, 8/90, and 31/90).3 The Act also 
introduces a number of new solutions taking into account necessary changes in the 
organization of the political, economic and legal system of the Republic of Croatia after 
its becoming a sovereign state. 
Under the Act, citizens and legal persons have at their disposal an independent and 
autonomous institution of legal services ensuring them legal assistance for a fee, or free 
of charge in the cases provided by the Act and by-laws of the Bar Association 
(henceforth the Bar).4 Such legal services not only protect the rights of citizens and other 
legal persons but are also a prerequisite for the normal functioning of the courts, 
government administration and economy of the country, since the institution of legal 
services constitutes an essential factor of legal security and stability in a democratic 
society. The new Act means another step forward in the establishment of Croatia as a 
democratic state based on the rule of law. 
In this account, only the most important solutions from the provisions of the Act will 
be described. 
II. Basic principles of the organization and function of legal services 
The basic principles of he organization and function of legal services are laid down 
in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Art. 27, which defines 
legal services as an autonomous and independent institution whereby advocates provide 
legal assistance to citizens. Moreover, the framers of the Constitution have given special 
significance to the legal profession so that its specific role in the Republic of Croatia is 
emphasized in a number of other constitutional provisions.5 
The Act regulates the organization and function of legal services by means of the 
following principles: advocates' autonomy and independence; advocates' immunity, obliga-
tion to form a bar association; monotype and universal provision of legal protection; actual 
and continuous law practice; professional incompatibility; conscientiousness and profes-
sional responsibility; exclusive right to provide legal assistance for a fee; duty of secrecy; 
free access to information. Only the most important principles will be described here. 
Croatian province), whereby legal practice was inroduced as a free profession, and in 1872 the first Bar 
Association was instituted in Zagreb and Osijek. 
3 Before the enactment of the new law, European legal standards were also recognized and applied by 
Croatian advocates who belonged to one of the few professions able to win and retain independence even in 
the former political regime. 
4 For example, the Bar must secure free legal aid for defensive-war victims and socially endangered people 
in legal matters in which such persons exercise rights related to their position (Art. 21). 
5 Thus, for example, judges of the Constitutional Court and members of the State Tribunal are partly elected 
from the ranks of distinguished advocates (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Arts 121 and 122). 
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1. Advocates' autonomy and independence 
One of the basic rights of every citizen is to consult an autonomous and independent 
advocate. Citizens and legal persons are entitled to avail themselves of legal services 
provided by independent advocates whom they choose themselves so that their rights may 
be protected.6 Advocates achieve autonomy and independence especially by practising 
law autonomously and independently, as a free professional activity, and by forming a 
bar association or law society as an autonomous and independent organization of 
advocates which lays down its own Articles and other laws and admits or disbars 
advocates (Art. 2). 
2. Advocates' exclusive right to perform legal services for a fee 
In order that citizens may obtain legal assistance of high professional quality, the Act 
states that only advocates may practise law as a profession (Art. 5). At the same time, 
special laws may provide that other legally-qualified persons also render certain legal 
services.7 The basic reasons for the exclusive right of advocates to work in private 
practice and render legal services for a fee are professional skill and responsibility. 
The Act also introduces a new institution: legal services, i.e. legal advice and opinion, 
offered for a fee by professors of law in Croatian universities. In this way, highly 
specialized jurists may provide legal services which advocates, because of their regular 
engagement in representing clients before courts and administrative agencies, do not offer 
or are not able to perform at the same level of expertise as university professors. 
3. Advocates' immunity 
An advocate may not be prosecuted for a legal opinion expressed during his 
performance of legal services in proceedings before courts or administrative agencies 
(Art. 15). He may not be arrested for an offence committed in performing legal services 
without a warrant of arrest issued by a panel of three judges of a competent court (Art. 
16). A search warrant for the examination of an advocate's office or his person may only 
be issued by a competent court if all conditions prescribed by the Penal Code of the 
Republic of Croatia are fulfilled (Art. 17). 
The intention of these provisions is not to give advocates special rights but to ensure 
them freedom and security in performing their professional activitity and protecting their 
professional secrets. These provisions also protect the rights of their clients. However, 
the immunity of advocates is narrower than judicial immunity. Thus immunity does not 
6 In this sense, the principle of advocates' independence and autonomy is laid down in the provisions of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia relating to the basic freedoms and rights of man and citizen, which 
shows the commitment of Croatia to democracy and the rule of law. 
7 E.g. the Notarial Services Act (Zakon о javnom biljeïniStvu, Narodne novine, 78/93) regulates the 
organization of work and powers of notaries public. A notary public performs his work as an exclusive 
profession and, among other tilings, is also authorized to draw up certain official documents concerning legal 
transactions, statements and facts on which legal rights are based (Art. 2). He is also authorized to represent 
clients before court in non-litigious matters when such matters are in direct connection with a document he has 
issued, in which case he has power of attorney involving the rights and duties of an advocate. 
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exempt an advocate from punishment for having insulted a judge or another person 
involved in legal proceedings or for other misbehaviour (e.g. obstruction of proceedings) 
in court or during any other proceedings. 
III. Remuneration and reimbursement of expenses 
Advocates are entitled to remuneration for their work and to reimbursement of 
expenses incurred by their work according to the fee rates established by the Bar (Art 
18). The determination of fees by the Bar is an essential element of the advocates' auto-
nomy.8 However, this also means that an advocate may not charge a fee without any 
criteria or entirely of his own accord. 
A new solution consists in the possibility to negotiate remuneration in proportion to 
the success of legal services rendered in property disputes (pactum de quota litis), which 
used to be forbidden. The upper limit of remuneration in terms of a negotiable percentage 
is determined by the Bar (Art. 19). The aim of these provisions is to motivate advocates 
to negotiate out-of-court settlements of disputes so that courts may be less burdened with 
cases and parties achieve their rights in a shorter time. 
IV. Advocates' offices and law firms 
With respect to the organization of legal services, the Act introduces some essential 
novelties. An advocate may freely choose or change the residence of his office in the 
territory of Croatia. An advocate may only have one office, but several advocates may 
have a joint practice which is established by registration in a special register of the Bar 
(Art. 25). 
Two or more advocates may found a law firm which has the status of a legal person 
and is instituted as a partnership (Art. 27). Only advocates may be members of a law 
firm, and only advocates and articled clerks may provide legal services in such firms. In 
order to establish a law finn, its founders (advocates) must first receive approval from 
the Bar. The aim of such solutions is to adjust the organization of legal services in 
Croatia to contemporary trends in the organization of legal services abroad. The 
establishment of larger law firms will facilitate relations with foreign law firms,9 and 
increase the quality of work, possibility of specialization, use of computers, etc. 
A joint practice or a law firm my have several offices on condition that in each office 
at least one advocate works permanently (Art. 22). 
8 Exceptionally, the fee for the advocvate's work in ex officio defences is fixed by the Ministry of Justice 
(Art. 18, para. 2). 
9 A Croatian and a foreign law firm may link up by a written agreement for the purposes of legal work of 
mutual interest, mutual assistance, etc. The mode and conditions of such cooperation are regulated by the 
Articles of the Bar. 
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An advocate can submit a request to practise as a specialist in a branch of law, and 
at their registration law firms can confine themselves to legal services in a specific 
branch of law (Arts 69 and 70). Requests for approval of specialization are dealt with by 
a competent board of the Bar, and the branches in which advocates may be admitted to 
specialize are defined in the Articles of the Bar. When the approval is given, the 
specialization is entered in the advocates' directory and may be advertised in the name 
of the office or the relevant law firm. 
V. Obligation to form a bar association 
The Bar is an autonomous and independent organization with the status of a legal 
person. The Bar represents the advocates of the Republic of Croatia as a whole (Art 37). 
Its bodies are the following: Assembly, Board of Directors, Executive Board, President 
and other bodies specified in its Articles. The Assembly lays down the Articles of the 
Bar and the Code of Legal Ethics (the Act, Arts 41 and 42). The Bar keeps a directory 
of advocates and articled clerks and a register of joint practices and law firms and other 
records prescribed by the Act or its Articles. 
The regulation of the advocates' organization is based on two essential postulates: 
obligation to form a bar association and full autonomy of the advocates' organization and 
activities. Every advocate is required to become a member of the Bar (Art. 37). In order 
to maintain high standards of legal services, every advocate is subject to control by the 
Bar as an autonomous and independent professional organization, and not by any 
government bodies or other national authorities. 
VI. Professional liability insurance 
Special importance is attributed to the provisions of the Act that introduce obligatory 
professional liability insurance which pays compensation if an advocate incurs damage 
to a third party by performing legal services (Art. 44). This institution protects advocates 
against any of the risks or faults in their conduct or performance in legal services. On the 
other hand, the parties concerned are given a guarantee that they will receive indemnity 
for any damage incurred by negligent or improper behaviour of advocates. The Bar can 
underwrite liability insurance of all advocates in the Republic of Croatia. In that case, 
every advocate is bound to pay an insurance premium to the Bar. 
VII. Admission and disbarment of advocates 
The Act regulates the basic questions relating to the admission and disbarment of 
advocates. In this matter, the Act mainly incorporates relevant solutions from the former 
law on legal services that are well-established in practice. However, the fundamental 
changes in the organization of the political, legal and economic system of the Republic 
of Croatia after its becoming a sovereign state, as well as a considerable increase in the 
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number of advocates and a relative decrease in the quality of legal services,10 resulted 
in stricter requirements for the admission of advocates. Also, the possibility that a lawyer 
enrolled in the bar of another state acts as an advocate in the Republic of Croatia is 
restricted to proceedings before arbitration tribunals in legal matters with a foreign 
element (Art. 47). 
The right to practise law in the Republic of Croatia is achieved by registration in the 
advocates' directory after an oath-taking ceremony. The right of registration may be 
granted to a person who: is a Croatian citizen; possesses legal capacity; is physically and 
mentally fit to work as an advocate, has graduated from a law school in the Republic of 
Croatia, has at least three years' experience of legal work in an advocate's office or in 
a court, or five years' experience in other legal work; is a fluent speaker of Croatian; has 
passed the bar examination in the Republic of Croatia; is not under criminal investigation 
or charged with an offence by a public prosecutor; is not engaged in any activity 
incompatible with law practice (Art. 48). All the requirements must be fulfilled 
cumulatively. An advocate is disbarred if he or she has lost Croatian citizenship; has lost 
legal capacity; has become permanently unfit for practice; has received a suspended 
sentence prohibiting him or her from practicing as an advocate; has been suspended from 
practice as a result of a disciplinary measure; gives up working as an advocate; does not 
actually practise as an advocate for more than six months without good reason; gets 
employed (elsewhere than in an advocate's practice or in a law firm); is sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment of more than six months (Art. 56). 
VIII. Instead of a conclusion 
The Articles and other by-laws of the Bar must be brought into conformity with the 
Act within a year from its effective date. With this Act coming into force, the former law 
on legal services (Narodne novine 53/72, 8/90 and 31/90) has ceased to be operative. 
10 One of the aims of the Act is to prevent unlincensed law practice (or quack practice), a phenomenon 
regarded as dangerous and detrimental to any legal system. In principle, only advocates are allowed to practise 
law professionally, and the Bar is empowered and obligated to initiate proceedings in the cases of unauthorized 
performance of legal services (Art. 6). Any performance of legal services contrary to the provisions of the Act 
is punishable by pecuniary penalties which may be inflicted on either a natural or a legal person, and in 
recurrent cases the operating licence granted to a legal may be cancelled temporarily or permanently. 
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KALEIDOSCOPE 
A Note on the Hungarian Acceptance 
of the Optional Clause 
1. The relations of the former socialist States to International Court of Justice were 
not very friendly. In forty-five years the Central and Eastern European States with some 
exceptions always refused to appear before the Court either as applicant or as 
respondent1 and until the end of 1992 not a single case were submitted to the Court by 
those States. The same applies to the advisory proceedings and the Central and Eastern 
European States tried to hinder the Court to respond to the requests of advisory opinions 
in almost all cases in which they were touched upon.2 
Hence the Central and Eastern European ('Socialist') States did not accept the 
Optional Clause of the Statute of the World Court and as a rule they made reservations 
to multilateral treaty provisions containing a clouse concerning the jurisdiction of the 
Court for certain disputes between the contracting parties.3 As a result of the political 
changes in the region entailing an emphatic commitment to the rule of law in general 
and in international relations in particular, the Central and Eastern European States 
necessarily changed step by step their attitude toward the Court; as a first move they 
1 The East European ('socialist') States were involved in the contentious cases of the Corfu Channel, the 
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955. 
2 See Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations; Interpretation of Peace 
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania; Mazilu case, etc. 
3 Only very few multilateral treaties were exception to this practice. Sometimes the reservations of the East 
European States were formulated in such a way that the consent of the parties to the dispute were required for 
each dispute separately to the jurisdiction of the Court, and as a result instead of the acceptance of a compro-
missory treaty provision the State just repeated the very well known principle that without the consent of the 
parties to the dispute the Court could not consider a conflict. 
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revoked their reservations to judicial clauses found in multilateral treaties and than even 
some Central and Eastern European States made unilateral declaration accepting the 
Optional Clause. 
2. Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the so-called Op-
tional Clause, provided for the introduction of a particular system of compulsory inter-
national jurisdiction on a strictly voluntary basis. Under this system the States could, by 
making unilateral declarations of acceptance, recognize as compulsory, in relation to 
States accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Since in the Statute of the Permanent Court there were no provisions on the form of 
the declarations, States developed in practice several forms and the acceptance of the 
Optional Clause was admitted in any form.4 A few States just repeated the words of the 
Optional Clause, while the declarations of others widely differed from the Statute in their 
text. In certain other cases the States concerned announced simply, in a single sentence, 
that they recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Some States included such 
declarations in their instruments of ratification of the Protocol of Signature of the Statute 
of the Court, others in turn sent an Optional Clause declaration by letter to the Secretary-
General of the League. After the Second World War the situation was similar since the 
Statute of the new Court is almost literally identical with the Statute of its predecessor, 
and thus no change has been made regarding to the declarations.5 
As to the content of the declarations the States are free to formulate their 
declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction. The more than seventy-year 
history of the Optional Clause shows that some States with the reservations added to their 
declarations limited very much the scope of compulsory jurisdiction of the two Courts, 
especially if take into consideration the principle of reciprocity which applies ex lege, 
owing to the Statute, to the system of the Optional Clause irrespective whether the States 
are mentioning, or not the reciprocity in their declaration. The States making declarations 
under the Optional Clause are not bound by any rule, they have full discretion to decide 
what obligations to assume by their declarations, as well as for what disputes, in relation 
to which States, and for what period of time. 
The reservations or limitations appended to declarations under the Optional Clause, 
which effectively restrict the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, are usually divided 
4 Cf. FARMANFARMA, A. N.: The Declared Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Montreux, 
1952. 25-26. 
5 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice reads as follow: 
"2. The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso 
facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction 
of the Court in all legal disputes concerning (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international 
law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; 
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the 
part of several or certain States, or for a certain time." 
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into three groups, differentiating between limitations ratione temporis, ratione personae, 
and ratione materiae.6 
In the last more than seven decades the States in their declarations accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the two Courts have developed many and rather complicated 
reservations which incontestably weaken the effect of the declarations. In scientific 
literature the debates about the admissibility of reservations to declarations accepting 
compulsory jurisdiction were rather academic character, especially because the States did 
not object to any reservation and the two Courts themselves, when receiving notification 
of some rather "disputable" reservation, simply took note of it. As Sir Humphrey 
Waldock pointed out in this connection "...it was a recognized interpretation of the Statute 
that States had an inherent right to qualify their acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction 
under the Optional Clause by limitations, reservations, and conditions".7 
3. At the time of the Permanent Court of International Justice the majority of Central 
and Central and Eastern European States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court and at the eve of the Second World War Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia were parties to the 
system of the optional clause.8 However, these declarations either expired, or owing to 
the dissolution of the Permanent Court lapsed,9 or the declaring State itself disappeared 
like the Baltic States. Till the end of the '80s the Central and Eastern European States 
were out of the system of the Optional Clause. After the democratic changes in the 
region Poland was the first in accepting the Optional Clause at 25 September, 1990. This 
were followed by Estonia (21 October, 1991), Bulgaria (24 June, 1992)10 and Hungary 
on 22 October, 1992. 
It should be mentioned that the first Hungarian declaration accepting the Optional 
Clause dated from 14 September, 1928, in that declaration Hungary accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court practically without reservation, it did not 
exclude any category of dispute, and even did not rule out the retroactive effect of the 
declaration, since it did not mentioned that the declaration concents only disputes arising 
in the future, or with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the ratification of the 
declaration. That declaration contained only two restrictions, namely it was made on 
condition of reciprocity, and for a period of 5 years from the date of the deposit of the 
instrument of ratification. The condition of reciprocity, as we already mentioned, was not 
a real restriction since the principle of reciprocity according to the Statute was inherent 
to the system of compulsory jurisdiction under the Optional Clause, and this principle 
applied to all declarations irrespective whether it was included, or not in the declarations. 
The declaration of 1928 was renewed twice, first for another period of 5 years as from 
6 Cf. MERRILLS, J. G.: The Optional Clause Today, in: BYIL 1979, 96-110. 
7 WALDOCK, C. H. M.: Decline of the Optional Clause, in: BYIL 1955-56. 248-249. 
8 See PC1J Series E. No. 16. Sixteenth Report of the PCIJ (June 15th, 1939-December31st, 1945). 331-361. 
9 See the case of the Bulgarian declaration of 1921 in the Case concerning the Aerial Incident of July 
27th, 1955. 
10 Cf. ICJ Yearbook 1991-1992. 76-77, 82, 101-102. 
86 Kaleidoscope 
13 August, 1934, and than for the period from 13 August, 1939 to 10 April, 1941. This 
second renewal was made already at the time of the Second World War, and this is the 
reason why this declaration, according to our knowledge, contained the shortest time 
limitation in a declaration of acceptance ever made by a State. 
4. On 22 October, 1992, after more than a semi-centennial interruption the Hungarian 
Government by a letter to the Secretary-General of the UN joined to the system of 
compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court. The decision on the acceptance of the 
Optional Clause was adopted by the National Assembly practically unanimously." 
The Hungarian declaration was made on condition of reciprocity with respect of all 
disputes arising in the future in respect of facts or situations subsequent of the declaration 
of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 
The Hungarian declaration contains several reservations restricting to a certain extent 
the scope of the obligations assumed by Hungary under the optional clause: 
a) The first reservation excludes from the application of the declaration those disputes 
in regard to which the parties agreed to recourse to some other method of peaceful 
settlement. It is well known that the reservations relating to other methods of pacific 
settlement are one of the most frequently used reservation and correspond to Article 95 
of the Charter which provides that nothing in the Charter "shall prevent Members of the 
United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by 
virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future". The 
reservation concerning other peaceful method of peaceful settlement gives a freedom of 
action to the State by securing that according to its wish certain disputes covered by the 
declaration should not be submitted to the Court. 
b) As regards the time-limit of the Hungarian declaration like the majority of the 
post-war declarations contains a provision concerning termination or denunciation. The 
declaration itself do not comprise any reference to duration, i.e. the Hungarian 
Government accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for an indefinite period, 
and practically it reserves the right of termination of the declaration at any time. 
However, what is very important, according to the declaration the termination will take 
effect only after six months of notice period. 
The Hungarian Government as many States accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court reserved also the right at any time to amend, or withdraw any of the 
reservations its declaration or to add to it any other reservations, and again any of such 
modification of the declaration will take effect after six months of the notification. 
c) One of the most debated and most important type of reservation to the declarations 
of acceptance are the reservations relating to matters of domestic jurisdiction. That 
reservations are in line with Article 2, para. 7 of the Charter stating that nothing in the 
Charter "shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State". The reservations concerning domestic 
jurisdiction date back to the interwar period when in 1929 Great Britain introduced in its 
11 Resolution of the Parliament 56/1992 of 2 October, 1992. 
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declaration a reservation concerning domestic jurisdiction. This type of reservations was 
subject of criticism by Hersch Lauterpacht already in the late '20s.12 However, later on 
the reservations concerning domestic jurisdiction become "popular" and in the practice 
of States two kinds of reservations concerning domestic jurisdiction were developed. The 
first one we call "objective" reservation to domestic jurisdiction, which means that the 
declaring State excludes matters falling within domestic jurisdiction as determined by 
international law. The other version is the so-called "subjective" reservation concerning 
matters of domestic jurisdiction, the famous Connally-reservation, which excludes from 
the recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court questions falling essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction as "determined" by the State concerned or which such 
State "considers" essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. The Court faced with the 
problem of subjective reservations to domestic jurisdiction in Certain Norwegian Loans 
and Interhandel cases. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht judge of the Court in his separate opinion 
delivered in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans challenged such reservations and 
declared them null and void.13 The Court itself never dwelt on these reservations and 
as it stated in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans: "...the Court has before it a 
provision which both Parties to the dispute regard as constituting an expression of their 
common will relating to the competence of the Court. The Court does not therefore 
consider that it is called upon to enter into an examination of the reservation in the light 
of considerations which are not presented by the issues in the proceedings. The Court, 
without prejudging the question, gives effect to the reservation as it stands and as the 
Parties recognize it."14 
Taking into consideration the destructive effect on the system of compulsory 
jurisdiction the Hungarian declaration refers to the objective reservation to domestic 
jurisdiction and excludes from the recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court 
disputes in regard to matters which by international law fall exclusively within the 
domestic jurisdiction of Hungary. 
d) The Hungarian declaration added a special and rather complicated reservation 
concerning hostilities, war etc. The reservations concerning anned actions first appeared 
at the eve of the Second World War when the member States of the British Common-
wealth and France added new reservations to their declarations of acceptance and 
excluded disputes arising out of events occurring at any time when the declaring States 
were involved in hostilities.15 After the Second World War the reservations on armed 
actions and hostilities become more complicated and nowadays some States shaped in 
such a way that they cover even the event due to the participation in UN peacekeeping 
actions. 
12 Cf. LAUTERPACHT, H.: Tile British Reservation to the Optional Clause, in: Economica, 1930. 148-149. 
13 Cf. ICJ Reports, 1957. 34-66. 
14 ICJ Reports, 1957. 27. 
15 At that time some member States of the League made "reservations" regarding these declarations or above-
mentioned limitations. Cf. PCIJ Series E. No. 16. Sixteenth Report of the PCIJ (June 15th, 1939-December 
31st, 1945) 333. 
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The inclusion of a reservation concerning events of armed actions was important for 
Hungary in view of the fact that several questions connected with the Second World War 
and the Revolution of 1956 were still pending. 
e) With the forth reservation of the declaration Hungary wanted to avoid to be suited 
by a State which accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court with immediate effect 
and with the aim to bring a given dispute before the Court As it is well known since the 
Case concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory the States are cautious and 
they try to avoid any "surprise" action by a State which very shortly after adhering to the 
system of compulsory jurisdiction of the Court introduces a proceeding against an other 
State accepting the Optional Clause. The States consider such "surprise" action as a 
danger especially because the Court upheld these actions by stating that "A State 
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court must expect that an Application may be filed 
against it before the Court by a new declarant State on the same day on which that State 
deposited with the Secretary-General its Declaration of Acceptance."16 
As a conclusion it should welcome that after so many years Hungary made a 
declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court. One can state that 
the reservations included in the declaration do not undermine the obligation assumed by 
adhering to the system of the Optional Clause. 
ANNEX 
The Text of the Hungarian Declaration of 1992 Accepting the Optional Clause 
"The Republic of Hungary hereby recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without 
special agreement, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice, in accordance with Article 36, para. 2, of the Statute of the Court in all 
disputes which may arise in respect of facts or situations subsequent to this declaration, 
other than: 
a) disputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed or shall agree 
to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement; 
b) disputes in regard to matters which by international law fall exclusively within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the Republic of Hungary; 
c) disputes relating to, or connected with, facts or situations of hostilities, war, armed 
conflicts, individual or collective actions taken in self-defense or the discharge of any 
functions pursuant to any resolution or recommendation of the United Nations, and other 
similar or related acts, measures or situations in which the Republic of Hungary is, has 
been or may in the future be involved; 
16 ICJ Reports, 1957. 146. 
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d) disputes in respect of which any other party to the dispute has accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court only in relation to or for the purpose of such 
dispute; or where the acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on behalf of any 
other party to the dispute was deposited less than twelve months prior to the filing of the 
application bringing the dispute before the Court. 
The Government of the Republic of Hungary reserves the right at any time, by means 
of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and with effect 
of six months of such notification to amend, add to or withdraw any of the foregoing 
reservations or any that may hereafter be added. 
This declaration shall remain in force until the expiration of six months after 
notification has been given of its termination." 
Vanda LAMM 
The State Council on the Judiciary of the 
Republic of Croatia 
I. Introductory Note 
The Republic of Croatia Parliament—its House of Representatives—during the June 2nd 
1993 session enacted "Zakon о Drzavnom Sudbenom Vijecu" [The Act on the State 
Council on the Judiciary] (Official Gazette: Narodne Novine No. 58/93). The Act came 
into effect as on June 26th 1993. It regulates the eligibility criteria for the president and 
the members of the State Council on the Judiciary (hereinafter: S. C.) and cessation of 
their office. In addition it also sets the procedure of appointing/discharging of the judges 
and state attorneys as well as their disciplinary responsibility procedure. Such an Act is 
important because it establishes the self-directing and independence of the judiciary, that 
being an indispensable prerequisite to develop a rule-of-law-state. 
II. The Situation Preceding the Enactment and Constitutional Grounds 
to Enact 
Prior to enacting and/or application of The Act on the State Council on Judiciary 
(hereinafter: S. C. A.), the judges of the regular courts, public prosecutor of the Republic 
and his deputies, public attorney of the Republic and his deputies were appointed/dis-
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charged as regulated by the Act on Regular Courts,1 Act on Public Prosecutor2 and Act 
on Public Attorney of the Republic of Croatia. Under the provisions of the quoted Acts 
the judges, public prosecutor and his deputies, public attorney and his deputies were 
elected, appointed and discharged by the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia. In 
accordance with the provisions of the S. C. A. the prerogative of appointing (disharging 
the judges and state attorneys has been transferred from the parliament to a separate 
organ—S. С., as provided by Art. 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia 
(hereinafter: Constitution) namely, Art. 4 of Constitution provides for the application of 
Art. 120 of the Constitution according to which the office of the judge is permanent 
Such provision develops and strengthens the principle of judicial independence 
constituting one of the essentials of democracy and a guarantee for protection of any kind 
of human rights. 
III. State Council on the Judiciary 
a) Competence 
Under the provisions of Art. 12 of S. C. A., and in compliance with Arts 120 and 121 
of the Constitution, the competences of the S. C. include: 
1. Appointing the presidents of the courts, judges, state attorneys and their deputies; 
2. Conducting the procedure and deciding on discharging the presidents of the courts, 
judges, state attorneys and their deputies; 
3. Conducting the disciplinary procedure and deciding on the disciplinary responsibil-
ity of the judges, state attorneys and their deputies. 
b) Composition of the State Council and Election of Its Members 
A new institution—State Council—has been introduced by the S. C. A. in compliance with 
Art 121 of the Constitution. The president and 7 members of the S. C. are to be elected 
among the judges, while 4 members are eligible among the state attorneys and/or their 
deputies and the remaining 2 members are eligible out of university professors of law, who 
as a rule have a standing in the profession of at least 15 years (S. C. A., Art. 4, para. 2). 
It should be emphasized that the S. C. is to be composed of top professionals in various 
branches of jurisprudence and it may reasonably be assumed that the eligibility of the 
judges and state attorneys will be based upon their morality and capability, allowing thus 
for the principles of professional and personal capability to govern their promotion. 
"Zupanijski dorn" [House of the Counties of the Croatian Parliament], following the 
rules of procedure, is due to ask The Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, State 
1 Act on Regular Courts, Arts 69-98 (Narodne novine, 32/88 consolidated text, 16/90, 41/90, 14/91, 66/91. 
2 Act on Public Prosecutor, Arts 28-46 (Narodne novine, 34/89, consolidated text, 16/90, 41/90, 41/91, 
66/91, 22/92, 39/92). 
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Attorney of the Republic of Croatia, Association of Attorneys of the Republic of Croatia 
to propose the personalities who, in their opinion, are eligible for the president and the 
members of the S. С.3 The next step is the final propounding of the candidates for such 
offices to be submitted to the House of Representatives by Zupanijski dorn (S. С. A., Art 
3). The final election and appointing the president and the members of S. C. for an eight 
year period is to be made by the House of Representatives (S. C. A., Art. 4). 
c) Immunity 
The president and the members of the S. C. are exempt from being held accountable in 
respect of their opinion expressed or votes given in the S. C. The president and the 
members of the S. C. may neither be imprisoned nor prosecuted without the consent of 
the S. С., unless caught in the very act of an indictable offence for which a penalty of 
more than 5 years of imprisonment has been imposed (S. C. A., Art. 8). 
d) Termination of Office 
In order to maintain the proportions among the individual professions that had been 
included in the S. C„ the provisions of the S. C. A. Article 9 determinates the office of 
the S. C. president or of the member to cease ex lege on the day the post he occupied 
at the time of his election into the S. C. is terminated.4 
The president or the member of the S. С. may be dismissed prior to expiry of the 
term of his office in the following cases: 
1. Upon his request; 
2. If a penalty of imprisonment has been imposed on him. The Court that pronounced 
the prison penalty is due to submit the final judgement to S. C. which in its turn will 
provide the information to Zupanijski dom. 
3. If he is permanently incapacitated to carry on his duty. 
4. If he becomes a national of another state. 
The decision on dismissal of the president or member of S. C. is to be passed by an 
absolute majority votes in the House of Representatives.5 
In case the procedure for dismissal has been instituted, the president or the member 
may be suspended from exercising his office. The decision on suspension is to be brought 
by a 2/3 majority votes of all the S. C. members (S. C. A., Art. 11). 
3 Act on Public Attorney of tlie Republic of Croatia, Art. 37 (Narodne novine, 17/77, 17/86, 19/90, 41/90, 
83/92). 
4 The elected president or die member of the S. C. is due to take the office within the term prescribed by 
the House of Representatives of the Parliament (S. C. A., Art. 5). Prior to talcing the office the president or the 
member of S. C. have to take an oath before die President of the Parliament (S. C. A., Art. 7). 
5 The reasons for discharging are the same as for the judges of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Croatia, the discharging determination being vested in the bodies entrusted with the duty to elect. 
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e) Methods of Work and Financial Resources 
The S. C. acts only occasionally and, for the reasons of economy, its administrative, 
technical and accountancy services are to be provided by the Ministry of Judiciary. In 
order to ensure the utmost independence and self-directing of the S. C., special funds are 
provided by the budget of the Republic of Croatia (S. C. A., Art. 40). The president and 
the members of the S. C. are entitled to remuneration of expenses incurred and to 
compensation for the reduces salary together with the reward for their work in the S. C. 
(S. C. A., Art. 41). 
The methods of the S. С. work are to be laid down in the rules of procedure adopted 
by the majority votes of all the members. 
IV. Final Considerations 
It should be noted that the application of provisions in Sections III to VIII of the S. C. A. 
related to the procedure for appointing/discharging the judges and state attorneys as well 
as to the procedure for determining their disciplinary responsibility, will begin on the day 
of coming into force of the Act regulating the establishment, jurisdiction and organization 
of the regular courts and state attorneys office. It primarily relates to the Act on Courts, 
another act crucial for establishing an efficient and independent judicial system. By the 
realization of the said acts the Republic of Croatia will achieve a judiciary appropriate 
for a democratic state. 
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BOOK REVIEW 
Pál HORVÁTH: Frank Ignác (Ignác Frank), Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1993. 275 pp. 
In its series of A múlt magyar tudósai 
(Hungarian Scientists of the Past) Akadémai 
Kiadó has presented the reader with a wel-
come study, thorough and understanding, 
by Professor Dr. Pál Horváth on Ignác 
Frank (1788-1850), a prominent Hungarian 
jurist and professor of law. A noted scholar 
in Hungarian private law and professor of 
the Private Law Department at the Law 
School of Péter Pázmány University, Ignác 
Frank has, for a century now, been a subject 
of much debate and diverse assessments as 
regards both his personality and his scien-
tific accomplishment. There is hardly any 
question that his career as well as his 
works—first of all his major essays and 
books, especially his conservative national 
mentality they reveal and the historico-legal 
school or, more specifically, its Hungarian 
adaptation providing a legal philosophy ba-
sis for such mentality-give good cause for 
a diversity of appraisals. (Unfortunately, 
space forbids a discussion of the legal and 
historical role played by the Gennan histori-
cal school (Hugo, Savigny) under contempo-
rary Gennan conditions and in the different 
Hungarian context [See Gyula EÖRSI: 
Összehasonlító polgári jog (Comparative 
Civil Law), Budapest, 1975. pp. 149-150; 
Vilmos PESCHKA: Thibaut és Savigny 
vitája (The Dispute between Thibaut and 
Savigny) in: Jog és jogfilozófia, Budapest, 
1980. pp. 26-69; Gábor HAMZA-András 
SAJÓ: Savigny a jogtudomány fejlődésének 
keresztútján (Savigny at the Crossroad of 
the Development of Jurisprudence), Állam-
és Jogtudomány XXII/1.1980. pp. 79-112, 
etc.], but it must be noted that the relevance 
and role of Savigny's historico-legal school 
were more or less adequate to the contem-
porary set of German conditions, while this 
cannot be said at all for Ignác Frank's 
adaptation of that school.) The writer of the 
appreciation reviewed here being a legal 
historian, it is no surprise that he should 
devote relatively little attention to the sub-
stance of Ignác Frank's private law record 
and its legal philosophy basis and still less 
to their critical assessment. Indeed, it is 
difficult to say anything new about this after 
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the appreciations and assessments that the 
presentation, not particularly opportune, of 
the conservative national mentality of the 
historico-legal school in the Hungarian 
science of private law was aimed at con-
serving rather than assisting and supporting, 
in a manner admitting of little doubt, the 
feudal Hungarian private law in the prevail-
ing pattern of contemporary Hungary's 
economic, social and political conditions. 
Consequently the real value of these works 
on private law consisted in what Ferenc 
Eckhart, in his work "History of the Depart-
ment of Political and Legal Sciences", perti-
nently formulated in these terms: Ignác 
Frank's works on private law "make it virtu-
ally superfluous for one seeking orientation 
in old private law to know and study all that 
which was written down before them [Ferenc 
ECKHART: A jog- és államtudományi kar 
története. A királyi Pázmány Péter Tudo-
mányegyetem története, II (History of the 
Department of Political and Legal Sciences. 
History of Royal Péter Pázmány University, 
II), Budapest, 1936 (quoted by HORVÁTH: 
op. cit., p. 53)], an assertion which even the 
author finds to be a slight exaggeration. 
Equally self-evident is the fact for the legal 
historian this summation, perhaps the last, 
of feudal Hungary's private law represents 
the greatest value in Ignác Frank's works. 
The most interesting and most informative 
aspects of Pál Horváth's study are consti-
tuted by his careful and thorough presenta-
tion of contemporary social, political and 
chiefly university conditions and, embedded 
in that context, that of Ignác Frank's career 
from a Piarist high school student through 
his professorship to his activity as Dean and 
Rector. As it becomes clear from the 
author's assessment, the work of Ignác 
Frank as a teacher and university leader is 
also overshadowed by his conservative 
national attitude and cautious reflections 
about change and the need for change. 
Although Pál Horváth emphasizes Ignác 
Frank's considerable support for József 
Eötvös's university reform plans, he himself 
was hardly pressed to show concrete traces 
thereof. While one may sympathize with an 
attitude of reserve, withdrawal and a wait-
and-see approach in an era of revolutions, 
with a professor contemplating events from 
his library's window and worried about his 
rich and famous library, Ignác Frank can 
hardly be regarded as a champion of a 
bourgeois transformation of society and law. 
There is no denying that, for Hungarian 
culture and science, the most valuable and 
abiding part of Ignác Frank's life-work is 
constituted, apart from his summary account 
of feudal Hungary's private law, by his 
imposing library of 14 000 volumes, of 
which Pál Horváth gives the reader an 
extremely informative and enjoyable picture. 
The only point about which one may have 
some doubt is that whether all the items of 
his rich collection of books, such as those 
containing the most modem thoughts of the 
time (Kant, Hegel, etc.), have indeed 
brought positive influence to bear on Ignác 
Frank's thinking and scientific work, as is 
benevolently supposed by Pál Horváth 
[HORVÁTH: op. cit., pp. 269-270]. Even 
if one does not hold that (even passionate) 
collection of books and reading (not to 
speak of understanding) them are two quite 
different things, one may reasonably argue 
that the some outstanding pieces of his 
library exercised considerable influence on 
Ignác Frank's thinking; but it is remarkable 
that the influence instead of being positive, 
was confined to provoking his criticism. 
Ignác Frank was an eminent scholar and 
professor of the feudal Hungarian private 
law who observed with clarity that the 
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epoch of feudalism in Hungary too was due 
to end soon; he reacted with resignation 
and disappointment and decided to tum 
away from the new, emerging world rather 
than to document the decay of the old 
Hungarian private law, as it is recalled by 
Pál Horváth with a great deal of empathy 
and tact. To cut a long story short, the book 
under review is worth reading not the least 
because offers useful insights in many ways. 
Vilmos Peschka 
HANNIKA1NEN, L.: Cultural, Linguistic and Educational Rights in the Aland Islands. 
Publications of Advisory Board for International Human Rights Affairs No. 5, Helsinki 
1993. 102 pp. 
Aland Islands have been an autonomous 
province of Finland for more than 70 years. 
This autonomy, which is based on linguistic 
and cultural autonomy, constitutes a unique 
example for the treatment of minorities. The 
author, as a senior researcher of the Acad-
emy of Finland, looked into this autonomy 
and the implementation of cultural, linguistic 
and educational rights in this territory from 
the perspective of international law. He has 
found out that the principal problem is not 
that of Finland unduly restricting the rights 
of the Swedish-speaking population but it 
appears to be that of whether the restrictions 
set by the authorities of Aland Province on 
the use of Finnish language in public life 
in order to preserve Aland's monolingually 
Swedish-speaking character in a country 
where more than 90% of the population is 
Finnish-speaking are consistent with inter-
national human rights conventions as regards 
the rights of the Finnish-speaking residents 
of Aland Islands. 
The main questions examined in order 
to throw light upon this problem can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Development of Aland's autonomy; 
2. Status of the Swedish-speaking and 
the Finnish-speaking population of Aland 
under international and Finnish law; 
3. Linguistic situation in education and 
in other fields in Aland in the light of the 
international human rights conventions. 
1. It was in 1920 when the newly in-
dependent Finnish State granted autonomy 
to Aland Province in order to counter the 
nearly unanimous will of the population to 
have their territory become a part of 
Sweden. On the initiative of Finland, the 
League of Nations decided in 1921 that the 
Aland Islands were to remain under the 
sovereignty of Finland, but Finland had to 
strengthen the autonomy granted earlier and 
ensure the preservation of the Swedish 
character (language, culture, local habits) 
of Aland. This decision was implemented 
in Finnish law by the 1922 Guarantees Act 
which included provisions for the estab-
lishment of Aland's Provincial Parliament 
and Provincial Government Swedish was 
declared as official language even in the 
official correspondence between the pro-
vincial administration and the State author-
ities, and in education the language of 
instruction was Swedish. The laws concern-
ing the autonomy and the guarantees for the 
Swedish character could not be amended 
without the consent of Aland Provincial 
Parliament and these amendments had to be 
enacted by the Finnish Parliament following 
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the same procedure as that required for the 
amendment of the Finnish Constitution. 
The autonomy was strengthened and the 
legislative powers of the Provincial Parlia-
ment were increased by subsequent legisla-
tion in 1951 and 1991. The 1951 Act in-
troduced the so-called right of domicile 
which could also be called "provincial 
citizenship". Its acquisition required a domi-
cile period of 5 years in the Âland Islands 
but the Aland Executive Council had the 
power to deny it "for weighty reasons" 
which were considered to include the in-
adequate ability to speak Swedish. The 
Finnish Supreme Administrative Court re-
ferring to the equality of citizens did not 
approve this view in 1978, the 1991 Auton-
omy Act, however, following the opinion 
ihat this requirement had a legitimate aim, 
was reasonable and there was a pro-
portionality between the means employed 
and the aim sought, there was not inconsis-
tent with the equality, expressly provided 
that "a resident must also have adequate 
knowledge of Swedish" for the acquisition 
of the right of domicile. 
Aland Province has its own flag with 
blue, yellow and red colours, though it was 
only in 1953 that the President of Finland 
gave his blessing to its public use. From 
1991—according to the 1991 Autonomy 
Act—"Aland" appears in passports issued in 
Aland Islands. 
The fact that Aland Islands have been 
a demilitarized region for over a hundred 
years has had an impact on the value system 
of the Alanders: manifestations of militarism 
and the advocacy of violent solutions have 
no place in Alandic society. 
2. In Finnish law the Swedish-speaking 
population is not considered to be a minority 
in the legal sense, since the Swedish is the 
second official language of Finland and the 
Swedish-speaking population is regarded as 
equal to the Finnish population under the 
Constitution. The Swedish-speaking popula-
tion of Finland is a de facto—linguistic, 
ethnic and national—minority. The Swedish-
speaking population of Aland Islands is a 
part of this but at the same time forms a 
community of its own. Under international 
law this distinct national community should 
be considered as a national minority—con-
cludes the author after considering the basic 
criteria for minority in international law. 
The Alandic population has the right to 
internal self-determination which is based 
on a special regime in international law. 
Although the Finnish-speaking popu-
lation belongs to the majority, it is in a 
minority status in Aland. However, the 
Finnish-speaking minority does not form a 
community or group of its own which would 
express itself as a linguistic, ethnic or 
national minority. The Finnish-speaking 
inhabitants' number is quite small and they 
have adapted themselves to their Swedish-
speaking surroundings. They also speak 
Swedish, since it is taught in every Finnish 
schools in Finland. They have their own 
association, the Ahveniset, but only a small 
proportion of the Alandic Finnish takes part 
actively in its activities. In conclusion, it is 
difficult to recognize the international 
minority rights of a numerically small group 
which does not express itself as a distinct 
community. Nor does the Finnish law treat 
them as minority. 
3. The restrictions on the use of Finnish 
language are present in various fields, in-
cluding education, broadcasting, publication 
and even in consumer protection. As regards 
television broadcasting, about 60% of the 
Alandic population can choose between 
several Swedish, Finnish and international 
television channels due to the cable televi-
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sions. The rest of them, however, can only 
choose between two channels: Channel 1 
transmits the programmes of Swedish tele-
vision Channel 1; for Channel 2, a board 
of Àlandic politicians selects the pro-
grammes from the programmes of Swedish 
television. Finnish-speaking programmes can 
also be selected but they must have Swedish 
subtitles. In practice, the board often pre-
ferred programmes from Sweden to the 
Swedish-speaking ones from Finland, even 
if they were in English. As far as radio 
broadcasting is concerned, the currently 
existing six channels broadcast mostly the 
programmes of Swedish Radio or other 
Swedish-speaking programmes, only one of 
them broadcasts in Finnish. This channel's 
principal recognized purpose is to serve the 
Finnish-speaking tourists. 
In education the language of instruction 
is Swedish, English is the obligatory second 
language and Finnish can be chosen as 
optional third language. Since 1993, there is 
no need for special permission to teach 
Finnish in schools, and more than 90% of the 
Âlandic pupils already study Finnish. It can 
be a disadvantage for the Finnish-speaking 
pupils to be instructed in Swedish instead 
of their native tongue, therefore, if need be, 
they are given supportive instruction. 
Having examined the international 
human rights conventions concerning edu-
cation and discrimination, the author con-
cluded that the situation in Aland is not 
inconsistent with the European Convention 
on Human Rights, the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The 
UNESCO Convention Against Discrimina-
tion in Education, however, contains several 
provisions in the light of which the monolin-
gual school system of the Aland Islands 
appears to be problematic. That is why 
Finland did not become a party to this 
Convention at the time of its conclusion but 
only ten years later when the conflict 
between the Autonomy Act and the Conven-
tion was considered to be of only theoretical 
character and of no practical significance. 
In practice, indeed, there were no complaints 
against the Âlandic school language system 
and the situation is even less problematic 
today when the vast majority of students 
study Finnish as well, due to the fact that 
the links between the Aland Islands and the 
Finnish mainland are increasing and the 
knowledge of Finnish is an advantage on 
the Âlandic labour market 
The international human rights organs 
have recognized that the equality and the 
prohibition of discrimination cannot be 
interpreted too rigidly, differential treatment 
has to be accepted in a number of circum-
stances, therefore the European Court of 
Human Rights formulated the basic criteria 
for the determination of lawfulness of such 
treatment. The Âlandic situation is consis-
tent with these criteria established in the 
Belgian Linguistic Case. 
The European Convention on Human 
Rights and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child are undoubtedly binding on the 
authorities of the Aland Islands since the 
Aland Provincial Parliament gave its consent 
to the Finnish parliamentary acts by which 
these Conventions were brought into force 
in Finland. In respect of the UNESCO 
Convention and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights the Âlandic 
authorities were not asked for their consent, 
therefore it could be questionable whether 
they are binding on the Âlandic authorities. 
On the other hand, Finland is obliged to 
ensure their implementation on its entire 
territory without exceptions since it did not 
make any reservations to them. 
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Although the present situation has not 
given rise to complaints by the Finnish-
speaking population of the Aland Islands, 
the future developments might bring about 
certain problems. For example, if Finland 
abolished the Swedish being second official 
language and that caused the increasing 
number of Finnish people not speaking 
Swedish, they still could not acquire the 
right of domicile in Aland but they could 
claim instruction in Finnish under the 
human rights conventions. Finland's ac-
cession to the European Union will also 
affect the language situation in the Aland 
Islands but it is difficult to predict how. 
The spirit of multiculturalism might cause 
either the strengthening or the weakening 
of the restrictions set in order to protect 
the monolingual character of Aland. 
As to the applicability of this model 
elsewhere, the author concludes that the 
autonomy and demilitarization could be 
suitable and welcome for any other mi-
nority territory, the system of safeguards 
for the national character, however, is so 
particular that it could hardly be suitable 
model for other situations. 
Finally, the book contains an unofficial 
English translation of the 1991 Aland 
Autonomy Act attached to the essay and 
this is followed by a bibliography of over 
80 books, articles and reports relating to 
human rights, in particular cultural and 
minority rights. 
Mónika Weller 
MA VI, V.: The Council of Europe and Human Rights. Budapest, 1993, 318 pp. 
Viktor Mavi's book is the first one in 
Hungarian which gives a comprehensive 
review on the Council of Europe's system 
of human rights protection. It summarizes 
the results of several years' research dedi-
cated to the analysis of the case law and 
practice of the European Commission and 
Court of Human Rights. The most important 
purpose of the publication is to present, at 
the level of "daily practice", the expecta-
tions and requirements established by the 
Strasbourg organs for the Council of 
Europe's member States and to contribute 
to the use of this protection mechanism by 
Hungarian nationals, since human rights 
protection, including compliance with the 
standards set by the Strasbourg case law, 
is an important precondition for the rule 
of law which can be promoted by the 
individual applications. 
In the first part, the author describes the 
Council of Europe's structure, aims, tasks 
and competences within the European 
integration. This is followed by an analysis 
of the particular features and implementation 
mechanism of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, its relationship with the 
domestic legislation of member States, as 
well as the right of complaint established 
by the Convention and the competence and 
procedure of the Convention organs relating 
thereto. In this context, a survey is made on 
the plans for future reforms of the control 
organs according to which the Commission 
and Court would either merge and constitute 
a single Court or become a dual judicial 
body ensuring protection on two instances. 
The second part is dedicated to the 
practice of interpreting the rights set forth 
in the Convention, that is the case law of 
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the Strasbourg organs. This section con-
tains an analysis of the interpretation of the 
most important rights, namely the right to 
life (Article 2), prohibition of torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 
3), right to liberty and security of person 
(Article 5), right to a fair trial (Article 6), 
protection of private and family life, home 
and correspondence (Article 8), freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion (Article 
9) and freedom of expression (Article 10). 
The author gives only a selective presenta-
tion of the rights and the relevant case law. 
The basis for the selection was the fre-
quency of reference to the respective rights 
in the individual complaints and the 
likelihood that, in the future, these articles 
might be invoked in cases against Hungary. 
Each articles subjected to analysis are 
supplemented by a guide to the relevant 
case law both of the Commission and the 
Court in order to facilitate the orientation 
of those who intend to apply to the Stras-
bourg organs in concrete cases. This guide 
contains not only a mere list of cases but, 
respectively, a brief indication as to the 
most important issues raised by the applica-
tions referred to. 
As far as practicability aimed at by the 
author is concerned, its value is being 
seriously enhanced by the supplements 
contained in Part III of the book. In addition 
to the texts of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms and the Rules of Procedure of 
the European Court of Human Rights, the 
most useful supplements are "The applica-
tion form", a "Guide on how to fill it" and 
"Information on lodging an application with 
the Commission". 
Having reviewed the book's contents, 
the conclusion can be made that the 
analysis of the Council of Europe's human 
rights protection system and the interpre-
tation of the rights protected, the supple-
ments and the bibliography consisting of 
more than a hundred references to books 
and articles relating to this matter gives 
plenty of information to everybody inter-
ested or concerned in human rights issues. 
Mónika Weller 
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FOREWORD 
The present issue of Acta Juridica Hungarica publishes the papers (sometimes in a 
revised version) submitted to the First European Regional Conference of the International 
Law Association (ILA) held in Budapest, 2 - 5 October 1993. The papers are published, 
in a general way, in the chronological order of their presentation at die conference. The 
papers published here, could not claim to be, however, a full presentation of the materials 
of the conference, since several contributions were presented only orally and their authors 
renounced from submitting them in a written form. Moreover, the papers printed here do 
not reflect the discussions that naturally followed their reading, except, of course, in so 
far the authors took into consideration of the debates of their papers. 
The editor wishes to thank in the name of the Hungarian Branch of the ILA the 
Executive Council of the International Law Association, especially its chairman, The 
Right Honourable Lord Slynn of Hadley and his predecessor, The Right Honourable Lord 
Wilberforce. The editor and the Hungarian Branch owes much, and acknowledges this 
with thanks, to Professor James Crawford, Director of Studies of the ILA for his kind 
support in many questions, especially in the scholarly programme of the conference. Last 
but not least, the editor wishes to acknowledge with thanks a donation made by the Japan 
Foundation. 
Ed. 
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PREFACE 
Since its foundation in 1873, the International Law Association has carried out most of 
its work through biennial general conferences to which its various committees have 
reported. The 66th such conference is about to be held in Buenos Aires. 
But there has been a demand for a forum in non-conference years, at which issues 
of concern to ILA members could be aired and the work of particular committees 
introduced or advanced. It was thought useful to target in this context regions where the 
ILA and its work needed to be reinforced. Thus the Executive Council welcomed an 
invitation from the Hungarian Branch of the ILA to hold its first European Regional 
Conference in Budapest in October 1993. This was a most appropriate choice of venue 
given the extraordinary changes that have occurred in Central Europe since 1989. The 
Conference theme, "The Transformation of Europe: Its Impact on International Law", 
proved a useful umbrella under which a very wide range of legal issues of relevance to 
the region were discussed. The metaphor of the umbrella may seem wont, but is was 
appropriate, not least because it rained torrentially for the duration of the Conference. 
Despite—or because of—this, the interest and participation of those attending remained 
high throughout, and, as the ILA's Patron, Lord Wilbeforce, emphasized in reporting to 
the Executive Council on the success of the Conference, the quality both of the papers 
and the discussion was first class. 
The work of the Conference was organized under a series of topic headings: (1) New 
and Reborn States in Europe and their Relationship to International Law; (2) Human 
Rights, Minority Rights and the Protection of Refugees; Questions of Definition, 
Implementation and Control; (3) Conflict Resolution—Old and New Methods; (4) Inter-
national Commercial Law; (5) International Trade Law and Regional Economic 
Development; and (6) International Environmental Law. This volume brings together a 
selection of the papers given to the Conference, and demonstrates both the variety of 
issues facing the region and the way in which existing legal ideas and structures are 
being coopted, modified and developed in aid of their solution. 
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The ILA expresses its gratitude to the Hungarian Branch, to Professor Hanna Bokor-
Szegő, its President, and to the members of the Organizing Committee, especially to Pro-
fessor Vanda Lamm and Dr András Bragyova. The assistance and cooperation of the 
Institute for Legal and Administrative Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
is also gratefully acknowledged. Above all, thanks are due to Professor Lamm, who bore 
the main brunt of the organization of the Conference and of collecting and editing these 
papers. 
It is a mark of the success of the Conference that a second regional ILA Conference, 
covering the Asia Pacific Region, is to be held. This will be hosted by the China Taiwan 
Branch of the ILA and will be held in Taiwan, from 27 to 30 May 1995. 
James Crawford 
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Tibor VÁRADY International Law and 
the Transformation of Europe 
—An Essay in Realism and Idealism 
Keynote Address at the First European 
Regional Conference of the ILA 
In this time of strife and disunion around Central and Eastern Europe, I would 
like—by this introduction—to remember two unions, both of which were forged hundred 
and twenty years ago. In 1873, a year of harmony marked by the birth of both Caruso 
and Chaliapin, the year when Tolstoi wrote Anna Karenina and Germany adopted the 
Mark as its currency, the ILA was founded in October in Brussels. In the very same 
year of 1873, the cities of Pest and Buda united, to form Budapest, the capital of 
Hungary. 
During the last hundred and twenty years—which hardly left anything un-
contested—the justification of these two unions was never really questioned. Today, their 
paths have crossed to spark and inspire another (this time much more difficult) 
union—that of Europeans under international law. 
This First European Regional Conference of the ILA in Budapest is devoted to the 
transformation of Europe. This transformation—which is far from being completed—has 
shocked us, and thrilled us in the course of the last five years. It has proved that even 
our most daring dreams may come true—and that the same applies to nighunares as 
well. 
A social structure feared and deplored by most, collapsed virtually overnight. Its 
vanishing left a void, however, and the speed of the breakdown left no time for the 
unfolding of a viable alternative before the critical moment, when the change became 
suddenly possible. The room for alternatives in Central and Eastern Europe is now wide, 
wide enough to accommodate both hope and despair. On the Western side of our 
Continent, the dramatic change of our time is that towards a union, which is not sudden 
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and unprepared, yet the reality of which is still baffling, and many consequences are 
taking both partisans and opponents by surprise. 
I know that one is inclined to overestimate the importance of the present moment, 
and of the events we are just living. One could hardly keep counting of the sports 
encounters within the past decade only, which have been proclaimed to be the match 
of the century; the same applies to events in the realm of arts or politics. Still, even if 
we make appropriate markdowns on account of our inclination to attribute highest 
importance to games in which we are players (or at least spectators), one cannot 
discount the fact that there have rarely been times in which the options would have 
been as open and as wide as nowadays. We may be on the threshold of Europe where 
people and states are not placed any more on the Procrustes beds of ideologies, and 
their main problem is not to decide which bed is the better one, and who is the 
favourite overnight guest of Procrustes. I am referring to the dream of a united Europe, 
which is just about to leave the empire of fantasy, and approaching to the domains of 
reality. At the same time, we are on the brink of new painful divisions and explosions 
which cannot be contained with the existing arsenal of instruments geared towards old 
partitions. 
In this time of transition, legal rules are also changing. In Central and Eastern 
Europe the very foundations of a given legal structure have been questioned. This is a 
perilous juncture, because one cannot easily discard a whole set of rules and authorities, 
without endangering the very purpose and standing of legal rules per se. In the decades 
which are now behind us in Central and Eastern Europe, legal rules may have been 
perverted, yet they have never been completely abandoned. Even in situations in which 
interests incompatible with international law were pursued by brutal force—like the 
invasion against the Hungarian revolution in 1956, or against the Czechoslovak in 
spring, in 1968—there was an endeavour to offer a makeshift link to international rules 
of behaviour. It was argued that the invaders were invited. (Not much attention was 
paid, however, to the sequence. Instead of the traditional progression, meaning first the 
invitation, and then the visit, this time a somewhat unorthodox chronological order was 
adopted: First the visit—by tanks—and then the invitation!) 
But what I really want to say is that while the visitors withdrew after having made 
an honest peace with the countries they left, executors of new merciless brutalities—this 
time on the Balkans—have forgotten law even as a pretext. The only recurring 
justification is the naked assertion that "I must be right since I belong to this (or that) 
nation". 
The task which our profession is facing today is tremendous. Problems have 
emerged which defy preexisting patterns, which are even beyond our preexisting 
imagination. After Chernobil, international environmental law is not any more a matter 
of improving the quality of our life, it has become a matter of our bare survival. After 
the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia, those colleagues who have been teaching 
state succession, international dispute settlement, international criminal law, human 
rights, or minority rights, they should not worry. Everything which was imaginable—or 
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unimaginable—every conceivable and inconceivable law/fact pattern became hard 
reality. Hypotheticals will not be needed for some decades to come. 
In the sphere of economy and private international law, the challenges may be 
somewhat less dramatic, but their importance is tremendous. Within a short and 
turbulent period, company forms, patterns of property, and principles of civil law in 
Central and Eastern Europe have become essentially compatible with their counterparts 
in Western Europe. This happened later than many people wished, yet sooner than 
many hoped. It happened just in time to catch the last train towards the with 
integration in the West, before it becomes separation; if the train would make a stop 
at these stations at all. One has to remember that, at times when this region was under 
the strong grip of a totalitarian ideology, and when challenging walls, barbed wires or 
prescribed patterns of communication assumed real risk, attempts from this side to join 
the logic and the institutions of the other side were encouraged an applauded. One 
could only hope that the ending of the barriers will not bring about the ending of the 
encouragement. The reasons for this are not only of a moral nature. Our destinies have 
become so intertwined, that economic prosperity, or conflicts (or ecological disasters 
for that matter) cannot be contained on one part of Europe only. 
A new unity—which may include the East-West axe as well—invites new legal 
precepts. In Private International Law, with more and more conflict rules above the 
level of individual states, we shall have to rediscover (and modemize) the dreams and 
principles of the statutists and other pre-Wächter scholars, who were engaged in a 
search for non-national guiding rule. In doing so, we must not forget that community 
conflict rules, choice-of-law rules of the Hague conventions, or other supranational 
sources of Private International Law, are still being applied first of all by municipal 
rather than by supranational courts. The same courts are in most cases dealing with 
new conflicts, those emerging between national legislation and the legislation of 
regional integrations like the EC; while decision-making authorities on the regional 
level are harbouring hardly disguised pretensions. The growing spirit of cooperation 
is also a temptation to change the borders of Private International Law—by relatively 
peaceful means. For centuries, national states were prepared to apply foreign law only 
if their own conflict rules would decide that foreign elements in the underlying legal 
relationship were dominant—and if the problems were rather remote from direct 
sovereign interests. For these reasons the playground of conflict rules did not extend 
beyond the confines of private law. Today, these borders have become contested. It has 
become increasingly difficult to improve discipline in international road, traffic, e.g. 
without applying the concepts of Private International Law on some domains of 
Administrative Law, and even Criminal Law. We have started to apply foreign 
administrative law, and we have started to recognize foreign decisions in administrative 
and criminal matters. We shall also have to be prepared for a new passionate round of 
our good old discussions about the fallacies of the term "Private International Law"; 
and fancy alternative terms will no doubt emerge again. 
International Commercial Arbitration has become these days more important than 
ever—and more international than ever. After having sent such able vanguard outposts 
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as the 1923 Geneva Protocol and the 1927 Geneva Convention, the main thrust came 
with the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, and with the UNCITRAL Model Law. It remains to be seen whether 
the fact that commercial arbitration became truly international will also inspire the 
development of a fellow-problem, that of the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
court decisions, and whether after Brussels and Lugano, further frontiers will be 
conquered. 
There are hardly any major obstacles which would impede harmonization in the 
realm of International Commercial Law. Principles which have been espoused 
throughout Europe have become more compatible than ever. What remains are the 
details; but of course, the real problems usually are in the details. The Vienna sales 
convention is gaining ground more or less evenly in all parts of Europe—and not only 
in Europe. There are many dilemmas pertaining its implementation, yet there are no 
reasons, not even plausible pretexts, which would obstruct the common efforts in 
solving these problems. Scholars and practitioners are equally needed in the shaping of 
the law of international trade, and our Association may and should play a prominent 
role in the building of a legal structure which would correspond to present economic 
currents. One should remember that the first name of our Association which it took in 
1873, was: "Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations". 
I would like to tum now to a problem which may be the most painful predicament 
of our time. The focal point of the quandary is in the question, how should inter-
national law respond to nationalism? A serious effort to find a solution was made after 
World War I, when nations became one of the organizing principles along with states, 
and with the postulate of minority protection. At that time—like today—one spoke of 
a "new world order", and magic was expected from these three words. The then-new 
world order was not uncontroversial. In the heart of the dispute was the rivalry 
between nation and nationalism (seen, both as a possible agent of devastation and 
as a necessary principle) on the one hand, and state on the other hand. This 
controversy never ended, it has only varied in its intensity. Legal rules were supposed 
to forge the right and viable compromise, but this task has not yet been performed. In 
our days, we are confronted again in a most dramatic way with the predicament of 
ethnicity, with majorities and minorities, and with the contest between sheer might and 
the authority of law. In this confrontation, the legal profession cannot draw much 
inspiration from success, yet we may be spurred by the desire to overcome failures and 
frustration. 
It is true that today we may be on the threshold of an international settlement in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The circumstances of the possible resolution bring to my memory 
the lines of one of the great poets of our host country, János Arany. After one of the 
many bloody conflicts on the Balkans which took place century ago, and after one of 
the many international settlements (the Berlin Conference), Arany wrote a short poem 
entitled "Civilization". Reading it under the angle of the present Bosnian tragedy, I 
have translated it into English with much enthusiasm—probably more enthusiasm than 
competence. The poem reads: 
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"In wars of early times 
principles were not heeded 
the strong took from the week 
whatever he wanted. 
This was the past. Today, the World 
is directed by Conference 
and if the strong is mischievous 
it convenes—and grants acquiescence". 
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I am coming from a country were the "strong" have had their ordeal. Acquiescence 
seems to be imminent. This will not help our cause, the cause of international law. The 
international community did put its authority at stake in the Yugoslavian crisis. Actions 
were taken, responsibility was assumed. Solutions and guiding principles were not only 
proposed, but asserted. The first asserted solution—that of maintaining the unity of 
Yugoslavia—was lightly abandoned. As a matter of fact, this principle may not have 
the strength of a moral imperative. Much more consequential were the pronouncements 
against territorial changes by force, and against ethnical cleaning. Solemn statements 
were made, that these practices will not be permitted. Here, we are dealing with the 
moral foundations of the post World War II and post cold-war order. At present, it 
seems that these principles have also been defeated. There is also room for doubt 
regarding the International Tribunal established by the UN Security Council for the 
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law. Questions are being raised not so much with regard to the chances of this 
Tribunal to operate, to fulfil its mission, and to send the right message. 
Ethnic turmoil is, of course, not novel or unique in history; and it is not the 
monopoly of this Region. What makes the present Central- and East-European situation 
so severe, is the fact that the events are taking place amid a sudden vanishing of 
precepts and standards prompted by the collapse of the whole architecture of the 
socialist-communist structures. The only persuasion ready to fill the emerging void in 
Yugoslavia (and elsewhere) was that of nationalism, which remained uniquely 
unbalanced under the given circumstances. The new creed inherited the mental 
coordinates of the one-party consciousness. The mindset that mandated an ostracism 
of dissidents and equated difference with treason, survived—and ethnic minorities fill 
now the same position that ideological dissidents did earlier. Minorities have found 
themselves outside the new trends, and even outside the logic of the new communities 
that have been taking shape. They have essentially become an encumbrance; a 
hindrance by their different culture, language, alphabet—or by their very existence. In 
the light of this sequence of events, the classic dilemma regarding individual rights and 
collective rights has gained new inspiration; and it seems that some protection of 
collective rights (in addition to individual rights) has become an unavoidable postulate. 
During the ongoing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in certain parts of the 
former Soviet Union, really or imaginary atrocities are being ascribed to ethnic 
colletives, and vengeance is also aimed at ethnic groups. Ethnic collectives have been 
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gaining control over disputed territories, and have been driving out other groups. As 
a result of ethnic cleaning millions have lost their homes, and dignity, hundreds of 
thousands lost their lifes. Even rape has become a device of ethnic fundamentalism. 
The bulk of refugees is seeking shelter in areas where they would belong to the 
majority, rather than the minority. At some distance from the actual armed conflicts, 
bilingual road signs, place names, and bilingual education which were earlier tolerated, 
or even mandated, are now becoming monolingual. 
It is abundantly clear that the targeted victims are precisely minority groups, rather 
than citizens as individuals. One cannot have a viable system of protection while 
ignoring the target of the attack. The need for recognition of the collective dimension 
was acknowledged in very simple and persuasive terms by Justice Blackman of the 
United States Supreme Court, who stated: "In order to get beyond racism, we must 
first take account of race. There is no other way". In the former Yugoslavia today, 
Moslem-Slavs, Croats, Serbs, and others are being massacred and driven out from 
particular regions, exactly because they are Moslem-Slavs, Croats, or Serbs. The denial 
of minority schools, bilingual road signs or place-names can hardly be conceived but 
as an attitude and a gesture towards a group, towards an ethnic collective. 
It has been said, and not without reason, that minorities are often oversensitive, 
that their fear may be out of proportion. In Bosnia, the realities have matched the 
wildest fears. Also, I would like to tell you the story of one of íny colleague from 
Haifa he told me once about a graffiti. The words of the graffiti were: YOU MAY BE 
PARANOIC, BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THEY ARE NOT AFTER YOU! 
The civilized solution to the problem which has been plaguing us is relatively 
simple. Human rights should be guaranteed to members of all ethnic groups, and the 
right to foster a language, tradition and culture, should not be restricted to the majority 
only. This implies appropriate forms of self-organization. There is no reason or 
justification whatsoever, for imposing the renouncement of one's identity as a 
condition for living in a larger community. Minorities should be offered full 
opportunity to affirm their identity within the state to which they belong, rather than 
forcing them to link their hopes with change of borders. The loyalty of the minorities 
is in a direct proportion to the rights granted to them. 
Within the past several years ethnic conflicts have not been solved along these 
lines. Brutal force has taken precedence over principles; and the international commun-
ity—although better organized than ever—has not been able to offer more than promises, 
protest, and then acquiescence. If—after all what has been said, done, or not-
done—statesmen can still remain statesmen, this will be due to one crucial factor—and 
that is short memory. 
What are the lessons to be drawn, and what hopes can we cherish regarding the 
impact of international law on the transformation of Europe? 
One of the possible options is to side with many whose horizons are enwrapped 
with national symbols, and to serve the cause of ethnic fundamentalism, like two 
medical doctors from my home country who were ardently engaged in a public debate 
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pertaining to the big issue whether cyrillic letters or latin letters were better for the 
eye. 
The other option is a more naive one. It implies a continued belief in international 
law, and continued efforts to make it more efficient, and to raise the price of non-
observance. And we can find encouragement in the wonderful short story of Thomas 
Mann, Das Gesetz (translated into English as "The Tables of the Law"). This is the 
story of Moses who wrote the law. He failed the first time, but he returned to the 
mountain, scraped and chiseled the stones, painted the letters with his blood, and 
descended once again, with the law under his arms. Then he said to his people (and 
I am quoting Thomas Mann): 
"I know well and God knows in advance that his commandments will not be 
obeyed, and they will be transgressed at all times and everywhere. But at least the 
heart of everyone who breaks them shall turn icy, for the words are written in 
everyman's flesh and blood and deep within himself he knows that the words are all-
valid. " 
If even divine commandments will not loose sense if they are not followed always 
and by everyone, the same should hold true in respect of human rules. Law—and 
international law in particular—create a web of social and psychological motivations 
and deterrents. These help us to reach a better compromise with our own imperfec-
tions. 
The point I want to make is that in the domain of international law, idealism may be 
more practical than realism. 
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of Justice: Choice of Alternatives 
I. Introduction 
1. Ladies and Gentlemen, I must say at the outset that I am very honoured to be part 
of this gathering here today, and that I am looking forward very much to hearing the 
comments of our distinguished Director of Studies and to the discussion that is to 
follow. We are here to participate in the First European Regional Conference of the 
ILA. While the First Regional Conference speaks for itself, the word here that is really 
so novel, of course, is European, not Western or Eastern, but European. And the topic 
of this session today is conflict resolution, old and new methods, more particularly at 
this moment, using the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as one method of dispute 
settlement. And perhaps we may say that the ICJ is at the present time novel in its way 
too, coming into, or experiencing, a period that can almost be described as over-
utilization. 
2. Not only is there an intense activity in the work of the International Court, there 
is also a very intense discussion among international lawyers on the use of the Inter-
national Court, often in connection with a discussion on the use of arbitration. One of 
the very latest manifestations of this is the Spring Issue, 1993, of the Leiden Journal of 
International Law, devoted to the topic of international arbitration. In three of the 
articles, at least, adjudication by the ICJ is considered alongside arbitration. Here I 
confine myself to some remarks on innovations in the use of the ICJ, on Europe and 
international adjudication, and these two topics combined. 
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II. The International Court of Justice 
3. Just over two years ago eleven contentious cases were pending before the ICJ. Four 
of these have been discontinued: Nicaragua discontinued its proceedings against both the 
United States and Honduras by letters dated 12 September 1991 and 11 May 1992 
respectively; Finland and Denmark notified the Court of their settlement of the case 
Concerning Passage Through the Great Belt out of Court by letters dated 3 and 4 
September 1992 respectively; by a joint letter filed in the Registry of the Court on 9 
September 1993, the Agents of Nauru and Australia similarly discontinued their 
proceedings concerning Ceratin Phosphate Lands in Nauru. Three cases have proceeded 
to Judgment; for Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal on 12 November 1991; for El Salvador v. 
Honduras on 11 September 1992, in a special chamber procedure; and for Denmark v. 
Norway on 14 June 1993. But as six new contentious cases have been brought before the 
Court, the number of cases in its docket remains ten,' and there must be added the 
request for Advisory Opinion made by the World Health Organization, contained in a 
letter dated 27 August, 1993, from the Director-General of the Organization. This is the 
first request for an advisory opinion since 1989, when the Court handed down its Opinion 
concerning Article VI, Section 22 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the United Nations on 15 December of that year. This number may be compared with the 
total of fifty-two Judgments and twenty-one Advisory Opinions given by the Court 
between 1946 and June 1991. 
4. Bearing in mind the fact that the International Court itself always comes to its 
decisions in plenary session, with the participation of all 15, or possibly 17, Judges, 
unless requested by the parties to a case to form a special chamber in accordance with 
Article 26, Paragraph 2, procedure,2 this list of cases surely indicates that the ICJ is 
taking an active part in the resolution of inter-State disputes. For it remains a Court in 
which States only have standing (Article 34 of its Statute). Furthermore, not one of these 
cases now pending is one in which a State party is espousing the claim of its national, 
1 The six new proceedings are: two separate Applications filed by Libya on 3 March 1992 instituting 
proceedings against the USA and the UK respectively on the basis of the Montreal Convention for the 
suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971; the joint notification by Hungary and 
Slovakia to the Registrar of the Court of the Special Agreement signed at Brussels on 7 April 1993 concerning 
the Construction and Operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Barrage System and on the construction and 
operation of the "provisional solution"; Iran's Application filed on 2 November 1992 instituting proceedings 
against the USA with respect to the destruction of Iranian oil platform, based on a treaty of 1955; proceedings 
instituted by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 20 March 1993 against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for 
violating the Genocide Convention; and the proceedings instituted by the State of Qatar against the State of 
Bahrain of 8 July 1991 concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between the two States. 
Hearings on this last case are to open on 28 February 1994. 
2 Article 26 (2) of the statute of the Court provides: 
"The Court may at any time form a Chamber for dealing with a particular case. The number of judges to 
constitute such a chamber shall be deternrined by the Court with the approval of the parties. (3) Cases shall be 
heard and determined by the chambers provided for in tlris article if the parties so request." 
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on the basis of diplomatic protection, as did Greece for its national, in the Mavrommatis 
Palestine Concessions case before the Permanent Court.3 As has been pointed out 
elsewhere, Mr Mavrommatis would now, in contrast to the position in the early 1920's, 
have a variety of options for pursuing his claims: the International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes of the World Bank (ICSID) in Washington or the 
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris in particular.4 Not that this means that the 
issues in an inter-State dispute are always clearly linked to the States parties to the case. 
In the Case Concerning East Timor, brought by Portugal against Australia on 22 
February 1991, the matter at issue rests on the legality of Indonesia's annexation of East 
Timor. 
5. Being a court for States, with a jurisdiction dependent on the consent of States, 
there is otherwise no limit on the subject-matter of the issues to be adjudicated, provided 
that the dispute can be formulated in legal terms. States can themselves choose the 
method of dispute settlement, and for this the last decade has been a fruitful period for 
innovations in the way the ICJ may be used by States. I shall take three examples. 
6. The Gulf of Maine case was the first case to be submitted to a Chamber of the 
Court pursuant to Article 26, Paragraph 2, and Article 31 of the Statute of the Court. This 
was effected by an Agreement between the parties, Canada and the United States, 
transmitted to the Court by a joint letter dated 25 November 1981. It will be recalled that 
two changes, in the Statute and the Rules, made this procedure attractive to States. Article 
26 (2) of the Statute of the ICJ is new and was lacking in the Statute of the Permanent 
Court. It embodies two changes of considerable importance: the parties to a case may 
themselves request the formation of a special chamber, and the decision as to the number 
of judges to constitute such a chamber is to be determined by the Court "with the 
approval of the parties" and not, as during the time of the Permanent Court, "with due 
regard to the provisions of Article 9". 
7. The revised Rules of Court of 1978 clarified the procedure to be followed under 
Article 26 (2) of the Statute in allowing for an increased control over the composition of 
the Chamber by the parties themselves. So under Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the present 
Rules "When the parties have agreed" on a request for the formation of a Chamber to 
deal with a particular case "the President shall ascertain their views regarding the 
composition of the Chamber, and shall report to the Court accordingly". Paragraph 3 of 
Article 17 continues: "When the Court has determined, with the approval of the parties, 
the number of its Members who are to constitute the Chamber, it shall proceed to their 
election..." Article 26, Paragraph 1, of the 1972 Rules provided for greater control by the 
Court of the composition of the Chamber, with the wording: "When the Court... decides, 
at the request of the parties, to form a Chamber to deal with a particular case". To 
complete this picture of a special chamber composed of judges of the Parties' choosing, 
3 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, 1924. PCIJ Ser. A, no. 2. 
4 WERNER, J.: "Interstate Political Arbitration: What Lies Next?" in 9 J. Int'l Arb. (1992) p. 74. 
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Article 17 (2) of the Rules provides for the appointment of ad hoc judges [(Article 31 
(4)], who need not, of course, be members of the Court. 
8. Lastly, for the way in which the parties to this case ensured their choice of judges, 
we must look at the way the Gulf of Maine Boundary Treaty Dispute Settlement Treaty 
was formulated. The Treaty consisted of four articles. Two agreements relating to the 
submission of the dispute to a chamber of the ICJ or an ad hoc Court of Arbitration are 
annexed to the Treaty. Article I of the Treaty reflects the Parties' agreement to submit 
the dispute to a Chamber of the ICJ on the terms set out in the Special Agreement 
annexed to the Treaty. Article II provides that if a Chamber of the ICJ is not constituted 
in accordance with the Special Agreement by the end of six months following the entry 
into force of the Treaty, either Party may terminate the Special Agreement where-upon 
the Arbitration Agreement, also annexed to the Treaty, automatically enters into force. 
Article III further provides that either Party may terminate the Special Agreement if a 
vacancy on the Chamber is not filled to the satisfaction of the Parties. In that case also 
the Arbitration Agreement automatically enters into force.5 This procedure was accepted 
by the Court, and three more cases have since that been submitted to a Chamber of the 
Court.6 A judgment rendered by a Chamber has the same status as a judgment of the full 
Court. This illustrates how States, prompted by international lawyers—the name here of 
the late Judge Jessup comes immediately to mind—can be innovative within the 
constitutional framework of the Court in the manner in which they can institute 
proceedings. 
9. Further, this case has very interesting consequences for the future of international 
adjudication and arbitration, with the blurring of the differences between the two methods 
of dispute settlement. 
10. For other innovative uses of the International Court, we may look at compro-
missory clauses in treaties. Recendy attention has been drawn to so-called advisory 
compromissory clauses. These are clauses contained in treaties entered into between 
States and international organizations, where provision is made for the request for 
advisory opinion, to be considered binding by the parties to a dispute as to the 
interpretation or application of the treaty. The legality of such a provision was challenged 
in 1956, in the Court's Opinion on Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO 
upon complaints made against UNESCO,7 on the ground that under this procedure the 
International Court would be acting as Court of Appeal, but the Court dismissed the 
argument and stated in general terms that "the fact thai the Opinion of the Court is 
5 Letter of Submittal, Dept. of State to the President, April 18, 1979, reproduced in 20 ILM 1374 (1981). 
Also Judge Oda's Declaration in the Land. Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute case, Order of 8 May 1987, 
ICJ Reports 1987, p. 13. 
6 Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali, ICJ Reports 1985, p. 6; the 
Elettronica Sicula S.p. A. (ELSI) case between the United States and Italy, ICJ Reports 1987, p. 3; and the 
Land, Maritime Frontier Dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, ICJ Reports 1987, p. 10. 
7 ICJ Reports 1956, p. 84. 
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accepted as binding provides no reason why the Request for an Opinion should not be 
complied with". 
11. In the Opinion on the Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 
21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Order of 9 March 
1988? the Court acceded to the request for an advisory opinion put to it by the General 
Assembly of the UN concerning a disagreement of substance with the United States, on 
the question (only) of whether the United States, as a party to the Agreement between 
the UN and the USA regarding the Headquarters of the UN, is under an obligation to 
enter into arbitration in accordance with Section 21 of the Agreement? Section 21 of this 
Agreement provided that any dispute between the United Nations and the USA regarding 
the interpretation or application of the Agreement or any supplemental Agreement should 
be settled by negotiation, failing this, it shall be referred for final decision to a tribunal 
of three arbitrators. The Secretary-General or the United States was permitted to ask 
("may" do so) the General Assembly to request of the ICJ an advisory opinion on any 
legal question arising in the course of such proceedings. Thereafter "the arbitral tribunal 
shall render a final decision, having regard to the opinion of the Court". This was thus 
a way, again, in which the Court's jurisdiction, here the advisory jurisdiction, was used 
in conjunction with arbitral proceedings. 
12. The Opinion also clarified or demonstrated certain matters connected with this 
procedure. Thus, while the Court cannot indicate provisional measures in advisory 
proceedings, there is no requirement of the prior exhaustion of local remedies. And by the 
modification of Article 103 in the 1978 Rules, the body authorized by or in accordance 
with the Charter to request an advisory opinion, or the Court itself, may refer to the 
urgency of the matter. Thus this Opinion on the Headquarters Agreement was rendered just 
seven weeks and one day after the letter addressed by the Secretary-General of the UN to 
the President of the Court, containing the formal communication of the General 
Assembly's request for an opinion, was received and filed in the Registry of the Court. 
The other change in the present Article 103 of the Rules is the insertion of an 
undertaking by the Court to convene specially when such a request is made, if it is not 
then in session.9 Without comparing this with the length of earlier opinions of the 
Court—after all, the Namibia Opinion,10 where the proceedings lasted almost one year, 
involved far more complex issues—this procedure is nevertheless of interest for parties 
looking for an authoritative statement on a legal point at issue within a reasonable, or 
even short, period of time. 
8 ICJ Reports 1988, p. 3, pursuant to resolution 42/229 В of 2 March 1988 of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. This Opinion concerned the disagreement between the United Nations and the United States 
over the United States Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 and its application to the Permanent Observer Mission of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization to the United Nations. 
9 ROSENNE, S.: Procedure in the International Court (1983) p. 216. 
10 Id. The Namibia Opinion was given at the request of the Security Council by resolution 284 of 29 July 
1970 and rendered on 21 June 1971. 
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13. The drafting of compromissory clauses in treaties is negotiable as any other 
clause in a treaty, and the wording thus may differ. One such clause contained in two 
recent United Nations Conventions, on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context, 1991," and on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water-
courses and International Lakes, 1992,12 provides for the settlement of disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention by negotiation or other 
means of dispute settlement agreed upon by the parties to the dispute. Alternatively, when 
accepting the Convention a party may declare in advance that it accepts submission of 
the dispute to the ICJ or to arbitration in accordance with the procedure set out in Annex 
IV to the Convention or to both. If both means of dispute settlement have been accepted, 
and the parties have not agreed otherwise, the dispute may be referred only to the ICJ. 
This is of interest in that adjudication by the Court takes precedence over arbitration 
where no express choice is made. But it is otherwise an example of a regrettable practice 
of separating a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court for the settlement of 
disputes arising out of it from the text of the Treaty itself. 
14. Thirdly, I want to refer here to the Secretary-General's Trust Fund to Assist 
States in the Settlement of Disputes Through the International Court of Justice, 
announced by him to the General Assembly on November 1, 1989.13 The financial 
assets of the Fund are to be based entirely on voluntary financial contributions from 
outside the United Nations Organization, but it otherwise functions in close connection 
with the UN and under the surveillance of the Secretary-General himself. The Financial 
Regulations and Rules of the United Nations apply to the administration of the Trust 
Fund, including the auditing procedures provided for therein. By 25 October 1991 some 
thirty States from all regions of the world had made financial contributions to the Fund. 
In May 1991 an award was made to a developing country seeking a solution to a dispute 
with its neighbour through the ICJ. A second application, also from a developing country, 
was still pending at that time.14 
15. This Trust Fund, as an independent source of legal aid for poor litigant countries, 
is of great significance for the future of the International Court. One point must be noted, 
however. In Paragraph 6 of the "Terms of Reference etc." of the Fund, the object and 
purpose of the Fund are more narrowly expressed to be to provide "financial assistance 
to States for expenses incurred in connexion with: (i) a dispute submitted to the ICJ by 
way of a special agreement, or (ii) the execution of a Judgment of the Court resulting 
from such special agreement". Proceedings based on the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court are thus excluded. 
11 30 ILM 800 (1991), Article 15. 
12 31 ILM 1312 (1992), Article 22. 
13 28 ILM 1589 (1989), entitled "Terms of Reference, Guidelines and Rules of the Secretary-General's Trust 
Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes Thought the ICJ". DONNER, R.: "Recent Developments 
in the Work of the ICJ" II FYBIL (1991) pp. 357-360. 
14 Information Note added to tire January 1992 issue of the ICLQ. 
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III. Europe and the ICJ 
16. My remarks on Europe and the ICJ will be confined to the three major regional 
organizations or groupings in Europe: the Council of Europe, the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the European Community. The attitude of the 
individual States of Europe to the ICJ are thus only included incidentally. 
17. Some definition of the term Europe, however, may be in order. The Council of 
Europe undertook to do this during the meeting on 21 April 1992 between the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Revision of the Statute and a delegation of the Ministers' Deputies. 
With the geographical enlargement of the Council of Europe a clear policy was needed 
as to what is "European".15 It was noted that unless one day the meaning of the term 
were to be extended to the southern and south eastern shores of the Mediterranean (an 
idea occasionally put forward) this problem concerns only the former Republics of the 
Soviet Union. The conclusion reached was that the three Baltic Republics of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania, as well as the other European Republics of Russia, i.e. Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine, were obviously "European". On the other hand, the qualification 
"European" would be difficult to accept for the five Asian Republics, Kazakhstan, 
Kirgizia Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The discussions in the Bureau were 
not entirely conclusive as to whether the Caucasian Republics of Armenia, Azerbaïdjan 
and Georgia should be considered European. 
18. To take the Council of Europe first. The Statute of the Council contains no 
provision for the peaceful settlement of disputes, out of consideration of the Members' 
participation in the United Nations. However, the European Convention for the Peaceful 
Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957,16 was drafted within the Council of Europe, not 
as a legislative act, but in the form of an international treaty, albeit restricted to the 
Members of the Council of Europe. In the latest European Yearbook, the number of States 
parties as of 4 May 1992 was thirteen out of the total of twenty-six.17 This Convention 
follows closely the wording of the Geneva General Act of 1928. Basically, it divides all 
disputes into two classes. International legal disputes are to be submitted by the parties to 
the ICJ for compulsory adjudication, Chapter I, Article 1, containing a list of disputes as 
in Article 36 (2) of the Statute. The parties to a dispute may resort to the procedure of 
conciliation before that of judicial settlement. All other disputes are to be submitted to 
compulsory conciliation unless the parties to a dispute agree to submit it to arbitration. 
19. This Convention has served as the basis for jurisdiction in only one case before 
the ICJ, the North Sea Continental Shelf case,18 for the reason there that the Federal 
Republic of Germany was not at that time a Member of the United Nations, and hence 
15 H R U , 30 June 1992. Vol. 13, 1992, p. 231. 
16 Text in 320 UNTS pp. 243-267, and in the ETS, No. 23. The Convention entered into force on April 30 
1958. 
17 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
18 ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3. 
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not a party to the Court, although this could otherwise have been effected in accordance 
with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of 15 October 1946, providing for 
the submission of a case to the ICJ by non-Members by way of a general or special 
declaration. Miehsler suggested some years ago that the Convention may have influenced 
the course of negotiations, such as on the Rhine pollution between the Federal Republic 
of Germany and Switzerland." I would suggest that the division of disputes into 
justiciable and non-justiciable, on which the Convention is premised, is not only now 
outdated, but also perhaps even counter-productive in that it assumes non-justiciable 
disputes. 
20. Treaties concluded under the aegis of the Council of Europe do not as a general 
rule contain compromissory clauses providing for the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International Court. On the contrary, they may contain clauses providing for adjudication 
(in the broad sense) by way of arbitration, as in the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism (Article 1), or provide for other preliminary methods of friendly 
settlement, as in the European Convention on Extradition (Protocol I, Article 7 and 
Protocol II, Article 10) or by the establishment of a European tribunal consisting of the 
members of the European Court of Human Rights, as in the Additional Protocol to the 
European Convention on State Immunity (Article 4). These provisions on the other hand 
have the effect of reducing the right of the Contracting States to take a case to the 
International Court, because by Article 28 of the 1957 Convention recourse to other 
methods of friendly settlement has the effect of excluding application of the Convention. 
Add to this that by Article 28 disputes in connection with the European Convention on 
Human Rights are expressly outside the sphere of application of the Convention. Even 
with the enlarged Council of Europe membership, one may doubt the usefulness of this 
convention. 
21. With the CSCE process two documents are of relevance. First, there is the Report 
of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes adopted at Valletta 
on 8 February 1991.20 Here references to the ICJ are only hortatory. States are to 
consider accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ either by treaty or by a 
declaration under Article 36, Paragraph 2, of the Statute or by submitting disputes by 
special agreement to the ICJ, or resort to arbitration. The proposed CSCE Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism is to be established in a manner reminiscent of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration as established in 1907 but it provides a form of good offices for the 
purpose of selecting an appropriate method of peaceful settlement. The services of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration are expressly mentioned in Section VI, Article 3. No 
mention is made of the ICJ. Recourse was had to the Mechanism in June 1991 for 
Yugoslavia, without success. 
22. The Concluding Document from the Fourth Follow-Up Meeting of the CSCE, 
held in Helsinki in July 1992, contains the Summit Declaration and the Decisions. No 
19 In "Liber Amicorum pour Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte." (1977). 
20 30 ILM 382 (1991). 
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reference is made to the ICJ, although the Conference was of the opinion that "the 
participating States consider their commitment to settle disputes among themselves by 
peaceful means to form a cornerstone of the CSCE process".21 The Conference is 
continuing its work on the establishment of a conciliation and arbitration court within the 
CSCE, on enhancing the Valletta Mechanism and on establishing a CSCE procedure for 
conciliation, including directed conciliation, where any two participating States have not 
been able to settle a dispute within a reasonable period of time. 
23. Thus the participating States in the CSCE process would not appear to consider 
that the ICJ has a contribution to make within an area that includes the whole of the 
former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
24. Lastly, the European Community. Here it is without doubt unthinkable that a 
Member of the Community would institute proceedings against another Member State 
before the ICJ. Even Article 170 EEC procedure, providing for cases brought by State 
against State has been used only once.22 The Community is a closed system; Article 219 
of the EEC Treaty provides that the Court of Justice is the only court given jurisdiction 
to hear disputes between Member States concerning the interpretation or application of 
the Treaty. 
25. There are limits, however, on the jurisdiction of the ECJ, it being a court of 
attribution. Article 31 of the Single European Act, 1986, excludes the powers of the 
Court of Justice to review the legality of the exercise of any of the provisions contained 
in Part III of the Treaty, relating to European Political Cooperation. Thus while a start 
has been made to institutionalizing the European Council, neither the European Council 
nor the European Political Cooperation procedures are subject to review by the Court.23 
When confronted with the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia and the conflicting views 
of Member States as regards recognition of the break-away Republics, the European 
Community and its Member States agreed in a declaration at a meeting held in Brussels 
on 27 August 1991, to convene a peace conference on Yugoslavia and to establish an 
Arbitration Commission, the Badinter Commission. This commission has issued ten 
opinions and no awards so far. By the terms of the EC Declaration the Commission was 
requested to give its decisions within two months of being requested to act. Opinions 4 
to 7 were delivered in less than one month.24 
IV. Europe and the ICJ: Suggestions for Use 
26. How, then, can the ICJ be of greater use for these three European bodies, one a 
hybrid union, another a treaty-based organization and the third a "process"? 
21 31 ILM 1385 (1992) at p. 1402. 
22 Case 141/78 France v. U. K. (1979) ECR 2923. 
23 Freestone and Davidson, "Community Competence and Part III of the Single European Act" 23 CMLREV. 
(1986) 793-801. This is not altered by the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. [Add: Comment by Lord Slynn?] 
24 31 ILM 1488 (1992). 
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27. A chamber for regional disputes is one possibility, either under the procedure laid 
down in Article 26, Paragraph 1, for particular categories of cases, or perhaps even the 
chamber of summary procedure, pursuant to the provisions of Article 29. For many 
reasons, however, this possibility of a regional court, or chamber, finds little support 
Already the Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the PCIJ, 
1944, made no recommendation on the two proposals given for regional Chambers.25 
The Council of Europe, as noted above, decided against a regional tribunal. As the 
President of the Court, Sir Robert Jennings, pointed out at the Hague Academy Workshop 
on die Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in Europe, held in 1990, the "World 
Court" is also necessarily a regional court, and while the law applied by the Court is 
international or universal the Court can and does take note of relevant regional variations 
or special notes, as in the Asylum and the Frontier Dispute between Burkina Faso and 
Mali. Also, there may be difficulty in deciding where Europe ends. The CSCE process 
is, after all, a European-Asian-American framework of cooperation. On the other hand, 
the International Court has recently changed its attitude to the formation of a standing 
special chamber to deal with environmental matters, under Article 26 (1) of its Statute. 
Whereas in the past it had on occasion considered such a chamber to be unnecessary, 
emphasizing that it was able to respond rapidly to requests for the constitution of a so-
called "ad hoc" Chamber, pursuant to Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Statute—as discussed 
above—with competence to deal with any environmental case, it has now decided to form 
a seven-member Chamber for Environmental Matters. This was carried out not only for 
the reason that two of the eleven cases on the docket of the Court in July 1993 had 
important implications for international law on matters relating to the environment, but 
also in view of the developments in the field of environmental law and protection which 
have taken place in the last few years. The Members of the Chamber entered upon their 
duties on 6 August 1993.26 Whether or not resort will be had to this special standing 
Chamber may be of great significance for future developments. After all, Article 26, 
Paragraph 1 refers to "particular categories of cases", which could include regional ones, 
and the two examples given in the text, of labour cases and cases relating to transit and 
communications, have in common only the fact that they were topical when the Statute 
was drafted in 1920, whereas environmental law is a developing branch of international 
law. 
28. Secondly, compromissory clauses of a truly compulsory kind are always to be 
encouraged. In this way disputes arising out of the treaty relations of States may be 
settled by a binding decision concerning their interpretation or application. Here the new 
policy of the Soviet Union to recognize the binding jurisdiction of the ICJ in respect of 
a number of human rights treaties, which was announced by Mr Gorbachev in his address 
to the United Nations on 7 December 1988, does indeed give new hope for the legal 
25 39 AJIl (1945) Suppl. of Docs, 1-42. 
26 ICJ Unofficial Communique 93/20. The two cases are brought by Nauru against Australia and Hungary 
against Slovakia. 
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society of nations. The long-standing policy of Eastern Europe now abandoned was not 
to recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ as embodied in compromissory 
clauses in treaties any more than in declarations under the optional clause. One argument 
which was put forward in the International Law Commission was that the majority of 
States would not accept conventions on substantive law containing such procedural 
provisions. Hence the drafting technique of providing for separate declarations of 
acceptance of the Court, noted above. One may hope that his argument will be 
abandoned. 
29. If jurisdictional clauses are to be inserted in treaties the variety of possibilities 
must be stressed. For it is possible not only to require a settlement by negotiation first 
There can also be combinations of conciliation or arbitration or adjudication by the Court. 
This raises another long-standing question: can the Court be considered as a Court of 
Appeal?27 It is certainly an interesting point, because a judicial system with no 
procedures for appeal—apart from the statutory incidental jurisdiction for interpretation 
or revision under Articles 60 and 61 of the Statute—is in the nature of what Judge André 
Donner in his 1966 Rosenthal Lectures indirectly referred to as "judicial roulette". But 
the Court, as it has reiterated on a number of occasions is not a Court of Appeal. The 
PCLJ had three instances of appeal from a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal and there is the 
Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council case between India and Pakistan, 
which constituted a form of appeal from a decision of the ICAO Council. In general, and 
here I refer to Rosenne's recent article on the ICJ and international arbitration,28 the 
Court has been meticulous to maintain the integrity of the arbitral as well as of its own 
judicial process, and is reluctant to do other than uphold an impugned decision, as in the 
Judgment of 12 November 1991 in the Case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 
1989.24 
30. If arbitration and adjudication are on a par, why choose adjudication by the 
Court? Judge Lachs suggested the greater security of the result.30 Here there is the 
authority of the World Court and of Article 94 of the Charter, providing only that 
decisions of the ICJ will in the last resort be enforced by the United Nations Security 
Council. And as Judge Jennings has written the authority of the International Court stems 
also from the fact that it is a World Court in the composition of its members.31 
Professor Pellet has suggested that a European Court of settlement and arbitration is 
today absolutely necessary. While agreeing entirely with this one may question one 
reason that he gives for entrusting the task of deciding on frontier changes to an arbitral 
tribunal: that it could be inspired by equity or by general norms reflecting the States' 
27 See e.g., LAUTERPACHT, E.: Aspects of the Administration of International Justice (1991) pp. 99-116. 
28 Leiden J. Int'l Law, Spring Issue 1993, p. 53. 
29 Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, ICJ Reports 1991, p. 53 
30 In "International arbitration: Past and Prospects" (ed. A. H. A. Soons, 1990), p. 48. Contra I. Brownlie, 
p. 59. 
31 "The Opinions of the Baditer Arbitration Committee. A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of 
Peoples". 3 EJIL (1992) p. 181. 
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common agreement32 Could not that function be entrusted to the ICJ just as well? I 
refer here to the application of equity infra legem, requested by Mali in the Frontier 
Dispute between itself and Burkina Faso. In its Judgment in 1986 the Chamber of the 
Court stated that it "will have regard to equity infra legem, that is, that form of equity 
which constitutes a method of interpretation of the law in force, and is one of its 
attributes...". And it cited an earlier decision of the Court to the effect that it will find an 
equitable solution derived from the applicable law.33 
31. This application of equity infra legem applies equally well to proceedings brought 
by special agreement. Perhaps even more so, because the Court is bound by the 
agreement, or compromise, for its jurisdiction. Why could the CSCE Mechanism not be 
used for a form of compulsory negotiation leading to such an agreement? Or perhaps link 
such an agreement with the proposed directed conciliation. The failure of Iran and Iraq 
to agree on the formulation of such a compromise, with the subsequent ten-year war, is 
a haunting reminder of the necessity to agree. Here, too, the Secretary-General's Trust 
Fund is a further incentive for use of the ICJ. 
32. If third-party settlement is not wanted, then the Court's advisory procedure may 
be very relevant. Take the example of the dispute between the Russian Federation and 
the respective Baltic States over the nationality (citizenship) of ethnic Russians resident 
in those States. A request for an advisory opinion could be framed in the form of a 
question as to the right to a certain nationality. The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has already touched on this question.34 And as regards the Court's advisory 
jurisdiction in general, we know that it compares well with that of other tribunals where 
speed is of the essence. 
33. Here I may refer to the intriguing Article 32 (3) of the United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
adopted on 19 December 1988.35 
It provides that regional economic integration organizations which have competence 
in respect of the negotiation, conclusion and application of international agreements in 
matters covered by this Convention may, through a State Member of the United Nations, 
request an advisory opinion of the ICJ in accordance with article 65 of the Statute of the 
Court, which opinion shall be regarded as decisive. The precondition is that the dispute 
cannot be settled by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, recourse to 
regional bodies, judicial process or other peaceful means of their own choice. Is this not 
an indication that the European Community could request advisory opinions, subject to 
the requirements of Article 96 of the Charter? Perhaps through the Secretariat of the 
European Council in Brussels. 
32 59 BYIL (1988) pp. 31-47. 
33 ICJ Reports 1986, p. 544, paragraph 28. 
34 Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica. Advisory Opinion of 
Jan. 19, 1984. No. OC-4/84 5 HRLJ (1984) p. 161. 
35 28 ILM 493 (1989). 
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34. You will have noted that I have not mentioned the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court as accepted in declarations deposited under the optional clause, Article 36, 
Paragraph 2, of the Statute. Perhaps this is partly because I consider there is a certain 
unfairness involved in the limits on reciprocity as regards the duration of such 
declarations. But here it is rather a question of there being little choice involved, apart 
from the initial decision to deposit a declaration. Or the choice exercised is of a rather 
negative kind, as shown in reservations. By accepting the jurisdiction of the Court by 
special agreement, by requesting an advisory opinion, by inserting true compromissory 
clauses in treaties, States may exercise choice in other ways. This is all not to belittle in 
any way the declarations deposited by Poland on 25 September 1990 and Spain on 29 
October 1990. A number of cases now before the Court are based on optional clause 
declarations,36 and the fact that three such cases have recently been discontinued after 
settlement out of court is an interesting comment on the value of the Court as a mediator. 
35. In conclusion, the President of the International Court may be empowered in a 
treaty to appoint arbitrators. Also, the composition of the ICJ itself is the end result of 
nominations from the States of the international community. 
36 Sir Robert Jennings, President of die ICJ, has stated: "This new busyness of die Court has also coincided 
with a reversal of the former decline in the number of declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court under Article 36, paragraph 2 of its the so-called 'optional clause'. Indeed, the Court at the moment is 
seized of six cases brought by unilateral application under that clause: or some treaty jurisdiction clause". "An 
Expanding Court", in The World Today, March 1992, p. 44. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the disbandment of the CMEA, the economic activity in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Republics diminished significantly. This was due to the related trade 
gap on one Hand and to the collapse of the central planning systems on the other hand. 
Meanwhile, the contraction of the industrial output has stopped in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic, whereas the situation in the former Soviet 
Republics has continued to deteriorate. 
From the point of view of indebtedness, an immediate danger for the world financial 
system is not visible. The main concerns are structural weaknesses rather than typical 
debt problems. Therefore, debt reducing operations which have been successfully 
implemented with several middle income countries in the Western Hemisphere or 
governmental deficit spending would not help. As a market-oriented system is not yet 
fully workable, the multipliers which could initiate a self- supporting upswing are not yet 
in force. In this situation, financing the stabilization of the economic environment is 
necessary, under condition of internal reform programs, and along with supporting 
projects which are appropriate to make up for the existing trade gap through export 
income streams. 
With regard to facilitating the stabilization of the economic environment, programs 
are supplied by the IMF, the World Bank, the EC, the EBRD, and the G-10 countries. 
However, on a long-term basis private capital is necessary. Therefore, incentives for 
banks and other private capital providers will have to be project andJor trade-related. 
Attracting foreign capital, enhanced trade and project financing will be the key factors 
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of success at the early stages, probably in the shape of co-lending with international 
institutions rather than balance-of-payments credits. The AID programme for Polish 
housing projects may serve as an example. Here, private hard currency loans to a public-
owned Polish institution are guaranteed by the US government, backed by the Polish 
government These funds are then passed on in local currency to Polish commercial 
banks serving as final lenders. The currency risk is covered by the Polish government 
Following increasing reform progress, bond and equity finance in the course of re-
entering the international capital markets, initially by means of securitization and using 
collateral and enhancement methods, will be appropriate. Apart from that, foreign-
exchange regulation should allow debt service for investment loans to be paid in foreign 
exchange out of related currency income streams. This would be neutral with regard to 
exchange rate control and enable specific foreign investments such as accommodation for 
foreign employees to be self-financing. 
As the country exposure of private external lenders will be limited due to transfer 
(country) risks, a permanent flow of domestic capital will be necessary to secure 
investments. On the long run, in the interest of attracting foreign capital freedom of 
capital movements following the example of the EC Directive of 26 June 1988' is 
desirable. This framework could still provide for safeguard measures on capital 
movements and payments within national competence. In case of joining monetary 
unions, transitory exemptions would be possible, as was the case with new EC members. 
As long as balance of payments and monetary stability require more control, the basic 
freedom of capital movements could be introduced under condition of a list of non-
liberalized transactions following the example of former EC capital movements 
Directives.2 Such treatment might reduce unnecessary bureaucratic efforts. 
2. Capital Needs 
Following the collapse of the central planning systems with their allocation failures, an 
immense demand for capital in the reform countries exists. These capital needs are 
created by privatisation programs: 
1. refurbishment of restituted properties; 
2. investment in small and medium-sized businesses; 
3. sale of large enterprises. 
Covering the gap in the infrastructure of local governments will also absorb 
significant capital amounts. Furthermore, an adequate supply of affordable housing is a 
major concern. The emerging building industry may well prove to be a motor of 
economic growth providing for multipliers which could initiate a self-supporting upswing 
of the domestic economy. 
A permanent flow of long-term capital will be necessary to secure investments: 
1 EC OJ 1988, L 178. 
2 EC OJ 1960, L 43/921 and 1962, L 9/62. 
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1. Fixed assets such as property, equipment etc. must be financed. Under condition 
of a stable financial system this will be only possible on a long-term basis matching the 
cash flow of debt service by the return on investment. 
2. This is particularly true for infrastructural measures because of the related slow 
return on investment. 
3. Environment for Raising Long-term Capital 
How to raise long-term capital? Participating in the international capital markets is 
certainly important However, only part of the capital needs can be covered by external 
sources. As the country exposure of private external lenders will be limited due to 
transfer (country) risks, a permanent flow of capital out of domestic savings will be 
necessary. 
Central governments or major public companies are the only institutions to borrow 
directly in the securities markets, due to their standing. Projects of local governments are 
quite often too small for stock-exchange issues, whereas the balance sheets of recently 
privatized companies will not be strong enough to attract long-term capital. But also 
banking institutions as financial intermediaries have to raise the funds in the market prior 
to channelling them through in the shape of loans. 
Establishing a long-term capital market has to meet specific challenges. The 
stabilization programs of IMF, World Bank and central banks are normally under 
condition of strict domestic credit ceilings and tight minimum reserves to secure 
monetary stability. The resulting conflict with the target of long-tenn capital supply can 
be settled by establishing a separate market for investment capital in which debt service 
is matched by the returns on the related invesünents. Due to this "matching", the 
volatilities could be evened. In countries with significant inflation rates index clauses for 
funding and lending would have to be matched in order to avoid excess of money 
demand or supply. By these means monetary institutions could achieve independence and 
would be enabled to limit their measures and credit ceilings to the short-term money 
markets. As a result, a similar situation would be achieved as the one of national 
monetary institutions within the EC prior to the last stage of the Monetary Union where 
monetary policy still remains within national responsibility. 
From the point of view of banking supervision, stability in the sense of strength and 
soundness of financial institutions is required, which implies solid lending practices. As 
regards the maintenance of a capital basis which is sufficient to cover the ordinary 
banking risks, the examples of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland show that 
regulation in line with the principles of the Basle Coimnittee on Banking Supervision and 
related EC Directives3 is possible along with transitory supplements. In order to avoid 
3 Solvency Directive EC OJ 1989, L 386/14 and Directive on die Own Funds EC OJ 1989, L 124/16. 
Regarding investment firms see EC OJ 1993, L 141/1 and L 141/27. 
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risk concentration, the EC Directive regulating large exposures4 may serve as an 
example. The correlation of debt service and return on investments will have to find its 
counterpart in the asset-liability management of banks. Mismatches caused by differing 
indexation of funds and loans would be particularly dangerous. In this field, EC legis-
lation so far is insufficient, because related regulation only exists for investment firms 
and not for banks.5 Therefore, this subject will be taken up by the Basle Committee on 
Banking Regulation step by step. Long-term lending merely against balance sheets of 
debtors is not advisable. A "golden banking rule" requires fixed assets to be financed on 
a long-term basis and not by short-term deposits. 
4. Major Problem: Incentives for Long-term Savings 
A basic requirement is supporting incentives for long-term saving. Looking at the 
experiences in East Germany, considerable private savings were held in the form of 
deposits or cash. Initially, they went into consumer durables such as cars, TVs and 
fridges, of which the private individuals had been under-equipped. In the reform countries 
we have to face a similar situation. Meanwhile, savings rates are increasing, however 
highly focussed on short-term deposits. Investors would only be prepared to undertake 
long-term opportunities if they can trust in the safety of their capital. The security has 
to be two-fold: 
1. value ptotection, i.e. protection against inflation and securing real interest rates; 
2. depositors protection against failures of banks. 
Basically, both problems remained unsolved. In reform countries benefitting from 
reasonable monetary stability—mainly the Czech Republic and Hungary, variable interest 
rates may offer a certain security of real interest rates and hence value protection. In 
countries with a less stable situation, depositors facing negative real interest rates will 
find themselves in a losing game. In Poland, e.g., the interbank rate was 37%, when an 
inflation rate of 45% had to be faced. From the point of view of depositors'protection, 
the capital ratios of banks are widely weakened by write-offs against pre-refonn loans 
or just in the stage of building up in case of new establishments. This is not a situation 
in which long-term deposits appear to be advantageous. Even in the EC, there are still 
disputes on the principles of depositors' protection.6 
4 Final draft see EC Dok. 5766/92. 
5 Measurement of Banks' Exposure to Interest Rate Risk, Basle April 1993. Regarding investment firms and 
securities portfolios of banks see EC Directives OJ 1993, L 141/1 and L 141/27 as well as the related Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision proposal "The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risks", Basle April 
1993. 
6 Recommendation EC OJ 1987, L 33/16; draft EC Directive OJ 1992, С 163. 
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5. Possible Solutions 
With a view to these unsolved problems, savings are concentrated in deposits with 
savings banks. The outcome of the first experiences in raising long-term funds was not 
uniform; in Hungary, the first industrial bonds were sold successfully, whereas in the 
fairly reasonable monetary environment of the Czech Republic five years bank bonds 
issued under attractive conditions are taken up reluctantly. The obstacles in the Czech 
Republic seem to result from investors' attitude which is not in favour of long-term 
engagements, whereas in Poland reasonable indexation might help. 
How to clear all the hurdles? An institutional approach of supporting long-term 
saving would lie in provision of old-age life insurances and pension funds. This approach 
would introduce a potential of long-term investors in securities or property. At the early 
stages, strict regulatory frameworks are advisable in order to inspire investors' 
confidence. The EC Directives on life insurances may serve as an example of minimum 
standards.7 This approach has proved to be a highly stabilizing factor in Chile. Within 
10 years, considerable amounts went into pension funds within a social security program. 
Institutional investors also had a stabilizing influence on the German post-war capital 
markets. Regarding the reform countries, life insurances and pension funds are being 
established e.g. in the Czech Republic. 
Another instituional approach would be investment funds following the French 
example. Here, again, the related EC Directives8 may serve as an example of minimum 
standards. 
Also the Danish or German mortgage bond systems should be taken into consider-
ation, securing both depositors' protection and long-term investment: 
1. bond issue by specifically licenced banking institutions only; 
2. specific public supervision over issuers; 
3. regulation protecting investors; 
4. coverage of bonds by legally specified assets until the date of termination; 
5. preference of the mortgage bond creditor in the event of bancruptcy of the bank; 
6. standardized funding and investment instrument the rating of which can be kept 
widely independent from the specific issuer, taking into consideration collateral rather 
than credit-worthiness; 
7. swapping savings into financing long-term fixed asset investments including 
infrastructure and public debt finance. The German mortgage banks e.g. cover more than 
1/4 of the public credit demand, whereas 40% are raised by immediate governmental 
bond issue. 
7 See particularly EC Directive OJ 1990, L 330/44. 
8 EC OJ 1985, L 375/3; L 212/37; 1979, L 66/21; 1980, L 100/1; 1982, L 48/26; 1988, L 348/62; 1989, 
L 124/8. 
148 Klaus Peter Follak 
This standardization is achieved through mortgage bonds which may be issued only 
by banking institutions which are subject to specific supervision and a limited range of 
activities which investors can clearly keep track of.' 
On the other hand, the system of mortgage-backed securities, the principle of which 
could be simplifyingly circumscribed as independent mortgage portfolios, shows certain 
disadvantages: 
1. it is hard to standardize; 
2. without governmental guarantees, a highly complex structure of guarantees and 
collateral is necessary which is hard to survey from an investor's point of view. 
In particular, the Danish and the German systems of mortgage bonds can serve as 
good examples of how large sources of funds can be raised, at stable conditions, stabiliz-
ing the monetary environment as well as the property market and hence minimizing 
volatilities. The economies of the reform countries may not yet be prepared to introducing 
fixed interest rates. But the "Pfandbrief' system has proved its efficiency in environments 
of various indexations and variable interest rates as well. During the currency difficulties 
following World War I, the German mortgage banks were able to attract significant 
amounts of foreign capital by means of mortgage bonds on a gold or US S index basis—a 
success due to the cumulation of security. 
After all, the mortgage bond system shows a good track record in the tradition of 
many reform countries—Baltic states, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic. 
Characteristically, it has developed in an environment of capital undersupply for agri-
cultural (18th century) and residential (19th century) purposes. 
* 
6. Banking Structures: Universal Banking System, Supplemented by 
Specialized Institutions? 
The main condition of a successful introduction of mortgage bond funding would be strict 
regulation regarding loan-to-value ratios, principles of valuation and supervision over 
issuing institutions as well as workable stock exchanges. The adoption of well-proven EC 
standards would facilitate attracting foreign capital. As an institutional supplement to raise 
long-term funding one might also think of "Bausparkassen". As the related system 
requires disbursements to be linked to specific collective funds, medium-term bridging 
finance and additional long-term loans would be necessary which could be supplied by 
mortgage banks. With regard to introducing "Bausparkassen", the Czech Republic, again, 
may serve as a model. 
The divisional structure of the banking system existing in many reform countries is 
a major obstacle to establishing long-term capital markets. These divisional structures had 
been used for channelling specific subsidies. As a result, individual savings banks were 
able to build up monopolistic positions in the field of private deposits. The Polish PKO, 
9 As for the EC standard for "Pfandbriefe" see the so-called OGAW Directive Art. 22 (4). 
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e.g., holds 40% of all private deposits. Accordingly, 80% of the Hungarian residential 
mortgages are concentrated in the OTP Bank. Insufficient alternatives for investors, 
coupled with shortage of credit supply are the reasons for windfall profits with high real 
interest margins for credit institutions and negative real interest rates for investors. 
On the contrary, a universal banking system is capable of supplying a broad range of 
competitive credit and investment instruments. It would also avoid concentrations of risks 
linked to specific economic sectors and facilitate balancing cross-sector profits and losses, 
which is necessary to improve the average capital ratios. However, as a booster for long-
term savings the universal banking system might be supplemented by a group of institu-
tions with a limited range of activities, subject to specific supervision and specialization: 
1. The necessary improvement of capital ratios of universal banks to 8-12% will take 
time. The IMF states with a view to the Czech Republic: 
"...welcoming progress in establishing a modern banking system. Directors nevertheless 
observed that the weak balance sheets of commercial banks remained an obstacle to 
efficient intermediation. Therefore, in economies with developing capital markets it 
seems reasonable to establish institutions with a limited range of activities which can 
be clearly overviewed by investors, subject to specific security and control. This 
approach should facilitate attracting long-term savings. The traditional European 
mortgage banking system comprising residential and commercial mortgages as well 
as loans to public entities has proved to be a highly secure field of activities. However, 
these positive experiences depending on a spread of risk between mortgage collateral 
and public debt show that specialization should not be over-extended towards a focus 
on sectors with a specific need for aid and subsidies. Governmental guarantees for 
former public institutions would undermine competition and cannot have any anchor 
in market-oriented economies". 
2. These institutions could be kept free from problem loans dating back to the central 
planning era. 
3. As they do not have the cost problems of universal banks resulting from retail and 
clearing business, loans at advantageous conditions could be supplied for housing, 
infrastructure and agriculture. 
However, in the beginning relatively strict regulation is recommended. 
With regard to re-structuring the banking systems in specific reform countries, the 
most far-reaching progress has been achieved in the Czech Republic. Along with privati-
zation, i.e. conversion into public companies, the universal banking system was established. 
Facing serious difficulties in funding long-term investment loans, one might now think of 
introducing mortgage banks. A law on Bausparkassen already exists. In Poland and 
Hungary, the future development of banking systems is still an open question. 
7. Developing Property Markets and Property Finance 
Investments in property are an important part of developed economies; property finance 
is a motor of investment finance. 
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In the field of commercial properties, the situation of the reform countries can be well 
compared with the development in Fast Germany. A speedy pick up of construction 
activities is likely as soon as considerable returns on investment are to be expected. This 
is particularly true for investments related to day-to-day needs of private individuals such 
as supermarkets, but also for the shortage of office space. These investments will also 
attract foreign capital. 
Private investments in rented houses depend on whether the rental prices are still 
regulated for social reasons. Only open market rentals are sufficient to cover 
refurbishment or construction costs. This is a serious problem, because the population is 
not familiar with rental prices at a cost basis. Basically, housing in reform countries 
shows a differentiated pattern.10 In the Czech Republic and Poland there is a large 
housing stock owned by the public or by the co-operative sector. The related post-war 
stock was normally constructed with pre-fabricated parts, now often suffering from 
serious need for refurbishment. In the Czech Republic privatisation has made such a 
speedy progress that following an interim peak, housing and rental prices are on a 
certain decline. Poland, on the contrary, is still at the dawn of the development. There, 
the demand for new construction is estimated at 350 000-400 000 units p.a. during the 
next 15 years. In Hungary, private residential property is rather common; here, mainly 
smaller amounts for refurbishment facilities will be required. Initially, one might 
recommend the introduction of open market rental prices to the upper segments of new 
construction, as in the case of East Germany and the Czech Republic, at the same time 
vacating social housing in favour of the less prosperous part of the population. For 
systemic reasons of market-orientation, income subsidies should be preferred to interest 
payment aid. 
Fundamental requirement of a market-oriented property sector is the clear 
establishment of property rights and a framework of laws that enable the exchange of 
these rights and enforce contracts in brief, clearly defined rules of the game. Basically, 
the necessary political intention is present in reform countries. The difficulties in property 
markets and property finance are normally focussed on specific fields: 
1. Although the notary system was broadly implemented, clarity and security of 
property rights as well as speed of transactions suffer from various obstacles. The 
unconditional introduction of the principle of the constitutive effect and public faith of 
the entry into the land register would already mean significant progress. Along with a 
range of preliminary titles—which cannot yet be found even in advanced legal systems 
such as the one of the Czech Republic—these principles would already form a solid basis 
for straightforward transactions. Claims for restitution by former owners—a problem 
which is very common in East Germany—have to be settled speedily. 
2. Following the experiences in East Germany, clear titles are also a fundamental 
condition for the establishment of capital markets on a mortgage bond basis, because 
10 See RENAUD, Betrand: Housing Reforms in Socialist Economies, World Bank Discussion Papers no. 125, 
Washington D. C. 1991. 
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related risks would concern the safety and soundness of bonds. This problem is 
particularly serious as long as issuing institutions in reform countries have not yet built 
up sufficient reserves. 
3. A further necessary condition for the establishment of property finance would be 
the enforcement to execute mortgages. For social reasons, there still exist many obstacles 
in this field. In Poland, e.g. residential properties cannot be vacated unless the occupier 
is offered an alternative accommodation. A possible step-by-step approach might be 
limiting the speed of vacation to the upper segments of the market, i.e. the more 
prosperous part of the population in the beginning. 
4. With a view to the monetary environment, indexation of debt service and funding 
instruments will often be unavoidable. Therefore, mortgages should be open for 
indexation, currency clauses etc. 
5. Open market financing of accommodation requires basically a market-oriented 
rental system which might be introduced step by step following the example of East 
Germany. Here, the basic rental price is regulated and subject to annual reassessment, 
whereas renting newly built accommodation is liberalized. As a consequence, 
refurbishment of the old stock has to be undertaken step by step following the liquidity 
out of the permitted rent increase. This liquidity would be also the limit of possible debt 
service.The Czech Republic may serve as an example that situations exist when 
residential rentals can decline. 
6. Planning law and planning consents must be clear. The major problem, however, 
is matching planning consents with actual needs. It will take time until planning 
authorities will have an overview of demand and supply. As a result, property markets 
will be volatile, affecting the value of collateral and hence the soundness of banks and 
bonds issued by mortgage institutions. 
7. Mortgage bonds are necessarily linked to property valuation, because the property 
is the underlying value determining the safety and security of bonds. With a view to the 
volatility of developing markets, strict regulation regarding the loan-to-value ratios of 
mortgages is necessary in case they have to serve as bond collateral. This is also true for 
professional valuations themselves. 
8. A serious obstacle to progress in the structure of housing finance and to financing 
urgent refurbishments is the indebtedness of public residential property companies and 
co-operatives resulting from the socialist era This problem arose in East Germany and 
still exists in Poland. The related debt service does not leave any room for financing 
refurbishments, and the existing loan amounts block the properties to be mortgaged. 
Hence, these companies are not credit-worthy from the point of view of private lenders. 
The East German example demonstrates that the only possible solution which would not 
jeopardize the stability of the former lending institutions (normally public banks) is taking 
over the existing debt by the central government and then cutting it down. Due to this 
operation, the East German residential property companies were made credit-worthy and 
the related refurbishments can be financed by private lenders. It was also necessary to 
convey to these companies the public housing stock which can now serve as a source of 
collateral and liquidity for borrowing. The costs of the German operation amounted to 
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approximately DM 38 bn. In Poland, the amount of debt might be 60,000 bn Zloty which 
would of course increase central government indebtedness. In order to avoid further 
weakening the central government's standing, one might think of finance by sources of 
international stabilization programs in order to pave the way for future private lending. 
8. Outlook 
Procuring capital for the developing markets of the reform countries is a great challenge. 
It will be crucial to separate the investment capital market from the short-term money 
market. With the establishment of a long-term capital market where the payments for 
financing are adapted to the returns on investment, the monetary institutions could 
achieve independence to limit credit ceilings to the short-term money market. 
Long-term funding requires the confidence of investors. For this putpose, a universal 
banking system seems appropriate, which is supplemented by institutions securing 
collateral for funding instruments, subject to specific supervision and strict regulation. If 
this regulatory environment can meet European standards, the attraction of foreign capital 
should also be possible. Implementing common standards is possible without formally 
joining the EC or the Monetary Union. The field of capital standards for banks" is an 
example of how the principle of minimum harmonization of standards can support 
tendencies towards homecountry control and domestic preferential rather than most-
favoured treatment in cross-border financial relations. The US Banking Agencies state: 
"in determining whether a bank's capital meets the minimum standard, as an initial 
requirement applicants that adhere to the Basle Accord will be required to meet the 
Basle guidelines as administered by their home country supervision. ... the Basle 
standard provides a common basis for evaluating the general equivalency of capital 
among banks from various countries".12 
Another example of harmonizing regulation of the economy without being over-
engaged in political unions is the European Economic Zone (EEZ). 
11 BIS, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, Basle 1988. 
12 Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors/Secretary of the Department of the Treasury, Capital 
Equivalence Report, 19 June 1992, p. 42. 
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Thomas TRUMPY Implementing Appropriate Technology: 
The North-South, East-West Challenge 
There is a direction in history, progress exists. The 'direction of history' is not an ' ism', 
not socialism, not capitalism, not totalitarianism. It is economic progress fostered by the 
successful development, diffusion and utilisation of the fruits of man's mind, technology 
and technological innovation, from the wheel to the telephone, to today's fax and modem 
culture, to tomorrow's perhaps paperless, meetingless society. 
Introduction: Innovation and Technology 
1. Innovation and technology, in all their forms, are the key to economic develop-
ment 
Only implementation of new technologies has and will contribute to meet our 
economic, social and environmental goals, and to keep our economies growing, and 
INNOVATING! 
— Economic growth leads to innovation and provides the means for its imple-
mentation. 
— Innovation provides the means for economic growth and leads to economic 
growth. To meet our global challenges: economic development, the population ex-
plosion, energy penury and environmental damage, we have only one choice: We must 
innovate and innovate, we must introduce and promote the most economic and bene-
ficial technologies. 
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2. Technology is a catalyst resource for worldwide economic growth 
As part of the 'Uruguay Round' of the GATT negotiations the nations of the world are 
making commitments to protect intellectual property and to liberalize trade in services, 
and thus to encourage improved and accelerated diffusion of technology. 
To catalyse change, economies need introduction and application of improved 
technology. Technology is the tool for economic development. Technology moves 
worldwide in many forms: intellectual property rights, products, techniques, services, 
training. 
Most economic development and improvement projects, and energy projects in particu-
lar, need the catalyst resources: Investment, Management and Technology. (See: 'Resource 
Sharing: Penury or Development', T. Trumpy, 54 Hague AAA Yearbook 184, 1984.) 
3. Technology is an organic, renewable resource for change and development 
New technology is the result of inspiration, perspiration and market demand. 
— We can engineer technology to meet known needs, or create new markets for 
new ideas. We need both approaches. Neither alone will give the best path to develop-
ment. 
— Technology grows to meet needs; it continues to advance and to evolve. But like 
plants in a garden—those we want and need do not always thrive and grow the fastest! 
— Some needs are not large economic markets (tropical diseases, waste disposal). 
— Some unnecessary innovations are enormous markets (fast food franchises, 
snacks). 
As public policy seeks to provide the 'best available economic technology' for the 
needs of the economy, it must also anticipate TOMORROW'S technical advances. 
— We must study and respect development, testing an investment time cycles from 
laboratory to implementation. We must encourage innovation and technology 
diffusion. 
4. Technology is a special type of property; it needs special protection 
Project planners often neglect the particularities of protection, transfer, guarantee and 
remuneration of technology, assuming that if the physical aspects of a project can be 
financed, the promoters can obtain (cheaply and rapidly) the intellectual property 
rights necessary to complete the project and to produce the products. 
— Particularly in economies in transition and development this is rarely possible! 
Industry will NOT offer technology in countries where it cannot be protected and 
controlled, in countries where a licensor cannot STOP dangerous practices or 
products. 
— Particularly if an operation or project can only be partially controlled, licensors 
bear enormous risks for product liability (Remington) or environmental damage 
(Bhopal). 
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5. Technology is the fruit of physical and intellectual labor. It must be paid for! 
Technology is property. Technology transfer is investment. 
When there is no economic stability, there will be no investment. 
Needed technology will not be made available nor applied. 
Applying new technology requires SOME taking of SOME calculated risks. However: 
— No incentive will make an owner of technology risk selling unproven technology. 
(Lessons from windmills, coal gasification and PFBC, and from pharmaceuticals.) 
Owners of technology demand legal and financial security in recipient countries, or 
transfer of technology and economic development will be delayed. 
— New technology is rarely offered to economies in rapid transition and restructuring. 
6. Public policy must help to bring technology to market, to make it available 
If public goals call for new technology, public policy must help bring it to market. 
But public policy generally requires expenditure of public money; public funds are not 
an inexhaustible resource, so, public policy must favor and aid those technologies which 
will offer high economic and environmental returns for the whole economy! 
Policy push and market pull can make technology available more rapidly; but much 
technology is not yet proven in practice, or has not yet been engineered to meet the 
challenges of specific present and future needs, or of smaller markets. More is needed. 
7. Implementation of new technologies requires proven reliability 
Technology must be proven, and must be appropriate in scale and application. 
— The greatest FEARS of both owner-licensor and of user-licensee are of 
unexpected side-effects and of downtime (which seems to occur at times of greatest 
need!) 
— The greatest REASSURANCE (in any part of the world) is: 
— Ready and rapid availability of technical support when needed. 
Who will pay to make efficient technologies available and economic in Western 
Europe, here in Eastern Europe and in the countries of the developing world? 
— Public policy and funding, or guarantees for licensors, are needed to make 'best 
available' (cleanest and most efficient) technologies reliable, safe and economic, and 
also to make emerging markets for such technologies reliable, safe and economic. 
Full-scale demonstration of new technology, and application of new technology to 
specific practical problems, applications engineering, require major investments of time 
and money. Hungary is rich in geothermal power—who will develop it? 
Only support for full scale demonstration will bring NEW technology to market! 
— The process must be guaranteed, the applications engineering must be paid for. 
A review of practical and economic aspects and problems of selecting (introducing) 
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implementing 'new' technology shows that to obtain positive economic and environ-
mental results we need integrated systems approaches and favorable policy. 
— Policy signals and programs must 'bring technology to market' when and where 
needed. 
8. Diffusion of improved technology is slowed by regulatory barriers to progress 
Technology driven investments only occur if economic ('cheaper'). BlIT 
— If customs duties, taxes and product standards protect older products and older 
technology, implementation of 'economic' new products and technologies will be 
delayed. (The requirement of autocatalysers delays energy saving 'clean-bum' engines.) 
Innovation and new technology need legal protection, NOT regulatory barriers. 
Evolving technologies and open markets should be encouraged; norms and standards 
should prescribe effects and quality, not the technical means of achieving a desired 
result. 
9. Diffusion of improved technology is slowed by economic barriers to progress 
Technology driven investments only occur if economic ('cheaper'). BUT 
— If taxes, financial and fiscal incentives and product standards protect and 
encourage a certain product, licensors and producers increase its cost, reducing its 
economics, and delay further investment on better technologies. ('Mandatory' 
autocatalysers have high costs and high profits, and require incentives even for new 
vehicles.) 
Innovation and new technology need legal protection, NOT economic barriers. 
Evolving technologies and open markets should be encouraged; norms, taxes and 
incentives should prescribe effects and quality, not the technical means of achieving a 
desired result. Appropriate technical solutions are neither 'cheap' nor 'expensive', but 
ECONOMIC. We must beware of uneconomic solutions; even if they have lower front-
end costs and are 'cheaper' investments. A Lada or a Dacia car was 'cheap' to buy, but 
was uneconomic: more expensive, steel using, fuel consuming and polluting over 10 
years (250,000 km). Large cheap power plants without CHP only have an uneconomic 
42% efficiency, not 85%. 
We must select and promote technology for its total life-cycle cost and benefit. 
10. The 'market' does not always favor new technologies or economic technologies 
Stable economic demand and open markets are needed to guarantee return on investment 
in technology. Economic instability and transition, and well-intentioned rule-making and 
rule-changing, incentives and taxation destabilize innovation, supply and demand! 
— Governments should hesitate before meddling in markets, even for the 'environ-
ment'! Financial and fiscal policy should not create barriers to innovation and new 
products. 
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Competing technologies and their fruits are sold in fierce competition, regardless of 
the economically and environmentally most desirable technology or path of development. 
In economic growth productive (expansion/improvement) investments come first! 
Investments to make cleaner, safer products, or to make products more cleanly and 
safely are a lower economic priority. We must select, motivate and aid sectors where 
NEW technologies can give the best returns for public as well as private goals! 
If we let the whirling winds of a free market' blow freely, we may hustle and finance 
the evolving economies into hasty, wasteful and unwise investment in inappropriate 
technologies and products. Then will come the economic and debt crisis of 1998! 
11. Diffusion of improved technology is slowed by political barriers to progress 
Technology competes in a world market. The products made with technology compete 
in a world market. But the savings and the profits of the use of the best available 
technology are not obvious. Governments protect markets and tax our bad habits: energy 
alcohol and tobacco. They hesitate to encourage change; it may reduce tax revenues! 
Likewise, higher, 'more protective' customs duties provide some additional revenue for 
the State, but provide only a temporary barrier protecting production of lower quality, 
higher-priced goods against the inexorable tide of technology—more efficiently made 
goods at lower cost. American bicycles are cheaper and better than Indian bicycles! 
Energy and the Environment 
12. Energy savings and the environment: an example of conflicting political desires 
Among the challenges of our world today are protection of the environment and 
reduction of wasteful use of our limited natural resources, such as energy. This need is 
not limited to the wealthy nations. We must now find means to implement this policy 
in Eastern and Central Europe, and we must think also of the developing countries. 
Within the OECD economies there is consensus that for energy supply and environ-
mental reasons we must adopt policies and find strategies and means to achieve both: 
— Energy efficiency, reduced energy use, Rational Use of Energy (RUE), and 
— Control, even reversal, of environmental damage and pollution. 
However, Governments and energy sector companies profit from energy use and 
waste. Many States depend on energy revenues: profits of (semi-) public energy 
industries (oil, gas, electricity, motor fuels), (quantity related) excise taxes, Value-Added' 
taxes, taxes on profits of energy production, transport and distribution companies, fees 
to the State from energy imports (port and import fees and franchises). 
— Who wants energy savings? 
* Market pricing for national competitiveness drowns encouragement of energy savings. 
— Many States fear the economic consequences of higher energy taxes and prices. 
— Belgium prices energy relatively freely (subject to fiscal distortions). Belgium 
already taxes energy by more than the proposed rate of the EC's Energy/Carbon tax (but 
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all this tax revenue goes into the general budget, not for energy efficiency demonstration 
or incentives!). Yet Belgian energy prices are still too low to encourage real, non-
subsidized energy rationalisation investments, to make them ECONOMIC! 
* The private sector will invest in energy efficiency only if energy is relatively 
expensive and energy saving technology and money relatively available and cheap. 
— Government must price energy so industry can accomplish public goals at a profit! 
* The cost of energy is a small part of the budget of most persons and companies. 
— Most investments to save energy (or use it efficiently) have a very poor payback. 
— For industry they are an economically irresponsible use of financial resources. 
* Energy waste in the West is not that bad; presently best available technologies 
give only modest gains; the return on investment (the difference between cost of energy 
wasted vs. investment cost to save energy) is uncertain. Many countries have few or no 
financial or fiscal incentives to reduce payback time. Who will pay for energy savings? 
If there is no economic reason for energy users to save energy, there is no economic 
reason to develop new energy efficient technologies. Will energy efficiency die? 
We must MOTIVATE energy markets to change to energy and environmental con-
servation. 
— Energy is too cheap and money too dear-more energy saving is a poor investment. 
We must make economic a policy and strategy for energy retrofit with new technology. 
13. Can government policy, rules and tax measures help save energy and the 
environment? 
Normative and fiscal approaches (push and pull) may not always motivate change: 
— if better technology is not yet adequately known and full-scale proven 
[Pressurized Fluidized Bed (PFB), Integrated Combined Cycle Gasification (ICCG)] 
— if front-end capital for implementation is unavailable (LDC'S and eastern Europe) 
— when costs of regulation and taxes can be passed 'through' by utilities to users, 
(US use of 'lower sulfur' coal compared to FGD, FGD compared to ICCG) 
— when imposition of one technical solution blocks further research or improvement. 
(Authorized 'compliance': FGD on power plants or catalysers on automobiles.) 
Any additional 'energy tax' would have little effect on the public (as a % of total 
energy prices). Increased energy taxes would have more negative effect on Belgium's 
economy and already poor competivity than positive effect to reduce energy use/waste. 
Eastern Europe 
14. An example: Energy and environmental renewal in Eastern Europe 
Using the example of improved energy efficiency and environmental protection, 
in particularly the application of commercially available New Technologies in 
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Eastern Europe, we suggest that intensified international cooperation is needed to 
establish: 
— Common standards for equipment and process evaluation, 
— Norms for environmental and energy efficiency Impact Statements, and 
— Guidelines for approval of investments, subsidies and lending to projects. 
The collapse of the 'centrally planned economies' of Europe was provoked by under 
investment in new technology. The Soviet dominated economies were forced to cover 
the non-productiveness, the unreliability and the non-competitiveness of their industrial 
and product technologies by induced scarcity (automobiles), low prices and producer 
subsidies, the only, unreal economic world in which they were marketable! 
It is easy to identify opportunities for new products and projects in Eastern Europe, 
but a serious task to determine the most economic solutions and how to structure them. 
— Turbulent market conditions and uncertain medium-term financial stability of the 
local investment-receiving enterprise may block a project, even if the initial equipment 
cost and investment risks can be guaranteed by public institutions. 
— Continuing risks of licensors can be enormous and unmanageable (e.g. risk of loss 
of control of a technology in case of insolvency or take-over of a licensee). 
Yet many more projects in Eastern Europe are economic than some public-sector 
planners and economists believe. Some energy projects have immediate (under one year) 
payback. 
If technology needs first to be engineered to local needs and then demonstrated, 
SMALL demonstration projects are preferable. Improvement is more visible, although 
cost is relatively high (e.g. renewal of district heating pipe insulation, Kaunus, Lithuania). 
We must now train Eastern Europeans (and 'Western' bankers and businessmen!) how: 
— to identify such projects and bring them to the attention of the private sector, 
— to package such projects for financial attractiveness and lowest cost, 
— if needed, to attract foreign equity, loans, technology, suppliers and customers, 
— to negotiate projects in the best interest of all parties and Eastern Europe, 
— to avoid unnecessary foreign participation, costs, imports and involvement. 
15. Eastern Europe: Building a bridge between technology needs and skills available 
The emerging economies of Eastern Europe in particular need technology-led economic 
renewal, as they are already mature industrial economies with adequate (but not splendid) 
infrastructure for commerce. Principal goals of this renewal must be: 
— renewal of most energy producing, transforming and using equipment on a more 
environmentally compatible, economic and efficient basis; 
— renewal of the means of production, and restructuring/reselection of sectors; 
— modernization and improvement of quality of most products and services. 
'Development' or 'Renewal' energy projects, whether for supply, transformation or 
demand side, whether to improve energy efficiency or decrease pollution or both, will 
need finance and management. Usually they also need introduction and application of 
improved technology in the form of: equipment/engineering/ knowhow/training. 
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16. Matching skills and needs—Do not reinvent the wheel—Open the markets! 
We must review public and private skills needed (and available) in Eastern Europe. 
Eastern European industry had excellent, under-utilized engineers. Often they have 
been prevented from adopting the latest techniques not by ignorance or pride, but by: 
— Western (COCOM) restrictions on the transfer of some technologies and equipment; 
— unvailable capital or foreign currency to buy modem technologies and equipment; 
— (e.g. mine mouth coal preparation plants for run-of-mine coal in Poland) 
Local engineers frequently know the needs they could not afford to fulfil. Ask them! 
We must identify the West's transferable/exportable technologies and market them. 
— Identification of such technologies, analysis who can transfer them, analysis of 
priority markets in terms of payback on new technologies, and development of legal and 
economic conditions to encourage owners of techniques to cooperate to market them 
abroad, ALL must become Western policy goals for cooperative industry projects. 
— Eastern Europe must ask for what it needs, and must open its markets to the West! 
We must also identify what products, services and skill Eastern Europe has to offer. 
— The West MUST open its markets to those products and services of emerging 
economies! 
17. The project recipient—Eastern Europe—as project partner 
Where technical input is needed, review when a project needs: 
— to attract local and foreign equity, loans, equipment and supplies; 
— to avoid unneeded foreign participation, purchases and involvement. 
The EC's PHARE Program is praised compared to national OECD export-credits, as 
local-source material can be substituted, thus reducing import costs and foreign capital. 
Eastern European engineers have adapted with amazing speed and are NOW the best 
project engineers and local partners. Unlike 'Institutes' they can IMPLEMENT new 
technologies. 
— Call on these local skills, to match local needs to available technology. 
— Use local engineers to find local parners and to manage sub-contractors. 
In many cases the time is now ripe for the West to support (much less costly) intra-
East European cooperation and aid, and to encourage partnerships within Eastern 
Europe. 
— Technology transfer is the transfer and continuing upgrading of LOCAL skills. 
— Technology transfer is a CONTINUING partnership—not a cure one can inject! 
18. The role of the Western partner/investor/licensor 
Investment and technology transfer require political and economic stability. We need a 
new relation of trust and cooperation between the OECD countries and Eastern Europe. 
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— We must help Eastern Europe (and the LDC's) to learn what they NEED from the 
West. 
Western help should be hands-on big-brothering to help Eastern Europe help itself. 
Publicly supported, private sector teams (e.g. the EC's OPETS) develop local skills. 
The West has many needed skills and technologies. Unfortunately much time and 
effort is wasted by eager but technically illiterate bankers and bureaucrats solicited by 
hard-sell Western consultants and high-price fly-in-fly-out experts with universal ideas. 
19. Crossing the remaining project barriers in Eastern Europe 
It remains difficult to structure projects to provide security of ownership and remuner-
ation of intellectual property rights for an investor or licensor, particularly as the legal 
structure and economic viability of many enterprises is uncertain. 
— Legal structures for securing rights to payment on industrial and commercial 
projects in most of Eastern Europe are new and unproven. 
— Rights in insolvency are still a puzzle, and litigation appears uncertain rapidly to 
stop infringement or misuse of technology. 
Technology is as proprietary as investment capital. Legal conditions must assure their 
protection. (See: Analysis of Financial Regulations and Incentives Governing Foreign 
Private Direct Investment, T. Trumpy, 47 Hague AAA Yearbook 114, 1977). 
— If risks are too great relative to rewards—technology is NOT made available. 
— If there is no secure expectation of profit—technology is NOT made available. 
If energy retrofit and other types of economic renewal in Eastern Europe are to be 
a private initiative, licensors and investors need security for investments and a fair rate 
of profit. Energy renewal and many other projects can be privately implemented and 
financed, IF they are economic and if the technology has been demonstrated/proven. 
All economic and financial aspects of proposed projects must be analyzed. For energy 
efficiency and environmental improvement investments (or expenditures) the goals are: 
— to improve payback periods for both investors and investment recipients, 
— to minimize investment and costs to public sector institutions and municipalities, 
— to reduce high profit margins demanded by foreign currency investors, and 
— to minimize national balance of payments costs and risks of foreign financing. 
We must structure investments to reduce costs and foreign exchange risk. We must: 
— maximize local purchases (when consistent with investors' export credits), 
— maximize use of local financing, fiscal incentives and tax deductions, and 
— compensate with export trade (including partial sub-contracting to order) or 
— sequester currency streams on project related (or unrelated) exports, or 
— sequester currency streams on project related (or unrelated) import-avoidance, and 
— 'partner' with local firms to multiply skills and profits on future projects. 
Where technological input is needed, consideration will also be given both to needs: 
— to attract foreign equity, loan and supply participation, where appropriate, and 
— to avoid unnecessary foreign participations, costs, imports and involvement. 
We must select and motivate key sectors with MONEY and proven available technologies! 
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Conclusions 
20. Public—private cooperation is needed for energy, the environment and the economy 
Are energy and the environment too important to leave to the 'free market'? Are 
technology transfer and economic development too important to leave to the market? 
— In the world of the blind the one-eyed are king. State must COOPERATE with 
industry! 
We need varied policy approaches—and greater technical-economic dialogue NOW: 
— Some technological efficiency gains are economic NOW (CHP, topping turbines). 
— Some (with 'push-and-pull') can be made economic more or less rapidly (ICCG). 
— As experience increases, risk decreases, cost decreases, economics improve. 
— Some require public support, implementation and changes of lifestyle (CHP). 
— Some violate rules of physics are dangerous (underground coal gasification). 
We need increased dialogue among local, regional, national and international: 
— energy and environmental policy makers, administrators and economists, 
— providers of technology and applications engineering, 
— providers of equity and debt finance, public and private, and 
— businessmen: producers, buyers and sellers of goods and services. 
Such dialogue must assure funding for demonstration projects and implementation, and: 
— seek appropriate technologies in view of need, cost and viability/maintenance, 
— 'appropriate technologies must be proven, available and economic (cheap), 
— provide legal and operating structures, security and guarantees for all parties, 
— analyze financial circumstances of proposed investments/expenditures so as to: 
— improve payback periods for investors and investment recipients/partners, 
— reduce overall costs for project reviews, engineering and implementation, 
— reduce or eliminate foreign exchange risks and burdens to parties and countries. 
And we must open Western markets NOW to the ECONOMIC products of Eastern 
Europe! 
Thus we need international cooperation, North-South, East and West, to assure that: 
— international borders open to technology and that countries assure its protection, 
— the best available and the most appropriate technology be effectively available, 
— appropriateness respect economic, social and environmental criteria, 
— the products of improved technology can be freely traded in the world marketplace. 
Economic development, improved energy efficiency, better environmental standards 
are linked. With cooperation ALL will come in the normal course of a social market 
economy. 
21. The role of technology policy in a social market economy 
Companies wishing an active role in Eastern Europe in energy renewal and other projects 
should identify and plan projects NOW, and proceed as soon as technical and financial 
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risks can be assessed and managed. They should work with local partners and 
government. 
Companies compete, seeking profits from innovations which give savings and market 
advantage to purchasers. If the state helps on the costs, it should share in profits! 
— We need private research, and protection and dissemination of innovation! 
— We need cooperative demonstration projects to bring technologies to market! 
— We need selective aids (investment incentives) to improve retrofit payback times. 
To accelerate change and growth in emerging markets we need the help of the state 
to share some of the costs and risks. We all win if the private sector and government 
work together where needed, but when government does not interfere in the normal cycle 
of technology and industry, or in selecting or imposing technologies on industry. 
— If bureaucrats could pick tomorrow's winners— they would not remain bureaucrats! 
Yes, we suggest that intensified international cooperation is needed to establish: 
— Common standards for equipment and process evaluation, 
— Norms for environmental and for energy efficiency Impact Statements', and 
— Guidelines for approval of investments, of subsidies and for lending to projects, 
(but we favor subsidiarity at all levels, and respect for private initiative!) 
— Economic growth, not taxes, permits investments for energy saving and less 
pollution. CAPITALISM WORKS—Support and Help Free Enterprise. Thank you. 
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1. Introduction: The "Close Call" of Vienna 
Over the years, against many odds, the United Nations have succeeded in developing 
multi-faceted international institutions for the protection of Human rights. 
In its standard-setting aspects, the system includes nearly one hundred treaties as 
well as some Declarations which various experts consider either as proof of Interna-
tional Customary Law or as accelerators of its emergence. 
The system further includes several mechanisms for monitoring and deterrence: 
periodic public debates on violations, where NGOs participate; the critical examination 
of state reports; complaint procedures of various types, open to individuals and NGOs; 
as well as a growing number of ex officio investigations by Expert Committees or 
Special Rapporteurs. 
True, this system normally does not lead to compulsory decisions, as they exist at 
the European and Inter-American levels. It is far from perfect. Nevertheless, its very 
existence is remarkable, considering the narrowness and ambiguity of its legal basis in 
Articles 1 (3), 2 (7), 55 and 56 of the Charter. 
A pragmatic process, built upon a maximalist interpretation of the Charter, it lead 
to a near-metamorphosis of the Organization. Utilizing the "mobilization of shame" as 
their sole or main weapon, these procedures have had some sizeable degree of 
effectiveness. 
In Vienna, at the UN World Conference on Human Rights of June 1993, this castle 
of cards was nearly swept aside. 
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To a large extent, the debate in Vienna was ostensibly conceptual. An important 
group of States, mostly from South and South-East Asia, lead in part by China, 
challenged the concepts of the universality and indivisibility of Human Rights. These had 
been, and remain, the very bases of the United Nations system. In short, universality was 
challenged as a disguise for Western cultural and political imperialism. The indivisi-
bility of HR was rejected in favour of a hierarchical doctrine granting full priority 
to collective rights, especially the right to development conceived as a collective 
entitlement. Finally, however, the universality, indivisibility and equal importance of 
all Human Rights were re-affirmed, but after a hard, protracted fight. 
The conceptual debate concealed another tension—possibly the crucial one—over the 
monitoring and deterrence powers of the United Nations. Various challenging States 
denied that the Organization had any power under the Charter to take any supervisory 
action without the explicit consent of the States concerned at every stage of the 
procedures. Cooperation, they said, should never presumed—as the UN had in fact 
sometimes done—from absolutely sovereign States. The aim almost appeared to be a 
return to a pre-1960 United Nations dominated by a resurgent Article 2 (7). Again, the 
challenge failed narrowly. 
The compromise Vienna Declaration was built around two leitmotifs: "cooperation" 
and "objectivity". As usual, at the United Nations these are ambiguous concepts, 
already prominent in the Charter, but to be decoded in the Vienna context. 
"Cooperation" was meant by the majority as a strong demand for increased ef-
forts to reach a consensus based on genuine respect for all cultures and political re-
gimes, without undue "selectivity". In itself a legitimate call, not always heeded in 
the past. 
This emphasis on "cooperation" and "non-selectivity" was meant to apply to super-
visory processes without, however—and this is essential—questioning existing UN 
powers to monitor and deter. 
Such are essentially the lessons of the Vienna "close call". They are not likely to 
wreck the UN HR mechanisms of today. They might even improve them somewhat in 
promoting more objective standards in the choice of culprits. 
But would the Vienna spirit assist or hinder the UN in adjusting to the needs of the 
21st century? 
The emerging world will be a multipolar one. More sophisticated and cheaper 
resources—intellectual, technological, military—will be spread among an increasing 
diversity of power centers: supranational politics, states, non-statal ethnic, religious or 
ideological groupings, as well as huge multinational corporations. A "dangerous place" 
therefore, fraught with growing trends towards violence and mass atrocities, developing 
faster and faster. 
The United Nations Human Rights System is not at all adjusted to this future 
World. To avoid the "dustbins of History", it must imperatively reform. Let us briefly 
reflect on the broad lines of this reformation. 
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/. Towards Early Prevention 
The United Nations cannot wait for fires to break out before doing anything about 
them. From merely desirable, preventive action will become an imperative need in the 
future. Progress in communication and military technology, as well as the increased 
availability of equipment and weapons will accelerate the emergence of conflicts and of 
ensuing mass violations of human rights. 
The UN System at present—whether in the form of complaint procedures or of ex 
officio Special Rapporteur inquiries—shows an almost total post facto orientation. 
How to achieve its mutation towards an early preventive mechanism? 
A. Effective Data-gathering 
A comprehensive UN report on the main practical problems and the main trends in 
human rights in the various regions and states of the world, quickly available and 
constantly updated, would be an essential strategy. It should include all available sources 
of information in the UN system: periodic and occasional state reports, findings of bodies 
responsible for handling complaints, various submissions by States, intergovernmental 
organizations and non-governmental organizations, and studies by subcoimnission and 
Commission Rapporteurs. 
Human Rights data exist in abundance within the UN System. True, they are often 
not up to date. They are useful, however, to identify long-term and medium-term trends 
through time and country-to-country comparisons. Such analyses are nearly impossible 
at present, the data being so widely dispersed and hard to retrieve. Synthesizing them in 
an action-oriented manner requires extensive and intelligent computerization of the UN 
system. The need for computerization is indeed foreseen by the United Nations. It is all 
the more regrettable to note the small amount of contributions so far received by the UN 
Voluntary Fund for the Financing of the United Nations Database referred to in General 
Assembly resolution 45/85, pursuant to the recommendations made in 1990 by the Task 
Force on Computerization. The suggestion made at the fourth meeting of chairpersons 
of UN Treaty-bodies that private sources might be asked to contribute should be carefully 
considered, having regard to the need to preserve the image of impartiality of the System. 
B. A Permanent United Nations Presence 
Effective prevention would require, as its most important element, the continuous 
monitoring of situations closest to the ground, if possible in situ. 
Here and there, one perceives an emerging awareness of the need for a UN presence 
on Human Rights, as well as a lesser resistance of sovereign States against it. Thus, the 
visits in situ of investigation bodies—such as the Committee on Forced Disappearances 
—and Special Rapporteurs on countries-Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala, Haiti, Iran, Salvador 
and other situations—or on thematic issues—Torture, Summary Executions, etc.—are 
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increasingly, almost routinely, accepted by Governments. The short duration of these visits 
(one or two weeks per year), as well as occasional problems—such as inadequate prepara-
tions and lack of familiarity with the socio-cultural conditions of the country at stake—often 
severely limit their investigative and preventive value. Nevertheless, such missions are 
useful as contributing factors in the creation of state practice and, perhaps, one day, of 
customary law, regarding fuller cooperation with the UN monitoring system. 
In quite another form, the UN are present in several countries as a provider of 
technical assistance and "advisory services" on Human Rights. Under this programme, 
experts—e.g. on constitutional law, electoral processes, or criminal procedure—are sent to 
requesting countries, fellowships are granted and training courses for key personnel 
(judges, the police, the military) organized, with a view to strengthening democratic 
institutions and creating a human rights culture. Experts and Training Missions stay in 
general longer in the countries concerned (say, from a few months to a year) than Special 
Rapporteurs. All these services are extended only upon request from the States concerned. 
For over twenty years, States were very shy in asking for help under this programme, 
for fear that requests be perceived as implicit confessions of Human Rights failure. The 
last decade, in contrast, revealed a surge of government interest and a rebirth of the 
programme. The impetus came from countries which, under preceding dictatorial regimes, 
had suffered massive violations of human rights and destruction of their infrastructures, 
such as Equatorial Guinea and Uganda, other States with slightly less traumatic pasts, for 
example Guatemala, Haiti and Romania, followed. At present, even some less disrupted 
countries appear to be applying. 
The mandates of at least some Experts and training missions of the UN HR Technical 
Assistance Programme appear to be broad enough to include certain preventive activities: 
data-gathering, conciliation, confidence-building, even expressions of concern and 
remonstrance. To what extent they do act in this fashion is difficult to know in view of 
the usually confidential character of their detailed findings. Some of them—in Equatorial 
Guinea, Guatemala and Haiti, for example-certainly carried out their missions in an 
active spirit of prevention. 
Lastl)^-a positive novelty—Human Rights "components" were included in some UN 
Peace-Keeping, Peace-Making and Political Observers' Missions established by the 
Security Council: Cambodia, Salvador, South Africa, among others. 
The Human Rights aspects of these Missions are often—purposely—covert ones, under 
such labels as "electoral surveillance", or "civil training". The UN Cambodia operation 
(UNTAC) was more explicit in including full sectors devoted to the promotion of Human 
Rights and Human Rights Education. Let us stress that a resolution of the Economic and 
Social Council of July 1993 called for the continuation of the UN Human Rights 
Education activities in Cambodia, in accord with the Government, for some time even 
after the termination of UNTAC. 
However valuable, these ad hoc arrangements should not be viewed as substitutes for 
a permanent or long-term UN presence on HR. Only through such a presence can one 
gain the feel for societal issues which is required to deal effectively with emerging 
human right tensions. 
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Such Human Rights Advisers, established with Governments' accord at the 
subregional or, better, national levels, could perform or coordinate a wide range of 
functions: gathering data on available HR issues; spreading knowledge of UN standards 
and procedures; promoting with UNESCO HR education and training; gaining the trust 
of Government officials and helping to prepare their UN periodic reports and requests for 
HR technical assistance; developing relations with, and gaining the trust of minorities and 
NGOs; promoting confidence-building measures at an early stage of inter-group tensions; 
offering mediation and conciliation services; and, if all fails, reporting to the appropriate 
UN organs through the Secretary General, with proposals for remedial action. 
There exist some offices of the UN system at the sub-regional level which could, if 
they wish, deal to some extent with Human Rights, inter alia, those of: the World Bank 
(with its "Governance" and "labour law" projects); the UNDP (with its "Human Develop-
ment" programme component); UNESCO; ILO; UNHCR; and WHO. However, the pre-
vailing attitude at such Offices has been sometimes described as an avoidance of Human 
Rights, viewed as political trouble-makers wrecking technical programmes. Furthermore, 
there is still little actual coordination, on Human Rights as on other matters, between 
these Offices. The proposed UN HR Advisors should work in close liaison with, and 
promote co-ordination between, all sub-regional programmes of this kind. 
The mission of the suggested UN HR Advisers would thus be extremely complex 
and sensitive, demanding a high level of ethical dedication as well as objectivity and 
great diplomatic skill. From my experience, however, I believe that teams displaying 
such qualities could be found in the UN spheres as well as among governments and 
NGOs. 
Would States ever accept such peoples for long periods on their own territories, or 
is the whole scheme a raving Utopia? My answer would have been resoundly "utopia" 
only a few years ago, but today I am somewhat less sceptical. As noted earlier, govern-
ments do accept UNHR observers ever more readily. 
In fact, the problem might in the near future have a different focus. The very 
readiness of states to welcome UN observers sometimes—or often?—conceals a strategy 
to use the international presence as an alibi. UN observers may be hosted as a 
convenient protecting screen under which Human Rights violations are perpetrated by 
"private" death squads. In this respect, the recent cases of Guatemala and Haiti should 
be borne in mind. The UN Commission on Human Rights rightly re-transferred those 
countries from the "assisted" to the "accused" lits. HR cooperation should always be 
coupled with critical vigilance. 
In spite of strong pressures in its midst against UN power, the Vienna Conference did 
perceive to some extent the need for international preventive action. Thus, it called 
"strategies to address the root causes ... of movements of refugees" (A/Conf. 57/23 p. 9). 
It further recommended that the UN provide at the request of governments, as Technical 
Assistance, "qualified experts on minorities and human rights, as well as on the 
prevention and resolution of disputes, to assist in existing or potential situations involving 
minorities" (A/Conf. 157/23, para 25, p. 17). 
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II. Better Targeting 
UN procedures increasingly highlight the important and sometimes decisive role of non-
State entities in the perpetration of violations of human rights: ethno-nationalist 
movements committing genocide; religious fundamentalist groups guilty of summary 
executions and persecuting other religions; as well as transnational corporations which 
may be responsible for serious environmental damage and the maintenance of unfair 
working conditions. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the operations of supranational entities such as 
the European Union may also create human rights problems for the citizen. They were 
the subject of an initial symposium, organized by the European Parliament and the EEC 
Commission, in November 1989 in which I was an interested participant. 
United Nations procedures for the protection of human rights, dominated by a 
traditional view of international law centred on the State, generally ignore non-State 
entities. Consequendy, deterrence is trapped in a vicious circle. The State, to which the 
United Nations addresses its exhortations, pleads its helplessness, which is disregarded in 
ensuing condemnations. True, the State should not be absolved without exhaustive scrutiny. 
It would however be just as unrealistic and dangerous to deny a transfer of responsibilities, 
in some cases, from Governments to parties outside their control. Sometimes—as in Bosnia, 
Lebanon and Somalia-the State appears to be nothing but an empty shell. 
Thus operating in a vacuum of authority, non-state forces will grow more powerful 
and, quite possibly, more destructive of human rights. 
The main response of the United Nations to this problem has so far been to step up 
technical assistance to weak States in order to strengthen their infrastructure against 
internal forces hostile to human rights. Such a response is necessary and important, but 
it is not enough. Until such time as the assisted State gives clear evidence of its increased 
strength, direct international deterrence against the perpetrators of atrocities that set 
themselves up as independent powers should also be applied. 
There are already a few exceptions to the statocentric rule in international Human 
Rights Law. The Geneva Conventions and their Protocols have taken an important first 
step forward by affirming to some extent the international responsibility of all the parties 
to armed conflicts, including organized groups of insurgents. 
In the same spirit, a number of recent United Nations resolutions (e.g. on 
Afghanistan and Salvador) have called upon "all the parties" to internal disturbances 
and civil wars to respect human rights. One resolution of the Subcommission in August 
1993 went further in condemning explicitly the Peruvian insurrectional movement 
"Shining Pass". 
It is essential to extend this approach. Regarding non-treaty procedures, ECOSOC 
resolution 1235 (XLVII) of 1966, which instituted the UN periodic public debates on 
violations "wherever they occur", may offer scope for monitoring non-state powers. 
Treaty mechanisms of the Protocol to the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, the Torture 
Convention and CERD raise more problems, as they are expressly centred on the State 
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as respondent. Rather than resorting to the cumbersome amendment procedure, the best 
approach may be to provide in Protocols for the responsibility of non-statal groups, 
targeted as precisely as possible. Incrementalism—one protocol for each type of group as 
the need for regulation is increasingly felt—would be advisable. 
At the supra-national level, an ongoing project is to guard against possible human 
rights infringements by the European Union through its adhesion to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It would be desirable to apply the same approach with a 
view to securing the Union's adhesion to the Covenants and some other UN Treaties, as 
the latter instruments have a larger scope than the European Convention. 
One of the more significant progresses towards individualizing—and strengthen-
ing—international deterrence on Human Rights would be the establishment of a permanent 
International Criminal Court inspired by Nuremberg Law. The subject is of such 
importance that it calls for a distinct section, below. 
III. Towards an International Criminal Court 
Nuremberg law was excluded from the Charter of the United Nations and the Organiza-
tion's activities, largely through the paralysing effect of the East-West "cold war". Now 
this major source of tension no longer exists, work has resumed in the International Law 
Commission, on establishing a Permanent International Criminal Court. In fact, the 
Commission did submit the first Draft Statute for such a Court to the General Assembly 
in 1993. 
As the present ILA Conference is benefitting 1'roin the comments of Professor 
Crawford, a distinguished member of the I.L.C. and prime author of tire Draft Statute, 
I shall not dwell on the subject. The Court would apparently be competent to punish 
persons guilty of massive and/or most serious violations of Human Rights already defined 
in treaties as international crimes, such as the "grave breaches" of the Geneva 
Conventions on the crimes against humanity proclaimed in the Genocide of 1948, the 
Convention of the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity of 1968, and the Anti-Apartheid Convention of 1973. Furthermore, 
since its jurisdiction ratione materiae is foreseen to be open-ended, other grave violations 
of human rights which may be regarded in the future as international crimes—perhaps 
some particularly serious violations of economic and social rights or of International 
Environmental Law—would also be covered. 
A fundamental element of the Court Statute, taken over from Nuremberg Law, is to 
target individuals, even heads of State or persons acting in official capacity, as well as 
non-state, definable groups. If only in that respect, the future Court would go a long way 
indeed towards making International Human Rights Law more realistic and dissuasive, 
as outlined in the preceding section. 
A further breakthrough-which we hope will not remain quite Utopian forever!—would 
be to provide for the direct access of individuals and NGOs as plaintiff to the Court, 
under appropriate criteria for admissibility. 
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Existing UN HR Treaty—bodies could conceivably, in certain cases, at least, become 
examining organs of first jurisdiction, ruling on admissibility and carrying out preliminary 
inquiries, under the Court's supervision. This would have the advantage of bringing the 
individual into the system, even if his direct access to the Court were ruled out. The 
structure would then somewhat resemble those of the European and Inter-American 
systems. Such a reform might be achieved, hopefully without undue legal complications, 
through appropriate protocols to existing treaties and/or the Court Statute. 
IV. The Issue of Urgency: "Mission Impossible"? 
The preservation of human rights, like that of peace of which it is a prerequisite, 
requires urgent, even immediate action in the face of major crises. The large-scale atroci-
ties in Somalia, Kurdistan, Bosnia and so many others, highlighted by the media, have 
strongly bolstered this demand on the part of the public. The need for quick response by 
the UN will be much greater in the future since mass Human Rights violators—state and 
non-state—will benefit from more efficient technology to commit their crimes. 
Although the length and number of their meetings is increasing, the sessions of the 
human rights bodies are subject to severe budgetary constraints and to the limitations of 
the calendar of conferences. Only in 1990, by resolution 1990/48, did the Council 
authorize the Commission to meet exceptionally between its regular sessions. This new 
rule was applied on 10 August 1992 for the question of Bosnia, five days after the 
request was made by a State member: the action was as rapid as possible in view of the 
problems of communication, although five days might prove to be too many in several 
circumstances. 
Provision should at any rate be made for some inter-sessional powers of the 
Chairmen, Bureaux or Secretariats. This necessity has been clearly perceived by the Inter-
America Commission on Human Rights, whose rules of procedure seem to permit 
substantial inter-sessional action (see, for example, Arts. 9. 26 C3, and 27). A similar 
trend can be seen in various ILO organs and in the European Commission. This is in 
sharp contrast to the attitude of the United Nations human rights bodies. Ever since their 
inception, they have shied at delegating the slightest jurisdiction, even of pure routine, 
to their officers, to a rapporteur or a fortiori to the Secretariat. It is typical, for example, 
that when the UN Human Rights Committee adopted its rules of procedure in 1977, it 
formally rejected a draft article from the Secretariat which had made provision for such 
delegation. Only during the last three years has the Committee taken some steps in this 
direction: the appoinunent of a special rapporteur to request a suspension as an interim 
measure in the case of death sentences; the authorization for its Working Group on 
communication, meeting immediately before the plenary, unanimously to declare a 
complaint admissible without reference to the Committee; and lately, the appoinunent of 
a special rapporteur to perform some initial procedural functions between sessions, 
basically the transmittal of complaints to the Governments concerned for comments on 
admissibility. 
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This trend should be intensified by assigning to the officers of the Committee or to 
a rapporteur inter-sessional duties similar to those in effect under regional systems. This 
shortcoming on the part of the United Nations flows clearly from the high degree of 
mutual distrust between so many Member States as compared with the relative ease of 
decision-making within the smaller and more homogeneous regional bodies. The situation 
is nevertheless very detrimental to the credibility of UN procedures. Let us hope that 
increasing public outrage shall soon prompt the UN to fully overcome this weakness. 
V. Stronger Deterrence? 
A. Towards a Revitalized International Court of Justice 
Leaving aside the jurisdiction of an international criminal court which would be 
exceptional, efforts should be made to revitalize the International Court of Justice with 
regard to international human rights law. Its importance in this field has been unfortunate-
ly gready reduced by its loss of favour in the eyes of States. First, in 1966, the Third 
World States lost faith, and for a long time, after the aborted Namibian case. As a result, 
no clause of compulsory jurisdiction is to be found in the Covenant and other treaties. 
Lately, Western countries appear to signal misgivings for other reasons. The Secretary 
General's recommendations to promote the jurisdiction of the Court should be supported. 
Despite his appeal in "Agenda for Peace", the Vienna Declaration contains a microscopic 
weak reference to the World Court. 
Ideally, one way—still, I fear, very much an Utopian wa>^-of resuscitating the Court 
in the Human Rights field would be to provide for access of the individuals and groups 
aggrieved under suitable conditions. Even assuming the political will for it exists 
somewhere, this would require fundamental amendments to the Statute, a nearly 
impossible task. 
Anothei—slightly less Utopian—strategy would be to promote much more frequent 
requests for Advisory opinions from the General Assembly and, by delegation, from 
various UN Human Rights organs. 
Furthermore, the practice might be encouraged to develop in UN organs to consider 
by consensus the Court's Opinions—on most important HR issues, such as Genocide or 
"ethnic cleansing"—as legally binding. The HR Committee and other treat-bodies could 
conceivably play a role in such a process: they might, as they would feel necessary, try 
to persuade the General Assembly—to which they directly or indirectly report—to ask 
Advisory Opinions on basic problems concerning the interpretation of the treaties. A 
major risk would be, of course, that UN HR bodies transfer abusively their responsibil-
ities to a compromise—prone World Court. The countervailing advantage would be that 
individual plaintiffs present before the HR Treaty-bodies would thus have some indirect 
access to the World Court. Perhaps one way of solving the dilemma would be for the 
Treaty-bodies to ask, via the GA, for an Advisory Opinion only upon the clear request 
of the individual plaintiff. 
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Such plans, and many others which have been suggested with the same goals, appear 
to be unrealistic for the time being, in view of the paucity of active support for the Court 
which persists in many quarters within the UN membership. 
This is all the more regrettable, as the World Court seems in recent cases to have 
taken a firmer stand on Human Rights issues. 
B. Collective Sanctions for Mass Violations of Human Rights 
Role of the Security Council 
Recourse, under Chapter VII, to mandatory sanctions to protect human 
rights—diplomatic and economic sanctions and, as a last resort, the use of armed force by 
the United Nations—has also been tried at the United Nations. In order to justify such 
recourse, reference has rightly been made to the basic link, recognised in the Charter, 
between the maintenance of peace and respect for human rights. However, these attempts, 
mosdy by the African Group of States, have been only very partly successful: the 
economic blockade on the Smith regime in Rhodesia, the embargo on offensive weapons 
for South Africa. The vast majority of attempts were stopped by vetoes. The practice 
persists to some extent even after the end of the Cold War. 
The recent events in Iraq and Yugoslavia and some of die Security Council's 
decisions concerning those regions have led to strong hopes in public opinion. There has 
been talk in this connection of the emergence of a "right of intervention" or indeed of a 
"duty" of intervention by the United Nations for massive violations of human rights. An 
analysis of these decisions and of the preparatory work for them seems, however, to 
indicate a persistent will to link economic sanctions and the sending of United Nations 
armed forces essentially to the question of the free conveyance of humanitarian assistance 
to the Kurdish minorities on the one hand, and to the besieged Bosnian towns, on the 
other. Sanctions or warnings clearly and distinctly on account of human rights violations 
have not apparently been decided upon under Chapter VII. 
Support should be given to the recommendations of the fourth meeting of 
chairpersons of treaty bodies aimed at encouraging the Security Council to take into 
account, on a continuing basis, major human rights problems as helping to create a 
likely and serious risk of a threat to peace. The United Nations monitoring bodies 
should be encouraged to bring such situations to the attention of the Security Council. 
They could in any case do so through the General Assembly, which has statutory 
relations with the Council (Arts. 15 and 16 of the Charter). The Secretary General could 
bring such situations to the attention of die council at any time, under Article 99 of the 
Charter. 
However, one should not place undue hopes on die mutation of die Security Council 
into a Human Rights deterrence organ. This is a highly political organ, sensitive above 
all to power relations. Furdiermore, present, trends towards granting veto rights to more 
States would not make decision-making easier, especially on Human Rights issues which 
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raise the dual problem of being politically sensitive and some say—only of marginal 
Security Council jurisdiction. 
The Vienna Declaration, although it contains no word expressly denying the need 
for strong Human Rights deterrence and pays lip service to strengthening the UN HR 
system in general, shows a prevailing trend not supportive of far-reaching reforms 
towards compulsory decisions. The emphasis was rather on the need to maintain friendly 
relations between equally sovereign States and to ensure respect for territorial integrity. 
VI. The Actors of the United Nations Human Rights System: 
Dysfunctional Trends? 
In the UN Human Rights System, decision-making is at present a multipolar process. It 
involves: Governments; independent "experts" nominated by states but elected by UN 
bodies in a personal capacity; and NGOs in consultative status, which seek to ensure 
meaningful communication between the peoples and die United Nations. 
This balanced system has lead to a creative dialogue. It begins to show, however, 
dysfunctional trends. 
States, wary of the growing power of experts and NGOs, seek to reduce their 
influence. As was done for the Crime Prevention committee, they eliminate some experts' 
bodies and replace them by "Government experts" under state control. The effectiveness 
of NGOs is being eroded—for instance at Vienna—through the increased use of closed 
sessions, restrictions upon speaking opportunities and odier means. One had buried the 
Sovereign State too early. 
Furthermore, experts and NGOs are weakened through factors specific to these 
classes of actors. One basic problem regarding experts flows from the fact that many of 
them also act as representatives of their Governments in other UN bodies. In the public 
eye, their image of independence is therefore marred, in spile of the high level of 
personal integrity of UN experts generally. 
This will be especially damaging in tomorrow's world, where inter-group distrust will 
make faith in independent arbiters more crucial than ever. 
As revealed or confirmed at the Vienna Conference, a deep chasm exists between 
transnational NGOs in consultative status and grassroot associations of Human Rights 
defenders. The former, thoroughly familiar with UN procedures, have a strongly positive 
impact upon the Human Rights activities of the organization. Yet, grassroots associations, 
confronted with the daily fight for justice and impatient with UN mechanisms, tend to 
resent the status of NGOs as part of an inter-governmental "establishment" to remote 
from popular roots. Some trends have appeared among local groups towards rejection of 
a world NGO structure and a retreat into the regional and sub-regional spheres. 
A divided NGO movement along these faults would be a tragedy for Human Rights. 
Reconstruction efforts through mutual understanding and recognition from both 
sides—status and grassroots NGOs—must be a high priority among Human Rights defend-
ers all over the world. 
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Last but not least, the United Nations Secretariat could play an important role of 
implementation, harmonization and guidance in the Human Rights System. It has indeed 
taken a major^ though largely hidden—part in such achievements as the drafting of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the adoption of the Covenants in 1966, 
the progress of the Technical Assistance programmes from 1955 up to now, and, in 1993, 
the difficult—and finally successful—consensus-building for the Vienna Declaration. 
These achievements are all the more remarkable in view of the problems which the 
Secretariat must increasingly face: grossly insufficient funding by Member States; 
understaffing; growing external influences for recruiunent, placement and promotion; and 
consequent demoralization of staff. 
To sum up, the over-all trend appears to be one of gradual disequilibrium, directly 
or indirectly strengthening governments and weakening non-state sectors. Reverting to 
a multipolar, balanced structure would be an important condition for UN efficiency in the 
emerging world. Indeed the Organization, more than ever, will need a pluralistic debate 
to understand and address the Human Rights issues and prevent the conflicts of 
Tomorrow. 
Conclusions 
The United Nations Human Rights System has gone through many changes, beyond 
the legal constraints of the Charter. It must undertake again—and quickly—a major 
mutation, lest it becomes a wasteland in the emerging world. 
I hope to have shown that most of the essential reforms can be achieved through 
changes in approach and practice, without need for Charter amendments. The Vienna 
Declaration places a renewed emphasis on mutual respect for cultural and political 
differences, and on non-selectivity, but it does not in itself prevent the reform of the UN 
Human Rights System. In some respects, it showns support for innovative changes. 
The decision of the General Assembly on 20 December 1993 to establish a UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights may constitute an important first step towards quicker 
responses and a more preventive system. As a global ombudsman, the High Commis-
sioner is empowered to initiate "contacts" and "dialogue" with governments at any time. 
He is expected to "play an active role" not only in remedying violations but, further, in 
"preventing" them. Should he fail to persuade States, he would recommend further action 
in public reports to the Commission and the General Assembly. 
Such progress, however, would not happen automatically. To attract consensus, the 
mandate is drawn in broad terms and sometimes in self-contradictory language. All will 
depend upon the strong, innovative practice which the High Commissioner would no 
doubt seek to develop, and upon the resources which he would be able to obtain from 
Member States. 
The basic ambiguity of the mandate resides in the High Commissioner's dual 
obligation to "promote" human rights through a "dialogue" with Governments, while 
respecting also "... the domestic jurisdiction of States". Uncooperative Governments might 
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try to use that proviso to tolerate only the most formal and perfunctory "dialogue", 
excluding all specific fact-finding and exhortation. 
Under such a mandate, it might require great efforts of negotiation to obtain the right 
to conduct comprehensive inquiries in situ and, even more so, to outpost permanent or 
long-term observers on the spot. Yet we believe that a permanent UN presence is the 
main requirement for effective prevention. 
Also, the GA resolution is silent on the crucial subject of the sources and methods 
of information of the High Commissioner. UN Special Rapporteur's practice would 
suggest that he could have a rather broad leeway to gather data within the UN system, 
contact IGOs and NGOs, receive petitions and hold oral hearings. How far could he go, 
however, without being accused of infringing "domestic jurisdiction"? The Special 
Rapporteurs' mandates do not contain explicitly such limitations. A host of issues would 
need to be tackled with special care in clearly drafted guidelines or rules of procedure, 
such as the possibility of utilizing UN confidential material (under res. 1503 for instance), 
the conditions of admissibility of petitions, the criteria governing the choice of witness, 
guarantees of hearings in situ free from State influence, and measures to ensure the 
protection of witnesses. Clear guidelines on such matters are essential for the full 
credibility of the system. 
Finally, emphasis is placed in the mandate upon the mission of the High Commis-
sioner to ensure the "rationalization" and "streamlining" of the UN Human Rights 
machinery. This has been for long a popular idea in UN circles. Indeed this empirically-
grown system is overly complex, cumbersome and ridden with duplication. Coordination 
must be intensified. Let us beware, however, that "streamlining" plans do not become 
obsessive efforts at unification. 
In a totally unified Human Rights system, the losers may be those that we seek to 
protect, the victims of Human Rights violations. At the international level where the odds 
under all procedures are still so strongly against the plaintiff, the pluralism of recourses 
is a crucial guarantee for a minimum justice. 
Let us express our faith that the High Commissioner shall make the most effective 
and wise use of his mandate to bring about a true culture of Human Rights on Vessel 
Earth. 
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I. Introduction 
Due, in particular, to the large media coverage of the plight of the Kurds in Northern Iraq 
after the (second) Gulf War, the international public became—at last—fully aware of the 
problem of internally displaced persons.1 Internally displaced persons may be described 
as such persons who have been force to leave their homes or have been forcibly removed 
from their homes to another part of their country whereas externally displaced persons 
are outside their country of origin (or previous habitual residence); thus, refugees in the 
sense of the universally applicable 1951 Refugee Convention or in the sense of any regi-
onal instruments such as the 1969 OAU Convention or the 1984 Cartagena Declaration 
belong to the latter group. The current wars in former Yugoslavia added to the inter-
national, in particular European, awareness of this issue of internally displaced persons. 
In 1991, more than 24 million people throughout the world were internally displaced as 
a result of various causes such as e.g. forcible movements to inhospitable areas, civil 
strife and civil war and ethnic persecution as part of governmental policies.2 Given the 
1 It should be emphasized, however, dial die phenomenon of internally displaced persons is by no means 
a recent one; as a result of the civil wars in many areas of Africa, Asia and Latin America, there have always 
been, at least during the last decades, large numbers of persons who had been forced to leave their homes in 
order to seek refuge in another part of dieir country; in some cases, UNHCR (and odier governmental 
organizations) and, in particular, non-governmental organizations provided assistance and protection to such 
persons, usually on an ad hoc basis. 
2 See CUENOD, J.: Report on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Returnees, UN Doc. E/109/Add. 1 (1991). 
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more recent developments in e.g. Bosnia-Herzegowina, Croatia, Liberia Somalia and 
several of the successor states of the former Soviet Union (to mention only the most 
known countries with a large population of internally displaced persons), it might be 
estimated that, in the meantime, this number has increased quite considerably. Notwith-
standing this development, the issue of internally displaced persons is still not directly 
addressed by any international instrument which explains to some extent the ad hoc 
nature of the international community's response to this problem. It is, however, increas-
ingly recognised that this failure of the international community to appropriately address 
this issue may result (and indeed results) in a serious threat to the internal stability of 
states, since those persons who do not receive assistance and protection in their own 
country will seek such assistance and protection (as refugees)3 in other countries. Such 
movements might result in a serious economic, political and social destabilization of the 
countries of refugee concerned and, thus, in a threat to peace and security in a whole 
region. 
The absence of any adequate legal machinery for the protection of internally dis-
placed persons and the scarcity of pertinent scholarly discussion of this issue4 prompted 
the ILA recently to establish its Committee on Internally Displaced Persons. The 
following paper is meant to serve as a basis for the future work of this Committee. 
II. Scope and Factual Background of this Paper 
There is—as yet—no consistent and generally accepted definition of the term internally 
displaced person,5 Obviously, this term excludes such persons who are externally dis-
placed, persons who seek assistance and protection outside the boundaries of their own 
countries irrespective of whether they are qualified as refugees under any international 
legal instrument. It is suggested that, more precisely, internally displaced persons can be 
divided into two—admittedly rather broad—categories: Those who are forcibly removed 
from their homes and resetded in another area by governmental or opposition forces 
within their own country; and those who (are forced to) move to another area within their 
3 According to recent estimations, the current number of refugees throughout the world exceeds 18 million 
people, see UN Doc. ЕЛ993/20. 
4 See, however, LEE, L.: Legal Status of Internally Displaced Persons, Proceedings of the 86th Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (1993), pp. 630 et seq.; LEWIS, С.: Dealing with the 
Problem of Internally Displaced Persons, Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 6 (1992), pp. 693 et seq.; 
NANDA, V.: International Law and the Refugee Challenge: Mass Expulsion and Internally Displaced People, 
Willamette Law Review 28 (1992), pp. 791 et seq. and recently DENG, F.: Comprehensive Study on the 
Human Rights Issues Related to Internally Displaced Persons (1993). 
5 It should be mentioned, however, that the UN Secretary-General used this term "to refer to persons who 
have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers; as a result of armed conflict, 
internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters; and who are within the 
territory of their own country", see UN Doc. E/CN.4/23 (1992). 
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own country due to ethnic persecution or other human rights violations, civil strife or 
war, or other reasons. 
This definition would cover also such persons who are removed or move as a result 
of natural or man-made disasters. It is suggested, however, that the scope of the work of 
this Committee should not include such persons for the following reason: Internally dis-
placed persons are of interest to the international community mainly because they lack 
assistance and protection from their own government. Although natural or man-made 
disasters may cause the internal displacement of civilians, they generally do not result in 
a state depriving its citizens of such assistance and protection as necessary to allow them 
to remain in their homes or to survive if they do become displaced; moreover, in the case 
of most natural or man-made disasters, states are generally prepared to extend available 
internal resources and receive foreign assistance to help persons displaced for such 
reason.6 
Therefore, it is suggested that the scope of the work of this Committee should cover 
(only) those persons who are internally displaced on the grounds of (1) forcible displace-
ment as a result of government or opposition actions, or (2) ethnic persecution or other 
systematic violations of fundamental human rights, or (3) armed conflicts such as civil 
strife and civil war; and who are subject to governmental policies excluding them from 
receiving internal or foreign assistance. 
As to the factual background of the issue of intentai ly displaced persons, it is to be 
repeated that, due to most recent developments, the above-quoted number of 24 million 
internally displaced persons does not reflect reality which might be close to 30 million 
people; regardless of the figures used, the magnitude of these numbers becomes even 
more striking when compared to the smaller figure of "only" 19 million refugees. The 
fact that such refugees (or externally displaced persons) are covered by a relatively 
extensive and fairly efficient system of international protection whereas internally 
displaced persons do not benefit from such a system of protection based upon binding 
legal instruments, just adds to the plight of internally displaced persons. 
With a view to the apparently deteriorating situation in many successor states of the 
former Soviet Union and to the only limited prospects for a lasting solution to the 
conflicts within, in particular, Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, some 
Central American countries, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Croatia and Bosnia-Herceg-
owina, there does not seem to be any realistic hope for a considerable decrease in the 
number of internally displaced persons in a foreseeable future. 
It is now generally accepted7 that international refugee law does not only deal with 
the imminent protection needs of refugees but addresses also the root causes of refugee 
movements and the question of durable solutions to refugee situations, in particular 
voluntary repatriation if and when such root causes have ceased to exist. It is suggested 
that the work of this Committee should follow this pattern of current refugee law and, 
6 This point has been rightly emphasized by C. Lewis (supra note 4), at p. 694. 
7 See only UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees. The Challenge of Protection (1993), pp. 1 et seq. 
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consequently, address the causes for internal displacements, look for possibilities of 
efficiently protecting internally displaced persons and, finally, discuss possible solutions 
for such situations. 
III. Root Causes of Internal Displacement and Their Legal Context 
Corinne Lewis rightly states that "the fact that such a finge number of people are 
internally displaced as a result of forcible displacement, persecution, or civil war suggests 
ihat there is a problem in the protection afforded to these people under international 
law".8 
Therefore, the following section deals, firstly, with the violations of international law 
which cause such displacement and, secondly, with the apparent deficiencies of 
international law in this context. 
1. Violations of International Law as Root Causes for Internal Displacement 
The major areas of international law norms the violation of which cause internal 
displacements are human rights and humanitarian law. 
a) Forcible displacements are characterized by governmental actions moving parts of 
the population of a state to another area of that state in order to better control the people 
concerned who are usually considered as opponents to the government in power, or in 
order to weaken (armed) opposition to that government. Such policies will—as a 
rule—infringe upon the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose a residence 
as guaranteed under Art. 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights9 and respective provisions of other human rights instruments applicable on the 
universal or regional level.10 In specific cases, such policies violate, moreover, a whole 
range of other human rights such as the right to personal liberty, privacy or, in extreme 
cases, even the right to life. 
b) A major reason for internal displacement is persecution based upon ethnic or other 
grounds; such persecution takes a variety of forms and may, thus, constitute violations 
of numerous human rights such as the right to life; freedom from torture; freedom from 
arbitrary arrest or detention; the right to a fair trial; the right to privacy; freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression; the right to peaceful assembly; 
freedom of association; the right not to be subjected to discrimination including the whole 
set of rules constituting the rights essential for the protection and promotion of the 
8 LEWIS, C. (supra note 4), at p. 696. 
9 As to this provision see NOWAK, M.: U.N. covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary 
(1993), pp. 197 et seq. 
10 See in particular Art. 2 of the 1963 4th Additional Protocol to the 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights, Art. 22 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights and Art. 12 of the 1980 Afrian Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights. 
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distinct identity of any national or other minority. Generally speaking, these are the same 
rights the violation of which is usually considered as resulting in a well-founded fear of 
persecution as mentioned in most definitions of the term "refugee". However, whereas 
"refugees" as persons who are forced to be outside their countries of origin for such well-
founded fear of persecution are protected by an international legal structure offering 
assistance and protection, internally displaced persons do not benefit from such a system. 
c) The most important root causes for internal displacements are, however, (internal) 
armed conflicts which often coincide with forcible displacements and human rights 
violations as just described. Almost all of the countries with large numbers of internally 
displaced persons are the sites of internal (or internationalized internal) armed con-
flicts." Such internal armed conflicts will force civilians to move in order not to be 
caught in the crossfire or to escape from human rights violations committed by govern-
mental or insurgent military forces. It should be stressed, however, that armed conflicts 
are rightly considered as situations allowing for restrictions on human rights as enshrined 
in the pertinent international instruments; it is, on the other hand, equally important to 
stress that fundamental human rights are generally considered not to be subject to any 
derogations even in cases of national emergency. 
In addition to (general) human rights law, persons living in areas raged by internal 
conflicts are protected, at least to some extent, by provisions of international humanitarian 
law applicable also to such internal conflicts.12 The most important are Art. 3 of each 
of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (common Art. 3)13 and the provisions of the 1977 
Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol II) which apply to per-
sons in a country which is the site of an internal armed conflict. Under common Art. 3 
and Protocol II, persons who are actively taking part in the conflict are to be "treated 
humanely". Consequently, the state as well as the opposing party or parties are under an 
obligation to respect certain fundamental rights of such persons.14 Thus, under common 
11 For details see LEWIS, C. (supra note 4), at pp. 699 et seq. 
12 See e.g. SCHINDLER, D.: The Different Types of Armed Conflict According to the Geneva Conventions 
and Protocols, Recueil des Cours 163 (1979 II), pp. 121 et seq.; CASSESE, A.: La querre civile et le droit inter-
national, Revue Générale de Droit International Public 90 (1986), pp. 553 et seq.; GASSER, H. P.: Armed 
Conflict Within the Territory of a State, in: Festschrift für Dietrich Schindler (1989), pp. 225 et seq. and 
MYREN, R. S.: Applying International Laws of War to Non-International Armed Conflicts: Past Attmepts, 
Future Strategies, Netherlands International Law Review 37 (1990), pp. 347 et seq. 
13 See e.g. ABI-SAAB, G.: Droit humanitaire et conflits internes (1986), pp. 50 et seq. and VEUTHEY, M.: 
Les conflits armés de caractère non-international et le droit humaintaire, in: A. Cassese (Ed.), Current Problems 
of International Law (1975), pp. 179 et seq. (at pp. 209 et seq.). 
14 See e.g. GASSER, H. P. (supra note 11), at pp. 237 et seq. and RALSHOVEN, F.: Applicability of 
Customary International Daw in Non-International Armed Conflicts, in: A. Cassese, ibid., pp. 267 et seq. (al 
pp. 281 et seq.). 
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Art. 3,'5 the parties to the conflict are prohibited from committing any violence to any 
person, such as mutilation, cruel treatment and torture and any "outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment". Protocol II16 also prohibits 
15 This provision reads: "In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the 
following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down 
their arms and those placed hors de combat, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse 
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria 
To this end, following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with 
respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. 
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all 
or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict". 
16 Of particular relevance are the following provisions: 
Art. 13 reads: "(1) The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the 
dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules shall be observed 
as a minimum. 
(2) The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or 
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are 
prolii bited. 
(3) Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Party, unless and for such time as they take a direct 
part in hostilities". 
On this provision see e.g. JUNOD, S. S. in: V. Sandoz—C. Swinarski—B. Zimmermann (Eds.), Commentary 
on the Additional Protocols (1987) at pp. 1449 et seq. and SOLF, W. in: M. B o t h ^ K . J. Partsch-W. Soif, New 
Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts (1982), pp. 676 et seq. 
Art. 14 reads: "Starvation as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, 
remove or render of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of 
foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works". See JUNOD, S. S. 
ibid., pp. 1456 et seq. and SOLF, W. ibid., pp. 680 et seq. 
Art. 15 reads: "Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical 
generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if 
such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian 
population". 
Art. 16 reads: "Without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, it is prohibited to commit any actis places of 
workship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and to use them in support of the military 
effort". See JUNOD, S. S. ibid., pp. 1467 et seq. 
Art. 17. reads: "(1) The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the 
conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such dis-
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the parties to the conflict from using the civilian population as the object of armed 
attacks, from committing "acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to 
spread terror among the civilian population" and from starving civilians as a method of 
combat. They are, moreover prohibited from committing "outrages upon personal dignity, 
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape,... and assault" and from imposing 
the death penalty on children under eighteen at the time of the offense or on pregnant 
women. Considering the well-known, outrageous atrocities committed in most current and 
previous internal conflicts, it is obvious that these rules of humanitarian law, as well as 
others, are most often disregarded by the Parties to the conflict with the intent of gaining 
military advantages. 
Moreover, civilians are often victims of forcible displacements which take place in 
order to deprive insurgents of assistance and support. Such displacements constitute a 
violation of Art. 17 of Protocol II "unless the security of the civilians involved or 
imperative military reasons so demand". 
2. Failure of International Law to Adequately Address the Root Causes of Internal 
Displacement 
It results from the foregoing that international law does provide for a system of rules to 
protect persons from forcible displacement, persecution and other gross violations of 
fundamental human rights outside and within the context of internal armed conflicts. 
However, reality shows that this system is not efficiently working and does not serve to 
prevent the causes of displacement. This fact results from the incomplete nature of this 
protection machinery, in particular the deficiencies of the international legal system as 
regards the implementation and enforcement of states' obligations under human rights and 
humanitarian law.17 
a) One aspect of the incompleteness of this protection machinery stems from the fact 
that not all states are members of the relevant international instruments. This applies in 
particular to the 1966 International Covenant and the Protocol II, whereas the 1949 
placements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may 
be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. 
(2) Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons concerned with the conflict". See 
SOLF, W. ibid., pp. 690 et seq. 
Art. 18 reads: "(1) Relief societies located in the territory of the High Contracting Parties, such as Red Cross 
(Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations, may offer their services for the performance of their traditional 
functions in relation to the victims of the armed conflict. The civilian population may, even on its own initiative, 
offer to collect and care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked. 
(2) If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for their 
survival, such as foodstuffs and medicial supplies, relief actions for the civilian population wltich are of an 
exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be 
undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned". 
17 On this issue see only PARTSCH, K. J.: Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, in: R. Bernhardt (Ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Instalment 8 (1985), pp. 292 et seq. 
186 Rainer 1 lofmann 
Geneva Conventions and other instruments, such as in particular the Genocide Conven-
tion, are in force in virtually all countries. 
This leads to the question whether and to what extent the provisions of those instru-
ments which lack quasi-universal membership may, however, be considered to represent 
customary international law, and with regard to some rights even jus cogens,18 thereby 
binding upon all states irrespective of whether these are in fact members of the relevant 
instrument. This question cannot be adequately dealt with in the framework of this paper; 
it is suggested, however, that such fundamental human rights as the right to life, freedom 
from torture, right to a fair trial, the prohibition of discrimination based upon racial and 
religious grounds, and the obligations specified in common Art. 3 have the legal status 
of customary international law." 
Another issue calling for further thorough consideration is the question whether and 
to what extent states are entitled to restrict the scope of their obligations under these 
instruments, in particular as regards the substantive provisions of the relevant human 
rights treaties, or even derogate from their obligations in times of situations of national 
emergency. This problem results mainly (or to a very considerable extent) from the fact 
that, on the universal level, there is in many cases no international supervisory organ 
authorized to interprete, with binding force upon all member states of the treaty in 
question, the substantive provisions of such treaties and to define their exact contents. 
Another aspect of the incompleteness of the existing protection machinery concerns 
the fact that the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are not appli-
cable to civilians during certain internal conflict situations: If the internal conflict is not 
to be considered as an internal armed conflict under common Art. 3 or Protocol II, these 
rules are inapplicable. Consequently, state governments may be tempted to label a con-
flict a riot or an isolated or sporadic act of violence, which would, therefore constitute 
only an internal disturbance or tension rather than an internal armed conflict, and thereby 
avoid the applicability of common Art. 3 and the provisions of Protocol II; this situation 
is aggravated by the fact that there is no mechanism for determining, with binding force 
upon the parties concerned, whether a situation of internal conflict qualifies as an internal 
armed conflict in the sense of international humanitarian law. 
b) In addition to these shortcomings of the existing protection system, there is, as in 
all fields of international law, the issue of implementation or enforcement of a state's 
obligations. Notwithstanding the fact that the human rights instruments relevant in 
situations of imminent or ongoing internal displacements do provide for mechanisms to 
protect the individuals concerned, it is suggested that such mechanisms, simply due to 
their structure, fail to offer prompt relief for any internally displaced person or to avert 
the root causes resulting in a person becoming internally displaced. 
18 See FROWEIN, J. A.: Jus Cogens, in: R. Bernhard! (Ed.), Endyclopedia of Public International Law, 
Instalment 7 (1984), pp. 327 et seq. and HANNIKAINEN, L.: Peremptory Norms (jus cogens) in International 
Law (1988). 
19 See MERON, T.: Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (1989), pp. 41 et seq. 
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Furthermore, these mechanisms are not structured in such a way as to allow the 
international community to force a state to remedy situations of or resulting in internal 
displacements. It is a well-known deficiency of, in particular universal, human rights law 
that even if the relevant instrument provides for a complaint system available to indi-
viduals or other states, the subsequent findings of the bodies called upon to deal with 
such complaints are of a non-binding character. The efficiency of these systems is, 
moreover, considerably limited by the very slow and time-consuming character of the 
procedures to be followed which prevents them from constituting an effective mecha-
nism to avert or to remedy situations of internal displacement. 
Similar considerations apply with regard to international humanitarian law: Neither 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions nor Protocol II provide for any mandatory mechanism for 
bringing violations of the humanitarian law rules laid down in common Art. 3 and 
Protocol II to the attention of the international community or for enforcing the obligations 
resulting from these instruments. It is, moreover, a well-known deficiency of international 
humanitarian law that, whereas the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or 
any other governmental or non-governmental organization may offer their services to 
victims of internal armed conflicts, there is no provision which entitles such bodies to 
provide assistance and protection to civilians if the state concerned refuses to allow their 
officers access to these victims. 
These facts link the issue of internal displacement to the general problem of deter-
mining how the international community should react to (widespread and systematic) 
violations of international law. This problem doubtlessly constitutes one of (if not the) 
the crucial issues to be addressed by practitioners and scholars of international law alike 
in this last decade of this century; it relates, inter alia, to the future role of the UN 
system, in particular the Security Council, in making use of the means offered by Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter,20 the legal and political possibilities offered by the emerging 
rules of state responsibility,21 the future role of die institute of humanitarian interven-
20 On this issue see e.g. CARON, D.: The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 
American Journal of International Law 87 (1993), pp. 552 et seq.; SCHACHTER, О.: United Nations Law in 
the Gulf Conflict, American Journal of International Law 85 (1991), 452 et seq.: URGUHART, В.: The UN 
and International Security after the Cold War, in: A. Roberts—B. Kingsbury (Erls.), United Nations, Divided 
World (2nd ed. 1993), pp. 81 et seq. and the contributions in J. Delbrück (Eil.). The Future of International Law 
Enforcement. New Scenarios (1993). 
21 On this issue see e.g. HOFMANN, R.: Refugee-Generating Policies and the Law of State Responsibility, 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 45 (1985), pp. 694 et seq.; SACHAR1EW, K.: 
Les droits des Etats en matière de mesures de mise en oeuvre du droit international humanitarie, Revue 
Internationale de la Croix-rouge 71 (1989), pp. 187 et seq. and OETER, S.: Kriegsverbrechen in den Konflikten 
um das Erbe Jugoslawiens. Ein Beitrag zu den Fragen der kollektiven und individuellen Verantwortlichkeit für 
Verletzungen des Humanitären Völkerrecht 53 (1993), pp. 1 et seq.; generally see ZEMANEK, К.: 
Responsibility of States: General Principles, in: R. Bernhardt (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
Instalment 10 (1987), pp. 362 et seq. 
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tion22 and to the legal questions related to the concept of obligations erga omnes;23 all 
these aspects of current international law raise intricate questions, in particular since the 
present practice of the international community and their competent organs is—according 
to this author's opinion—characterized by a most deplorable selective and partial approach 
which has severely damaged all expectations for the establishment of a "new world 
order" based upon universal observance and enforcement of the rule of international law 
as it seemed to become possible subsequent to the end of the Cold War. 
IV. International Law and Situations of Internal Displacement 
Whereas the previous section of this paper was devoted to the (inadequate) relation 
between international law and the root causes of internal displacement, this section deals 
with the deficiencies of current international law in addressing the effects of internal 
displacement and adequately responding to the needs of internally displaced persons. 
1. Effects of Internal Displacement 
Internally displaced persons as a most vulnerable group of people are in urgent need of 
food, water, shelter and medical care in order to survive; they also need protection 
against physical attacks and further gross violations of fundamental human rights. As 
stated above, current reality shows that governments will often deny such persons the 
necessary assistance and protection or refuse to allow other states or international 
organisations to provide such assistance and protection. 
22 On this issue see e.g. BEYERLIN, U.: Humanitarian Intervention, in: R. Bernhardt (Ed.), Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law, Instalment 3 (1982) pp. 211 et seq.; VERWEY, W.: Humanitarian Intervention, 
in: A. Cassese (Ed.), The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force (1986), pp. 57 et seq.; BAZYLER, M. 
J.: Re-Examining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and 
Ethiopia, Stanford Journal of International Law 23 (1987), pp. 547 et seq.; SPERDUTI, G.: Protection Domestic 
Concerns of States, Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International 86 (1989), pp. 309 et seq.; BETTATI, M.: Un 
droit d'ingérence?, Revue Générale de Droit International Public 95 (1991), pp. 639 et seq.; MALANCZUK, 
P.: The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War, European Journal of 
International Law 2 (1991), pp. 114 et seq.; id., Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of 
Force (1993); SCHERMERS, H. G.: The Obligation to Intervene in the Domestic Affairs of States, in: Essays 
in Honour of Frits Ralshoven (1991), pp. 583 et seq.; FRANCK, T. M.: The Emerging Right to Democratic 
Government, American Journal of Internationa] Law 86 (1992), pp. 46 et seq.; RODLEY, N.: Collective 
Intervention to Protect Human Rights and Civilian Populations: The Legal Framework, in: N. Rodley (Ed.), To 
Loose the Bonds of Wickedness: International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights, pp. 14 et seq.; 
ADELMAN, H.: Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurds, International Journal of Refugee Law 4 
(1992), pp. 4 et seq. and LILLICH, R. В.: Humanitarian Intervention through the United Nations: Towards the 
Development of Criteria, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 53 (1993), pp. 557 
et seq. 
23 See e.g. FROWEIN, J. A.: Die Verpflichtungen erga omnes im Völkerrecht und ihre Durchsetzung, in 
Festschrift für Hermann Mosler (1993), pp. 241 et seq. 
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Notwithstanding the clear prohibition of using starvation as a means of warfare also 
in internal armed conflicts,24 food and other assistance for internally displaced persons 
are often used as a strategic weapon to gain advantages in internal armed conflicts. It is 
suggested that, from a human rights point of view, such governmental policies constitute 
a clear violation of the right to life and physical integrity of the victims of such policies 
and, it is additionally suggested, thereby a violation of human rights norms having the 
status of jus cogens. As to humanitarian law, it is to be stressed that, whereas common 
Art. 3 and Protocol II prohibit the starvation of civilians as means of warfare and 
provide that wounded and sick persons shall receive appropriate medical care and atten-
tion, they do not, however, provide for a unambiguous obligation to provide food, 
medical or other assistance to civilians during an internal armed conflict unless such 
persons are interned or detained. 
In all internal armed conflicts, internally displaced persons are a primary target of 
acts of physical abuse and violence. Such acts clearly contravene rights guaranteed under 
human rights law and obligations of the parties to such conflicts under humanitarian law. 
2. The Failure of International Law to Adequately Address the Effects of Internal 
Displacement 
It appears from the foregoing that international human rights and humanitarian law 
provide for a system of protection for internally displaced persons which, although far 
from being complete and showing several serious deficiencies, should serve as a gene-
rally satisfactory framework for ensuring the sheer survival of (most) internally displaced 
persons. Reality shows, however, the (at least partial) failure of international human 
rights and humanitarian law to implement and enforce this system. 
This is partly due to the same reasons which explain the failure of international law 
with respect to the implementation and enforcement of those international norms deemed 
to prevent the occurrence of situations of internal displacement, i.e. the apparent 
deficiency of international law to force unwilling states to respect their international 
obligations. 
An additional factor of, however, extreme importance is the already mentioned 
absence of any international instrument establishing an unambiguous right of internally 
displaced persons to assistance and protection or defining the obligations of the 
international community in this context. Therefore, the international community had and 
has to deal with these problems on an ad hoc basis. The problem is further aggravated 
by the fact that, notwithstanding some recent action of the UN Security Council in the 
context of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, there is still no international 
24 See e.g. MACALISTER-SMITH, P.: Protection de la population civile et interdiction d'utiliser la famine 
comme méthode de guerre, Revue Internationale de la Croix-rouge 73 (1991), pp. 464 el seq. and DINSTEIN, 
V.: Siege warfare and die starvation of civilians, in: Essays in Honour of Frits Ralshoven (1991), pp. 145 et 
seq. 
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organisation clearly responsible for providing such assistance and protection. Among the 
numerous UN agencies involved, UNHCR seems to emerge as the main actor, whereas 
the ICRC, for obvious reasons, plays a key role among the various non-governmental 
organisations involved; it is, however, not completely clear whether there is, in fact, 
sufficient co-operation between these bodies or whether their activities suffer from 
unnecessary competition and the lack of adequate co-ordination between them. 
Another important aspect not yet resolved by the international community consists 
of the apparent problems in getting food and other assistance to all internally displaced 
persons in situations of internal armed conflict. This was and is particularly true with 
respect to the armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegowina. Even the ICRC is facing this 
problem, in spite of its international reputation for absolute neutrality, its long-standing 
experience of negotiating solutions in seemingly dead-locked situations and its 
generally accepted role as the primary provider of assistance to internally displaced 
persons. 
It is, therefore, no surprise that the international community had to start considering 
ways and means of compelling the various parties to such conflicts to allow supply 
transport to reach those internally displaced (and other) persons in need thereof. The 
question, however, whether and to what extent actions such as the establishment of relief 
corridors and safe havens for internally displaced persons, or the delineation of no-fire-
zones may actually contribute to ensure (a better) access to internally displaced persons 
in need of such assistance cannot be dealt with in the framework of this paper; the same 
applies to the discussion as to whether UN peace-keeping (and peace-enforcing) forces 
should play a more active role in this context, in particular as to the question whether and 
to what extent their mandate should include the right to the use of force in order to get 
such assistance to those people in need thereof. 
A hist important point to be mentioned in this context is the striking and very funda-
mental contrast between the level of assistance and protection available to externally 
displaced persons (refugees) and internally displaced persons. As stated above, inter-
national refugees law does not apply to the latter group of persons even though their fear 
of persecution is (more or less) identical to that of refugees. Furthermore, UNHCR leads 
and coordinates quite a sophisticated international legal and institutional framework 
providing for assistance and protection to refugees whereas internally displaced persons 
have only limited protection under human rights and humanitarian law and receive only 
ad hoc assistance and protection from states and international organizations which, 
moreover, must be organized and coordinated in each situation of internal displacement; 
this holds hue notwithstanding recent efforts on the UN level and decisions aiming at an 
even more active involvement of UNHCR in remedying the plight of internally displaced 
persons.25 Finally, mention should be made of the fact that current international law 
25 See in particular General Assmebly Resolution 47/105, para. 14, and the recent conclusions of the 
Executive Committee of the High Commisioner's Programme, adopted at its 44th session. UN Doc. 
A/AC.96/821, para. 19 (s); see also the Opening Statement of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees at this 
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does not provide for any specific mechanisms to implement durable solutions to situations 
of internal displacement. Again, this fact constitutes a striking contrast to the legal and 
factual situation of refugees with regard to which there is long-standing experience and 
practice as to the means to bring about, secure and monitor the generally preferred 
durable solution, namely voluntary return or repatriation of refugees; there exists, as yet, 
nothing comparable with regard to internally displaced persons. 
V. Conclusion 
By way of conclusion, it seems justified to state that international law is not yet 
adequately dealing with situations of internal displacement. Such situations result not only 
in immense suffering on the part of the displaced persons, but increasingly tend to 
threaten the internal stability of the states concerned and peace and security in a given 
region of the world. Therefore, the international community is called upon to seriously 
consider means to deal with this issue in a more efficient way. It is suggested that this 
implies, firstly, to adequately address the root causes of internal displacements and 
secondly, to develop more efficient means to extend assistance and protection to inter-
nally displaced persons in situations when the government in place is unwilling to provide 
such assistance and protection or to allow another country or the international community 
to do so. In other words: What is needed is a thorough discussion of the possibilities of 
the international community as to how causes and effects of internal displacements might 
be more efficiently dealt with. 
As regards possible improvements with respect to the root causes of internal displace-
ments, the human right to be strengthened is the right to remain, or the right not to be 
forcibly displaced. This goal might be achieved by its explicit inclusion in the relevant 
human rights instruments. 
Furthermore, the use of derogations, restrictions and exception clauses in international 
human right instruments should be more strictly construed and a state's pertinent practice 
be closely monitored. 
Moreover, the international community must develop a stringent and politically 
unbiased, non-selective strategy as how to deal with the root causes of internal displace-
ments. Options to be more intensively considered include the resort to peaceful 
(economic) sanctions against those states with policies generating internally displaced 
persons. Humanitarian interventions should be considered only as a last resort for 
preventing intentai displacement. In line with recent developments, it is to be stressed 
that they should never be undertaken as a uni- or multilateral action without the explicit 
approval of the competent bodies of the UN or regional organisations.26 Since humani-
session, UN Doc. А/AC.96/821 at 31. 
26 As to the potential role of regional arrangements to maintain international peace and security see e.g. 
WOLFRUM, R.: Der Beitrag regionaler Abmachungen zur Friedenssicherung: Möglichkeilen und Grenzen, Zeit-
schrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 53 (1993), pp. 576 et seq. and NOLTE, G.: 
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tarian intervention is fraught with the risk of potential abuse, the standards for its 
deployment and operation should be very carefully developed. 
As regards possible improvements with respect to the effects of internal displace-
ments, the most pressing problem consists of ensuring the survival of the persons 
concerned. In this regard, the option of drafting a specific document establishing the 
rights of internally displaced persons to receive (international) assistance and protection 
(and a corresponding obligation of the international community to provide it) deserves 
further consideration. Furthermore, current trends aiming at bringing internally displaced 
persons under the mandate of a single international organization should be intensively 
studied. Given the similarities between refugees as externally displaced persons and 
internally displaced persons, an explicit extension of the mandate of UNHCR seems to 
be a viable solution given the long-standing experience of this organ in providing 
humanitarian assistance and protection; this does not mean, however, that the crucial role 
of ICRC should be changed. It is suggested that this extension of the mandate of UNHCR 
should be effected by specific provisions of the above-mentioned new instrument on the 
legal status of internally displaced persons. 
Again, the option of resorting to peaceful sanctions and, eventually even to humani-
tarian interventions, in order to ensure that internally displaced persons in fact receive the 
necessary assistance and protection has to be studied very carefully, but may not be 
excluded. 
Restoring Peace by Regional Action: International Legal Aspects of the Libérián Conflict, Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 53 (1993), pp. 603 et seq. 
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Boldizsár NAGY The Refugee Situation in Hungary: 
Where Now? 
Hungary, approaching the tum of the millennium, has acquired a new role in international 
migration. In the forty years preceding and following the tum of the nineteenth and 
twentieth century approximately two million Hungarians have booked a one way ticket 
for the steamers heading towards the "New World". During the authoritarian regimes of 
fascism and communism further hundreds of thousands fled from here, for example in 
the one year period 1956-57 194.000 persons.1 The gradual loss of population by 
emigration (3000-6000 persons per year) was not counterbalanced by the numbers of 
foreigners naturalized, averaging 550 per year for the period 1960-1980, mainly as a 
result of family unification or final settlement of Greek and Chilean refugees.2 During 
this period the number of immigrants did not exceed 1500 yearly.3 
Hungary which was a typical country of origin during this century has become a signifi-
cant host country in Europe during the past half decade, as well as an important stepping 
stone for those heading for the West. Between 1988 and 1992, 90.101 persons have arrived 
1 Detailed statistics for the migration in 1956 are published in: L. RÉDE1, Mária: A nemzetközi népesség-
mozgás negyven éve Magyarországon (Forty years of international igration) in: P. Tamás and A. Inotai (Eds), 
Uj exodus. Budapest, MTA Társadalmi Konfliktusok Kutató Központja és MTA Világgazdasági Kutatóintézete 
1993. pp. 188-191. 
2 Data calculated on the basis of figures provided by the Ministry for the Interior. 
3 Yearly data of immigration requests for the period 1963-1991 are published in: Trends in International 
Migration, SOPEMI (Continuous Reporting System on Migration) OECD, 1992. p. 154 and in: L. RÉDEI, 
Mária: A nemzetközi népességmozgás negyven éve Magyarországon (Forty years of international migration) 
in: T. Pál and A. Inotai (Eds), Uj exodus. Budapest, MTA Társadalmi Konfliktusok Kutató Központja és MTA 
Világgazdasági Kutatóintézete 1993. p. 192. 
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in Hungary who have stayed longer than one year either as immigrants or as refugees.4 
During the same five years, 118.467 persons have registered with the local offices of the 
Office for Refugee and Migration Affairs, of whom many remained for less than a year.5 
A Glance at the Global Processes 
A decade ago, in 1983, 68.700 requests for asylum were registered in the most important 
European countries of destination. This number for 1992 was 686.329.6 Whereas in 1983, 
50-80 percent of the applicants were recognized as refugees, now the recognition rate 
hardly exceeds 10%.7 Everything was put into a new light by the tragedy of the dismem-
berment of Yugoslavia, even if it did not significantly raise the number of political refugees 
falling under the definition of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
In Spring 1993 the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees recorded that 600.000 
persons fled to territories outside former Yugoslavia to escape the cruelty facing them in 
Croatia and Bosnia.8 Besides them there were at least 1.2 million internally displaced 
persons in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and within Bosnia-Herzegovina.9 Victims of the 
southern Slav conflict are excluded from the regular procedure on recognition of political 
refugees and granted temporary protection in most of the host countries. In order to 
understand better the message of the hard data, it is appropriate to have a brief look at the 
major turning points of the period following the Second World War. 
4 JUHÁSZ, Judit: Internationa] Migration in Hungary Country Report presented to the ECE Workshop on 
"Causes and consequences of Emigration from Central and Eastern Europe", Geneva, September 13/14, 1993. 
Table 1. Manuscript. 
5 Source: Office for Refugee and Migration Affairs. Treatment of the figures calls for great care, because 
this figure reflects the cumulated number of those who have contacted the refugee office. The number of 
recognized refugees in September 1993 was 5.491, of those asylees who enjoyed the support of the Office 
approximately 8500. (See further information in die main text.) 
6 The source of the figures is: 1983: Report of ECRE Biannual Genera] Meeting, Geneva, 1992, Appendix 
3 "NOMBRE DE DEMANDEURS D'ASILE PAR AN DANS DIFFERENTS PAYS EUROPEENS" France 
Terre'd Asile, 1992: UNHCR Statistics on Asylum Applications, UNHCR Regional Office for the European 
Institutions, Brussels, 1993 May, in: Report of ECRE Biannual General Meeting, Berlin, 1993, Appendix 21. 
7 In the first four months of 1993 in Germany 1.7% of the 41.251 led to the recognition of the claims of 
the applicant. Migration News Sheet, No. 103, June 1993, p. 7 (in 1992 the recognition rate was still 4.25%. 
See, Report of ECRE Biannual General Meeting Berling, 1993. p. 110). 
8 Survey of the Implementation of the Temporary Protection, 30 April, 1993. 
9 Numbers on internally displaced persons vary widely. A publication of the UNHCR aggregating the figures 
for internally displaced, for asylum seekers who had crossed international borders and other protected groups 
estimated to total at 3.445.000. See UNHCR: Information Note on Former Yugoslavia, No. 5/1993, p. 8. 
However according to the Office of Displaced Persons and Refugees of the Government of Croatia as of 22 
September 1993 numbers are smaller. According to them the total number of registered refugees and displaced 
persons in Croatia is 486.191 to which 36.808 unregistered asylum seekers has to be added. The same source 
indicates that the number of "refugees from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina located in other countries" 
amounts to 428.200. Certainly these figures are silent upon the number of displaced persons and refugees in 
Serbia and within Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Data directly transmitted from the said office.) 
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The world arena 
After the Second World War undoubtedly Europe was the focus of refugee flows. However, 
since the sixties and seventies many more become uprooted in the developing world than 
in Europe and more people live in refugee-like situations there, than on our continent.10 
Today out of 18 million refugees," 15 million live outside of Europe,12 whereas before 
this time most of the refugees fled from a European country and found protection in the 
developed world. 
European movements 
The European refugee movements have undergone two important changes, first at the 
middle of the decade, the second in the period still running, which began at the tum of the 
nineties. 
The first change was caused by the dramatic increase of the applications submitted by 
persons fleeing from the developing world. The number of asylum seekers claiming refugee 
status has risen three to ten times, practically paralyzing the mechanisms of recognition 
designed for the processing of a couple of hundred files per year.13 
10 From the recent literature on this see: LOESCHER, Gil: Refugee Movements and International Security, 
Adelphi Papers, No. 128, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992. London, pp. 11-16. 
I t Refugee here refers to recognized refugees as well as other persons in refugee-like situations, who have 
crossed international borders and are in need of protection. The theme will be elaborated later in this paper. 
12 According to the World Refugee Survey, there were 17.556.900 refugees on December 31, 1992. (One year 
earlier: 16.647.550.) 1.050.000 were in the successor states of the Soviet Union, 1.2 million on the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia, and 984 thousands in other European countries. See: World Refugee Survey, US 
Committee for Refugees, 1992. p. 33, Table 1, and 1993. pp. 50-51, Table 1. 
13 For the sake of comparison: 
Number of new applications in the year (in thousands) 
Country 1980 1990 
Austria 9.3 22.8 
Belgium 2.7 13.0 
Denmark 0.2 5.3 
France 18.8 54.7 
Germany 7.8 193.1 
The Netherlands 1.3 21.1 
Switzerland 6.1 35.8 
United Kingdom 9.9 30.0 
Source: People on the move, New migration flows in Europe, Council of Europe. 1992, p. 195 and Trends in 
International Migration, SOPEMI (Continuous Reporting System on Migration) OECD, 1992, p. 132. Table 3. 
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The second change is the result of the regime change in Eastern Europe. The flight of 
masses from the Transylvania part of Romania, into Hungary and the repeated occupation 
of embassies by large groups of GDR citizens pressing for their evacuation to the West 
indicating the beginning of the outburst of their "Übersiedlung" has at the same time clearly 
put an end to the earlier pattern of East-West migration. The historic Autumn of 1989 has 
brought at least three novelties: 
— After a decade of small scale flow of asylum seekers, large masses were once again 
knocking at Western Europe's door, just as in 1968 and after 1981, partly from states which 
earlier did not produce significant numbers of refugees (Romania, Yugoslavia, the Baltic 
states). 
— Central European states which used to be countries of origin have become countries 
of transit or asylum. 
— After 1990 the asylum seekers no longer were escaping socialism/communism and 
its political regime, but they came from more or less democratic states, till subscribing to 
market economy systems, where either generalized violence, civil war, or the attacks against 
minorities or the unbearable life conditions forced the people to move. 
The large waves coming from the Southern Slav states only could confirm this 
observation. They also reinforced the need to argument the definition of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention which had not been intended to cover wtir-refugees, with a new category and 
new procedures, relieving the asylum seeker from the complicated individual procedure and 
assuring at least temporary protection. Indeed, most of the European states have introduced 
either in law or in practice a provisional status for the Croat and for the Bosnian asylum 
seekers (primarily for the latter), which guarantees elementary provision for their basic 
needs and protection against refoulement.'4 
Hungary 
Brief history 
The period between 1945 and 1987, "the past", is uniform: there were no refugee affairs, 
with the exception of the reception of a few thousand Greek and a few hundred Chilean 
communists. Accordingly there was no legislation on refugees, except for a single sentence 
of the Constitution "Everybody who is persecuted for his democratic behaviour, or for his 
activity to enhance social progress, the liberation of peoples or the protection of peace, may 
be granted asylum" (Art. 67). It was not supplemented with executive orders, so there were 
no institutions dealing with refugees. The communist party made the decisions which were 
executed by the state apparatus on an informal (political) basis. 
14 The practice of 30 states is summarized in: Survey of the Implementation of Temporary Protection 
(Comprehensive Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Former Yugoslavia) UNHCR, 30 April 1993. 
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The "present" started in 1987 with the fleeing of Transylvanian Hungarians, who 
refused to return to Romania after the expiration of the thirty days of their legal stay. 
This "present" may be subdivided into two large waves of influx and three phases of 
legislation. 
The first legislative phase lasts till the entry into force of Geneva Convention and 
other legislative acts, regulating the refugee procedure and status.15 Before the 
enactment of the rules on refugees, the Hungarian political leadership has gradually taken 
over the responsibility from NGOs and religious institutions ever more openly admitting 
its intentions to support both the Hungarian asylum seekers who had arrived from 
Romania and the GDR citizens who were looking for an escape route to the West 
through Hungary. The first sign of these intentions was a Government Decree on the 
"Settlement Fund" allocating money from the budget for the care of asylum seekers, 
promulgated on 28 June 1988, which still in a euphemistic way avoided the term 
"refugee" and spoke of "foreigners staying in Hungary for longer duration". 
The second phase of the first wave of influx covered the period October 1989-
Summer 1991 till the start of the entry of Southern Slav asylum seekers. In that two 
years almost exclusively Romanian citizens arrived, frequently illegally crossing the 
green border. 70-90% of them were ethnic Hungarians who spoke the language of the 
receiving country, were familiar with its customs, frequently had relatives and family 
members here. The attitude of the Hungarian Government was also simple: it treated 
these people as potential immigrants, members of the Hungarian nation who had lived 
in a minority position in Romania but chose to join the motherland. Therefore, the 
priority of the authorities was to enhance their speedy integration, not to limit state 
action to protection and provisional solutions. Asylum seekers were granted residence 
and work permit without preconditions, could move freely within the country and were 
relieved from many administrative hurdles in terms of documentary evidence for 
professional qualifications or formal conditions for taking a bank credit. 
IS The Convention and the Protocol together became Law-Decree No. 15 of 1989 (1989. évi 15. tvr.), see 
Magyar Közlöny (Official Gazette) 1989 No. 60, p. 1022, entering into force on 15 October, 1989, Hungary 
became bound by them on 14 March (Protocol) and 12 June (Convention). The Cabinet-Decree (101/1989. Mt. 
rend.) on tlie procedure was published in Magyar Közlöny (Official Gazette) 1989 No. 66, p. 1090. An 
unofficial and inaccurate translation of it can be read in Report of ECRE Biannual General Meeting, Budapest, 
1991, Appendix 14, which reproduces die Council of Europe, European Committee on Migration document 
(CDMG) "Information on the main features of the situation with regard to refugees in Hungary" The Law-
Decree on the status of refugees (1989. évi 19. tvr.), see Magyar Közlöny 1989 No. 66, p. 1090—just like the 
Cabinet-Decree on the recognition procedure has entered into force on 15 October 1989. The Law No. XXXI 
of 1989, radically reshaping the Constitution and enacting the new rules on asylum was promulgated on 23 
October 1989. (Magyar Közlöny, 1989. No. 74. p. 1244.) An unofficial translation incorporating later 
modifications was published in a trilingual law publicadon called Hatályos magyar jogszabályok, Geltende 
Ungarische Rechtsnormen, Hungarian Rules of Law in Force, vol. I/1990/No. 16, p. 1625. 
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Table 1 
The number of asylum seekers in the first wave of influx 
until the 
end 
of 1988 
1989 1990 
1991, until 
June 1, 
1991 
total until 
June 1, 
1991 
Total 13.173 17.448 18.283 2.629 51.533 
From 
Romania 13.098 17.171 17.416 2.103 49.788 
Formally 
recognized 
as refugee 
0 185 2.561 149 2.895 
Source: Authors calculations based on data of the Office of Refugee and Migration 
Affairs16 
The second wave lasting from Summer 1991 is characterized by a totally different 
composition of asylum seekers. The number of arrivals increased radically. Whereas 
until 1 June, merely 2629 persons have come, of whom 80% were Romanian citizens 
almost exclusively of Hungarian origin and further 16% Soviet citizens, after the 
outbreak of war in Croatia only between 1 June and 30 September, an estimated 35.000 
persons fled to Hungary, mainly Croats (67.7% of the registered asylum seekers). By 
the end of the year, the proportion of Yugoslav citizens among the total of 54.693 
asylum seekers has reached 87% and that of Romanian citizens dropped to 10%. In 
1992, 92.7% of the 16.204 asylum seekers came from Yugoslavia, 5.2% from Romania, 
1.5% from the former Soviet Union and 0.6% from other countries.17 The arrival of 
Croats, Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, Albanians and Russians meant that for the first time 
the state organs were confronted with a real refugee flow, calling for rapid reactions and 
brave emergency solutions. They had to deal with asylum seekers who came from 
genuine nightmares, often only hours before meeting the Hungarian authorities. All in 
all the support system functioned quite well and many civil servants of the Office of 
16 Unfortunately there is a lack of coasistency in the data provided by the Office of Refugee an Migration 
Affairs. Figures for the same period may differ in subsequent communications. Even interviews with the person 
compiling the statistics could not entirely clear the puzzles. 
17 All the data in this paragraph stent front mimeographed fact sheets of the Office of Refugee and Migration 
Affairs. 
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Refugee and Migration Affairs proved to be ingenious in solving absolutely acute 
problems which they had never experienced during the far more balanced previous 
phases. Contrary to the ethnic Hungarians who had come from Romania with the view 
of settling here, the refugees from Croatia and Bosnia did not intend to integrate, but 
were and still are awaiting the end of hostilities when they can voluntarily return. This 
was even reflected in the fact that they were unwilling to leave the close vicinity of the 
Southern border of Hungary (facing Croatia and Serbia) and move into the middle or 
Northern part of the country. The only alternative to voluntary return in their eyes is 
resettlement in the West. 
As the worst moved down to Bosnia and the situation in Croatia became stabilized, 
the stream of asylum seekers has slowed down and a transformation in the composition 
can be observed. Of the 3.256 persons entering Hungary in the first seven months of 
1993 with the aim of receiving protection and some sort of status, 2.224 were ethnic 
Hungarians. This might signal the beginning of a fourth phase, in which internal 
tensions within Serbia—especially in the region where most of the 450.000 ethnic 
Hungarians live, Vojvodina—may force people to escape individualized persecution 
committed or tolerated by the state authorities, as was the case in Romania not so long 
ago. The following table summarizes the most important data: 
Table 2 
The number of asylum seekers in the second wave 
Junel, 1991 
December 31, 
1991 
1992 
1993 till 
1 September total 
Total 52.064 16.204 3.596 71.864 
From 
(former) 
Yugoslavia 
approx 
48.000 15.012 3.053 
approx. 
66. 000 
From 
Romania 1.791 844 401 3.036 
Formally 
recognized 
as refugee 
285 472 186 943 
Source: Data of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs The situation in 
September, 1993 
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Many members of the first asylum seeker wave have in the meantime regularized their 
status. An indication for that is that the number of naturalization requests have gone up 
sharply. In 1989, 2.800, in 1990, 9.500, in 1991, 13.400, in 1992, 15.000 and during the 
first half of 1993, 11.400 applications for naturalization were filed, which means that 
around 120.000 persons are awaiting naturalization, because each application concents 
a whole family. Until September 1993, approximately 45.000 persons were naturalized 
as a consequence of these requests, in about one thousands cases Hungarian citizenship 
was denied, the remaining cases are still pending.18 
More than 10.000 persons have chosen to apply for immigrant (permanently resident 
alien) status who afterwards still have to option to become naturalized. Therefore the 
majority of the asylum seekers who have come from Romania have drifted into another 
status including several thousands successfully resettled in the West and other hundreds 
who voluntarily returned. The total lack of continuous record of former asylum-seekers 
makes it impossible to produce precise statistics.19 In April-May, 1993 the authorities 
have decided to re-register the asylum seekers, who still enjoyed refuge in Hungary 
whether in reception centers and temporary shelters or at families or on their own, to 
answer challenges heard from different circles concerning the actual number of persons 
supported. The result of this process has revealed that indeed an impressive share of the 
new arrivals, who appeared in the statistics has in the meantime disappeared from the 
view of the authorities, including local governments which distributed aid to privately 
hosted asylum seekers. The result of the registration may be summarized as follows: 
Table J 
Asylum seekers registered as receiving support from Hungarian state organs in 
September 1993 
Category Number of persons 
Asylum seekers living in permanent reception 
centers or temporary shelters run by the Office 3.327 
Asylum seekers receiving support from the 
municipal authorities, but hosted by families or 
living on their own account 
4.581 
Source: Office for Refugee and Migration Affairs 
18 Data provided on the author's request by the Department on Nationality of (he Ministry of the Interior. 
19 Since figures on natiuralization and immigration include "normal" cases and asylum seekers one cannot 
simply deduce from the number of asylum seekers from Romania the naturalized or immigrated Romanian 
citizens. (As a matter of fact even statistics enabling this simple calculations are not available.) 
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At this point it is important to note that there are approximately 10-15.000 persons 
enjoying refuge in Hungary without ever receiving formal support as asylum seekers. 
Draft evaders and others with strong family links frequently prefer to remain 
anonymous, and stay in Hungary within the bounds of normal aliens law, eventually 
letting the alien's police know about their particular motives, which may lead to a more 
liberal treatment in granting stay or residence rights. 
Legal Status of Asylum Seekers in Hungary 
Refugees 
The Hungarian Constitution includes rules which are almost identical with die Geneva 
Convention's definition.20 
Section 65 
"(1) The Republic of Hungary—in accordance with the provisions of law—grants 
asylum for those foreign nationals, who in their country of nationality, or for 
those stateless persons who in their residence are persecuted for racial, religious, 
national, linguistic or political reasons. 
(2) A person granted asylum cannot be extradited to another state. 
(3) The adoption of the law on asylum requires the votes of the two thirds of 
the Members of Parliament who are present." 
Since October 1989, when the possibility to apply for refugee status was opened up 
approximately seven thousand applications were filed, and 5.491 persons were 
recognized as Convenhon refugees.21 Roughly 80% of them were Romanian, 10% 
Yugoslav citizens, including Yugoslavia's successor states, and the last ten percent is 
divided between Russian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian citizens, and persons from the Balkan 
region. The majority of those who came from Romania and the Yugoslav successor 
states declared herself/himself Hungarian. None of the recognized refugees came from 
the developing world, which is explained by the fact that Hungary acceded to the 
Geneva Convention with the geographic reservation, which meant, that victims of 
persecution outside of Europe were excluded from the implementation of the Convention 
by the Hungarian authorities. Therefore those who fled unbearable fate in Iraq, Iran, 
China, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and other countries still practising political persecution 
and came to Hungary or were stranded here on their way to another destination, only 
have one hope: if the Budapest representative of the UNHCR Recognizes their claim 
20 A more detailed description of the legal framework highlighting the slight differences between the 
Constitution and the Convention is to be found in NAGY, Boldizsár: The Hungarian Refugee Law (in: H. 
Adalman—E. Sik—G. Tessényi (eds.), Refugees in Hungary, York Lanes Publishers, Toronto, 1993, in print). 
21 Data provided by the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs on 30 September 1993. 
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to refugee status and UN protection, their presence will be tolerated upon the basis of 
a gentleman's agreement between the representative and the Hungarian alien's police.22 
Asyless 
This term is used to describe the more than hundred and ten thousand asylum seekers, 
constituting more than 95% of all arrivals, who did not become Convention refugees in 
Hungary. Since they are not refugees in the narrow sense of the word, they do not come 
under the personal scope of the—otherwise generous—refugee legislation, granting 
Convention refugees national treatment with the exception of the right to vote or to take 
a job requiring Hungarian citizenship.23 What is their position, what are they entitled 
to, could we ask. Surprisingly until Spring 1993 this term did not show up in any 
Hungarian legislation.24 Written law is fairly sparse, enumerating certain expenses 
(elementary and secondary schooling, health care, social services, supply in the 
reception centers, including meals, language education) which can be covered by the 
Fund. In practice about 16 thousand Southern Slav asylees have spent briefer or longer 
periods in the permanent reception centers (Bicske, Békéscsaba, Hajdúszoboszló) or in 
the temporary shelters (Lakitelek, Máriagyüd, Mohács, Nagyatád, Pécs, Szigetvár and 
others). As of 1 September 1993, 2954 persons were taken care of in those camps. The 
others were either hosted by Hungarian families—in some villages the asylum seekers 
in 1991 outnumbered the local population—or had the means to support themselves in 
bread and breakfast rooms or modest pensions. Few hundred asylees found shelter in 
establishments run by the Hungarian Red Cross in Csillebérc25 or in Nagyharsány, 
maintained by the Hungarian Interchurch Aid. 
Practically also those who came from Romania were asylees, since out of the 
approximately fifty thousand only about four thousand have become Convention 
22 The existence of this gentleman's agreement was not only confirmed by conversations of this author with 
relevant actors, but also by the former deputy head of the Office for Refugees, see: Dr. TÓTH, Judit: Ungarn, 
National Report, in: Asyl- und Einwanderungsrecht in europäischen Vergleich (Schriftenreihe der Europäischen 
Rechtsakademie, Trier, Band 1) ed.: HAILBRONNER, Kay 1992, p. 88. Between 1989 and 31 July 1992 16 
Somalis, 4 Ethiopians, 3 Iraqis, 3 Sri Lankans, 2 Iranians, 1 Chinese and 1 Egyptian person has received the five 
line long certificate confirming that "on the basis of available information [that person] is considered to be a 
refugee within the mandate of the Office of The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees". The total 
number of recognized persons till September 1993 was 47 out of 1313 who have approached the Budapest Office. 
23 See the Law-decree No. 19 of 1989 which also exempts refugees from military service, guarantees free 
language education and accelerated naturalization if they apply. 
24 Only the Law No. XXVI on the Fund for the Support of Refugees replacing the Settlement Fund of 1988 
introduced the term "persons enjoying temporary portection on the territory of Hungary" which amounts to 
asylees. Art 3 (2) c). 
25 According to data, provided by the Hungarian Red Cross 250 persons have arrived to the Csillebérc camp, 
and 183 have left during 1992. 40% of them stayed less than a month and the majority of those who left 
managed to travel to third countries with the help of the Red Cross. It is important to note that Csillebérc is 
one of those shelters where non-Europeans get assistance as well. 
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refugees. The others might have lived for a while in the reception centers, they also may 
have received financial assistance from the Settlement Fund, but most of them have 
already integrated into the Hungarian society. Relatives, friends, the impressively active 
Hungarian churches and NGOs were instrumental in paving this way. 
Problems awaiting solution 
Legislative issues 
The missing code 
The present government has been unable to submit to Parliament the comprehensive bill 
on the status of refugees and the procedure leading to it which had been promised by 
the predecessor government already at the adoption of the presently effective regulation. 
The urgency of the problems in 1989 has justified that neither the rules concerning the 
rights of recognized refugees, nor the procedure of recognition was regulated in an Act 
adopted by Parliament, but in a Law-decree adopted by the 17-member Presidential 
Council, and in a government decree. It was understood that those rules were only to 
guide action for a brief period until the requirement of the Constitution that individual 
rights must be regulated by Acts of the Parliament would be met. Conceptual drafts of 
the bill have circulated in ministerial offices but a coherent final text of the bill does 
not yet exist in September 1993. 
Unification of terminology 
The new Act on the Refugee Support Fund26 adopted on 9 March 1993 has only 
increased the confusion already prevailing in the written law. Before its enactment the 
cavalcade of denominations included "refugee", applicant for refugee status" "applicant 
for territorial asylum", "applicant for refuge" and person enjoying ("territorial asylum" 
The Act on the Refugee Support Fund has introduced two new categories: "persons 
enjoying temporary protection" and "persons who were granted leave to enter for 
humanitarian grounds". [Art. 3 (c) and (d) of the Act.] This is an unwelcome innovation 
in this form, since no one knows whether rules embodied in earlier legislation including 
the constitution itself which do not use these terms but refer only to refugees or persons 
enjoying asylum would also cover the new categories, the asylees. To give but one 
example: the absolutely fresh Act on Entry, Sojourn and Immigration of Foreigners 
adopted by Parliament on 14 September 1993 makes it clear that its—fairly strict—rules 
do not apply to "aliens recognized by the Hungarian authorities as refugees, and to 
asylum-applicants until their case is decided". [Art. 2 (3).] Does that mean that persons 
enjoying temporary protection are subject to the fairly demanding requirements which 
ordinary aliens have to meet for the grant of a residence permit? (At present nobody 
would think so. But if harder times come with large influxes of non-Convention 
26 1993. évi XXV. IV. Act on the Fund for Refuges. 
204 Boldizsár Nagy 
refugees, this law may be used as a tool to keep them at bay, which would certainly be 
a disfunction of the innovative mood of the law-maker.) The only way out of this could 
be if the asylee status was codified with a clause expressing the legislators intention 
concerning the interpretation of terms included in earlier acts and decrees. 
An asylee status comprising temporary protected groups and individuals accepted 
on lesser than Convention grounds be established and defined 
Clear rules must be formulated guaranteeing the protection of victims of civil wars and 
other man-made catastrophes. They should enjoy a certain measure of tolerance and 
protection. They should be exempted from the usual requirements that foreigners are 
supposed to meet if they want to stay or reside in Hungary. An asylee status, something 
similar to the temporary protected status established by ILS legislation27 should be 
introduced which would unambiguously determine whether the temporary protected 
person had a right to work, or to set up business venture to what level of state 
assistance (s)he is entitled, whether (s)he was allowed to return briefly to her/his home 
country to check if the house was still not destroyed, family members still alive. The 
situation giving rise to claims for temporary protection would be designated by an 
appropriate body, which should be appointed after political discussions. The determina-
tion would extend this form of protection to a whole group or class of persons and it 
would explicitly have temporary character, not—or at least not necessarily—giving ground 
to claims for further presence, immigration or naturalization. 
The second "asylee" situation to be regulated would refer to cases where an 
individual for one or more reasons does not meet the criteria of the 1951 Convention 
but for humanitarian reasons, to be determined on a case by case basis, would be 
allowed to remain in Hungary for a reasonably long, or an unlimited period. Such an 
individual should not only be exempted from the normal requirements of immigration 
but should also enjoy full protection from the persecuting state and against refoulement: 
moreover he would enjoy part of the benefits offered to Convention refugees. Decision 
is needed to regulate their position if grounds for flight cease to exist. It is crucial that 
procedural rules on the—individual or group—recognition of as y lee s be elaborated. 
Withdrawal of the geographic limitation 
The government's several times repeated promise on the withdrawal of the geographic 
reservation must be realized. None of the neighbouring countries has made such a 
reservation, even though their economic situation is by no means better than ours. A 
further fact calling for the withdrawal of the reservation is that Art. 65 of the 
Constitution on asylum does not contain any reference to geographic scope, but clearly 
27 See Section 302 of the Immigration Act of 1990 which became Section 244A of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952. 8 USC 1254A. 
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declares that Hungary grants asylum to the persecuted. One may add that the customary 
rule of non-refoulement is binding Hungary without the need for a treaty-law 
confirmation. As a result of this, Hungary is not entitled to return persons to non-Euro-
pean areas if their life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, or if they had 
to face torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.28 This means that a 
person from the developing world already now has a right to stay in Hungary if no safe 
third country is obliged to let that person enter. 
Guarantees affecting the procedure have to be strengthened 
Today applicants normally do not have legal assistance. They have to recount traumas 
which are psychologically extremely painful to recall, often with the help of untrained 
translators, frequently fellow asylum seekers. Circumstances of the hearing hardly 
alleviate the mistrust, asylum seekers normally feel towards authorities, whom they are 
used not to rely upon. Anxiety for those who remained at home may also induce the 
applicant to "correct" the story which undermines credibility in the eyes of the 
authorities, even if was justified by that concern. Many phases of the procedure are only 
regulated by established practice, without the sanction of law. Presently the border guard 
himself decides whether to return to Serbia a bus packed with exhausted Bosnian 
refugees, insisting that (small) Yugoslavia is a safe country where they could have 
found protection. These practices have to be reviewed and regulated by written rules 
setting standards against which the act of the individual official may be judged. 
The practice of preliminary screening 
One may wonder what happens to those "newcomers" who appear at the input side of 
the statistics but disappear before the numbers concerning formal recognition procedure 
starts. To take a non-exceptional year, preceding the flight from Yugoslavia, in 1990 
18.283 asylum seekers were registered but only 3.513 procedures for recognition were 
started. What happened to 4/5 of the asylum seekers, to almost 15.000 persons? In their 
case a sort of "eligibility" procedure or preliminary screening has shown that their claim 
is manifestly unfounded. The person conducting the first personal hearing of the asylum 
seeker relied upon his personal experience and feeling in deciding whether to screen out 
that person, for "obviously unfounded claim" or whether to enter him in the register of 
28 1984 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
expressly prohibiting refoulement or extradition of a person "to another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture" became part of Hungarian law 
in 1988 as Law-decree No. 3 of 1988. Hungary is also bound by the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols which she signed in 1990 November 6. 
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applicants, thereby setting into motion the formal procedure safeguarded by the 
possibility of administrative and judicial review. 
In these "eligibility procedures" two different groups are involved. 
The first comprises aliens, who because of the lack of information simply did not 
precisely know how to achieve their goal of remaining in Hungary. They might have 
approached the organs of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs with a vague idea 
of their possibilities for remaining in Hungary and after receiving advice might have 
entered the normal route of aliens desiring residence. No serious reservations should 
concern these cases since the persons concerned voluntarily observe the advise of the 
contacted organ. 
The other group is composed of cases in which die asylum seeker is prevented from 
starting the procedure against his will. The authority may find that his application is 
simply repeating an earlier one and deny its processing or it may declare that it is 
manifestly unfounded or late in time. The effort to start a procedure unfounded or late 
in time. The effort to start a procedure may fail right at the outset when the alien does 
not succeed in convincing the border guard that as an asylum seeker he or she is 
entitled to enter Hungarian territory and submit a formal application. 
In both cases no formal—and therefore appealable—decision is taken, everything 
happens in an informal, non-written way which by definition raises doubts. Only the 
adoption of public regulation raises doubts. Only the adoption of public regulation of 
this preliminary screening procedure could clear this anxiety. 
Information 
Staff of the Office for Refugee and Migration and of the local offices repeatedly 
complain about the lack of finn information on which to base their decision. It is rarely 
possible to verify by external means whether the fear of persecution is well founded. 
Therefore the credibility—or alleged non-credibilit^-of the applicant becomes paramount. 
There are hardly any data banks and other sources of information within reach of the 
acting authorities to confirm or defy statements of the applicant. If asylum seekers come 
in great numbers from well-defined areas of neighbouring countries this problem can 
be overcome by comparing reports and statements of the asylum seekers who frequently 
described the same events in terms allowing cross checking.29 But in the case of 
asylum seekers coming from remote areas of the world—especially after the lifting of 
the geographic reservation—the authorities entrusted with die responsibility to decide will 
have to multiply their efforts in order to get access to information generated and 
29 According to recollections shared by officials active in local authorities in cases when Hungarians 
were persecuted in Romania in spring 1990, then after the first person's account of the events taking 
place in a village or similarly well defined location (pogroms, whatever) they could expect that further 
persons affected by the persecution would show up and frequently those persons indeed appeared within 
a matter of days. 
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transmitted by impartial actors. This task is already existing, even if the geographic 
limitation is in force, because the non-refoulement principle binds Hungary in relation 
to forced migrants, wherever they may have come from. 
Another aspect of the information issue is the total lack of transparency with regard 
the activity of the Office. No decisions are published, not even the courts's judgements 
in the five cases decided at court level so far. The public has no access to the 
reasoning of these decisions, so it cannot assess whether the conspicuous inclination 
to confirm the decision of the first instance after appeal still within the administrative 
procedure (in less than 1% of all the cases did the appeal organ, the Office of Refugee 
and Migration Affairs reverse the negative decision of its own local authority passing 
the first decision) is the sign of the extreme well-foundedness of die first decision, or 
of something else. 
The challenge of asylum seekers (forcibly) returned or expelled from Western 
European states 
In 1993 more and more Bosnians and ethnic Hungarians from Voivodina and Romania 
were called upon in Western Europe to voluntarily return or were deported back, 
frequently with the formal justification that Hungary was the country of first asylum. 
In order to avoid producing refugees in orbit the Hungarian law must incorporate 
guidance for this—ever more frequent—situation. 
Practical issues 
The refugee identity card issued to the persecuted and the residence permit handed 
over to the asylee only ladles a spoonful out of the see of troubles surrounding an 
asylum seeker. In order to live a worthwhile human life (s)he has to find a durable 
solution. If there is no third state offering resettlement—the dominant condition of the 
asylum seekers today in Hungary—then the Hungarian society has to advance those 
structures and mechanisms which are requisite either for the integration of the 
refugees and asylees, or for the endurance of long years of temporariness. Basic 
schooling, health-care and social security are not enough. It is of paramount impor-
tance that also asylees not only recognized refugees be freed from the closed circle 
of subsidies. They must regain their self-assurance by taking wage earning jobs or 
setting up their own businesses. No effort may be spared from reuniting divided 
families. A more reasonable use of the Refugee Support Fund should enhance their 
access to normal housing conditions. Domestic population must be informed that a 
few ten thousands of (or even less) asylum seekers (75% of them elderly, minor 
and women) do not appreciably increase the tension of the labour market with 
already 700.000 unemployed. In order to check xenophobia, a consequent campaign 
must be carried out highlighting the difference between asylum seekers and illegal 
migrants, it must be emphasized that being one of the 45 most developed nations in the 
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world30 it is Hungary's moral and legal duty to assist the victims of persecution and 
other disasters, whereas the state is indeed entitled to fight and does fight against illegal 
migrants with all the tools approved under the rule of law and in conformity with 
international legal obligations. 
What is ahead? 
Future does not derive from the past, even it cannot arrive without iL What should we 
prepare for, then? 
Ever more people will come from the developing world. The South-North pressure 
is increasing for demographic and economic reasons. In the coming twenty years 730 
million new job seekers will appear on the labour market and—upon failure to find 
employment—consider moving to the developed world (where at present there are 586 
million jobs altogether!).31 Western Europe is rushing to close all legal gates leading to 
the long term residence of non EC national aliens (with the exception of the EFTA 
countries). Conditions for acquiring refugee status are tightened in several states. 
New, restrictive national laws 
As of 1 July 1993 Germany has modified its generous Art. 16 of the Grundgesetz, which 
served as a compensation for the persecution committed by the Third Reich, and granted 
asylum for all politically persecuted. In Austria a new law on asylum entered into force 
on 1 June 1992 significantly narrowing the possibilities of asylum seekers, introducing 
clauses which exclude investigation of the substance of applications if the concerned 
person has come from a safe country, and also if the application is obviously unfounded 
according to the judgement of the authorities. Simultaneously the physical control of 
borders with Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republic has been reinforced. New, stricter 
Asylum Law was adopted in Britain in Summer 1993 and the enactment of the new 
French legislation was only delayed because of the intensive public protest against its 
discriminatory features.32 
Steps taken by member states of the EC 
The European Communities is also adopting a policy of establishing administrative and 
legal techniques to circumvent the spirit of the Geneva Convention. National refugee 
30 World Resources 1992-1993, A Report of the World Resources Institute in collaboration with The United 
Nations Environment Programme and The United Nations Development Programme, Oxford University Press, 
New York, Oxford, 1992. Table 15.1, pp. 236-237. 
31 Speech of James N. Purcell, Director General of ЮМ at the 1993 April meeting of the human dimension 
of Ute CSCE. 
32 Migration News Sheet, No. 123/93. p. 3. 
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officials tend to complain about the large number of "manifestly unfounded claims" 
which only deserve an accelerated and simplified processing, if at all. In 1990 the twelve 
EC members have adopted the Dublin Convention outside the legislative mechanism of 
the EC to identify one single state responsible for the investigation of an application for 
asylum status, with the effect of a binding decision on the other eleven.33 The same 
purpose motivated relevant parts of the Schengen agreements of 1985/1990.34 Although 
at present none of these agreements is formally in force, they deeply influence the 
practice of Western European states. In order to avoid the substantive evaluation of the 
asylum seeker's application they endorse several concepts not to be found in the Geneva 
Convention.35 Resolutions of the Ministers of the Member States of the European 
Communities responsible for immigration, adopted at their meeting in London, on 30 
November to 1 December and confirmed by the European Council in Edinburgh, 12 
December, 1992, legitimize the use of categories such as "manifestly unfounded claim", 
"deliberate deception or abuse of asylum procedures", "host third country". For 
"manifestly unfounded claims" accelerated procedure is foreseen which "need not include 
full examination at every level of the procedure those applications which fall within the 
terms of paragraph 1". That paragraph identifies three kinds of manifestly unfounded 
claims: where there is no substance to the claim, where the claim is based on deliberate 
deception or is an abuse of asylum procedures, finally when the application falls within 
the provision of the other resolution of the ministers on host third countries. If the asylum 
seeker comes from a country which appears on a list of countries in which "there is in 
general terms no serious risk of persecution", that may be enough to limit her/his chances 
by presuming that there is no substance to the claim, therefore it is manifestly unfounded, 
include the frequent situation that the applicant destroyed her/his passport, or produced 
an application, which was inconsistent or contradictory or even if protection was available 
for the individual in "another part of his own country to which it would be reasonable 
to expect him to go". 
The "Resolution on a harmonized approach to questions concerning host third 
countries" plainly tells that "[t]he principle of host third country is to be applied to all 
applicants for asylum, irrespective of whether or not they may be regarded as refugees". 
In order to qualify as a host third country, modest requirements are to be met. The life 
and freedom of the asylum applicant must not be threatened, (s)he must not be exposed 
to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, and must be afforded effective protection 
33 See: International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 2 (1990) No. 3. p 469. 
34 The Schengen Agreement and the Schengen Implementation Agreement were concluded by France, 
Germany and the Benelux countries, see ILM, vol. 30 (1991) p. 68. Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain adhered 
later. They include provisions on control at outer frontiers, a common visa policy, carrier's sanctions, 
responsibility for dealing with requests for asylum and establish the Schengen Information System. 
35 From the most recent literature see: HAILBRONNER, Kay: The Concept of "Safe Country" and Expedi-
tious Asylum Procedures—A Western European Perspechve and ARBOLEDA, Eduardo—HOY, Ian: The 
Convention Refugee Definition in the West: A Legal Fiction, International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 5 
(1993) No. 1. pp. 31-65, and pp. 66-90. 
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against refoulement. If these conditions apply and the person at least "has had an 
opportunity at he border or within the territory of the third country to make contact with 
that country's authorities in order to seek their protection" then the case will not be 
examined on the merits. This meant that a Bosnian refugee, who transited Bulgaria (not 
a party to the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees) has nevertheless 
been in a host third country and can be sent back after the accelerated procedure or even 
returned at the border, without any procedure at all. 
This purpose is reinforced by the spreading grid of readmission agreements entitling 
the more affluent Western states to return persons to countries which they have travelled 
through, with the obligation of the latter to readmit them to their territory.36 
Hungary's choice 
So far Hungary has achieved international respect with its generous, humane policy 
towards asylum seekers, including times of large scale influxes. Nevertheless now it 
seems to face a hard political and moral choice. Either it will harmonize its legislation 
and administrative practice with the restrictive European powers hoping that joint efforts 
with them will help to obey obligations of refugee law and resist undesired irregular 
migration, or, remembering the specific features of the Central and East European fate, 
it will try to cooperate with countries of this region facing similar challenges.37 That 
could lead to common leverage on the wealthy states to share the burden and responsibil-
ity of finding a middle ground between restrictions and economically not viable openness. 
Such a balanced policy would make the border guards and refugee officials identify the 
same fear and hope in the eyes of the Iraqi or Moroccan asylum seeker what their 
Canadian or Austrian counterparts could see in the look of our—similarly poor and 
underqualificd—predecessors in 1957. 
36 The Benelux states, Germany and France have concluded an agreement to this effect witlt Poland on 21 
March 1991. published in: Asyl- und Einwanderungsrecht in Euopätschen Vergleich (Schriftenreihe der 
Europäischen Rechtsakademie, Trier, Band 1) ed.: Kay Hailbronner, 1992. pp. 208-213. Which was followed 
by another bilateral agreement between Germany and Poland on 7 May 1993 assuring Poland financial 
assistance in the magnitude of 120 million DM. Germany is trying to conclude similar agreement with the 
Czech Republic, and has already signed one with Romania. Austria and Hungary have also signed a return 
agreement on 9 October 1992. Hungary also has return agreements with Romania (signed 1 September, 1992) 
and with Slovenia (signed 20 October, 1992). None of the Hungarian agreements has been made public nor 
entered into force yet. 
37 Interior ministers of Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia have adopted 
a Final Communiqué at their negotiations in Prague, 16 April 1993, reflecting their agreement to propose their 
governments cooperation concerning five issues: denial responsibility for "old cases" of foreigners whom the 
FRG intends to return as a consequence of the new asylum law; allowing transit for returned persons, making 
efforts "towards completing mutual standardized readmission agreements in their countries and will initiate the 
conclusion of such agreements witlt countries producing illegal migration"; harmonization of asylum procedures 
and finally use of possibilities provided by the CSCE to tackle the "serious security problem" of the issue of 
European migration. 
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Gillian WHITE Regional Economic Integration 
and the Multilateral Trading System: 
What Role for the GATT? 
1. The Phenomenon of Regional Economic Integration 
Definition of terms is an essential preliminary to any scientific study. I have found the 
following definition by a British economist, Dr. Ali El-Agraa, a specialist in the analysis 
and critique of international economic integration, to be clear and helpful: 
"international economic integration is ... a state of affairs or a process which 
involves the amalgamation of separate economies into larger regions". [My 
emphases.] 
The same scholar elaborated, as follows: 
"More specifically, [it] is concerned with the discriminatory removal of all trade 
impediments between the participating nations and with the establishment of 
certain elements of cooperation and coordination between them". [My emphases.] 
(El-Agraa, 1988) 
Article XXIV of the GATT (extracts from text are annexed) defines customs unions 
and free trade areas (FTAs) for purposes of qualifying for the exception to the basic 
most-favoured-nation (MFN) rule that Article XXIV provides. Summarising Article 
XXIV, para. 8, a free trade area is an association ("group") of two or more countries 
("customs territories") with duty free treatment of imports from other group members, 
together with removal of other trade restrictions, particularly quantitative restrictions, 
inter se. 
A customs union is an association of countries with duty free treatment of imports 
from members, plus removal of other trade restrictions inter se, plus, crucially, a common 
external tariff for imports from non-members. Article XXIV also contemplates an 
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"interim agreement" leading to a FTA or customs union within a "reasonable period of 
time" [para. 5 (c)]. 
The now distant decade of the 1960s has been tenned the decade of integration 
[Haberler in American Econ. Rev. (1964)], but the trend has not slackened. A recent list 
compiled by the GATT Secretariat showed that almost 80 preferential trade arrange-
ments (most of them regional) had been notified to the GATT, under Article XXIV, or 
had GATT implications. In 1992 the GATT Council was notified of sixteen regional 
integration initiatives. The then Chairman of the Contracting Parties, Ambassador Anell 
of Sweden, declared that "much time will be devoted in die coming years to working 
party examinations of these arrangements". (Address to Annual Session, 2 Dec. 1992, 
GATT Press Communique.) He suggested the time was now ripe for a review of the 
way in which the working parties well fulfill their remits under Article XXIV, in 
particular, to ensure that they produced "clear and meaningful results". Later in this 
paper, I shall refer to recent proposals for reform of Article XXIV and procedures for 
its application. 
By the mid-1990s membership of the GATT was approaching universality, and very 
few of the Contracting Parties are not also parties to a regional FTA or an actual or 
potential customs union. Such arrangements exist in all continents and involve all the 
major market economy and industrialised nations except Japan; many developing 
countries, and (in ASEAN) some of the New Industrializing Countries (NICs). China 
and India are not parties to regional arrangements; Pakistan is a member of a loose 
cooperation agreement with Iran and Turkey; South Africa is also an "outsider", as are 
Russia and the other republics of the former USSR. But these are exceptions. [The next 
paper in this session deals with the Association Agreements between the EC and Central 
and East European States—an incipient form of regional economic cooperation.] 
2. Reasons for Forming Regional Trade Arrangements 
From now on in this paper, I shall use the looser, non-technical term "regional trade 
arrangements" (RTAs). 
Many RTAs were proposed for political reasons, even though these may have been 
undeclared, and covered by arguments that the proposal would bring economic 
advantages. 
Among the main economic advantages which are possible in theory and which have 
been realised in varying degrees by certain of the established RTAs, including the EEC 
an EFTA, are the following: 
more efficient production following increased specialisation (the economic law of 
comparative advantage); 
increased production levels from economies of scale made possible by the larger 
market; 
improved international bargaining strength bringing better terms of trade; 
more efficient use of resources through increased competition. 
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If member countries proceed beyond formation of a customs union to closer 
economic integration (a common market—customs union with free factor mobility across 
members' frontiers; or an economic and monetary union) further gains become possible 
from 
— factor mobility—free movement of goods, labour, investment capital, establishment 
of companies and firms, provision and receipt of services; 
— coordination of monetary and fiscal policies. 
Other motives which can lead States to form RTAs: 
(i) to find relief from the use of allegedly "unfair" trade rules, e.g. imposition of anti-
dumping or countervailing duties on their exports. This seems to have been one reason 
for Canada and Mexico seeking to form FTA with the United States. 
(ii) dissatisfaction with the GATT, particularly since the growth in membership which 
results in perceived slowness of negotiating tariff reductions and the control or 
elimination of non-tariff barriers. 
(iii) to create a regional arrangement within which the member States can regulate 
matters which they consider need some control but which, currently, are outside GATT 
rules, e.g. trade in services; intellectual property rights; competition policy; environmental 
concerns. 
(iv) to create an arrangement of trading parüier countries within which there can be 
more effective dispute settlement procedures (quicker, more likely to lead to binding 
determinations which are then implemented) than are currently available in the GATT 
system. This motive was clearly present for the US and Canada in negotiating their FTA 
which entered into force in 1989. Many members of the GATT Working Party examining 
this Agreement were concerned at the implications for the GATT dispute settlement sys-
tem of the dispute settlement provisions in this FTA, particularly as regards their possible 
impact on the GATT interests of third parties. (BISD 38th Supp. 47 at 54-55, 75.) 
3.1. GATT Law—MFN Principle and Article XXIV 
Since 1950 economists have pointed out that formation of a customs union or FTA can 
have harmful effects for non-members. The arrangement is inherently protective vis-à-vis 
third parties in that the move to free trade among the members is combined with 
retention or even increase in impediments to trade against non-members. In other words, 
the members create discriminatory trade liberalisation. The GATT was founded upon the 
principle of non-discriminatory liberalisation. To quote from a US government study: 
"The unconditional most-favoured-nation (MFN) provision is the cornerstone of the 
international trade rules embodied in the GATT". 
[Exec. Branch GATT Studies No. 9. The MFN Provision, at 133. Quoted in Jackson 
& Davey (1986) 428.] 
The same study observed that this principle ensures that each country will satisfy its 
import needs from the most efficient sources of supply, allowing the operation of 
comparative advantage. 
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Article XXIV of the GATT enshrines on of several exceptions to the basic MFN 
provision. Some authorities regard it as the most important exception (Jackson & Davey, 
430). Article XXIV permits States which are GATT Contracting Parties to form RTAs 
provided that the arrangements satisfy certain conditions, namely, that they do not create 
higher levels of discrimination against non-members than existed when the RTA was 
formed, and that tariff and other trade restrictions are removed on substantially all the 
trade among the RTA members. 
Why did the GATT founders allow this exception to the principle of non-discrimination? 
1) Historical precedents—exceptions to MFN obligations for border trade and limited 
regional arrangements were traditional [see Article XXIV, para. 3 (a), frontier traffic], 
2) They considered that regional FTAs or customs unions would be a step towards ge-
neral trade liberalisation. The benefits resulting from free trade in one area should increase 
productivity and wealth, so that even more goods would be imported from non-members. 
3) They realised that they could not prevent States from entering into RTAs and to 
have attempted to deny States this right "particularly when the main driving force may 
be political rather than economic, would have been a major setback for the world 
community". (El-Agraa, p. 4.) 
3.2. Article XXIV in Practice. Problems of Interpretation and Application 
As noted, there are two main conditions attached to Article XXIV exception to the non-
discrimination principle. 
I (in para. 5) that the customs tariffs of the FTA or customs union applicable to trade 
with GATT parties which are not parties to the FTA or the union "shall not on the whole 
be higher or more restrictive " than "the general incidence" of such tariffs applied prior 
to the formation of the FTA or customs union. 
II (in para. 8) that the arrangement must cover "substantially all the trade" between 
the parties to the FTA or customs union. 
Condition I. Customs tariffs to be "not on the whole higher". 
If the adoption of a Common External Tariff by members of a customs union results 
in the raising of some member States' tariffs above the level at which those duties were 
"bound" under GATT Article II,' affected non-members have a right to renegotiate those 
bound tariffs, under the procedure of Article XXVIII, to arrive at "compensatory 
adjustment" (Article XXIV:6). These negotiations have been difficult and have led to 
some protracted disputes (the "Chicken War" between the LIS and the EEC in 1963; 
disputes over US rights to export grains to the EEC). One example must suffice: 
1 A tariff is "bound" when a State has filed with the GATT a commitment either not to increase an existing 
rate, or to lower it. Commitments are included in a tariff schedule. 
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When the EEC was enlarged by the admission of Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom in January 1973, a series of GATT bindings that had been in effect for those 
three States were withdrawn. In Article XXIV:6 negotiations the EEC argued that the 
tariff reductions which the three countries were implementing as part of the EEC's 
Common External Tariff outweighed the tariff increases on other products which they 
were having to impose on joining the EEC. Reduced tariffs on industrial goods were 
sufficient to offset loss of lower duty rates on agricultural products. The US disagreed 
and sought compensation for this increase in tariff rates affecting their exports to 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK. The dispute was settled by agreement in 1974. The EEC 
agreed to increase US market access for, inter alia, tobacco, citrus fruits, kraft paper, 
certain tractors and other machinery, diesel engines, pumps and plywood. 
The most recent Working Party report, on the FTA between Canada and the US, 
failed to determine whether the waiver by the US under that Agreement of its customs 
user fee in respect of imports from Canada only (FTA, Article 403:3) was legitimate in 
terms of Article XXIV:5(b). Other GATT parties trading with the US might be bearing 
a disproportionate share of this burden, since the FTA entered into force in January 1989. 
But this was impossible to determine on the available data. This example shown that 
issues raised by RTAs under Article XXIV are wider and more complex that a simple 
arithmetical comparison of pre- and post-RTA customs tariffs with the tariffs bound 
under the GATT. (BISD 38th Supp. 47 at 59-60, 74.) 
Condition II. The RTA must cover "substantially all the trade" between the parties. 
This requirement has been called "troublesomely ambiguous" (Jackson, 1993). The 
GATT Working Party which looked at the EFTA Convention in 1960 was unable to 
reach agreed final conclusions, being troubled especially by the fact that commiunents 
to elimination of trade barriers in the EFTA did not apply to trade in agricultural 
products. Side agreements on agriculture concluded by the EFTA countries were invoked 
by them as evidencing the consistency of EFTA with Article XXIV because these 
agreements facilitated the expansion of trade in agricultural products, but the EFTA 
countries admitted that barriers on such trade would remain for two-thirds of total trade 
in agricultural products between them. The EFTA countries relied on "the margin 
permitted by the phrase 'substantially all the trade'". (GATT, BISD 9th Supp. 70, quoted 
in Jackson & Davey, 458). Several members of the Working Party on the Canada-US 
FTA doubted whether it covered "substantially all the trade" between the parties. Various 
provisions on specific agricultural products were the object of members' concerns. (See 
BISD 38th Supp. at 65, 73). 
It should also be noted that Article XXIV does not require approval of a RTA by the 
GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES. Any GATT party deciding to enter into such an 
arrangement must notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES which can then make reports 
or recommendations to contracting parties (para. 7/aI). Moreover the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES may approve proposals for a RTA which do not fully comply with Article 
XXIV's conditions (para. 10). Such a decision ("waiver") needs a two-thirds majority of 
GATT parties belonged to one or another regional arrangement (Jackson, 1969, 588). 
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This might not be true today, given the greatly increased membership of the ОАТГ (now 
some 111 parties), although several more RTAs have been formed since 1970. 
3.3. Overall Assessment of Article XXIV 
With the general reductions in tariff levels achieved in the several GATT rounds of 
multilateral negotiations since 1960 (with further reductions anticipated from the Uruguay 
Round due to be completed in December 1993) the margins of preference afforded to 
States members of RTAs have grown progressively smaller. However, there remain 
tangible and significant advantages to such membership in the other forms of liberali-
sation, particularly the removal of quantitative restrictions and measures with equivalent 
or comparable effect. Concern is expressed by economic and political commentators that 
the trading world is being divided into competing blocs, and that this trend has perhaps 
gone so far as to distort the basic GATT multilateral and non-discriminatory principles, 
leaving them as a residual framework for that part of world trade not conducted either 
among members of RTAs inter se or in accordance with bilateral or inter-bloc arrange-
ments negotiated outside the GATT. 
The Board of the IMF has recently urged all countries, especially the major 
industrial nations, to ensure that RTAs are consistent with the С1АТГ, and that they 
support the multilateral trade system. States entering RTAs were "encouraged to ensure 
that such arrangements do not increase the average level of protection against non-
members". (IMF, Annual Report 1992, 67.) Many developing countries are concerned that 
they face increased marginalisation in a world of growing RTAs. (See also the remarks of 
the then Director-General of GATT, Arthur Dunkel, in May 1993, quoted in the Annex to 
this paper.) 
Jackson & Davey (1986, 455) observed that of the large number of RTAs claiming 
Article XXIV exception, arguably only very few genuinely qualified. Yet even in 
doubtful cases the RTA and its preference system have been "tolerated" either by explicit 
waiver2 or merely by inaction. These authors concluded: "Legal arguments have often 
been ignored or resulted in a standoff without resolution", (id.) In many cases, it is 
doubtful whether the arrangements comply with Article XXIV criteria. "Yet there has not 
yet been a concrete 'tum down' by the GATT system." (Jackson, 1993, at 127.) 
The Working Party on the Canada-US FTA noted that examination of the Agreement 
had revealed some areas which, in the view of some members, remained questionable in 
terms of GATT requirements (Article XXIV and some other provisions). The Working 
Party was unable to reach agreed conclusions as to the consistency of this FTA with the 
GATT. It limited itself to reporting to the GATT Council the views of its members. The 
two States were to be invited by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to submit reports on the 
operation of the FTA, beginning in 1993. (BISD 38th Supp. 76.) 
2 Article XXIV: 10, or Art. XXV: 5 under winch the CONTRACTING PARTIES can waive, by two-thirds 
majority, any GATT obligation in exceptional circumstances not otherwise provided for. 
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So, is the present position a "free for all"? Has Article XXIV been effectively 
"repealed" by the subsequent practice of the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES? (С/ 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles. 31 /3/ (b) and 39.) 
4. Proposals for Reform of Article XXIV 
Whatever the "answer" to the above question might be as regards RTAs already 
established and notified to the GATT, clearly the GATT members involved in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations consider Article XXIV to be both in force, as a matter of 
law, and of some potential, practical utility for the multilateral trade system. They have 
addressed the recognised deficiencies in the wording of the article and have drafted a 
formal Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV which is to be part of the 
Agreements and Decisions embodying the results of the Uruguay Round. The text of this 
draft Understanding is attached (with the exception of the paragraphs relating to Article 
XXIV: 12 which is outside the scope of this paper). 
Note. Since this paper was delivered the Uruguay Round negotiations were 
concluded, in December 1993, and among the instruments adopted was the Understand-
ing on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. This Understanding, together with those relating to other GATT Articles, is 
deemed to be an integral part of the GATT 1994. This GATT 1994 is annexed to and 
forms part of the new Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, and 
will be binding on all Members of the MTO. The GATT 1994 comprises the provisions 
of the 1947 GATT Agreement, excluding the Protocol of Provisional Application, as 
amended or modified by subsequent instruments which entered into force prior to the 
entry into force of the MTO Agreement; together with several multilateral trade 
agreements, and the Understandings, adopted at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes are separate agreements, not forming part of the 
GATT 1994. 
With regard to the Understanding of Article XXIV, drafting changes were made, to 
replace references to the CONTRACTING PARTIES with references to the Council on 
Trade in Goods created in the MTO Agreement and to substitute references to the GATT 
1947 or the GATT 1994 for references to "the GATT", as appropriate. The Dispute 
Settlement paragraph (para. 12) was slightly altered. No change of substance to the draft 
text was made. Accordingly, it is proposed to leave unchanged the following comments 
made in this paper on the drafi text. 
1. Preamble Whereas Article XXIV: 4 already recognizes the desirability of 
increasing freedom of trade by agreements for closer economic integration between the 
parties to such agreements, this Understanding adds the assertion that closer integration 
between the economies of parties to customs unions or FTAs may contribute to the 
expansion of world trade. 
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2. Preamble Article XXIV: 8 with its criterion of "substantially all the trade" remains 
in force and unamended, but its interpretation will surely receive a firm steer from the 
statement that contribution to trade expansion is increased if the elimination of tariffs and 
other restrictions on trade between parties to a RTA "extends to all trade, and [is] 
diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded". 
3. Preamble The GATT parties declare the need to reinforce the effectiveness of the 
role of the CONTRACTING PARTIES in reviewing agreements notified under Article 
XXIV. Criteria and procedures for assessment of new or enlarged agreements need 
clarification; and all Article XXIV agreements need to have improved transparency. This 
last point is made operational in para. 11 which builds on the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES' instruction to the GATT Council concerning Reports on Regional Arrange-
ments. This 1971 instruction went no further than to ask the Council to establish a 
calendar for the examination of reports of preferential agreements every two years (BISD 
18th Supp. 38). Para. 11 would require States to notify changes in their agreements "as 
they occur". 
4. Para. 1 The mandatory nature of the requirements of paras. 5, 6, 7 and 8 of 
Article XXIV is expressed clearly, something which is lacking in the rather permissive 
and ambiguous formulation of the article as it stands. 
5. Para. 2 offers a potentially useful and agreed methodology for evaluating the "gene-
ral incidence" of customs tariffs and other trade measures ("regulations of commerce"). 
6. Para. 3 attempts to pin down the "reasonable length of time" for interim 
agreements, but allows this period should exceed 10 years if the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES decide so. At least, the onus is on the parties to such an agreement to justify 
the need for a longer period. 
7. Paras. 4 and 5 try to firm up the negotiating procedure for compensatory 
adjustments. The principle that negotiations should be conducted in good faith with a 
view to reaching a mutually satisfactory adjustment is introduced into the text—a welcome 
addition from general international law doctrine and case law. Negotiating States are 
given specific criteria and guidelines to observe, the existing rights and to modify or 
withdraw concessions pursuant to Article XXVIII are affirmed. 
8. Para. 7 will apply to any notification under Article XXIV: 7(a) made after the 
Understanding enters into force. It will cover notifications of proposed customs unions 
or FTAs as well as of interim agreements. Notice the reference here to para. 1 of the 
Decision (Understanding). 
9. Paras. 8-10 usefully clarify the powers of working parties in relation to interim 
agreements, building on Article XXIV: 7. 
10. Para. 12 Dispute Settlement. The text as adopted reads "The provisions of 
Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Understand-
ing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes may be invoked". 
This paragraph provides only for the invocation of GATT Articles XXII and XXIII (the 
dispute settlement provisions, together with the 1979 Understanding, BISD 26th Supp. 
210) with respect to matters arising from the application of Article XXIV provisions 
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relating to RTAs or interim agreements. It does not, and could not, provide for the GATT 
dispute settlement clauses to be invoked by parties to a RTA in a dispute arising from 
the interpretation or application of that RTA. Several RTAs have their own dispute 
settlement procedures and institutions, e.g. the EEC; the North American FTA; the EFTA. 
However, it remains open for any GATT contracting party which considers that any 
GATT benefit is being nullified or impaired by the application by another GATT party 
of same trade measure required by that party's membership of a RTA, to invoke Article 
XXIII and to seek resolution of that dispute within the GATT forum. 
5. Conclusion 
Given the patent weakness and deficiencies of Article XXIV revealed in the practice of 
the past 35 years, and given the proliferation of RTAs in almost all parts of the world, 
involving the majority of GATT parties, a radical proposal would be to delete this article 
completely from the GATT, and leave it to any aggrieved GATT party to invoke Article 
XXIII seeking a remedy for "nullification or impairment" of trade benefits caused by 
RTAs of other countries with which it trades. But, unsurprisingly, the governments of 
GATT parties have not chosen this radical course. Instead, they have accepted, as part of 
the Uruguay Round package, an Understanding on Article XXIV which promises a more 
effective application of its clauses, which have the force of law for till GATT parties, to 
future RTAs. This development is to be welcomed if it lessens distortions to the 
multilateral and liberalising framework for world trade which GATT seeks to maintain. 
At the very least, increased transparency concerning RTAs, and periodic reviews of 
such arrangements by GATT working parties must be considered positive steps. From the 
point of view of the development of GATT law, the possibility of resort to GATT dispute 
settlement procedures for Article XXIV issues may also be seen as a modest benefit. The 
outcome of these procedures is normally a Panel Report which has to determine the 
consistency or otherwise with GATT obligations of the trade measures or inter se 
agreements applied by other GATT parties, to the alleged detriment of the complainant 
State or States. Determination of a specific complaint in this way could lead to greater 
certainty and clarity of relevant GATT provisions, something which has been lacking in 
past reports of Working Parties under Article XXIV. 
* * * 
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ANNEX 
Extract from speech by the then Director-General of the GATT, Arthur Dunkel, in Seoul, 
to the Pacific Basin Economic Council, May 1993: 
"I would say that the growth of regional trading arrangements would become a threat 
to the multilateral system only if these groupings were to tum inward on themselves, 
erect new trade barriers, and become hostile blocs. The world last saw this in the 1930s 
... I remain confident that the world's political leaders will not forget—and will not be 
allowed to forget—the painful lessons of our recent past." 
"Openness is the touchstone for regional agreements. It describes trade agreements 
which make a net addition to the volume of world trade rather than just diverting it; 
which break down existing trade barriers without erecting new ones; and of course, which 
follow GATT rules." 
From: GATT Focus, No. 99, May-June 1993, p. 1. 
GATT Article XXIV (extracts) 
3. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be construed to prevent: 
(a) Advantages accorded by any contracting party to adjacent countries in order to 
facilitate frontier traffic; 
4. The contracting parties recognise the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the 
development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies 
of the countries parties to such agreements. They also recognise that the purpose of a cus-
toms union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent terri-
tories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories. 
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the 
territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a tree-trade area 
or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union 
or of a free-trade area; 
Provided that: 
(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to the formation 
of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institu-
tion of any such union or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties 
not parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more restric-
tive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in 
the constituent territories prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such 
interim agreement, as the case may be; 
(b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of 
a free-trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the 
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constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or the adoption 
of such interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or 
not parties to such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding 
duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior 
to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement, as the case may be; and 
(c) any interim agreement ... shall include a plan and schedule for the formation of 
such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a reasonable length of time. 
6. If, in fulfilling the requirements of sub-paragraph 5(a), a contracting party proposes 
to increase any rate of duty inconsistently with the provisions of Article II, the procedure 
set forth in Article XXVIII shall apply. In providing for compensatory adjustment, due 
account shall be taken of the compensation already afforded by the reductions brought 
about in the corresponding duty of the other constituents of the union. 
7. (a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or 
an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall 
promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available to them 
such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them to make 
such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem 
appropriate. 
[paras, (b) and (c) relate to plans and schedules for interim agreements.] 
8. For the purposes of this Agreement: 
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs 
territory for two or more customs territories, so that 
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce ... are eliminated with respect 
to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union ..., and, 
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other 
regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the 
trade of territories not included in the union; 
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs 
territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce ... are 
eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in 
products originating in such territories. 
9. The preferences referred to in paragraph 2 of Article I shall not be affected by the 
formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area but may be eliminated or adjusted 
by means of negotiations with contracting parties affected... 
10. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may by a two-thirds majority approve proposals 
which do not fully comply with the requirements of paragraphs 5 to 9 inclusive, provided 
that such proposals lead to the formation of a customs union or a free-trade area in the 
sense of this article. 
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[Para. 11 relates to special arrangements for trade between India and Pakistan. Para. 12. 
the final paragraph of Article XXIV, concerns measures to be taken by contracting parties 
to ensure observance of the GATT by regional and local authorities in their territories.] 
U. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Preamble 
The CONTRACTING PARTIES 
Having regard to the provisions of Article XXIV of the General Agreement; 
Recognising that customs unions and free trade areas have greatly increased in 
number and importance since the establishment of the GATT, and today cover a 
significant proportion of world trade; 
Recognising the contribution to the expansion of world trade that may be made by 
closer integration between the economies of the parties to such agreement; 
Recognising also that such contribution is increased if the elimination between the 
constituent territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce extends to 
all trade, and diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded; 
Reaffirming that the purpose of such agreements should be to facilitate trade between 
the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties 
with such territories; and that in their formation or enlargement the parties to them should 
to the greatest possible extent avoid creating adverse effects on the trade of other 
contracting parties; 
Convinced also of the need to reinforce the effectiveness of the role of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES in reviewing agreements notified under Article XXIV, by 
clarifying the criteria and procedures for the assessment of new or enlarged agreements, 
and improving the transparency of all Article XXIV agreements; 
Recognising the need for a common understanding of the obligations of contracting 
parties under Article XXIV: 12; 
Agree as follows: 
1. Customs unions, free trade areas, and interim agreements leading to the formation of 
a customs union or free trade area, to be consistent with Article XXIV, must satisfy the 
provisions of its paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 inter alia. 
Article XXIV:5 
2. The evaluation under Article XXIV:5(a) of the general incidence of the duties and 
other regulations of commerce applicable before and after the formation of a customs 
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union shall in respect of duties and charges be based upon an overall assessment of 
weighted average tariff rates and of customs duties collected. This assessment shall be 
based on import statistics for a previous representative period to be supplied by the 
customs union, on a tariff line basis and in values and quantities, broken down by 
GATT country of origin. The GATT Secretariat shall compute the weighted average 
tariff rates and customs duties collected in accordance with the methodology used in the 
assessment of tariff offers in the Uruguay Round. For this purpose, the duties and 
charges to be taken into consideration shall be the applied rates of duty. It is recognised 
that for the purpose of the overall assessment of the incidence of other regulations of 
commerce for which quantification and aggregation are difficult, the examination of 
individual measures, regulations, products covered and trade flows affected may be 
required. 
3. The "reasonable length of time" referred to in Article XXIV:5(c) should exceed ten 
years only in exceptional cases. In cases where contracting parties believe that ten years 
would be insufficient they shall provide a full explanation to the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES of the need for a longer period. 
Article XXIV:6 
4. Paragraph 6 of Article XXIV establishes the procedure to be followed when a 
contracting party forming a customs union proposes to increase a bound rate of duty. In 
this regard it is reaffirmed that the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII, as elaborated 
in the guidelines adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 10 November 1980 
(27S/26) and in the 1990 Decision on Article XXVIII, Modification of Schedules, of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, must be commenced before tariff concessions are modified 
or withdrawn upon the formation of a customs union or an interim agreement leading to 
the formation of a customs union. 
5. It is agreed that these negotiations will be entered into in good faith with a view to 
achieving mutually satisfactory compensatory adjustment. In such negotiations, as 
required by Article XXIV:6, due account shall be taken of reductions of duties on the 
same tariff line made by other constituents of the customs union upon its formation. 
Should such reductions not be sufficient to provide the necessary compensatory 
adjustment, the customs union would offer compensation, which may take the form of 
reductions of duties on other tariff lines. Such an offer shall be taken into consideration 
by the contracting parties having negotiating rights in the binding being modified or 
withdrawn. Should the compensatory adjustment remain unacceptable, negotiations should 
be continued. Where, despite such efforts, agreement in negotiations on compensatory 
adjustment under Article XXVIII cannot be reached within a reasonable period from the 
initiation of negotiations, the customs union shall, nevertheless, be free to modify or 
withdraw the concessions; affected contracting parties shall then be free to withdraw 
substantially equivalent concessions in accordance with Article XXVIII. 
6. The General Agreement imposes no obligation on contracting parties benefiting from 
a reduction of duties consequent upon the formation of a customs union, or an interim 
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agreement leading to the formation of a customs union, to provide compensatory 
adjustment to its members. 
Review of Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas 
7. All notifications made under Article XXIV:7(a) shall be examined by a working party 
in the light of the relevant provisions of the General Agreement and of paragraph 1 of 
this Decision. The working party shall submit a report to the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
on its findings in this regard. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may make such recom-
mendations to contracting parties as they deem appropriate. 
8. In regard to interim agreements, the working party may in its report make appropriate 
recommendations on the proposed timeframe and on measures required to complete the 
formation of the customs union or free trade area. It may if necessary provide for further 
review of the agreement. 
9. Substantial changes in the plan and schedule included in an interim agreement shall 
be notified, and shall be examined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES if so requested. 
10. Should an interim agreement notified under Article XXIV:7(a) not include a plan and 
schedule, contrary to Article XXIV:5(c), the working party shall in its report recommend 
such a plan and schedule. The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the case 
may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these 
recommendations. Provision shall be made for subsequent review of the implementation 
of the recommendations. 
11. Customs unions and members of free trade areas shall report periodically to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, as envisaged by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in their 
instruction to the GATT Council concerning reports on regional agreements (18S/38), on 
the operation of the relevant agreement. Any significant changes and/or developments in 
the agreements should be reported as they occur. 
Dispute Settlement 
12. The dispute settlement provisions of the General Agreement may be invoked with 
respect to any matters arising from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV 
relating to customs unions, free trade areas or interim agreements leading to the 
formation of a customs union or free trade area. 
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Helen E. HARTNELL Association Agreements 
between the EC and Central 
and Eastern European States 
I. Introduction 
The second half of the 1980s was an extraordinarily hopeful time for the people of 
Western, Central and Eastern Europe. Waves of euphoria swept die continent as the 
European Community (EC) rushed headlong to complete its internal market by the end 
of 1992, and as the countries of the former Soviet bloc one by one cast aside the Iron 
Curtain that had enshrouded them for decades. Everyone stretched out his arms to 
embrace the other, and the strong helped the weak, no questions asked. It was a rare 
period of virtually unconditional brotherly love. It could not last. 
It did not. The tide began to tum in the early 1990s, as die bloom faded from the EC 
rose, as Yugoslavia fell apart, as the enormity of die task of transforming die Central and 
East European economies became apparent, and, not coincidentally, as the global 
recession deepened. No one but the most hardened Eurocynic, however, would have 
predicted the severity of the EC's reversal of fortune and the accompanying shift in 
attitudes. 
At the close of the celebrated 1992, die European Community was in a state of 
political and economic disarray. EC self-doubt—unleashed by the Maastrich debacle, by 
its inadequate response to the civil war in former Yugoslavia, and by recession and 
intractable disputes with its trading partners—rendered die Community a less dashing 
knight to the distressed reform economies in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet these 
countries condnued to wait for some kind of miraculous rescue. 
To be fair, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have good cause to be 
impadent for marked improvement in dieir economic situadon, since they reasonably fear 
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the political instability that lurks just around the bend. And to its credit, the EC has 
stayed a steady course with its ardent neighbours, even while rocked by ongoing internal 
crises. The Community has moved steadily to assist the transformation by providing 
funds' and expertise, and also to extend the privileges and responsibilities of integration 
to ever more European countries through a network of bilateral association agreements.2 
Association agreements that establish increased trade, dialogue and cooperation be-
tween the EC and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have proliferated in recent 
years. Yet still the relationship between the EC and countries in this region has been 
characterized by a significant degree of mutual misunderstanding and dissatisfaction. On 
one side, the high expectations of the Central and East European countries are reflected 
in their equally high disappointment levels vis-à-vis the EC. And on the other side, one 
senses that the EC grows weary of what it perceives as complaints and ingratitude. 
Against this background, I propose to examine two related issues. First, I will 
describe the nature and assess, the strengths and weaknesses of the association 
agreements themselves. And second, I will examine some recent developments in the 
relations between the EC and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, notably the 
Memorandum submitted by the Visegrád Group of countries3 to the EC in October 1992, 
and the EC's response to the demands raised therein, in order to assess the current state 
of relations. 
II. The Association Agreements 
In December 1991, the EC concluded bilateral association agreements with the countries 
comprising the Visegrád Group, viz. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. These 
treaties, which were entitled "Europe Agreements" in order to distinguish them from 
previous forms of association,4 establish a framework for political and economic 
integration over a ten-year term. Often referred to as "Second Generation" agreements 
to further distinguish them from earlier trade and cooperation (or so-called "First 
1 Funds have been made available directly to countries in the region through the PHARE (Poland/Hungary: 
Assistance for Restructuring of the Economy) and TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States) programs. See also Proposal for a Commission Decision granting a Community guarantee 
to the European Investment Bank against losses under loans for projects in Central and East European countries 
(Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and 
Albania), COM(93) 212 final, OJ 1993 С 160/8. 
2 Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome provides that association agreements "involving reciprocal rights and 
obligations, common action and special procedures ... shall be concluded by the Council, acting unanimously 
and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament which shall act by an absolute majority of its 
component members". 
3 Hungary, Poland, die Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic (then Czechoslovakia) began to coordinate 
their positions in 1991 during their respective negotiations with the EC on the conclusion of bilateral association 
agreements. 
4 See Communication from the Commission to die Council on Association Agreements widi die Countries 
of Central and East Europe: General Framework, CC)M(90) final 398 (27 August 1990). 
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Generation") agreements, the Europe Agreements represent a giant step on the long road 
toward integration, which actually began decades before the recent democratic 
revolutions. Each of the first three Europe Agreements in fact replaced an earlier 
bilateral First Generation trade and cooperation agreement, which in turn had replaced 
even earlier trading arrangements between the EC and the Visegrád countries. The same 
is true for the Europe Agreements that the EC concluded with Romania and with 
Bulgaria in late 1992. 
In addition to the Europe Agreements, the EC is expanding its network of trade 
normalization agreements with other countries in the region. For exempta, the EC has 
recently concluded First Generation trade and cooperation agreements with Albania5 and 
Slovenia.6 One unique feature of these agreements is that they contain a clause expressly 
requiring regard for democratic principles and human rights.7 Similar agreements were 
concluded with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania early in 1992.8 Relations with some 
members of the Commonwealth of Independent states are evolving as well. For example, 
negotiations with Russia and Ukraine for a new, intermediate type of "partnership and 
cooperation" agreement9 were recently resumed, after having been stalled by contro-
versy.10 Talks have also begun with Belarus, Kazakstan and Kirghizstan. The 
Commission views (1) Are the following: the First Generation agreements as an interim 
step, and has stated that Europe Agreements should progressively be concluded with all 
eligible Central and East European countries." 
The key difference between the First and Second Generation agreements lies in the 
nature of trade they envisage. The First Generation trade and cooperation agreements only 
5 Agreement between the EEC and Albania on trade and commercial and economic cooperation, OJ 1992 
L 343/2, implemented by Council Decision 92/535 of 26 October 1992 OJ 1992 L 343/1. 
6 Cooperation Agreement between die EEC and the Republic of Slovenia, signed 5 April 1993 and imple-
mented by Council Decision 93/407/ EEC of 19 July 1993 OJ 1993 L 189/1 (effective 1 September 1993), plus 
protocol on financial cooperation and agreement in die field of transport. 
7 Similar provisions appear in the Europe Agreements with Romania and Bulgaria, as well as in the 
renegotiated agreements with the Czech and Slovak Republics, but do not appear in the earlier Europe 
Agreements with Hungary and Poland. 
8 The Baltic States concluded a free trade area among themselves on 13 September 1993 for the purpose 
of facilitating faster integration into the EC. 
9 These agreements will have a wider scope than traditional First Generation agreements and will cover an 
extensive range of trade, economic, and political relations over a ten-year term. 
10 Russian has objected to the clause permitting the EC to suspend benefits in case of human rights violation 
and has demanded diat the agreement contain an "evolution" or "future events" clause permitting die agreement 
to be converted to a free trade agreement when circumstances warrant. See Agence Europe, Nr. 5993, p. 9 (4 
June 1993). Ukraine has insisted diat it receive the same treatment as Russia. 
11 Commission "Guidelines on the Future of Relations between die EC and Central and Eastern Europe" 
(December 1992), reprinted in Agence Europe Documents, Nr. 1814, p. 2 (9 December 1992) (hereinafter 
Commission Guidelines). The Copenhagen European Council (June 1993) invited the Commission to submit 
proposals for developing die EC's existing trade agreements with the Baltic States into free trade agreements, 
and to conclude Europe Agreements with these countries as soon as die necessary conditions have been met. 
Conclusions of the Presidency, Copenhagen European Summit, reprinted in Agence Europe Documents, Nr. 
1844/45, Art. 7 (B), p. 6 (24 June 1993). 
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purport to normalize trade relations by providing most-favoured-nation treatment and by 
progressively removing quantitative restrictions. The Europe Agreements, on the other 
hand, aim to establish a free trade area by the end of the ten-year term, at least with 
respect to certain products. This means that the Europe Agreements provide preferential 
access to the EC market for products originating in the territory of the Associated 
country. Even more important, the Europe Agreements are based on the principle of 
asymmetric trade liberalization, which means that the EC must open up its market to 
products from the associated countries quicker that those countries must open their 
markets to products originating in the EC. 
However, it is not just the nature of the trade envisaged that differentiates the 
Europe Agreements from the more primitive First Generation agreements. Although both 
types of agreement call for certain forms of cooperation and contain an institutional 
component, the Europe Agreements go much further than the simple trade and co-
operation agreements. In addition to their more extensive cooperation and institutional 
components, the Europe Agreements contain innovative provisions calling for high-level 
political dialogue (to include matters of foreign policy and defence); for progressive 
liberalization of the movement of persons, services and capital; and for gradual 
approximation of laws by the associated country. These provisions show that association 
under the Europe Agreements is meant to serve as a training ground for full EC 
membership, in addition to fostering economic development through the establishment 
of a free trade area. 
Unfortunately, the Europe Agreements have proven to be somewhat less than they 
appear. The first major problem is that they have not yet entered into force, since some 
EC Member States have failed to complete the ratification process.12 Fortunately, major 
portions of the Europe Agreements fall within exclusive EC competence in the field of 
commercial policy, and thus can be implemented by a decision of the competent EC 
organ.13 Still, failure to implement the Europe Agreements in their entirety means that 
many of their significant innovations have not yet been put into practice. The associated 
countries are especially looking forward to receiving the extensive economic, cultural and 
financial cooperation that the EC has promised. 
12 The Europe Agreements with the Visegrád countries were supposed to enter into effect on 1 January 1993. 
However, the agreement between the EC and die Czech and Slovak Federal Republic had to be renegotiated 
following that country's split-up on 1 January 1993. The renegotiated agreements between the EC and the 
Czech and the Slovak Republics, respectively, were initialled on 23 June 1993. 
13 Interim Agreements to implement the trade and trade-related parts of the Europe Agreements with 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland entered into effect on 1 March 1992 and were renewed for an indefinite 
period on 31 December 1992. See OJ 1992 L 114 (Poland); OJ 1992 L 115 (Czechoslovakia); and OJ 1992 
L 116 (Hungary). The Interim Agreement with Romania was implemented by Council Decision 93/186/EEC 
of 8 March 1993, OJ 1993 L. 81. The Interim Agreement with Bulgaria was delayed by controversy which was 
reportedly resolved in July 1993. However, no Interim Agreement between the EC and Bulgaria has been 
implemented as of this date. 
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A second set of problems, less easily solved than the foregoing, stems from the 
protectionism that is built into the agreements. First, even the most far-reaching Europe 
Agreement grants only limited access to those sensitive sectors of the EC market, such 
as agriculture, steel and textiles, in which the Central and East European countries are 
likely to have a comparative advantage. Secondly, the association agreements permit both 
parties to invoke safeguard and other trade protection measures against products 
originating in the other party's territory.14 The EC has already made use of these various 
opportunities—much to the dismay of the associated countries—for example by invoking 
protective measures to stop the spread of hoof and mouth disease; by imposing 
antidumping duties, such as on imports of seamless pipes & tubes of iron or non-alloy 
steel coming from inter alia Hungary and Poland;15 and by invoking safeguard measures 
to reimpose quotas on steel from the Czech and Slovak Republics.16 Finally, it has been 
observed that the Europe Agreements have in fact resulted in an increase in the EC's 
trade surplus with the associated countries, despite the asymmetric structure that was 
intended to favour exports from the associated countries to the EC.17 
Third problem is the lack of aspirational mutuality between the parties to the various 
Europe Agreements. Each of these association agreements recognizes that full EC 
membership is the ultimate goal of each associated country, but make neither acces-
sion—nor even the commencement of accession negotiations—automatic at the end of the 
ten-year transition period. The Europe Agreements nowhere state that eventual accession 
is the EC's goal as well. The Visegrád countries noticed that their yearning for ever 
closer union was unrequited by the EC, and began to doubt the sincerity of Community's 
intentions. 
Although some might argue that the associated countries are hardly in a position to 
bargain, the vanguard Visegrád countries have not hesitated to press their claims with the 
EC. It is nothing less than remarkable that they have been as successful as they have in 
the past year, both in gaining the troubled Community's ear, and in eliciting further 
concessions. 
14 Under the Europe Agreements, die associated countries may take "exceptional measures of limited 
duration" in order to protect "infant industries or certain sectors undergoing restructuring or facing serious 
difficulties". 
15 See Council Regulation 1189/93 of 14 May 1993, OJ 1993 L 120/34. 
16 Decision No. 1/93 of the EC-Czech Republic and Slovak Republic Joint Committee of 28 May 1993, OJ 
1993 L 157/59; Commission Decision 1970/93/ECSC of 19 July 1993 opening and providing for the administra-
tion of tariff quotas in respect of certain ECSC products originating in the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic imported into the Community (1 June 1993 to 31 December 1995), OJ 1993 L 180/10. 
17 Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka wrote a letter to the EC Heads of Government and to Commission 
President Jacques Delors in which she stated: "Our expectations have not been fulfilled. Today we are 
witnessing a sizeable trade deficit with the Community, in excess of one-eightli of all our exports to the EC. 
That deficit points to inequality that contradicts what was intended by the Agreement ...(and) clearly indicates 
that the Community is the main beneficiary of the Europe Agreement". Agence Europe, Nr. 5995, p. 9 (4 June 
1993) (hereinafter Suchocka Letter). 
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III. Recent Developments in the Relations between the EC and the 
Associated Central and Eastern European States 
The EC and the associated countries agreed in principle that the framework established 
by the Europe Agreements must be fully exploited and even extended in order to further 
the process of transformation and integration.18 They have differed, over how to achieve 
this shared goal. 
The Visegrád countries stated their position in a joint memorandum "on strengthening 
their integration with the European Communities and on the perspective of accession", 
which they submitted to the Commission and the Presidency in September 1992. In the 
1992 Visegrád Memorandum, the associated countries asked the EC to establish specific 
criteria and a timetable for accession." In addition, they issued the call to "speed up the 
process" by strengthening political and financial cooperation, as well as by accelerating 
economic integration. The Commission responded by issuing "Guidelines on the Future 
of Relations between the EC and Central and Eastern Europe" in December 1992.20 In 
anticipation of the meeting of the European Council on 21-22 June 1993 in Copenhagen, 
the Visegrád countries submitted a second joint memorandum in which they expressed 
their overall (but not complete) support for the Commission's position, and emphasized 
the importance which they attached to the outcome of that meeting.21 
The Copenhagen Summit represents a milestone for those Central and East European 
countries that already have concluded or may in future conclude Europe Agreements with 
the EC. Among the many significant conclusions of dial European Council, I wish to 
emphasize four: conclusions concerning accession; political cooperation; trade liberaliz-
ation; and other forms of cooperation. 
A. Accession 
The Treaty of Rome provides that any European State may apply to become a member 
of the Community.22 The Commission elaborated three criteria to determine the eligi-
18 Joint Statement of EC and Visegrád Foreign Ministers (5 October 1992 Luxembourg Summit), EC Bull. 
10-1992, § 2. 3. 1., point 5 (agreeing that cooperation under the Europe Agreements should focus on "consoli-
dating and extending progress"); "Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement", EC Bull. Supplement 3/92, p. 
18 (hereinafter conuuission Enlargement Report). 
19 In particular, they expressed their wish to join the Union "at the latest at Ute end of this century", and 
requested that formal negotiations on full membership start in 1996, more or less simultaneously with the mid-
term review called for under the Europe Agreements. 
20 These Commission Guidelines, supra note 11, were debated and subsequently approved (with some 
modifications) by the General Affairs Council that met in Luxembourg in early June 1993. 
21 The Suchocka Letter, supra note 17, called for the European Council to give a clear political message 
confirming the Community's will to see Poland and the other associated countries as future members of the 
European Union; to accelerate and improve access of Polish products to the Community market; and to increase 
EC aid and make it available for economic and investment (rather than just technical) purposes. 
22 Article 237. Article О of tire Treaty on European Union provides the same with res|xx:t to membership in die Union. 
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bility of a country that applies for membership: European identity, democratic status, and 
respect for human rights.23 These principles are broadly reflected in the preamble of the 
Europe Agreements.24 
The Copenhagen Summit Conclusions did not only state more particularly formulated 
criteria for membership, but also established the "objectives of membership" and affirmed 
that "the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become 
members of the European Union",25By this step, the unilateral wish of the associated 
countries to join the EC becomes a shared goal. Although no specific date has been laid 
down for the commencement of accession negotiations, as was urged in the 1992 in the 
Visegrád Memorandum, the Copenhagen Summit Conclusions provided that, the 
accession can take place as soon as the associated country is "able to assume the 
obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required". 
The eligibility criteria enunciated in Copenhagen are virtually identical to those first 
proposed in the Commission Guidelines26 in December 1992. First, the associated 
country must achieve "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for protection of minorities". Second, the associated country 
must have a "functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union". Finally, the associated country 
must be capable of taking on the obligations of membership (i.e. the acquis commu-
nautaire) and must adhere to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
These Copenhagen Summit Conclusions on accession are welcome, not least because 
they can themselves contribute towards achieving the goals they establish by encouraging 
further democratic reforms and foreign invesunent. Yet reasonable grounds for 
dissatisfaction still remain. First, the Copenhagen Summit Conclusions undercut the value 
of the accession provisions by reminding the associated countries that accession will 
ultimately hinge on the "Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the 
momentum of European integration". Thus, the EC still views relations with Central and 
Eastern Europe as a subissue in its debate over deepening versus widening the 
Community. Secondly, the community has failed to provide a timetable for evaluating the 
associated countries'progress in fulfilling the enunciated criteria. The Central and East 
European countries hope that this process will begin during the mid-term review called 
23 Commission Enlargement Report, supra note 18. In particular, the Commission emphasized the applicant's 
"acceptance of the Community system, and its capacity to implement it" (which "presupposes a functioning and 
competitive market economy, and an adequate legal and administrative framework in the public and private 
sector"), as well as the applicant's acceptance and ability to implement "the common foreign and security policy 
as it evolves over the coming years". 
24 For example, the preamble to the Hungarian Europe Agreement states that the "basis for association" is 
Hungary's "commitment to pluralist democracy based on rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
[to] a multiparty system involving free and democratic elections, to the principles of a market economy and to 
social justice". 
25 Copenhagen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, reprinted in Agence Europe Documents, 
Nr. 1844/45, art. 7. (A) (iii), p. 5 (24 June 1993). 
26 Supra note 11. 
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for in each of the Europe Agreements, but it is by no means assured. Finally, the 
accession criteria do little more than restate the obvious, and provide little concrete 
guidance. Yet it is hardly realistic to expect the EC to tie itself to particular criteria at 
a time when the entire nature of the Community is changing. 
B. Political Cooperation 
Central and East European countries have expressed a strong desire to participate fully 
in the formulation of the future architecture of Europe. Both the EC and the Visegrád 
countries readily agree on the need to deepen the political dialogue established under the 
Europe Agreements.27 While substantial agreement prevails at this level of generalities, 
traces of disharmony emerge upon closer examination. There are two primary sources of 
tension. 
The first problem in the area of political cooperation concerns the nature of 
cooperation contemplated. The 1992 Visegrád Memorandum expressly sought "gradual 
incorporation ... into the political cooperation of the European Communities, especially 
via direct linking to the Common Foreign and Security Policy as of January 1, 1993". 
This has not happened. Instead, the Copenhagen European Council proposed that the 
associated countries enter into a "structured relationship with the Intitutions of the 
Union" concerning "dialogue and concertation [sic] on a broad range of topics and in 
several fora".28 This purely advisory discussion framework will encompass diverse 
matters of common interest, including areas of Community policy,"common foreign 
and security policy, and home and judicial affairs. It provides for regular meetings at 
various levels of government, with enlarged Council meetings as the primary forum for 
discussion.30 
The "structured relationship" for political cooperation appears to be derived from the 
Commission's earlier proposal to create a "European Political Area" as a means of 
extending the basis of political cooperation beyond the Europe Agreements, but without 
27 The Europe Agreements call for regular political dialogue to consider issues arising under the association 
agreements themselves, as well as any other bilateral or international issues of mutual interest. The institutional 
framework will be composed of an Association Council, an Association Committee, and an Association Parlia-
mentary Committee. 
28 Copenhagen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Agence Europe Documents, Nr. 1844/45, 
art. 7(A) (iv), pp. 5 -6 (24 June 1993). 
29 Particularly those with a trans-European dimension, such as energy, environment, transport, science and 
technology. 
30 For example, the Copenhagen Summit Conclusions call for one Troika meeting at the level of Foreign 
Ministers and one at the level of political directors during each Presidency; a briefing at secretariat level after 
each General Affairs Council and each meeting of the political directors; one Troika meeting at Working Group 
level per Presidency for relevant Working Groups; and regular Troika consultations with the United Nations 
General Assembly and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Copenhagen European Council, 
Conclusions of the Presidency, Agence Europe Documents, Nr. 1844/45, annex II, p. 11 (24 June 1993). 
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interfering with "the Community's own autonomous development".31 The 1992 
Visegrád Memorandum responded cautiously to this proposal, since the associated 
countries feared it would be viewed by the EC as a substitute for full membership. In 
the wake of the Copenhagen European Council's adoption of the objective of 
membership, this fear has been succeeded by cautious optimism about the new 
framework for political cooperation, even though it grants less than the associated 
countries had hoped for. 
The second problem in the area of political cooperation concerns the multilateral 
framework proposed by the EC. Although the Europe Agreements themselves are 
bilateral, the "structured relationship" for political cooperation is designed to include all 
the associated Central and East European countries.32 The EC has repeatedly 
emphasized that such dialogue should be carried out on a multilateral basis. In addition, 
the EC has urged the associated countries (in particular, the Visegrád countries) to 
pursue regional cooperation. This is a very sensitive issue. The Visegrád countries have 
undertaken to coordinate a number of activities, including their economic relations,33 
their relations with other European institutions, and their security policies. However, 
there are serious tensions within the Visegrád group today, which raise doubts about the 
strength of these countries' desire to continue cooperating within this framework. 
Aside from the regional tensions themselves, the Central and East European 
countries are suspicious of the EC's multilateral leanings. In particular, they fear the 
creation of a "Europe bis" in this region, a "new division in Europe, the creation of a 
zone protecting the Community from the the insecurity coming from the East, and that 
this Europe-bis [might] become something permanent as was the case of the past 
European historical developments".34 The vanguard Visegrád countries have been 
especially disturbed to realize that the EC increasingly sees and prefers to deal with 
Central and Eastern Europe as an amorphous whole. The result is misunderstanding on 
both sides, despite the best intentions. 
Although I would criticize the EC Member States for failing to ratify the Europe 
Agreements concluded nearly two years ago with the Visegrád countries, I believe that 
the multilateral approach is a sensible, if not an essential approach to the reorientation 
of Europe. Even under optimal economic circumstances, the EC could hardly provide 
a complete substitute for trade and political dialogue with neighbouring Central and East 
31 Commission Guidelines, supra note 11, at p. 6. See also Commission Enlargement Report, supra note 18, 
at p. 18. 
32 Thus, the 21 September 1993 meeting between the EC Troika and the Foreign Ministers of the associated 
Central and East European countries was attended by representatives of all six countries that have concluded 
Europe Agreements with the EC to date (i.e. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the 
Slovak Republic). 
33 For example, they concluded the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which purports to 
create equal conditions to those between the EC and the Visegrád countries. The CEFTA entered into force on 
1 March 1993. 
34 Agence Europe: Together in Europe, Nr. 9, p. 2 (15 May 92). 
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European countries. In addition, regional cooperation is likely to be a key to the political 
and economic stability that is prerequisite to full membership. It should console the 
Central and East European countries to know that the currently ongoing accession 
negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden "will, to the extent possible, be 
conducted in parallel, while dealing with each candidate on its own merit".35 
C. Trade Liberalization 
It can come as no surprise that the 1992 Visegrád Memorandum urged the EC to 
accelerate the economic integration foreseen by the Europe Agreements, emphasizing 
that "[ojpening markets to our products remains ... the most important and efficient way 
of assisting our countries". In particular, the Visegrád countries requested further 
asymmetrical trade concessions in all sectors, including the sensitive ones, as permitted 
by the agreements themselves. The December 1992 Commission Guidelines echoed their 
call for increasing the pace of liberalization and removal of obstacles to trade in the 
sensitive sectors. 
In recognition of the crucial importance of hade in the transition to a market 
economy, the Copenhagen European Council agreed to accelerate the trade liberalization 
under the Europe Agreements. The Commission quickly prepared the different legal 
instruments to implement the hade concessions decided in principle in Copenhagen, and 
negotiated protocols to the Europe Agreements. The Council approved them and made 
them effective from 1 July 1993.36 In essence, the effects of these changes are to 
accelerate the suppression of customs duties on sensitive industrial products and the 
increases in quotas and ceilings; to suppress duties on textile and steel products earlier 
than originally provided; and to accelerate reduction of levies or duties and to increase 
quotas in the agricultural sector. 
Considering the difficult economic situation in the EC at this time, it is remarkable 
that any concessions have been obtained. It remains to be seen whether the associated 
countries will be satisfied with these improvements. It should be noted, however, that 
the Copenhagen European Council did not attempt to fashion any solution for the 
problems stemming from the EC's increasing use of hade protection measures against 
imports from Central and Eastern Europe. 
35 Copenhagen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Agence Europe Documents. Nr. 1844/45, 
art. 4. p. 4 (24 June 1993). 
36 Council Decision 93/421/EEC of 19 July 1993 on the provisional application of the Additional Protocols 
to the Interim Agreements on trade and trade-related matters between tlie EEC and the ECSC, of the one part, 
and certain tliird countries, of the other part, and to the Europe Agreements between the EC and tlieir Member 
States and the same countries, OJ 1993 L 195/42; Council Regulations 2232-2235/93/EEC of 5 August 1993, 
OJ 1993 L 200. 
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D. Financial and Other Forms of Cooperation 
Another area in which the Visegrád countries have sought further commitments from 
the EC is in regard to financial cooperation. The 1992 Visegrád Memorandum sought 
a substantial increase in aid and proposed that the EC's emphasis should shift from 
"more traditional technical assistance to greater support for investment". Aside from 
ongoing reforms of the PHARE and TACIS programs themselves, the Copenhagen 
European Council agreed to make further commitments in this field so that the 
assistance granted would be more effective. In particular, the EC will offer technical 
assistance to prepare and facilitate infrastructure improvements, as a complement to the 
decision made at the Edinburgh Summit to support the development of infrastructure 
networks.37 
In addition to financial cooperation, the Copenhagen European Council addressed 
itself to two other forms of cooperation designed to further economic integration. First, 
the Copenhagen European Council invited the commission to make proposals before the 
end of 1993 to open up Communist programs to Central and East European countries, 
as foreseen in the Europe Agreements, and instructed the Commission to take as its 
point of departure those programs which are already open for participation by the EFI~A 
countries.38 Second, the Copenhagen European Council agreed to assist tire associated 
countries in fulfilling their obligations to approximate their legislation to that of the EC. 
A task force will be established for this purpose, and training will be provided to 
officials from the associated countries.39 
IV. Conclusion 
The result of the Copenhagen European Summit has been well received, at least in 
Hungary. If the EC Member States complete the ratification process and thus cause the 
Europe Agreements to enter into effect, then I predict a period of relative harmony 
during which the associated countries get on with the business of transformation and 
approximation. Hungary for one will be consumed during the coming months with next 
year's election. Since there is a high degree of consensus here on the desirability of 
integration with the EC, the Europe Agreement is not likely to be a source of 
controversy during the campaign. 
37 The leading role in this context will be taken by the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and other international financial institutions, rather than the EC itself. 
Copenhagen European Council, Conclusions of die Presidency, Agence Europe Documents, Nr. 1844/45, annex 
II, point (iii) p. 12 (24 June 1993). 
38 Copenhagen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Agence Europe Documents, Nr. 1844/45, 
art. 7(A) (iv), p. 6 (24 June 1993). 
39 Copenhagen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Agence Europe Documents, Nr. 1844/45, 
art. 7(A) (iv), p. 6, and annex ii, point (iv), pp. 12-13 (24 June 1993). 
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The prevailing attitude, at least in Hungary, accepts that the relations with the EC 
are like a marriage after the honeymoon is over. Jean Monnet has been quoted as saying 
that close association means a destiny henceforth shared. It is a time for the associated 
countries to formulate strategic plans for developing this close association, and to get 
on with the work. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 
1993 35 5Г 3-4, pp. 237-120 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest 
Ilkka SARAVIITA European Economic Integration 
in the Framework of the EEA Treaty 
and its Impact on the Sovereignty 
of the EFTA Countries 
On May 5, 1991, in Porto, Portugal the European Community (EC), the European Coal 
and Steel Community, their Member States and the Members of the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) signed an agreement on the establishment of the European 
Economic Area, hereinafter referred to as the EEA Agreement. The Agreement required 
alterations in the EFTA Agreement, and new institutions had to be established, such as 
the EFTA Court, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and The Standing Committee of 
EFTA. In addition, the jurisdiction of the EFTA Council had to be broadened. One 
consequence of the EEA Agreement was that EFTA as an organ had to be altered: 
instead of being a loosely structured organisation it would now have some aspects of 
a supranational international organisation. 
The initiative for the establishment of the EEA was undertaken at a time when 
Europe was divided into two parts and the USSR was one of Ute two leading 
superpowers. The European States had organised their security policies along two 
alternative lines: the majority had chosen alliance, i.e. they had joined military 
organisations (NATO, Warsaw Pact). The alternative was neutrality; European states 
such as Sweden, Austria, Finland and permanently neutral Switzerland stayed outside 
the military alliances. The security policy of die latter nations was characterized by a 
cautious attitude towards the EEC, later the EC, which had been established by the 
Treaty of Rome. 
Membership in the EEC and EC was considered inconsistent widi a policy of 
neutrality. This was due in part to the fact that nearly all EC Member Suites were also 
members of NATO. The leading military power in Europe, the Soviet Union, regarded 
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the EC as an organisation which endorsed NATO policy and, in a sense, supported the 
alliance economically as well. 
In the White Paper of 1985 and the Single European Act of 1986, the EC decided to 
strengthen integration with the aim of creating complete internal markets beginning in the 
year 1993. In those days, the natural states in Europe—with the exception of Ireland—could 
not consider membership in the EC. On the other hand, economic realities—both in the 
EFTA States and the EC—required an expansion of the internal market towards the EFTA 
States. It was anticipated that Western Europe would become a competitive market area 
counterbalancing the two economic superpowers, the USA and Japan. This created a 
serious problem of how to reconcile a policy of neutrality and, at the same time, an 
interest in the Common Market and integration. The solution was to sign a treaty which, 
on the one hand, could provide the freedom to develop the Common Market and its 
institutions but, on the other, would bind the EFTA countries to the Community Law. 
The plan of closer co-operation between the EC and EFTA was first introduced by 
Jacques Delors in January 1989. As the division of Europe into two economic blocs (the 
EC and the socialist economic community SEV/COMECON) seemed firmly established, 
it was predicted that the EEA solution would become permanent. This was also the basis 
of the preparatory work of the EEA Agreement. However, the political situation in 
Europe changed extremely rapidly: the USSR ceased to exist; the two German States 
were unified; the Warsaw Pact and SEV were abolished. In the new political situation, 
the status of the neutral states with respect to economic integration within the EC was 
transformed. In spite of their officially declared policy of neutrality, the neutral EFTA 
States considered it possible to seek membership in the EC. 
It seems to me that the EEA solution will be rather temporary. The EFTA States have 
begun negotiations with the EC. It is anticipated that the EEA Agreement will enter into 
force in 1993 and that the first EFTA State will become an EC member in 1995 or 1996. 
One of the uncertain factors of membership is the outcome of advisory référendums 
which will be organised in EFTA States seeking full membership. It is likely—at least in 
theory^that only some of the EFTA States will join the EC. If this is the result of the 
negotiations, those EFTA States will permanently construct their relationship with the EC 
on the basis of the EEA agreement. 
* * * 
The negotiations on the EEA Treaty proved a long series of disappointments. The EFTA 
States wanted the EEA to be constituted as an organisation which would not possess any 
supranational authority and which would guarantee the sovereign rights of the EFTA 
States. As a result of the negotiations, an agreement was signed which was negative—in 
both a legal and political sense—where the protection of the sovereign decision-making 
powers of EFTA states was concerned. 
The system created by the agreement is unique in the history of international 
organisations. The conventions are the most extensive in the history of international 
agreements. Also the EEA Treaty as an organisational structure is unique and very 
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complicated. For instance, it is uncertain whether the EEA can be regarded as an 
international organisation and a subject in international law. 
* * * 
In the textbooks on international law, the concept "sovereignty" is at times divided into 
two sets of legal norms and customs. One may speak about the internal and external 
aspect of the sovereignty of a State. Internal sovereignty means territorial supremacy. 
Only the state organs of the state itself and its own officials can exercise authority 
within the territory of the state. The authority of the highest organs of a state is divided 
in constitutional law into the three branches: the Legislative, the Executive (Admi-
nistrative) and the Judicial. Secondly, the external sovereignty refers to international 
legal (customary) norms, which determine the status of a state in the international 
context (e.g. the right of a state to form its own foreign policy and security policy, 
equality of states, and the right of a state to receive certain treatment in the community 
of states). 
The Member States of the EC have significantly restricted both their external and 
internal sovereignty on behalf of the community organs by the Treaty of Rome and its 
supplements. The EC is occasionally characterised as a supranational organisation. When 
the EFTA States started negotiations with the EC, their point of departure was that they 
would not adapt themselves to the goals of the supranational use of power. Instead, they 
insisted on keeping their external and internal sovereignty unchanged. They also 
announced that they would not alter their constitutions because of the EEA Agreement. 
The Finnish Constitution (Hallitusmuoto 1919) expressly ordains that Finland is a 
sovereign republic, with legislative power belonging to the Parliament, executive power 
to the President of Republic and the government together and, finally, judicial power to 
the independent courts. These statutes are interpreted literally. The transfer of powers to 
a foreign state or international organisation is unconstitutional. By contrast, in the 
constitutions of the other Nordic EFTA countries, there are provisions which give the 
parliament power to transfer power of the state organs by special majority (3/4, 4/5 and 
5/6) or by amendments to the constitution. In the Swedish Constitution (regeringsform 
10:5), the "delegation" or transfer of public powers to a supranational organisation is 
permitted only with the support of a 5/6 majority in Parliament or through the procedure 
for the amendment of the Constitution. Minor transfers of power are allowed by a 4/5 
majority, as happened in the case of tire EEA Agreement. In Norway, corresponding 
transfer of power require a 3/4 majority (Constitution, paragraph 93). 
The EFTA States began their negotiations with the EC on the basis of organisational 
equality. The EFTA States thought the EEA Agreement would be based on the principle 
of equality; the preparatory work of new legislation for the economic area would be 
carried out by common organs. The implementation of the nonns would be secured by 
joint legal bodies, mainly by a special court inside the EC Court. The EEA Court was 
planned to include judges from the EC Court and the EFTA countries. Subsequently, the 
EC Court rejected this plan as being contradictory to the Treaty of Rome. 
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The final Agreement did not fulfil the aims of the EFTA States, especially concerning 
their possibilities to join the preparatory work of new legal norms for the EEA and to 
have a joint EEA court The EEA Agreement consist of several actual and some legally 
significant restrictions on internal sovereignty. 
In the following sections, I shall deal with these restrictions of sovereignty in rather 
broad terms1. 
1. The Supremacy of EC Law 
Some of the Member States of the EC officially apply the so-called dualistic and some 
the monistic system. In this context, dualism means that an international provision (legal 
obligation) laid down in a treaty or a decision of an international organisation has to be 
transformed by a separate legislative act as a part of the internal legal system 
(transformation/incorporation). In a state which applies the dualistic principle it might 
happen that, despite the state's having signed an international treaty, its parliament will 
reject the act transforming the treaty obligations. This would then mean that the courts 
of law and the administrative bodies are compelled to apply domestic legislation instead 
of the treaty obligations where norms conflict. 
In a monistic system without national legislation, an international obligation is 
applicable law in national courts and governmental bodies. International obligations are 
part of the law of the land and directly applicable. 
Although some of the EC Member States apply dualism and some monism, the 
Treaty of Rome and EC Court practice have actually instituted a monistic system in all 
the EC States. As is widely known, this occurs in two ways: firstly, the Regulations by 
Art. 189 of the Treaty of Rome are directly applicable in every Member State regardless 
of its constitutional provisions. Secondly, the EC court has developed some principles 
which give the directives direct effect and direct applicability if these directives fulfil 
certain criteria. The Member States are not allowed to try to avoid the legal effect of a 
directive by appealing to the uncompleted entry into force (transformation) of a directive. 
In a conflict between an internal legal norm (even a norm on the constitutional level) and 
a directive with direct effect, the directive prevails. 
Some EFTA States represent a dualistic, some a monistic system. During the treaty 
negotiations, the EC suspected that the Nordic Countries (Iceland, Sweden, Norway and 
Finland), when using a dualistic system, could avoid the legally binding force of certain 
legal obligations in the EEA Agreement, directives and regulations mentioned in the EEA 
Agreement, its protocols and Annexes. The basis for this doubt may have been certain 
negative experiences previously in implementing EC law by certain reluctant EC States. 
Of the EC Members, Germany and Italy officially use the dualistic system (and Great 
1 Unfortunately 1 have had for the present only limited possibilities to follow the developments in Iceland. 
I therefore concentrate on the constitutional debate in Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
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Britain de facto). For a long time they were reluctant to recognise the direct effect of EC 
Law and the supremacy of EC Law with respect to national legislation. 
Two EFTA States, Austria and Switzerland, employ the monistic system. International 
law and all the legal obligations of the EEA Agreement are directly in force and valid 
without any acts in these countries. Because of the Nordic systems, the EC claimed that 
the EEA Agreement should contain arrangements which guarantee that the Nordic 
Countries obey EEA provisions in the same way as the EC Member States. This was 
fulfilled by Protocol 35 of the EEA Agreement. According to the ingress of protocol 35, 
no party to the agreement is required to transfer legislative powers to the bodies of the 
EC; full legislative sovereignty is thus recognised. On the other hand, according to the 
only operative article of the Protocol 35, the EFTA States commit themselves to enact 
legislation against a possibility of conflict of EEA norms with the internal legislation of 
an EFTA state. 
The EFTA States committed themselves to the creation of a system in which EEA 
norms would have priority over national legislation in the case of conflict. If a particular 
EEA norm (EEA Treaty norms and future normative decisions of the EEA Joint 
Committee) should differ from previously enacted norms or the norm has been enacted 
after it, the EEA norm shall prevail over a national act. This obligation did not, in fact, 
apply to Austria because of its monistic system. 
All of the Nordic Countries enacted a single act by which the entire EEA 
Agreement—with the Protocols, Annexes and Acts (EC Regulations and Directives) referred 
to—was incorporated or transformed. Incorporation means the procedure by which the 
Parliament declares certain treaty obligations valid and binding in courts and governmental 
bodies. The method of incorporation was used in the cases of EC regulations mentioned 
in the Annexes of the EEA Agreement. 
The EC directives were transformed in national legislation by separate legislative acts: 
the norms which were part of EC directives were rewritten and enacted by the Nordic 
Parliaments. 
In some Nordic Countries, incorporation covered all the parts of the EEA Agreement, 
while in others it included only the parts of the agreement which required legislative acts. 
For example, Sweden only incorporated legislation regulating relations between states, 
leaving out those with national effect 
Sweden fulfilled the obligations set out in Protocol 35 according to the principle of 
"selection of law" (lagval). If there is a conflict of norms between ordinary national 
legislation and EEA legislation, Swedish courts of law are obliged to apply the EEA 
legislation. However, if a collision of norms appears on the constitutional level (i.e. an 
EEA rule conflicts with the Swedish Constitution), the provision of the Constitution will 
not be put aside. The Swedish Parliament, Riksdag, was of the opinion, that the 
principle of "selection of law"(lagval) does not conflict with its legislative sovereignty. 
There were differing views, however. The High Court in Skàne and Blekinge and the 
authoritative organ of experts (the legislative council, lagrâdet) took the opposite stance: 
the principle restricted the sovereign legislative power of the Parliament. The council 
suggested that the principle of the selection of law should be removed from the law that 
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transformed the legal norms of the EEA Agreement as part of the legislation of Sweden. 
The Government's view was that the principle of the selection of law could not be 
avoided because of the binding character of Protocol 35. 
In Finland, Iceland, and Norway, the obligations set out in Protocol 35 of the EEA 
Agreement was fulfilled in a stricter way than in Sweden. Finland and Norway enacted 
provisions by which the EEA norms—including the normative decisions of the Joint 
Committee—prevailed over or put aside domestic legislation in all cases of conflict 
except those involving the constitution. 
Because of its restrictive influence on the legislative power of the Parliament and 
the President of the Republic—and thus on their sovereignty—the act was regarded in 
Finland as conflicting with the Constitution; this did not, however, lead to amendment 
of the Constitution. During the negotiations Finland had announced that the 
incorporation of EEA Agreement would be carried out without any amendments to the 
Constitution. The Finnish Constitution specifies a procedure for this kind of situation; 
if there occurs a conflict with the Constitution, it can be avoided by statute if the statute 
is passed by a two-thirds majority. This voting procedure was used in the transformation 
of Protocol 35. 
In Iceland and Norway the principle of the priority of EEA norm was not considered 
unconstitutional. 
2. The Assessment of the Amendments of National Legislation by the EEA 
Joint Committee 
Article 97 of the EEA Agreement stipulates: This Agreement does not prejudge the right 
for each Contracting Party to amend, without prejudice to the principle of non-
discrimination and after having informed the other Contracting Parties, its internal 
legislation in the areas covered by the Agreement: 
— if the EEA Joint Committee concludes that the legislation as amended does not 
affect the good functioning of the Agreement or 
— if the procedures referred to in Art. 98 have been completed. 
Particularly in Sweden it was anticipated that Art. 97 (EEA) would restrict the 
sovereign legislative power of an EFTA State. It was suspected that the Joint Committee 
would get a veto right against amendments of national legislation. This point of view was 
not widely accepted in any of the Nordic Countries; Art. 97 (EEA) was not regarded as 
meaning a legislative veto right. The fundamental justification of this in Sweden was that 
decisions in the EEA Joint Committee are made unanimously. Where one of the parties 
(EC/EFTA) is opposed to the decision of the EEA Joint Committee, it could prevent it 
from concluding that a piece of Swedish legislation does not affect the good functioning 
of the Agreement. Individual EFTA States formulate their opinions, which are then 
presented to the EFÉA Standing Committee. The Committee applies the principle of 
consensus: if any of the EFTA States presents a dissenting opinion, the committee is not 
allowed to make a decision. 
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According to the Swedish interpretation, the EEA Joint Committee cannot achieve 
a legislative right of veto against the amendments in the Swedish national legislation, 
because Sweden can prevent in the EFTA Standing Committee making a decision which 
would result in statutes enacted by the Swedish Parliament to be against the EEA 
provisions. 
In Finland and Norway the government bills for the incorporation of the EEA Agree-
ment stated that the Parliament may enact a statute which is contrary to an EEA Pro-
vision. In the same context, the governments stated that this would mean an international 
delict and lead eventually to the use of sanctions against the State. This kind of procedure 
can also lead to the use of the Safeguard Measures laid down in Art. I l l (EEA). 
The actual meaning of Art. 97 is rather unclear. 
3. The Entry into Force of the EC Law and its Amendments in the EFTA 
States 
The fundamental objective of the EEA Agreement is to bring into force in the EFTA 
States the main part of the primary and secondary legislation approved by the EC 
Council and Commission during the last thirty years. Provisions introduced in the Treaty 
of Rome, EC Regulations, Directives and Decisions concerning the Four Freedoms will 
be put into force and implemented in the EFTA States. These four freedoms are the 
freedom of goods, the freedom of persons, the freedom of services and the freedom of 
capital. 
The norms developed before the signing of the EEA Agreement on 2 May 1991 will 
enter into force partly through incorporation and partly through transformation. As 
mentioned above, the EEA Agreement consists of the Main Agreement, Protocols and 
Annexes (EC Regulations, Directives and Decisions). They will not enter into force 
nationally in the EFTA States until the EEA Agreement has been ratified by the 
Contracting Parties. 
Not all the relevant rules were rewritten as parts of national legislation. This was 
necessary expecially because of the EC Regulations referred to in the Annexes. For the 
EC, Regulations are directly binding law in the EC area. The Community required, for 
securing the homogeneity of EEA legal system, that dualistic EFTA States could not 
begin to enact national statutes related to the Regulations. Instead, the Directives were 
transformed. 
The EEA Joint Committee may decide on the amendments to the norms in the EEA 
Agreement. These decisions are regarded as international agreements and are to be 
transformed and accepted by EFTA parliaments. This procedure does not formally restrict 
the sovereign legislative powers of EFTA States. Amendments to the EEA Agreement 
and entirely new rules (new EC Regulations and Directives) will be decided by the 
procedure of Treaty and by ratification. In other words these have to be implemented by 
the national legislative organs in the form of specific laws and decrees. According to Art. 
102 of the EEA Agreement, if the decision of the EEA Joint Committee requires 
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incorporation or transformation by the decisions of a legislative organ, this shall be 
notified to the EEA Joint Committee. The new norm or the amendment of a valid norm 
enters into force only when the parties have notified that constitutional requirements have 
been fulfilled. In a negative case—if, e.g., an EFTA parliament rejects the bill—this 
particular EEA rule will be provisionally suspended. 
The EEA system formally guarantees the legislative sovereignty of all the Contracting 
Parties. In practice, the reality is different. The Community Law (aquis communautaire) 
has been developed gradually over the decades via decisions on the Regulations and 
Directives, the Preliminary Rulings and other decisions of the EC Court. When the EEA 
Agreement enters into force in the EFTA States, with the exception of Switzerland, the 
states are obliged to put into force a vast number of norms (aquis) by a single decision; 
the members of the Community have had several decades time. However, the EFTA 
States had no alternative. They had to put into force the major part of the community law 
by a single parliamentary decision (hundreds of acts for bringing them into force). 
Actually the EEA Agreement meant a very radical interference in the legislative 
sovereignty of parliament in an EFTA State. There were only two alternatives: either to 
secure the legislative sovereignty and pay the price of remaining outside of the EEA 
system and the internal markets or to approve, without any real reservations and 
amendments, the legal norms which the EC had decided were required for fulfilling the 
Four Freedoms. 
In the early phase of the negotiations concerning the Agreement, the EFTA States 
presumed they would gain a position equal to that of the EC States in negotiating new 
EEA Rules and participating in the work of drafting committees. This aim had to be 
abandoned because of the resistance of the EC. As a result, the EFTA States may send 
experts to participate in the work of committees only as observers. Thus it is hardly 
conceivable that the EFTA States will have any significant role in creation of new EEA 
Rules. 
On the other hand, one may agree that the EC cannot accept a situation in which the 
EFTA states could seriously influence the norm-drafting work carried out in the interest 
of the Community. 
4. Arbitration 
The EEA Agreement provides for arbitration. The arbitration award is decided by the 
majority and the award has a binding effect, i.e. an EFTA State is legally obliged to 
implement the decision. If any Contracting Party finds that measures carried out by 
another party violate its economic benefits and are against the EEA Rules, it may take 
appropriate measures, which otherwise would be contrary to the treaty obligations. These 
are called Safeguard Measures. If a safeguard measure taken by a Contracting Party 
creates an imbalance between rights and the obligations, any other Contracting Party, as 
a target of safeguard measures, may take rebalancing measures. Solutions to such 
conflicts can be achieved through arbitration. At least two of the arbitrators will be 
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represent the parties and one must be impartial. The decision of the arbitration, i.e. the 
award, is made by the majority and the parties to the dispute are obliged to obey it. The 
award may mean, for example, that a party must give up the safeguard or the balancing 
measures and amend its legislation. Arbitration was found therefore to be against the 
Finnish Constitution in that it restricted both internal sovereignty and, to some extent, 
external. In Iceland, Sweden and Norway, this system was not deemed to be contrary to 
the constitution. The Swedish Constitution stipulates only that the public power must 
derive from the people (Regeringsform 1 §). In Finland the principle of sovereignty is 
written into the constitution. 
5. Sovereignty and the Use of Judicial Power 
According to Art. 6 (EEA), the EFTA States are bound to obey the relevant rulings 
made by the EC Court of justice prior to the date of signature of the Agreement (2 May 
1992). The provisions of the EEA Agreement which are identical in substance to 
corresponding rules of EC Law serve as the basis of their interpretation. In other words, 
the courts and the civil servants in the EFTA States are bound to apply the 
interpretations of Community Law in the decisions of the EC Court when interpreting 
EEA rules. 
Article 6 (EEA) can be seen as a restriction of the decision-making power of the 
Nordic countries. The Finnish Constitution (Hallitusmuoto 2nd paragraph) gives the 
judicial power in Finland to the independent courts. Prior to the EEA Agreement, the 
Finnish courts were not obliged to comply with any rules or decisions other than laws 
and administrative acts. In Nordic judiciary practice, not even the prejudicative decisions 
made by the Supreme Court have legally binding force: district courts enjoy total 
independence in their work. Article 6 (EEA) plus the principle of the Supremacy of the 
EEA Law meant a significant interference in the sovereign judicial decision-making 
power. 
6. The Binding Precedents of the EC Court of Justice 
According to Protocol 34 of the EEA Agreement, an EFTA State may assert the right of 
its courts and tribunals to request the EC Court of Justice to give a binding decision on 
the interpretation of a single EEA rule. The obvious objective of the EC was to ensure 
that the EFTA States would approve the system of Preliminary Rulings laid down in Art. 
177 (3) in the Treaty of Rome. 
A commitment to take into consideration the binding interpretations of a non-national 
court would have meant severe interference in judicial sovereignty, and the EFTA States 
accordingly decided to deny the EC Court the right to give binding interpretations of 
EEA Rules. The Finnish Constitutional Committee, in particular, considered that 
recognising such a power would be unconstitutional. In the future, the Government 
cannot recognise such a right without a decision of Parliament. 
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Still, the EC Court Decisions may have in the future have both direct and indirect 
influence on the decision-making of the courts in the EFTA countries. As mentioned 
before, decisions of the EC Court given prior to the signature of the EEA Agreement are 
binding on courts and tribunals in the EFTA States. Article 3 (EEA) contains rules about 
the indirect binding effect of decisions made after the signing. The Contracting Parties 
have promised to take all appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of the provisions 
of the Agreement. Moreover, the Parties have committed themselves to refrain from any 
measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Agreement. This 
is called the principle of loyalty. It can be considered an obligation on the part of EFTA 
States to take into account EC Court Decisions which have been handed down after the 
signing of the Agreement and which are connected with it. 
The second form of indirect binding effect concerns the EFTA Court; it has to take 
into account in its work the entire (even future) case law of the EC Court. It is possible 
that precedents made by the EC Court will be filtered into the legal systems of the EFTA 
States through the decisions of the EFTA Court. 
7. The Advisory Opinions of the EFTA Court of Justice 
According to Art. 34 of the Agreement of the EFTA States on the establishment of a 
surveillance authority and a court of justice, the interpretation of the EEA Agreement. A 
national court may freely 34, it is possible for an EFTA State to restrict the right to 
request advisory opinions from the EFTA court solely to the supreme courts of the EFTA 
States. In the Nordic countries, however, this jurisdiction has been granted to all national 
courts and tribunals. Because the decisions are advisory in nature, they are not considered 
direct legal interference in the EFTA States as sovereign users of legislative power. It is, 
however, highly unlikely that national courts will disregard such opinions even if 
formally they have freely and independently decided whether or not to request an 
interpretation. 
8. The Decision-Making Power of the EFTA Supervisory Authority, the 
EC Commission and the EFTA Court 
The European Community insisted that an efficient control system had to be established 
for ensuring the efficiency of the EEA system and the loyal application of its rules. The 
EFTA organisation had to be supplemented by organs using supranational decision-
making authority, and, accordingly, a control organ on jurisdiction was established which 
was equivalent to the EC Commission. In particular, this body monitors the rules on the 
freedom of competition in EFTA states. It may perform inspections in enterprises and 
industrial plants in EFTA countries. If it observes infringements of the Agreement, the 
Surveillance Authority has a right to impose fines. Also, the EC Commission has 
equivalent jurisdiction in the European Economic Area. In all the Nordic Countries this 
jurisdiction was considered delegation of a part of the administrative and judicial 
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decision-making power. In Finland it was deemed unconstitutional. By contrast, Sweden 
incorporated the rule of jurisdiction in accordance with its Constitution by a 4/5 majority 
in Parliament. Sweden took similar action with the approval of the right of control and 
right of imposing fines. 
Norway had difficulties with the EEA Agreement on this point. According to 
Paragraph 93 of the Norwegian Constitution, Parliament can delegate judicial and 
administrative powers only to international bodies of which Norway is a member. The 
EC Commission could impose fines on Norwegian companies operating within the 
territory of Norway; this possibility was considered contrary to Article 93 of the 
Norwegian Constitution. Norway accordingly informed the other contracting parties that 
it could not guarantee that the decisions of the Commission would follow developments 
in Norway and, if necessary, start discussions with Norway if difficulties should arise. 
A court also had to be established which would possess supranational judicial 
authority. This need became obvious after the decision of the EC Court in which the 
desire of EFTA States to create a common court for the EC Member States and EFTA 
States was abandoned. 
The EFTA States established a court composed of seven judges. The judges are 
chosen from persons whose independence from the native country is beyond doubt The 
EFTA Court acquired considerable supranational judicial power. The EFTA Court also 
has jurisdiction in actions brought by an EFTA State against a decision of the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority. In addition, it has jurisdiction in actions concerning the setdement 
of disputes between two or more EFTA States. Finally, it may impose penalties which 
have a binding effect on the EFTA States and their enterprises. 
* • * 
As is emphasised several times in the EEA Agreement and its ingresses, the arrangement 
has no restricting effect on the sovereign decision-making power of national organs of 
the Contracting Parties. Thus the ingress of the Main Agreement of the EEA 
acknowledges the independence of the courts and stresses that the Agreement will not 
restrict autonomy in decision-making. In the preamble of Protocol 35 it is said that the 
European Economic Area will be created without requiring any of the Contracting Parties 
to transfer legislative power to an institution of the EEA. 
In spite of this, it is widely thought in the EFTA States that the EEA will restrict the 
sovereignty of particular EFfA States considerably in all of the three areas of state 
powers—but in a covert, subtle way. Especially in Finland public opinion has been that 
several parts of the complex agreement affect sovereignty and therefore are contrary to 
the Constitution. Sweden and Norway solved the problem by applying a constitutional 
rule of the right to transfer administrative and judicial jurisdiction to the organs of an 
international organization by a majority of 4/5 and 3/4, respectively. 
Norway and Sweden did not alter their constitutions. In Finland a constitutional 
change may be effected. Finland will follow the example of Denmark. A special 
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committee in Parliament will act on behalf of Parliament and give preliminary deci-
sions—political, not legally binding—on draft-decisions of the Joint Committee of the EEA. 
The position of the EFTA States as the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement 
has occasionally been compared with eventual EC membership from the point of view 
of sovereignty. It seems to me that the sovereignty of an EFTA State shall be more 
restricted in the EEA than the sovereignty of the members of the EC according to the 
Treaty of Rome. A Member State of the Community is represented in the Council of 
Europe, in the EC Council, the EC Commission, the EC Court, the EC Parliament and 
all the EC preparatory committees and other organs. Furthermore, a member can play a 
part in drafting new EC legislation right from the beginning and participate in the 
formulation of the Court Decisions. In the EEA system, an EFTA State is isolated. The 
EEA Joint Committee may become a one-sided—rather than an interactive-legislative 
organ; possibilities to join in the decision-making are slight. The functioning of the EEA 
Joint Committee may develop to translate and transform the EC Law as a part of EEA 
system. The EFTA States cannot substantially influence the content of new regulations 
and directives during the preparation in the committees of EC Council and Commission. 
I doubt if any norms will be drafted by EFTA. EFTA is hardly able to prepare 
amendments independently which then would be implemented in the European 
Community by the EEA Joint Committee. 
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of Minorities in the International Regime 
of Human Rights 
1. In 1945 the Institution of International Minority Law, which had a long history came 
to exist in statu morendi by that time, appeared to have lost its place in the new 
international legal order emerging with the adoption of the United Nations Charter. This 
assumption and the fact that international minority rights were consequently stated to 
exist no more1 were due to various reasons, the decisive one being that the spread and 
effective operation of the international protection of human rights as well as of the idea 
of democracy not only made it superfluous per se to accord a special status to national, 
ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities,2 but were also inconsistent with it on the 
ground of the different philosophical motives behind them.3 
2. The protection of minorities through the recognition of general human 
rights4 has proved to be an illusion, however. A considerable part of minorities 
1 Study of the legal validity of the undertakings concerning minorities. UN. doc. E/CN. 4/367 and Add. 1 
(1950). For critical remarks on this Report, see KUNCZ, J.: The Present Status of the International Law for the 
Protection of Minorities. 48 AJIL (1954), p. 284; SOHN. L. В.: The Rights of Minorities, in: HENKIN, L. (ed.): 
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 1981), p. 271. 
2 DEMICHEL, A.: L'évolution de la protection des minorités depuis 1945, R.G.D.I.P., 1960, pp. 27-28; 
TOMUSCHAT, Ch.: Protection of Minorities under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Poli-
tical Rights, in: Festschrift für Herman Mosler (Springer Verlag, 1983, p. 949; more recently CULLEN, R.: 
Human Rights Quandary, Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992/93), pp. 79-88. 
3 See 1950 Study (supra, No. 1), Chapter XIV. 
4 It relied on the presumption that "... la suppression de l'oppression individuelle étant considérée, comme 
fuffisante pour amenez la cessation de l'oppression collective". BOKATOLA, Isse Omanga: La déclaration des 
Nations Unies sur les droits des personnes appartenant a des minorités nationales ou ethniques, rèligieuses et 
linguistiques, R.G.D.I.P. 1993. pp. 750-751. 
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survived5, and their existence carried in it the possibility of national and international 
conflicts. Therefore it can in no way be seen to be an accident that international minority 
law as a phoenix has risen again from its ashes, contra legem in some measure.6 
3. The Soviet Union was among the States which proposed the inclusion of minority 
rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,7 although it hardly fitted into its 
political philosophy and system.8 Despite its failure that attempt opened the way to the 
study of minority problems and the preparation of draft texts by the United Nations Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities,9 an 
organ of the Commission on Human Rights. As early as 1953 the recognition of certain 
rights for persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities was present in the 
wording of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was in the 
making.10 Thus the international minority law was clearly resuscitated in the inter-
national regime of human rights. In this context the past decades have witnessed a 
multiplication of international treaties on the protection of minorities as well as of 
international texts of legal import and texts devoid of such import." 
5 CAPOTORTI, F.: Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. 
UN doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2./384/Rev. 1. 1979. Annex III; DEMICHEL: op. cit. No. 2. p. 28; ERMACORA, F.: 
The Protection of Minorities before the United Nations, RCADI, vol. 182 (1983-IV), p. 346. 
6 THORNBERRY, P.: Is There a Phoenix in the Ashes? International Law and Minority Rights, Texas 
Internatioanl Law Journal, No. 15. 1980. pp. 421^58. 
7 For the background, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948/49. pp. 543-545. In view of the close 
relationship between the Declaration and the European Convention on Human Rights (COHEN-JONATHAN, 
G.: La convention européenne des droits de l'homme Paris, 1989. pp. 11-12, Uie latter is also limited to 
providing for non-discrimination and the precondition. 
8 The totalitarian political and state system called socialist (for the latter's criteria see KELSEN, H.: Genera] 
Theory of Law and State, Cambridge (Mass.), 1949. pp. 283-308), notably the dictatorship of the proletariat 
"... is a power not bound by any law whatever (LENIN: A proletárforradalom és a renegát Kautsky (The 
Proletarian Revolution and Renegate Kautsky), Lenin Összes Művei (Complete Works of Lenin), Vol. 37 (2nd 
Edition), Budapest, 1973. p. 232), which, representing at the same time the entire community of the State and 
society, is able to unify individual, group and all-social interests (FÖLDESI, T.: Emberi jogok (Human Rights), 
Budapest, 1989. pp. 13 and 36), which as a monolithic concept a priori deems otherness to be an enemy (ibid.). 
It refuses to accept national movements of this "otherness" as manifestations of particularism (LENIN: A 
nemzetiségi politika kérdéseihez (To Questions of Nationality Policy), Lenin Összes Művei (Complete Works 
of Lenin), Vol. 25 (2nd Edition), Budapest, 1970. p. 71), while it subordinates expressis verbis any support to 
the itnerests of the proletarian revolution LENIN: A nemzetek önrendelkezési jogáról (On the Nations' Right 
to Self-Determination), ibid., p. 273. 
9 ECOSOC Official Records, Ninth Session, Supplement 10, para. 13. Quoted by CAPOTORI, op. cit. 
No. 5. p. 28. 
10 Yearbook of the United Nations 1953, p. 383. 
11 For instance, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 27; UNGA Res. 47/135 (18 
December 1992): Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities; 1960 UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education; 1965 UN Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; 
1989 ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention; Final Act of the CSCE (Helsinki, 1975), Principle VII 
(Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms); and Copenhagen's (1990) and Geneva's (1991) 
documents; and finally CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (1992). 
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Since the international protection of human rights and minorities varies not only by 
philosophical approach,12 but also by its practical consequences, regarding to very 
different situations of minorities in the various countries and of the territorial States' on 
unjustified fear of threats to their integrity, or possibilities of interference, particularly 
where the minorities have ethnic links with foreign States,13 there is reason for asking 
whether the rights of minorities are harmoniously framed in the international regime of 
general human rights or, on the contrary, their place in it is ambivalent. 
4. The insertion of minority rights in the international regime of human rights shows, 
prima facie, a few surprising features. Given the limitations of space, this study cannot 
but draw a few summary conclusions without explaining the arguments. 
4.1. In accordance with the individual approach to human rights, with the ethos of 
respect for the individual, the persons belonging to minorities are the subjects of minority 
rights as well. While this approach may ensure the individual's freedom of choice or 
decision concerning their membership in a particular minority group, one should not 
forget that "a minority is not simply the totality of persons possessing individual rights, 
but a community whose members are bound together by close ties".14 The so-called 
minority rights are of a peculiar nature, obviously meaning individual rights to be enjoyed 
in community with the other members of the group. However, this usual statement 
implies also a certain extent of capitis deminutio, for there is uncertainty as to the 
measure in which these rights can be exercised or are recognized outside a particular 
minority group. 
4.2. Human rights are inalienable as they derive from the inherent dignity of the 
human person.15 This axiom is hardly applicable to minority rights, the genesis and 
exercise of which are essentially conditional on recognition by the territorial State of the 
existence of such minorities,16 which is not always the case.17 This situation cannot be 
explained solely by the lack of a generally accepted definition of minority or the 
distortion of facts so common in international practice.18 In the last analysis, as is 
rightly stated by Géza Herczegh, acceptance of minority rights depends on the political 
12 Supra, No. 3 and 4. 
13 CAPOTORTI: op. cit. Nos. 5. p. IV. 
14 HERCZEGH, Géza: A kisebbségek nemzetközi jogi védelme a mai Európában (The Protection of 
Minorities by International Law in Present-Day Europe). Emlékkönyv Dr. KEMENES Béla egyetemi tanár 65. 
születésnapjára (Book published in honour of University Professor Dr. Béla Kemenes on the occasion of his 
65th birthday), Acta iur. et. pol., Szeged, Tom. XL. III. Fasc. 1-43, p. 146. 
15 See Preamble of the Internationa] Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). 
16 CAPOTORTI: op. cit. No. 5. paras. 61 and 203. He nevertheless notes that the objective criteria are not 
negligible para. 204. 
17 Best known is the consistent official attitude of France: Décret no. 81-76 du 29 janvier 1981 portant 
publication du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques; Décret no. 90. 917 du 8 oct. 1990 
portant publication de la convention relatif aux droits de l'enfant. Report of the Human Rights Committee 
(GADR 38the session, A/38/40, para. 334. p. 78). For further examples, see CAPOTORTI: op. cit. No. 5. paras. 
66-69. 
18 LACHARRIERE, Ci. de: La politique juridique extérieur. Paris, 1983. p. 115. 
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will of a given State, which is indicative of its attitude to the minorities living in its 
territory, namely on "whether it (tiiat State) recognizes their existence and regards their 
survival as a value to be preserved or, quite the contrary, it endeavours to homogenize 
its population in keeping with the long-standing prejudices..."19 
4.3. International legislation itself is permeated with ambivalence manifested in the 
acceptance of the existence of minorities. While it is a standing duty of States to respect 
and ensure human rights and to take the necessary steps to give effect to them (Art. 2 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), this duty with regard to 
minority rights is a non facere obligatio, at least within the meaning of Covenant Article 
27, which even reflects an uncertainty about the purpose of minority protection. For 
example, Fawcett considers that a minority has only two options, namely integration 
(gradual assimilation, loss of identity as a minority) or separation.20 Since the possibility 
of seccession21 is ruled out by the international law in force, that law would merely 
afford temporary or transitory protection for minorities. 
4.4. The development of international law has partially remedied this unfavourable 
situation by strengthening the minimum rights of minorities, notably the linguistic, 
cultural and religious rights, on the one hand and by widening their scope on the other: 
in the Declaration of 1992, for instance, international law has come to recognize the 
existence of minorities and their right to preserve their identities as well as to accept 
a certain obligation to take related measures, which implies a tacit acceptance of 
certain collective rights, but it has failed to define the nature and scope of the latter 
rights. 
4.5. Existence of democracy, a constitutional State in the territorial country is a 
fundamental guarantee, a conditio sine qua non for the enjoyment of minority rights as 
well. At the same time, the covenant of 1966 regards the right to self-determination 
(Art. 1) as the touchstone of all human rights. As the peoples' right to self-determination 
implies full freedom of determination, the question inevitably arises whether prevention 
of the emergence of totalitarian, fascist regimes by free and earnest expression of the 
popular will is a conclusive presumption (presumptio iuris et de iure).22 
19 HERCZEGH: op. cit. No. 14. p. 153. 
20 FAWCETT, J.: The International Protection of Minorities, Minority Rights Group, Report No. 41. London, 
1979. pp. 4-6. 
21 For the situation since the Aland Islands case, see Report presented to the Council of the League by the 
Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations, Doc. B. 7. 21/68/106 1921, p. 27, quoted by HANNUM, H.: 
Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determinaüon. The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, Philadelphia, 1990. 
p. 29. 
22 UNCIO, Vol. VI. p. 445, quoted by CASSESE, A.: Political Self-Determination-Old Concepts and New 
Developments, in: UN Law/Fundamental Rights. Two Topics in International Law (CASSESE, A. (ed.) (Alphen 
van den Rijn, 1979, p. 138). This premise is reflected in, e.g., The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political 
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (Paris, 23 October 1991). In this context see ISOART, P.: L'Organisation 
des Nations Unies et le Cambodge, R.G.D.I.P., 1993, pp. 668-670. 
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4.6. The possibility of restricting human rights is similarly accepted by the de iure 
conditio rules of international law.23 Minority rights may also be restricted on another 
legal ground. Minority rights may also be restricted on another legal ground. As is stated 
expressis verbis in the Declaration of 1992, "Nothing in the present Declaration may be 
construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of 
States" (para. 4 of Art. 8). 
This prohibition, marking as it does a retrogression from the earlier formulas,24 
refers to the most sensitive aspect of the international minority regime. While the 
obligations undertaken to recognize and ensure human rights belong in the category of 
parallel obligations,25 there may be States, particularly in the case of national minorities, 
which are directly concerned and may have a "legal right or interest".26 
Such a State may challenge the official attitude of the territorial State to the existence 
of minorities, its one-sided classification, which may be in conflict with the maxim of res 
ipsa loquitur,21 and may take action against violations of minority rights. The latter 
possibility may even be supported by a historical precedent. The safeguards regime of 
the League of Nations' minority system allowed certain members of the Council (and 
them only!) to respond to grievances of minorities, in addition to action which the three-
member Minoritiees Committee was empowered to take in cases involving a public 
interest28 such response being presumably equivalent to protection of the individual 
interests of the States concerned.29 It is part of the truth and should therefore be added 
that the prevailing regime of minority protection has not yet reached this stage as there 
is no generally accepted definition of the State injured by an internationally wrongful 
act.30 Recognition of the legal interests of other States would be the more important 
23 BURGENTHAL, Т.: To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogation, and KISS, 
A. Ch.: Permissible Limitations on Rights, in: HENKIN: op. cit. No. 1. pp. 72-91 and 290-310. 
24 BOKATALA: op. cit. (No. 4), pp. 759-760. The 1975 Final Act of CSCE is more satisfactory in this 
respect. See BRUHÁCS, J.: A kisebbségek nemzetközi jogi védelme és a helsinki folyamat (The Protection of 
Minorities under International Law and the Helsinki Process), Jogász Szövetségi Értekezések, 1989. Vol. XII. 
No. 2. pp. 73-76. 
25 For the notion of parallel obligations, see FITZMAURICE, G.: The General Principles of International Law 
Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, RCADI, 1975-11. Vol. 92. pp. 125-126. 
26 South-West Africa case (Second phase), according to the formula of I.C.J, reports 1966, para. 14. There 
may also be a directly injured State beside a general interest in upholding minority rights, as was pointed out 
by, e.g., UCHAKOV, who, for that matter, argued for a restrictive interpretation of the notion of injured State 
(Ann. de la Comm. du droit int., 1984. Vol. I. p. 283). 
27 By analogy with the Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 274. 
28 The relevant decisions of the Council of the League of Nations are reproduced in CAPOTORTI: op. cit., 
paras. 118-121. For an analysis thereof, see BUZA, L.: A kisebbségek jogi helyzete (The Legal Status of 
Minorities), Budapest, 1930, pp. 152-249. 
29 It follows from, inter alia, the mle of incompatibility. See Desicion of 10 June 1925 (Journal Off., VI., 
année 1925. pp. 878-879. 
30 See Draft articles on State responsibilitiy, Part Two, Art. 5. Yearbook ILC, 1989. Vol. II. Part Two, para. 
302. 
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since the mechanism devised for submission by individuals of grievances arising out of 
the individual interpretation of minority rights fails to operate in a satisfactory manner,31 
and today it would be too early to form any judgement of the activity of the High 
Commissioner for Minority Rights. 
4.7. The primary source of international obligations concerning the protection of 
minorities is indisputably consituted by the various international treaties on human rights, 
and the question of whether the generally recognized rules of international law contain 
any provisions to this effect is not misplaced in view of the principle of res inter alios 
acta пес nocere пес prodesse potest. 
— The International Law Commission (ILC) has already considered talcing up the 
subject of codification of international minority law.32 Indeed, there is mounting 
evidence in support of the fact that today even general international law requires a certain 
measure of minority protection. 
— Participation in the physical and biological destruction of minorities gives rise not 
only to the criminal responsibility of offenders under the Convention of 1948 on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, but also to the international responsibility of the 
State for its internationally wrongful act, provided that the offender's conduct can be 
attributed to the State. According to the ILC draft articles on State responsibility,33 "on 
the basis of the rules of international law in force, an international crime (of State) may 
result from ... (c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of (the) international obligation 
prohibiting, inter alia, genocide" (para. 3 of Art. 19). The only question that may be 
asked is whether the pertinent facts of an act of genocide committed by a natural person 
or a State are necessarily identical.34 
The continuing study of the subject of minority protection and the further work of the 
Subcommission were doubtless inspired by the adoption of Art. 27 of the 1966 Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.35 This notwithstanding, the Declaration 
of 1992 cannot be regarded, contrary to expectations,36 as an interpretation of Art. 27, 
but rather as the opinio iuris of the international community concerning the international 
rules on minority protection that are in force or in statu nascendi,37 
5. The above few problems I have elucidated may substantiate the conclusion that 
the incorporation of minority protection in the international regime of human rights 
was not a perfect success, nor was it presumably viable, given the differences between 
the two regimes in purpose, subject-matter and structure. As a matter of course, there 
31 ALFREDSSON, G.-ZAVAS, A. de: Minority Rights: Protection by the United Nations, Human Rights Law 
Journal, Vol. 14. No. 1-2. pp. 5 et seq. 
32 Yearbook ILC, 1991. Vol. II. Part Two, Chapt. VIII. A. 
33 Yearbook ILC, 1980. Vol. II. Part Two, p. 30. 
34 For, e.g., the so-called crime of "cultural" genocide, see CAPOTORTI: op. cit. No. 5. paras. 220-224. 
35 See ibid. No. 9. 
36 CAPOTORTI: op. cit. No. 5. para. 617. 
37 BOKATOLA: op. cit. No. 4. p. 748. 
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is a growing recognition that the international protection of minorities has aspects and 
implications beyond the international regime of human rights. To lend support to this 
statement I can refer to the growing number of bilateral treaties or treaty provisions 
and to various draft multilateral instruments. By the nature of things, however, this 
brief summary cannot take up an analysis of these international documents. 
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1. Introduction 
In August 1991 the world witnessed three days which were to have profound 
implications for the future of the Soviet Union; 19-21 August 1991 were three days 
that shook the world. In fact, the failed coup d'etat was the first step in the final 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. It launched the last phase in a process which had 
already started a couple of years ago. By the end of 1991 the Soviet state had 
withered away, albeit not in the manner foreseen by Marx. 
Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union commenced, far-reaching changes 
had taken place in the foreign trade system of the country. Changes which had 
positive as well as negative consequences for Western businessmen involved in 
foreign trade transactions with Soviet entities. These changes also effected the number 
and frequency of disputes in the foreign trade area. 
Traditionally, there were very few litigated disputes in the previously existing 
Soviet foreign trade system. Naturally, differences of opinion and disputes did occur, 
but they were usually settled through negotiations. 
However, in recent years the number of disputes has increased significantly. In 
Stockholm, for example, the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce is handling an ever increasing number of disputes involving Russian 
entities, both pursuant to its arbitration rules and in acting as appointing authority in 
ad hoc arbitrations taking place in Stockholm. 
Generally, the reasons for the increased number of disputes in this area are to be 
sought in the following circumstances: 
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— As a result of co-operation in the corporate form—typically different kinds of 
joint ventures—parties have been confronted with considerably more complex problems 
than arose in traditional sale and purchase transactions; 
— The re-organization of the foreign trade system has resulted in many new enter-
prises and entities, typically less experienced than the old centralized foreign trade 
organizations; 
— Perhaps most importantly, many Russian companies have severe payment 
problems with respect to hard currency a situation which often leads to disputes. 
The increased number of actual disputes in the foreign trade area—which in itself 
is a new phenomenon—has led to yet another new aspect of doing business in the 
former Soviet Union, viz., the inability—and sometimes, although seldom, unwilling-
ness—of Russian parties to fulfil obligations following from an arbitral award. That 
is why enforcement of foreign arbitral awards against Russian entities has become a 
matter of some concern to Western businessmen. 
II. Background: The Organization of Foreign Trade' 
(i) General 
As mentioned above there were traditionally very few arbitrated disputes in Soviet 
foreign trade.2 When arbitrations did take place and resulted in arbitral awards such 
awards were always adhered to by the Soviet party in case it was on the loosing end. 
In fact, until 1990 there were no known cases where a loosing Soviet party did not 
fulfil the payment obligations in an award. In recent years, however, the situation has 
changed dramatically. In most cases the arbitral awards are the result of arbitrations 
arising out of contracts between Western parties and Soviet foreign trade organiz-
ations as they existed under the Soviet system of foreign trade. To fully understand 
and appreciate the problems facing Western parties today, it is therefore necessary to 
have a basic understanding of the Soviet system of foreign trade in its previous form. 
The organization of Soviet foreign trade had seen little change until January 1, 
1987. Radical reforms took effect on that date, however. On that date the first step 
in the decentralization and liberalization of the foreign trade system was taken by 
granting foreign trade rights to approximately 70 state enterprises and 21 economic 
ministries, departments and state committees. Prior to this reorganization virtually all 
Soviet foreign trade was conducted through approximately 50 so-called foreign trade 
organizations subordinated to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade. 
1 Ulis section draws on HOBÉR, K.: Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union. A legal treatise. (1989) Ch. 111. 
2 In the intra-Comecon foreign trade arbitrations were more frequent. The vast majority of cases decided 
by the then Foreign Arbitration Commission at tlie USSR Chamber of Commerce (now: the Arbitration Court 
of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation) consisted of such disputes. See e.g. 
HOBÉR, K.: Arbitration in Moscow, 2 Arbitration International (1987) 119, 121. 
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In September 1987 the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the USSR 
Council of Ministers issued a joint decree calling for further improvements in the 
management of foreign economic relations. This decree contained, inter alia, several 
provisions intended to facilitate and stimulate the use of foreign currency funds of 
state enterprises, organizations and ministries. In January 1988, another step was 
taken: the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the State Committee for foreign Economic 
Relations, GKES, the latter having primary responsibility for foreign trade with 
developing countries, were dissolved. At the same time, the Ministry for Foreign 
Economic Relations was established, replacing the Foreign Trade Ministry and GKES. 
In December 1988 yet another step was taken whereby foreign trade was further 
liberalized. On 2 December 1988 the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree 
which stipulated, inter alia, that by 1 April 1989 all enterprises, organizations, 
producing cooperatives, and other entities having competitive products or services to 
offer would be entitled to conduct foreign trade directly, provided they were registered 
with the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations. 
The reorganization and reform of Soviet foreign trade profoundly altered the well-
established patterns of doing business in the Soviet Union, which in tum has had, and 
still has, a significant impact on the negotiation and completion of contracts. 
(ii) The Ministry of Foreign Trade 
The fundamental distinctive feature of Soviet foreign trade was the principle of state 
monopoly of foreign trade. This meant that all trade and, in principle, all commercial 
contacts with foreign countries were entrusted to certain state organizations, which 
reported to the USSR Council of Ministers. Soviet foreign trade was thus centralized, 
a consequence of which was that the various republics had no right to engage in 
foreign trade. 
The highest body in the area of foreign trade was the USSR Ministry of Foreign 
Trade. The Ministry and its subdivisions occupied the central position in Soviet 
foreign trade. In addition to the Foreign Trade Ministry and other so-called "expert" 
ministries, such as the ministries of finance and trade, there was a large number of 
ministries for various industries that implemented general economic policies within 
their respective areas. Economic policy guidelines in the Soviet Union were drawn up 
by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Politburo. The Central 
Committee had a secretariat which included experts in the various areas. 
The work of the Ministry of Foreign Trade was led by the Minister of Foreign 
Trade, named by the USSR Supreme Soviet. The minister and the ten vice-ministers, 
named by the USSR Council of Ministers, constituted the Ministry's "collegium". 
The responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Trade included participation in 
the preparation and development of export and import plans and the direction and 
control of the activities of foreign trade entities. The ministry participated in the 
development and negotiation of trade agreements between the Soviet Union and other 
countries. 
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(Hi) Foreign Trade Organizations 
Most of the Soviet Union's foreign trade used to take place through foreign trade 
organizations—so-called FTOs—that answered to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. These 
were, as a rule, organized by industry, which meant that each organization was 
responsible for a certain group of goods. Responsibility was divided so that it was in 
theory impossible for two organizations to be assigned the same type of goods. 
Competition among FTOs was thus precluded. 
This division by industry also meant that each foreign trade organization achieved 
a high degree of specialization and expertise in its area. The Soviet foreign trade 
organizations did not themselves produce goods but rather functioned exclusively as 
middlemen. They traded products, technology and know-how for producing Soviet 
entities. Import transactions took place on the basis of agreements entered into 
between the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the end-user, or the End-user's Ministry. 
Export transactions, on the other hand, took place on the basis of administrative 
decisions. 
Foreign trade organizations were created by the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
determining the Articles of Association for the organization, or by a decision of the 
USSR Council of Ministers. The Articles of Association, which were published, included 
a list of the product groups each organization was responsible for. Publication itself, 
however, had no legal effect; the organization became a separate legal entity through the 
decision taken by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. 
A foreign trade organization comprised, in tum, a number of so-called specialized 
firms which were listed in the organization's Articles of Associations. The firms, unlike 
the organization, were as a rule not separate legal entities. 
Foreign trade organizations under the Ministry of Foreign Trade were led by a 
general director, who was appointed and removed from office by the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade. Soviet commercial life was governed by the principle of the so-called one-man 
management, which meant that the final right to make decisions rested with the general 
director. Beneath the general director were a number of vice-directors, who were also 
hired and fired by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. All authority to represent the organi-
zation, however, rested with the general director. 
The signing of foreign trade contracts was regulated by a law from 1978, when 
changes were made in the law governing activities of foreign trade organizations.3 This 
law required that all foreign trade contracts be in writing and be signed by two persons, 
either the general director, a vice-director, directors of the specialized firms within the 
foreign trade organization, or persons having a power of attorney from the general 
director. 
3 Decree 14 February 1978 of the USSR Council of Ministers, Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Sovieta SSR 1978, 
No. 10, item 162. 
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All Soviet foreign trade organizations were separate legal entities.4 Under Soviet law, 
this meant that they each had their own assets and that only these could be used to pay 
for the organization's debts.5 The Soviet state was thus not liable for the organization's 
debts, and the organizations were, in tum, not responsible for the obligations of the 
Soviet state.6 A foreign trade organization, like all other state organizations that are 
separate legal entities, had no right of ownership in its own name, however. All rights 
of ownership belonged to the state. Foreign trade organizations had a so-called right of 
operative management over property in their possession. This meant that the organization 
could possess, use and transfer property in accordance with applicable laws and 
regulations.7 
The question what assets of a foreign trade organization are available for execution 
is, needless to say, highly relevant in connection with enforcement and execution of 
foreign arbitral awards. The Soviet foreign trade organization always appeared as the 
contracting party with the Western party, even though it was never the end-user or the 
producer of the product. Western companies may thus as a matter of principle execute 
only on the assets of the foreign trade organization.8 
4 This was explicitly set forth in the charters of the foreign trade organizations. For example, in the case of 
the FTO Stankoimport, section 1 of the charter stipulated, inter alia, that Stankoimport "shall be an independent 
economic organization, shall enjoy the rights of a legal person...". 
5 Art. 32 of the RSFSR Civil Code. 
6 Art. 33 of the RSFSR Civil Code. 
7 When the 1990 RSFSR Law on Ownership was promulgated, a new concept was introduced viz., full 
economic jurisdiction, together with outright (private) ownership Consequently, Russian legislation on 
ownership today recognizes these two forms of ownership, or quasi-ownership, in addition to the right of 
operative management. In the old days, as mentioned above, state enterprises did not own the means of 
production they were using but had a right of operative management with respect to them. The state remained 
the owner. One important consequence of this bifurcation of the rights to means of production was that the 
state—as the owner—could at any time order the state enterprise what to do with the means of production, despite 
the fact that state enterprises were always described as separate legal entities. If a state enterprise holds property 
under the right of full economic jurisdiction, the owner of the property, i.e. the state, only retains the right to 
a share of the profit produced by the property in question and a rather loosely defined right to control the 
efficient use of the property. The owner may not take away the property from the enterprise as he would have 
been able to do, had the enterprise held the property under right of operative management. At this point it is 
not clear to what extent, or which, state enterprises enjoy full economic jurisdiction or operative management 
rights. For a Western company looking for assets of an FTO, or joint stock company, to execute an arbitral 
award on, full economic jurisdiction would seem preferable since that typically prevents die state (the owner) 
from exercising influence on the status of the assets of the state organization.—See also discussion in Section 
IV, infra. 
8 The possibility of piercing the corporate veil and thereby reaching the assets of the state itself and/or of 
other state entities, is discussed in Section V, infra. 
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(iv) The situation today 
As indicated above the state monopoly of foreign trade has been abolished. 
As a result of the decree adopted on 2 December 1988 foreign trade became open to 
practically all enterprises and organizations in the former Soviet Union. The decree did, 
however, require registration with the then Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. On 
15 November 1991 President Yeltsin issued a decree which did away also with the 
registration requirement.9 As a result of the 1988 Decree the conduct of foreign trade 
gradually shifted from the traditional foreign trade organizations to other enterprises and 
organizations which had obtained the right to engage in foreign trade transactions. 
Although no official statistics are available, it is believed that foreign trade today is to 
a large extent carried out by other entities than the foreign trade organizations in their 
original or transformed legal form; many FTOs are believed to have been transformed 
into joint stock companies, now governed by relevant Russian legislation.10 
Under the Soviet system of foreign trade the then USSR Foreign Trade Bank 
(Vneshtorgbanky-lnttr renamed the Bank for Foreign Economic Relations (Vne-
shekonombank)—played a vital role. Of particular interest in this connection is the fact 
that when a foreign trade organization signed a foreign trade contract involving hard 
currency payments, it had to obtain the approval of the bank. Upon such approval the 
bank "transferred" the required amount in hard currency to the account of the foreign 
trade organization in question. This meant that all hard currency payments under the 
contract were "secured" already when it was signed. This explains why Western parties 
rarely experienced any problems in receiving payments under such contracts. This system 
functioned as long as enough hard currency was allocated to foreign trade, which in 
turn-as a matter of principle—was regulated in the foreign trade plan. As a result of 
dwindling hard currency earnings, however, the bank has been forced to use whatever 
hard currency is available for emergency payments, at times using hard currency already 
reserved for other payments. That is why many foreign trade organizations have found 
themselves in a situation where hard currency reserved for them when the contract was 
signed, has been used for other payments." 
9 An English translation of the Decree was published in Soviet Business Law Report, 2 December 1991, 5. 
10 Joint stock companies in the Russian Federation are governed by Decree 601 of the RSFSR Council of 
Ministers, containing the Regulation on Joint Stock Companies; see discussion in Section IV, infra. 
11 In several arbitrations these factual circumstances have been pleaded by the Russian party as constituting 
force majeure or impossibilium, thus arguably relieving the Russian entity from responsibility for non-payment. 
It is not known to what extent arbitral tribunals have accepted such arguments.—As far as the Russian Federation 
is concerned the bank responsible for foreign trade is now called Rosvneshtorgbank and has thus replaced 
Vneshekonombank; the latter, however, still exists as a separate legal entity and fulfils certain functions with 
in the framework of the rescheduling of the former Soviet Union's sovereign debt. 
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III. The Legislative Framework 
(i) General 
Pursuant to Article 63 of the Fundamentals of Civil Procedure of the USSR and Union 
Republics, the enforcement and execution of foreign court judgments and arbitral awards 
are determined by international treaties to which the USSR is a party. Article 63 goes on 
to say: 
"Foreign court judgements and foreign arbitral awards may be submitted for 
enforcement in the USSR within three years from the moment of acquiring legal 
force.'"2 
The Soviet Union acceded to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in I960.13 When ratifying the Convention the 
Soviet Union made use of the reservation provided for in Article I (3) of the New York 
Convention.14 The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet made the following 
pronouncement: 
"The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics will apply the provisions of this 
Convention with respect to awards made in the territory of a State not participat-
ing in the Convention only on the basis of reciprocity."15 
The New York Convention proceeds from the assumption that each nation promulgate 
laws concerning the detailed procedures for the enforcement and execution of awards.16 
In the Soviet Union, however, such municipal legislation was not adopted until 1988 
when the USSR Supreme Soviet enacted a Decree on the Recognition and Execution in 
12 A similar provision is found in the RSFSR Civil Procedural Code of 1964, Art. 437, and also in the 
procedural codes of all the former republics of the Soviet Union. 
13 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Sovieta 1960, No. 46, item 421. 
14 Art. 1.3 of die New York Convention reads: 
"When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension under article X hereof, any State 
may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply die Convention to die recognition and enforcement 
of awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State. It may also declare that it will apply the 
Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whedier contractual or not, which are 
considered as commercial under die national law of die State making such declaration. 
15 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Sovieta 1960, No. 46, item 421. 
16 See Art. Ill which reads: 
"Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce diem in accordance widi the 
rules of procedure of die territory where the award is relied upon under the conditions laid down in die 
following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or liigher fees or charges 
on die recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies dian are imposed on die 
recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards." 
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the USSR of Decisions of Foreign Courts and Arbitral Tribunals." From a practical 
point of view this legal vacuum which thus existed for more than 25 years did not cause 
any problems, since there were no cases where the winning side in an arbitration with 
a Soviet entity had to seek recourse to Soviet courts to have his award enforced. 
Thus, until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was clear that enforcement 
and recognition of foreign arbitral awards were governed by the 1958 New York 
Convention and the 1988 Decree.18 
To complete the picture, however, it is necessary to take into account also the 
numerous bilateral treaties signed by the former Soviet Union and containing provisions 
on arbitration. Some of these treaties provide for the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards rendered pursuant to arbitration agreements between parties from the 
respective countries." The magnitude of bilateral arrangements in this area may create 
17 Vedomosti Verkliovnogo Sovieta 1988, No. 26, item 427. This decree is discussed on pp. 41-43, infra. 
18 Even though the New York Convention is without comparison the most important international document 
in this area, for the sake of good order, it should be mentioned that the Soviet Union also ratified the 1961 
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration in 1962 (Vedomosti Verkliovnogo Sovieta 1962, 
No. 20, item 210). 
19 For a discussion of this question, see GINSBURGS: Execution of Foreign Arbitration Awards; The 
Heritage of Domestic Legislation, Bilateral Treaties and Intra-Comecon Ententes, in A. J. Schmidt (ed.), The 
Impact of Perestroika on Soviet Law (1990) 457—490. In an appendix, Ginsburgs lists the following post-war 
Soviet bilateral treaties for the mutual recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitral awards. 
— Trade treaty with Poland. 7 July 1945 
— Treaty of commerce and navigation with Romania, 20 February 1947 
— Treaty of commerce and navigation with Hungary, 15 July 1947 
— Trade treaty with Finland, 1 December 1947 
— Treaty of commerce and navigation with Czechoslovakia, 11 December 1947 
— Trade treaty with Switzerland, 17 March 1948 
— Treaty of commerce and navigation with Bulgaria, 1 April 1948 
— Treaty of commerce and navigation with Italy, 11 December 1948 
— Trade and payments agreement with Afghanistan, 17 July 1950 
— Treaty of commerce and navigation with Austria, 17 October 1955 
— Treaty of commerce and navigation with the German Democratic Republic, 27 September 1957 
— Trade treaty with Japan, December 1957 
— Trade treaty with Mongolia, 17 December 1957 
— Treaty of commerce and navigation with Albania, 15 February 1958. 
— Treaty of commerce and navigation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 12 March 1958 
— Treaty of commerce and navigation with the Chinese People's Republic, 23 April 1958 
— Agreement on general questions of commerce and navigation with the Federal Republic of Germany 
— Treaty of commerce and navigation with the Korean People's Democratic Republic, 22 June 1960 
— Trade agreement with Syria, 4 November 1965 
— Treaty on reciprocal procurement of legal assistance with Iraq, 22 June 1973 
— Trade and payment agreement with Afghanistan, 20 March 1974 
— Trade treaty with Laos, 22 April 1976 
— Trade agreement with Cyprus, 24 November 1976 
— Trade agreement with Greece, 29 April 1977 
— Trade agreement with Algeria, 17 November 1979 
— Trade agreement with Kampuchea, 5 February 1980 
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quite complicated situations when countries are parties both to a bilateral treaty and to 
the New York Convention. By and large, however, this problem is taken care of by Art. 
VII (1) of the New York Convention which stipulates that it (the Convention) "shall not 
affect the validity of multilateral or bilateral agreements concerning the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the Contracting States". This means that 
parties coming from states which have signed the New York Convention as well as a 
bilateral treaty may choose to rely either on the New York Convention or the bilateral 
arrangement. This could be of importance in situations where die list of defenses against 
recognition and enforcement present differences. On the other hand, it may be that the 
bilateral treaty in question contains provisions to the effect that it is not possible to 
choose. In all likelihood, however, this is a rare situation. 
(ii) Is the Russian Federation a Member of the New York Convention? 
The events of August 1991 were nothing less than a new revolution which had far-
reaching consequences in the political, economic and legal fields. In fact, the failed coup 
d'etat trigged the final dissolution of the Soviet Union. The formal dissolution of the 
Soviet Union took place on 8 December 1991 when the so-called Minsk Agreement was 
signed by the Republic of Belorussia, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine.20 The 
purpose of this Agreement was to create the Common wealth of Independent States. In 
the preamble, however, the Parties to the agreement stated—in passing, as it were—that the 
USSR had ceased to exist as a subject of international law, as a "geopolitical reality". 
Furthermore, in Article 11 of the Minsk Agreement it is said that as of the signing of the 
agreement, the laws of third states, including the USSR, are not valid on the territories 
of states which sign the agreement. In other words, as of 8 December 1991 Soviet law 
was no longer applicable on the territory of the Russian Federation. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union raised a number of important and difficult issues 
concerning state succession and the international obligations of the former Soviet Union. 
For example, would the Russian Federation ipso facto be bound by international 
treaties—such as the New York Convention—signed by the Soviet Union, or would it 
accept to be so bound? The parties to the Minsk Agreement partially addressed this issue 
in that they guaranteed "the fulfillment of international obligations, treaties and 
agreements of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics coming from these 
— Trade agreement with Nicaragua, 19 March 1980 
— Trade agreement with Grenada, 11 June 1980 
— Trade agreement witli India, 10 December 1980 
— Treaty on reciprocal procurement of legal assistance with Algeria, 23 February 1982 
— Treaty on reciprocal procurement of legal assistance with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(South Yemen), 6 December 1985—See also, LEBEDEV, Mezhdunarodnyj torgovyj arbitrazh (1965) 165-195. 
20 An english translation of the Minsk Agreement was published in New York Times on 10 December 1991, 
Section A, p. 19. 
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obligations". The Minsk Agreement was followed by the so-called Alma Ata 
Declaration on 23 December 1991.22 One important result of this Declaration was that 
another nine of the former Soviet Republics joined the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (the "CIS"), created by the Minsk Agreement. In the preamble, the member states 
of the CIS seemed to qualify Article 12 of the Minsk Agreement in saying that they 
"guarantee in accordance with their constitutional procedures, the fulfilment of 
international obligations stemming from the treaties and agreements of the former USSR", 
(emph. added). This probably meant that CIS member states took the position that they 
would be bound by such obligations in so far as their respective parliaments ratified such 
treaties. 
With respect to the Russian Federation, it has been assumed by many observers in 
the West that the Russian Federation is the successor state to the Soviet Union, and as 
such is thus bound by the international obligations of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, 
the Russian Federation itself has declared itself to be such successor state.23 In a note 
verbale dated 26 December 1991 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation stated that the Russian Federation would continue the participation of the 
Soviet Union in all conventions, agreements and other international legal instruments 
concluded within the framework of the United Nations. In a further note verbale dated 
27 January 1992 the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United 
21 Article 12 of the Minsk Agreement. 
22 An English translation of the Alma Ata Declaration was published in New York Times on 23 December 
1991, Section A, p. 10. 
23 Generally speaking, the disintegration of the Soviet Union presents a number of very complicated issues 
under international law. Indeed, it is doubtful if the traditional "law of state succession" is capable of providing 
the answers to these issues. It should be emphasized that the term "state succession" does not connote that a 
succession of rights and duties occurs as a matter of course. Rather the term is used to describe a problem area 
of international law. See, e.g. BROWNL1E, I.: Principles of Public International Law (3rd ed. 1979) 652. It is 
used to describe the legal effects that occur when one state is replaced by another state with respect to 
sovereignty over a given territory. In particular it is important to focus on the identity and continuity of states 
in connection with changes of sovereignty over territory. If a state retains its identity despite territorial changes, 
as a matter of general principle, the state continues to be bound by its obligations. By contrast, if the state does 
not retain its identity—and thus a new state is created—the new state does not at that moment have any rights 
and obligations, with the exception for those that follow from the general principles of public international law 
cf. e.g. MAREK, К.: Identity and continuity of States in Public International Law (1954) 9-14. Even though 
it has obviously been expedient—and perhaps necessary—from a political and practical point of view to accept 
the Russian Federation as the successor state to the Soviet Union, it is submitted that a thorough factual and 
legal analysis would not necessarily lead to this result. Furthermore, it is doubtful if international law permits 
the acceptance of unilateral declarations of the state in question as the basis for resolving issues of state identity 
and state succession. What if the Russian Federation had declared what it was not bound by the treaties signed 
by the Soviet Union? It should be noted that the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of 
Treaties, which was adopted in 1978 by a United Nations Conference, has not yet entered into force. 
Furthermore, Article 7 of this Convention stipulates that it will apply, when in force, "only in respect of a 
succession of states which has occurred after the entry into force of the Convention, except as may otherwise 
be agreed". Consequently, the Vienna Convention will not apply, even when it conies into force, to the various 
issues arising from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, unless otherwise agreed. 
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Nations brought to the attention of the Secretary-General the text of a note from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the heads of diplomatic missions 
in Moscow to the effect that the Russian Federation would continue to exercise die rights 
and honor the obligations arising from international treaties signed by the Soviet Union. 
On the basis of these declarations, the Secretary-General has taken the position that he 
will replace the name "Union of Socialist Republics" with the name "Russian Federation" 
in the lists of parties or signatories to treaties which were in force for, or which had been 
signed by the USSR as of 24 December 1991.24 For practical purposes it has thus been 
assumed that the Russian Federation is bound by all international treaties signed by the 
Soviet Union, including, presumably, the 1958 New York Convention. 
However, the New York Convention itself contains provisions with respect to 
ratification and accession. Article IX (2) stipulates that accession shall be effected by the 
deposition of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General. Furthermore, 
pursuant to Article XII (2) the Convention takes effect on the ninetieth day after 
deposition of an instrument of ratification or accession for states ratifying or acceding to 
the Convention after its coming into force.25 The Russian Federation has not deposited 
any instrument of ratification or accession as prescribed, and it will in all likelihood not 
do so, since the United Nations have accepted the declarations described above. On die 
basis of this acceptance, and taking into account the willingness of the Russian Federation 
to be bound by the international treaties signed by the Soviet Union, it is reasonable to 
assume that the Russian Federation is now deemed to be a member of the New York 
Convention, notwithstanding the fact that it has not complied with the explicit provisions 
of the Convention itself. 
To date there is at least one case where a Russian court has applied the provisions 
of the New York Convention. 
On 23 January 1992, the Moscow City Court rendered judgment in a case which is 
believed to be the first case of enforcement of a foreign arbitral award rendered in a non-
socialist country.26 The Russian party raised the objection that the awards could not be 
enforced, since the Russian Federation had not ratified the 1958 New York Convention. 
The court rejected this argument referring to Article 12 of die Minsk Agreement pursuant 
to which the Russian Federation as one of the signatories had undertaken to fulfil the 
24 This position was explained by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs—Mr. Carl-August 
Fleischhauei—in a letter dated 2 March 1992 and addressed to the Director for Legal Affairs of die Council of 
Europe, Mr. Erik Harremoes. 
25 Article XII reads: 
"1. This Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the third 
instrument of ratification or accession. 
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to this Convention after the deposit of the third instrument or ratification 
or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after deposit by such State of its 
instrument of ratification or accession." 
26 The Western party had obtained twelve separate, but virtually identical, arbitral awards in London. The 
Moscow City Court thus had twelve awards before it, but they were all treated in the same manner. 
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international obligations of the former Soviet Union. The Russian party never appealed 
the decision of the Moscow City Court, but rather paid the amounts stipulated in the 
arbitral award shortly after having received the judgment. 
Even though the application of the New York Convention has not been addressed by 
any higher court in the Russian Federation, it would seem reasonable to assume that other 
courts would follow the example of the Moscow City Court. 
Another potentially troublesome aspect of the Minsk Agreement was the declaration 
that Soviet law was not applicable on the territory of the Russian Federation. Since the 
Russian Federation has, needless to say, not had time to introduce its own laws in many 
areas, there arises the issue of what laws do apply? In particular, is the 1988 Decree On 
the Recognition and Execution in the USSR of Decisions of Foreign Courts and Arbitral 
Tribunals still applicable? This problem was addressed by die Supreme Soviet of the 
Russian Federadon when it radfied the Minsk Agreement and the Alma Ata Declaradon 
on 12 December 1991. The Supreme Soviet declared that in the absence of Russian 
legislation in a given area, Soviet laws and reguladons would apply in so far as they do 
not contradict exisdng Russian legisladon, the constitution or the Minsk Agreement.27 
(Hi) The 1988 Decree 
As mendoned above, the relevant municipal legisladve act is the "1988 Decree" On the 
Recognition and Execution in the USSR of Decisions of Foreign Courts and Arbitral 
Tribunals ("the 1988 Decree"). Pursuant to that decree an application for the enforcement 
of a foreign arbitral award is tried at the request of the claimant by the Supreme Courts 
of union republics where no oblast division exists, the Supreme Courts of autonomous 
republics krai, oblast, city courts, courts of autonomous oblasts and autonomouts okrugs 
at the domicile of the debtor and, if the debtor has no domicile in the USSR or the 
domicile is unknown—at the place where the property is located. 
It is noteworthy that although ordinarily district (city) people's courts are assigned 
the task of issuing writs of execudon, a higher level of the court system is charged with 
the task of trying applications under the 1988 Decree. 
An application seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitnd award must indicate: the 
name of the claimant, as well as his representative if the petition is filed by the latter, 
information regarding the claimant's (and, if applicable, its representative's) permanent 
or temporary place of residence and if the claimant is a juridical person—its location; the 
name of the debtor, information on his permanent or temporary place of residence and, 
if the debtor is a juridical person its—location; the request of (lie claimant for enforcement 
and in the event the award was previously enforced, information regarding what portion 
and from which date enforcement of the award is called for. 
The decree does not list what documents must accompany the application. It refers 
instead to the relevant provisions of the treaty in question. Where an international treaty, 
27 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Sovieta 1991, No. 51, item 1798. 
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on the basis of which recognition and enforcement is sought in the USSR of an arbitral 
award does not list the required documents, the relevant language of the 1958 New York 
Convention is invoked to fill the gap.28 That list includes originals of the arbitral 
decision duly authenticated, or a duly certified copy thereof and the original of the 
agreement to submit the dispute to arbitration, or duly certified copies thereof; 
furthermore, if the arbitral award or agreement is not written in the official language of 
the country where recognition and enforcement are sought, the requesting party shall 
furnish a translation of these documents in that language.29 The translation must be 
certified by the official or deputized translator or consular institution. 
Hearings on the petition are conducted in open court session with notification to the 
debtor of the time and place of the hearing.30 Failure of the debtor to attend without 
valid reason when the court knows that notice has been served does not bar hearing of 
the application.31 If the debtor has filed a request with the court to reschedule the 
hearing and the request is recognized by the court as valid, the court reschedules the 
hearing and informs the debtor of the new date. After hearing the debtor's arguments and 
studying the documents submitted, the court issues an order granting enforcement of the 
foreign arbitral award or denying leave to execute. 
With respect to foreign arbitral awards, the 1988 Decree itself spells out only one 
round for refusing to execute an award namely, that the deadline for submitting a 
decision for enforcement set forth in Article 63 of the Fundamentals of Civil Procedure 
of the USSR and union republics has lapsed.32 Otherwise, a general reference is made 
in Section 11 of the 1988 Decree to international treaties in this area which have been 
signed by the Soviet Union, including the 1958 New York Convention. In so far as the 
claimant relies on this convention, the grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement 
listed in Article V are thus applied.33 The drafters of the Convention put the onus on 
28 See Article IV of the 1958 New York Convention. 
29 1988 Decree, Section 2. 
30 Id. Section 3. 
31 1988 Decree, Section 4. 
32 See discussion on pp. 44^15, Infra. 
33 Article V of the 1958 New York Convention reads: 
"1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is 
invoked, only if thai party finished to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, 
proof that: 
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some 
incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing 
any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or 
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the 
arbitrator of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or 
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to 
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, 
if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of 
the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or 
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raising these defenses squarely on the shoulders of the losing side. So, when the decree 
refers to the Convention, this allocation of burden of proof is imported into the Russian 
legal system where, traditionally, the tendency has been not to delineate such responsibil-
ities but rather to allow courts a free hand in establishing the pertinent facts and not be 
bound by the activities of the parties and their counsel. 
As of today there are no reported court cases on the application of the 1958 New 
York Convention in Russia. Consequently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict 
what the future holds for Western companies trying to enforce arbitral awards. One can 
only hope that Russian courts will adhere to the pro-enforcement policy which has been 
adopted by must member-states of the 1958 New York Convention. 
A copy of the ruling to grant or refuse leave for execution of a foreign arbitral award 
is dispatched by the court to the claimant or his representative and the debtor within three 
days from the date of issuance. The ruling can be contested in the superior court in the 
manner and on the terms set forth in existing legislation. On the basis of the decision of 
the foreign arbitral tribunal and the final court ruling sanctioning execution, a writ of 
execution is issued and relayed to the people's court at the place of execution of the 
arbitral award. Actions for execution of a foreign arbitral award are effected by the bailiff 
in accordance with existing legislation. Bailiffs (execution officers) are affiliated with 
district (city) people's courts. Execution of a particular award is handled by the bailiff 
of the peoples court where the defendant is domiciled, or his property is located.34 Thus, 
in the case of foreign arbitral awards, this means that in Moscow for example, the 
Moscow City Court will send the writ of execution to the bailiff of the relevant peoples 
court in Moscow for execution. A judge at such court supervises the execution procedure 
to ensure proper and timely conduct thereof.35 
The 1988 Decree does not address what is to happen at this stage of the proceedings. 
An older instruction of the USSR Ministry of Justice of 24 June 1973, No. 7, as amended 
and supplemented by order No. 11 of 1 August, 1978,36 contains a subsection under the 
heading of "Execution of decisions of foreign courts and arbitral tribunals and procedure 
of transmitting abroad the monetary amounts levied" which, inter alia, stipulates the 
following: 
d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in a accordance with the 
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where 
the arbitration took place; or 
e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent 
authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made. 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the 
country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; 
or 
(b) Thee recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country." 
34 RSFSR Civil Procedural Code, Art. 348. 
35 Id. Art 349. 
36 Bulletin normativnykh aktov ministerstv i vedomstv SSSR 1979, No. 11, 7-45. 
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"200. The sums levied pursuant to executory documents in favor of citizens 
living abroad in socialist countries are transmitted to the claimants by the 
institutions of the USSR State Bank and USSR Foreign Trade Bank at the 
behest of the enterprises, institutions, organizations paying these sums or 
effecting withholdings from the salary of the debtor. 
In case these sums are entered on the deposit accounts of people's courts, their 
transfer to the claimants is effected by a payment order to the institutions of the 
USSR State Bank where these deposit accounts are located to subtract these 
sums and transmit them to the address of the claimant. 
201. The sums levied from Soviet organizations or citizens in favor or persons 
living abroad in other (besides socialist) countries are stored in the deposit 
account of the people's court until receipt by the claimants of permission to 
transfer these sums abroad or enter them in accounts of the claimants opened 
in savings offices and other credit institutions of the USSR. 
Upon receipt of the appropriate permission, the transfer of the indicated sums 
abroad is effected through the USSR Foreign Trade Bank." 
It is unclear whether or not this 1973 instruction has been replaced by more recent 
instructions. 
In conclusion, it must be emphasized that even though there seems to exist—at least 
on papere-a system of executing "authorities", i.e. the bailiffs affiliated with the people's 
courts, it has hitherto never been put to test with respect to foreign awards. Again, one 
can only hope that a pro-enforcement policy will prevail. 
(iv) Interim security measures 
Chapter 13 of the RSFSR Civil Procedural Code contains provisions on security 
measures. Article 433 of the same code stipulates that foreigners enjoy the same 
procedural rights as Soviet citizens. Thus, as a matter of principle, die security measures 
outlined in Chapter 13 are available to Western parties trying to safeguard their interests 
during an ongoing arbitration, or in enforcement proceedings. Available security 
measures include arrest of property, injunctive relief prohibiting the defendant from 
taking certain measures, and injunctive relief prohibiting third parties from transferring 
property to the defendant or from fulfilling other obligations in relation to the 
defendant.37 The RSFSR Civil Procedural Code does not contain any restrictions with 
respect to the specific types of claims for which security measures may be sought. 
An application for security measures must be filed with the "court hearing the case" 
and be decided by such court on the same day as the application is made.38 The 
defendant and other persons participating in the case are not given notice of the appli-
37 RSFSR Civil Procedural Code, Art. 134. 
38 Id. Art. 136. 
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cation. It is important to note that the quoted language has been interpreted to mean that 
arrest of property is possible only in a case pending before the very court hearing the 
actual dispute. This means that it is not possible to obtain an arrest order by a Russian 
court in an ongoing arbitration, since the case is not pending before any court at all, but 
rather before an arbitration tribunal.3' Furthermore, even if the arbitration proceedings 
have not yet been initiated it will be impossible to obtain an arrest order since a Russian 
court will not accept jurisdiction of a dispute which is covered by an arbitration 
clause.40 
However, the situation would seem to be different in an enforcement proceeding 
pending before a Russian court. Although it is unclear if any Russian court has actually 
ruled on the issue, it would seem to follow from Article 136 of RSFSR Civil Procedural 
Code that the court hearing the enforcement case is authorized to issue an arrest order. 
When granting an application for security measures, the court may require the 
claimant to provide a guarantee, or security, for possible damages to the defendant.41 
It should also be mentioned that the 1968 USSR Merchant Shipping Code empowers 
port authorities to detain ships and cargo located in the port in question upon the request 
of persons having claims based on salvage, general average, collisions between ships, or any 
other damage. However, such order by port authorities is valid only for three days; if no 
attachment order with respect to ship or cargo is issued by a competent court within that 
time period, the ship or the cargo, as die case may be, must be released immediately.42 
(v) Statute of limitations 
Article III of the New York Convention stipulates that a state's enforcement procedures 
for foreign arbitral awards may not be substantially more onerous than those applicable 
to domestic awards, nor may the charges or fees be substantially higher. 
In other words there may be differences between foreign and domestic awards, since 
the New York Convention does not prescribe assimilation between domestic and foreign 
awards, but rather prohibits procedures for foreign awards from being substantially more 
onerous. One area where there may be differences between jurisdictions is the time 
period during which an arbitral award remains enforceable, i.e. questions relating to the 
statute of limitations. Generally, there would seem to be at least three approaches to this 
39 In the enforcement case mentioned above on p. 41, the Western company applied for an arrest ordei—while 
the arbitration was still pending—with the courts of first instance in Moscow, St. Peterburg and Tallinn. All three 
courts denied the application on the ground that the dispute was not being heard by the court in question. The 
decisions of the lower courts were affirmed on appeal. Before die Western company appealed to the courts of 
last instance the Russian Party paid the amounts in question. 
40 Article 6 of the RSFSR Civil Procedural Code stipulates, inter alia, that a court shall terminate the 
proceedings "if there is an agreement between the parties to refer the dispute in question for settlement by an 
arbitral tribunal". 
41 RSFSR Civil Procedural Code, Art. 140. 
42 1968 USSR Merchant Shipping Code, Art. 76. 
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issue, viz., no limitation at all, application of the ordinary statute of limitation and 
introduction of specific time limits for arbitral awards.43 
Pursuant to Article 63 of the Fundamentals of Civil Procedure of the USSR and the 
Union Republics, foreign arbitral awards must be presented for execution in the USSR 
within three years from the date they became final. Under Soviet law this provision is 
deemed to be mandatory and must be complied with irrespective of whether the disputed 
contract was subject to Soviet law or not.44 
The statute of limitation thus starts to run when the award becomes final, which as 
matter of principle should be determined by the applicable foreign law. Unless the parties 
have agreed otherwise the law of the place of the arbitration, i.e. the lex arbitri, will be 
applied to determine the finality of the award. 
However, it has been suggested that it would be sufficient for an award to have 
become binding pursuant to Article V(l)(e) of the New York Convention,45 without 
necessarily resorting to lex arbitri.46 This would seem to follow from Article 438 of the 
RSFSR Civil Procedural Code which stipulates that if an international treaty to which the 
Soviet Union is a party contains rules other than those contained in Soviet legislation, the 
treaty takes precedence.47 Even though there is consensus that the term "binding" in the 
New York Convention was intended to do away with the so-called "double exequatur" 
requirement, i.e. the requirement to have the award reduced to a judgment by a court in 
the country where the award was rendered, the position is less clear as to when an award 
becomes binding under the New York Convention. The number of court cases ruling on 
this issue is still fairly limited.48 This notwithstanding die generally held view is that an 
award becomes binding under the New York Convention as soon as it no longer is open 
to review on the merits, even if it may be open to nullification proceedings. In practice 
this means that an award becomes binding when it is rendered,49 at which moment the 
three year period thus starts to run. 
43 LEBEDEV: How long does a foreign a award slay enforceable?, in The Art of Arbitration (eds. 
Schultz—van den Berg) Liber Amicorum Pieter Sanders (1982) 220. 
44 LUNTS, L. A.: Mezhdunarodnyi grazhdanskii protsess (1966) 103.—Ttiis presupposes dial the barring of 
claims by lapse of time is classified as a procedural matter as opposed to a matter of substantive law. Procedural 
matters are governed by lex fori, i.e. Russian law, whereas substantive matters are governed by lex contractus. 
Under Swedish law, for example, this classification is done the other way around, that is to say that questions 
of limitation are classified as matters of substantive law, see e.g. Arbitration in Sweden, second (revised) edition 
(1984), 55, n. 18. 
45 Lebedev, supra, not 32, at 218. 
46 See SANDERS, P.: Vingt années de la Convention de New York de 1958, in Droit et pratique du 
commerce international (1979) No. 3, 369-370. 
47 Article 438 of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure which reads in translation: "If, an international treaty 
to which the USSR is a party, lays down rules other than those in Soviet civil procedure legislation, then the 
rules of the international treaty shall apply". 
48 One notable exception is the so-called Götaverken-case (Götaverken Arendal Aktiebolag v. Genera] 
National Maritime Transport Company, NJA 1979 p. 527). For a discussion of lliis case see e.g. Arbitration in 
Sweden second (revised) edition (1984) 165-168. 
49 VAN DEN BERG: The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 (1984) 345. 
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It is not unusual that the Russian party takes the initiative to commence "settlement 
negotiations" anew even after an award has been rendered in favor of the Western party. 
The purpose of such negotiations is usually to try to find ways of paying the amounts in 
question. When agreeing to participate in such negotiations, it is important to keep the 
above-described time limitations in mind. Pursuant to Article 346 of the RSFSR Civil 
Procedural Code the statute of limitation is tolled, and a new three year period starts, 
when the necessary documents are presented for executing, i.e. when an application for 
enforcement is made pursuant to the provisions of the 1988 Decree. In other words, 
participation in settlement discussions or negotiations, is not sufficient to toll the statute 
of limitation. 
IV. Assets Available for Execution 
Assuming that a Western party has been successful in enforcement proceedings before 
a Russian court and has obtained a writ of execution, the crucial question is which assets 
of the Russian counterparty are available for execution. In discussing this question a 
distinction must be drawn between FTOs established under the state monopoly of foreign 
trade and continuing to function in their old form, on the one hand, and FTOs 
transformed into joint stock companies, on the other. 
(i) Foreign trade organizations 
The assets of a foreign trade organization are carefully segregated from those of the state 
and of other state enterprises. For example, Article 33 of the RSFSR Civil Code 
explicitly stipulates that the state is not liable for the obligations of other state 
organizations. Each foreign trade organization is initially allocated capital which it may 
use for any purpose consonant with its charter, the amount of which is specified in the 
charter. The same basic rules of segregation apply to assets of foreign trade organizations 
which have been transformed into joint stock companies. Joint stock companies are 
regulated by a decree—No. 601—adopted on 25 December 1990 by the RSFSR Council 
of Ministers, ("Decree 601"). 
Since most foreign trade organizations are non-producing, trading, entities and thus 
maintain little or no equipment, their assets typically include only warehouses, office 
equipment and goods. The assets available for execution are further limited by the fact 
that assets are divided into basic assets and circulating assets, only the latter category 
being available for execution. Under Soviet law basic assets were immune from 
execution.50 Circulating assets include money and goods held for sale. Such assets are 
in tum divided into (i) items with a useful life over one year and (ii) items which, 
irrespective of useful life, have a value under a figure determined by each ministry.5' 
50 RSFSR Civil Procedural Code, Art. 411. 
51 Kommentarii KGPK RSFSR (Commentary to the RSFSR Civil Procedural Code) (1976) 532. 
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However, not even all circulating assets are available for execution. For example, 
amounts needed to pay wages already due as well as wages for the next fifteen-day 
period are exempted from execution.52 
Goods in transit are among a foreign trade organization's circulating assets and thus 
as a matter of principle available for execution. However, import goods never come into 
a foreign trade organization's operative management because it purchases goods on behalf 
of the end-user as a commission agent.53 On the other hand, export goods are purchased 
by the foreign trade organization outright. Typically, however, title passes to the foreign 
purchaser at the same time as the producer loses his right of operative management. In 
other words the foreign trade organization never acquires operative management.54 
Consequently, there is little in the way of assets available for execution, except for funds 
in bank accounts. In light of the fact that the traditional foreign trade system has been 
abolished and taking into account the changing nature of Russian law today it is uncertain 
to what extent the above-described rules still apply, even if the foreign trade organization 
in question has not changed its organizational and legal form. 
For all practical purposes, the only assets available for execution today would seem 
to be funds in bank accounts. Indeed, this was also the situation under the old system of 
Soviet foreign made. Pursuant to Article 409 of the RSFSR Civil Procedural Code, 
execution of judgments and awards against state enterprises and other state entities was 
to be levied, in the first place on funds in bank accounts. Only if such funds were 
insufficient, could execution be levied on other property of the state; entity, with the 
exceptions provided for by law which have been discussed above. 
In cases where the amount levied is insufficient to satisfy all the claims of creditors, 
Soviet law laid down the following priorities: 
(1) Claims to recover alimony; claims of workers and employees based on labor 
relationships; claims of kolchos members connected with their work in the kolchos; 
attorney's fees; claims for remuneration due to authors based on copyright, right to 
discovery, or invention covered by an author's certificate, or an improvement suggestion; 
claims for damages caused by bodily injury or other harm done to human health, or by 
death of the breadwinner; upon full satisfaction of the above claims, social insurance 
claims will be satisfied; 
(2) Claims for state and local taxes and non-tax budgetary revenues, and claims of 
the organs of State insurance concerning compulsory insurance; claims for damages 
suffered by state enterprises, institutions, organizations, collective farms and other social 
organizations as a result of breaches of law; 
52 GENKIN, D. J. (ed.): Pravovye regulirovanie vneshnei lorgovli SSSR (1961) 53. It is uncertain, however, 
whether this still applies since the source is more than 30 years old and since it has not been possible to 
ascertain whether or not these rules have been repealed, or are still in effect. 
53 Genkin, op. cit. 
54 This follows from Order of the Minister of Foreign Trade, 26 January 1960, No. 25 'On the Condition of 
Delivery of Goods for Export', in Sbornik normativnykh materialov po voprosam vneshnei torgovh SSSR, vol. 
2 (1961) 27-46. 
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(3) Secured claims of State credit institutions connected with their credit operations; 
(4) Non-secured claims of state institutions, enterprises, collective farms and other 
cooperative and social organizations; 
(5) All other claims.55 
Pursuant to this list, most foreign arbitral awards rendered against Russian entities 
would in all likelihood fall into the last category of claims. 
(ii) Joint stock companies 
As mentioned above, a good number of foreign trade organizations have been 
transformed into joint stock companies.56 In many cases it would seem that the state-
through a ministry—is the majority shareholder. Section 9 of Decree 601—the Joint Stock 
Companies Regulation—stipulates that the company is not responsible for the obligations 
of the shareholders. One would have expected to find the corollary to this principle, i.e. 
that the shareholders are not responsible for the obligations of die company. However, 
Section 8 of the Joint Stock Companies Regulation stipulates that the shareholders are 
liable for the obligations of the company to the extent of their investment in the (share) 
capital of the company. This language notwithstanding, the generally held opinion seems 
to be that the shareholders cannot be made personally responsible for such obligations. 
Rather, the underlying philosophy seems to have been a desire to explain that the 
investment of a shareholder may be at risk if execution is levied on the property of the 
company. 
Section 10 of the Joint Stock Companies Regulation contains a very important 
provision in that it states explicitly that a joint stock company is responsible with all its 
assets for its obligations. Thus, with respect to joint stock companies the exemptions from 
execution described above do not apply. This is a significant change, since nowadays also 
55 See Decree of die Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 5 May 1981, as amended on 2 December 
1987, On the Priority of Satisfying Claims on the Basis of Writs of Execution (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Sovieta 
1981 No. 19, item 711 and 1987 No. 49, item 791). 
56 This transformation process took place, to a large extent, prior to adoption of the Russian privatization 
legislation, and in some cases prior to the adoption of Decree 601 in December 1990. With respect to the latter 
category of joint stock companies, special decrees were typically issued by the then USSR Council of Ministers. 
To ascertain the legal status of such joint stock companies it is thus necessary to review the special decree in 
question. The Russian Privatization Law was adopted 3 July 1991 and the 1992 Stale Privatization Program 
in June 1992. Primarily on the basis of these two normative acts a number of additional legislative acts have 
been promulgated during the summer and fall of 1992, including, inter alia, the so-called Coqroratizalion 
Decree of 1 July 1992. Pursuant to Ute Corporatization Decree all large state enterprises, as defined in die 
DecreeHncluding any remaining FTOs—must be transformed into joint slock companies, die shares of wliich 
are subsequently to be sold in the privatizadon process. Tliis decree also includes a standard charter which all 
newly formed joint stock companies must adopt. Intitially, prior to die sale of shares in die privatization 
process, all shares of the company are owned by the state. Neither the decree itself, nor the standard charter 
contain any specific provisions limiting the assets of such joint stock companies on which execution may be 
levied. Therefore, Secdon 10 of Decree 601 presumably applies in this respect. 
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producing entities—with equipment and other potentially valuable assets—have foreign 
trade rights. On the other hand, the provisions with respect to state organizations 
contained in the RSFSR Civil Procedural Code discussed above have not been changed. 
Thus, it is possible that presumably they could still be relied on by state enterprises 
engaged in foreign trade. An important question in this connection is whether a joint 
stock company which is wholly owned by the state—typically because its predecessor is 
a state enterprise—remains a state organization, or does the creating of a separate joint 
stock company remove it from this category, giving the company itself, rather than the 
state, ownership rights over its property? The latter would be the natural conclusion if 
one proceeds from traditional Western notions of separate legal entities. Unfortunately, 
however, there is as yet no clear answer. If the joint stock company were to be 
characterized as a state organization, it would seem likely that the company could rely 
on the aforementioned provisions of the RSFSR Civil Procedural Code.57 
V. Piercing the corporate veil 
(i) General 
As Section IV above makes clear, the assets of a foreign trade organization available 
for execution are very limited. In practice this would seem to be the situation also with 
respect to FTOs which have been transformed into joint stock companies, as well as 
with respect to other legal entities engaged in foreign trade. This is why some Western 
creditors have tried to execute on the property of other state entities, or on the 
property—of the state itself. Even though the legal status under Soviet civil law of an 
FTO made it appear rather independent of the state and the government, the administrat-
ive-legal status of an FTO changed the picture considerably: administrative superiors 
created the FTO, appointed its management, planned and supervised all its commercial 
activities. As discussed in Section II above, the Council of Ministers created, merged, 
divided and liquidated FTOs on the recommendation of the minister of foreign trade and 
property was held, not with ownership rights, but rather on the basis of operative 
mangement.58 
Although the independence of an FTO as a legal entity—from which assumption the 
provisions of the RSFSR Civil Code theoretically proceed—was thus a fiction, Western 
businessmen, generally speaking, accepted the idea that an FTO was a separate legal 
entity, and that the Soviet state was not responsible for the obligations of the FTO. 
57 Chapter 39 of the RSFSR Civil Procedural Code contains provisions concerning execution on the property 
of citizens. As of today, the Procedural Code does not contain any provisions with respect to execution on the 
property of privately owned, i.e. non-state-legal entities. In the old days no such provisions were necessary since 
all commercial activities were carried out by state organizations within the framework of the planned economy. 
Clearly, the Procedural Code must be amended in this respect. 
58 See pp. 36-38. supra. 
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However, it is submitted that this acceptance was based on a tacit understanding that the 
state would always see to it that obligations of the FTO in question were fulfilled and its 
debts paid. Indeed, this was in fact the situation until recently. In the view of some 
Western businessmen and observers, the Russian Government is now taking away what 
it has earlier given, thereby defacto creating a situation in which the Russian Government 
may no longer stand behind the obligations and debts of the FTOs59 and the FTOs have 
no assets available for execution; this—the argument continues—is tantamount to an 
evasion of obligations, and the state must therefore bear the responsibility for the 
situation it has created. In other words, it has been argued that it must be possible to 
pierce the corporate veil of the FTO and execute on other state property. Guided by this 
line of reasoning some Western creditors have attempted to arrest the property of other 
FTOs, or other state entities, located abroad to make themselves paid pursuant to arbitral 
awards rendered against FTOs. 
Even though questions related to piercing the corporate veil are among the classic 
issues of international law, it is not until recently that they have become issues in 
Soviet/Russian foreign trade.60 
As a matter of principle, the starting point in trying to resolve these issues must be 
that in cases where it follows from lex corporations61 that an enterprise has a separate 
59 See note 11 at p. 38 supra. 
60 Generally speaking most legal systems proceed from the assumption that (lie separation from a legal entity 
of its owners should be respected. However, some legal systems recognize that under exceptional circumstances 
such separation should not be accepted. With respect to the United States, see e.g. BURKHARD: Neuere 
Probleme der Haftungsdurchgriff bei juristischen Personen im Recht der vereinigten Staaten (1969) and 
SERICK, Rechtsform und Realität juristischen Personen (1955); for comparative studies, see e.g. BASTID, 
S.-DAVID, R.: La personalité morale et ses limites (1960) and COLM-SIMITIS: Lifting the Veil in the 
Company Laws of the European Continent, 12 ICLQ (1963) 189ff. For treatment of die problem of piercing 
the corporate veil in international trade and commerce see e.g. BÖCKSTIEGEL, К. H.: Der Staat als 
Vertrangspartner ausländischer Privatunternehmen (1971); id. Der Durchgriff auf den Staat (1972); KHADJAVI-
GOUTARD-HAUSMANN: Zurechenbarkeit von Hoheitsakten und subsidiäre Staatshaftung bei Verträgen mit 
ausländischen Staatsunternehmen, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (1980) 533; id., Haftungsdurchgriff auf 
ausländische Staaten, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (1983) 1 and Ress, Regierungskontrolle von 
öffentlichen (staatlichen und halbstaatlichen) Industrieunternehmen, in Festschrih für B.C.H. Aubin (1979) 129. 
61 It is settled law in most countries that the lex corporationis is to be applied to all questions regarding a 
corporation's "internal affairs"—with respect to English law, see for example DICEY, A. V.-MORRIS, S.: The 
Conflict of Laws (11th ed.), (1987) 1128-1136 and to American law, Scoles & Hay, Conflict of Laws, (1982) 
883-896. These affairs include essentially those acts diat do not in and of diemselves implicate tltird parties. 
Thus, the status of a corporation (i.e. whether it is duly and validly incorporated), die rights and liabilities of 
its directors, officers and shareholders, the validity of its stock issues and by-laws, the election of directors and 
appointment of management, die declaration of dividends and dissolution are determined by the lex corpora-
tionis. The application of die lex corporationis to these issues means diat even if a company incorporated in 
one foreign country conducts all its activities in other countries, the law of the country of incorporation will 
nevertheless e applied to resolve disputes related to the "internal affairs" of the company. The eason for such 
a rule becomes obvious when one considers the ranüficalions of a different one. It would hardly be practical 
for the rights and obligations of directors officers and shareholders, for example, to vary depending on the law 
of each such individuals domicile. As explained by one American scholar: "The need for unity applies to such 
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legal existence, this separation of the enterprise from the owner should be respected. This 
basic rule also applies to state owned enterprises. It is part of the sovereignty of every 
state to decide that for certain activities in which the state wishes to engage it may create 
an enterprise with separate legal personality thereby creating the traditional legal 
consequences of such separation. However, problems arise when actions are taken by the 
state which may be characterized as an abuse of the separate legal personality or which 
may be said to militate against bona fide treatment of the separate legal entity. 
Under Soviet law, the separate legal existence of FTOs is firmly rooted. Article 564 
of the RSFSR Civil Code stipulates that the legal capacity of foreign legal entities is 
determined by the law according to which the legal entity was created. This is the 
traditional formulation of lex corporationis, which is accepted in most countries.62 
Consequently, the legal characteristics of a legal entity created on the basis of Soviet law 
are determined by such law. Article 33 of the RSFSR Civil Code provides that the state 
is not responsible for the obligations of state enterprises and such enterprises are not 
responsible for the obligations of the state. No cases are known under Soviet law where 
a Soviet court or arbitral tribunal has pierced the corporate veil of a state enterprise, or 
other state organization. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that a Western creditor would 
be successful in trying to execute on state property located on the territory of the Russian 
Federation other than that which belongs to the FTO, or the joint stock company, against 
which the award was rendered. 
(ii) Major legal systems 
Since many FTOs, and other state entities own property located abroad against which 
execution may—as a matter of principle—be levied, it is necessary to look briefly at some 
major legal systems in the West with a view to determining to what extent it could be 
possible to pierce the corporate veil of FTOs, and other state entities in such jurisdictions. 
As the brief overwiev below will show, the circuipstances under which the corporate veil 
matters as the stockholder's right to dividends, his right to participate in the management of the corporation 
by voting at stockholders meeting or otherwise, his liability on unpaid subscriptions, his subjection to assess-
ments or double liability by reason of his being a shareholder, the existence and nature of possible preemptive 
rights in other stock or the properties of the corporation, and every other relations right and duty which grows 
out of the fact of his being a stockholder", LEFLAR, American Conflicts Law (3rd ed.), (1971) 503.4 
62 Generally speaking, the lex corporationis may be either the law of the country were the entity in question 
was incorporated, provided incorporation is required for creation of the entity, the law of the country where the 
management of the entity is domiciled or the law of the country where the main activities of the entity are 
carried out. With respect to foreign entities, Russian law takes the position that the lex corporationis of such 
entities is the law of the country where the entity in question was established—Art. 564. second paragraph, of 
the RSFSR Civil Code reads: "When effecting a transaction in the course offoreign trade, and the accounting, 
insurance and other operations connected with it, the civil law capacity of foreign enterprises and organizations 
is governed by the law of the country where the enterprise or organisation is established "—For a discussion 
of Soviet law as lex corporationis, see HOBÉR, K.: Choice of Law and Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union, in 
F.J.M. Feldbrugge (ed.) The Emancipation of Soviet Law (1992) 120-124. 
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may be pierced vary. Generally speaking, however, it would seem to be clear that a legal 
entity's separate status may be disregarded only under exceptional circumstances. 
Consequently, it will be difficult to convince Western courts to disregard the separate 
legal status of Russian entities. Western parties seeking to pierce the corporate veil of 
Russian entities will—it is submitted—find valuable general guidance for structuring their 
arguments in the following pronouncement made by the International Court of Justice in 
the so-called Barcelona Traction case: 
"Forms of incorporation and their legal personality have sometimes not been 
employed for the sole purposes they were intended to serve; sometimes the 
corporate entity has been unable to protect the rights of those who have entrusted 
their financial resources to it; thus inevitably there have arisen dangers of abuse, 
as in the case of many other institutions of law. Here, then, as elsewhere, the law, 
confronted with economic realities, has had to provide protective measures and 
remedies in the interests of those within the corporate entity as well as those 
outside who have dealings with it... It is in this context that the process of 'lifting 
the corporate veil' or 'disregarding the legal entity' has been found justified and 
equitable in certain circumstances or for certain purposes. The wealth of practice 
in municipal law indicates that the veil is lifted, for instance, to prevent misuse 
of the privileges of the corporate personality, as in certain cases of fraud or 
malfeasance, to protect third persons... or to prevent the evasion of legal 
requirements or responsibilities."63 
1. The United States 
In 1983 the US Supreme Court decided the so-called Bancec case (First National City 
Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cubaj.64 Prior to this case the US Supreme 
Court had never addressed the issue of the separate corporate status of foreign 
government entities. In the Bancec case the Supreme Court broke from the position 
traditionally taken by US courts with respect to the legal status accorded government 
corporations from socialist countries and pierced the corporate veil of a Cuban FTO. The 
facts and holding of the Bancec case are as follows.65 
By 1960, First National City Bank ("Citibank") had established banking branch 
offices in Cuba. Citibank issued Banco Para El Commercio De Cuba ("Bancec"), an 
63 Case Concerning Barcelona Traction Light Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain) 1970 ICJ, 3. See also 
Böckstiegel, Arbitration and State Enterprises. Survey on the National and International State of Law and 
Practice (1984) 41—48. (This section discusses suggested principles for lifting the corporate veil.) 
64 102 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).—For comments on the case see e.g. Case note, The Liability of Foreign 
Government Entities: First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, Boston College 
International & Comparative Law Review, Vol. Ill, No. 1 (1984) 127-149 and Case Note, Piercing the Veil of 
Foreign Trade Organizations, Columbia Journal of Transnational I .aw, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1985) 483—496. 
65 The account below is based on the case report referred to in note 7, supra. 
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official, autonomous credit institution for foreign trade with full legal capacity of its own, 
an irrevocable letter of credit in connection with the sale of sugar by Bancec to a 
Canadian corporation. After delivery, all Citibank assets were seized and nationalized by 
the Cuban Government, through Cuba's national bank, Banco Nacional ("Banco"). When 
Bancec sought to collect on the letter of credit, Citibank refused payment, opting to credit 
the amount against losses from the Cuban nationalization. Bancec then brought suit in 
U.S. Federal Court. Shortly thereafter, the Cuban government dissolved Bancec, and the 
claim against Citibank eventually devolved to Banco. Throughout the nearly 20 year legal 
battle that ensued, Citibank sought to set off its Cuban losses from plaintiff's letter of 
credit. After the Federal Appeals Court refused to allow Citibanks counterclaim, the 
United States Supreme Court agreed to examine the ability of Citibank to offset losses 
incurred at the hands Cuba, in a lawsuit brought by its independent instrumentality. 
The Court began its analysis by recognizing and reaffirming the independent status 
of FTOs characterizing them as independent of the state establishing it, and as such 
conferred with unique characteristics, such as the right to sue and be sued. In this way, 
it is similar to a corporation, whose identity and existence is separate from its 
shareholders. As a shareholder's illegal behavior would rarely make a corporation liable 
for suit, so too government illegality will not usually affect an FTO. The Bancec case 
created a judicial exception to this rule when it held that Cuba's seizure of Citibank 
assets allowed Citibank to offset its loss against Bancec's claim for lack of payment 
under the letter of credit. 
In so holding, the Court essentially analyzed the situation under equitable principles 
of corporate law, and first observed that: 
"limited liability for governmental instrumentalities is the rule, not the exception 
and great deference should be accorded government instrumentalities established 
as juridical entities. However, as with private corporations, if an entity is so 
extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is 
created, one may be held liable for the acts of the о titer". 
When Bancec was dissolved, the claim devolved to Banco. The fact that Banco 
coordinated the seizure of Citibank assets upon the orders of the Cuban Parliament 
demonstrated to the Court that Banco was the agent of the Cuban Government. As 
Cuba's agent the Court reasoned that any recovery by Banco would be of primary benefit 
to Cuba, and thus Cuba should be accountable for Banco's illegal taking of Citibank 
property. As the primary beneficiary to Banco's recovery, the Court held that it would 
be inequitable to essentially allow Cuba to recover on a claim while avoiding responsibil-
ity for its actions. Cuba's transfer of the claim to Banco was also recognized as 
inequitable by the court: 
66 102 S. Ct. 2591 (1983) at 619. 
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"[There exists] the broader equitable principal that the doctrine of corporate 
entity, recognized generally and for most purposes, will not be regarded when to 
do so would work fraud or injustice."67 
When the Supreme Court rendered its decision in the Bancec case, it was unclear 
how broadly U.S. courts would interpret the ruling. Critics charged that the holding, 
based almost entirely on equitable principles of fairness, would create a barrage of 
previously excluded claims. However, in the nine years since the Bancec case, only a few 
cases have dealt with the subject, and all but one has refused to hold a government 
instrumentality liable for government action. These cases are an instructive guide to what 
courts will deem dispositive in ruling on similar claims. 
In Lettelier v. The Republic of Chile,68 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals con-
sidered the issue of whether a judgment against tire Chilean Government made its 
national airline amenable to execution. In Lettelier, numerous judgment creditors sought 
to enforce a lower court's judgment against the Republic of Chile by seizing an airplane 
owned by Linea Area Nacional, Chile's national airline ("Linea"). The District Court 
allowed the seizure, finding that adherence to the airline's separate corporate entity would 
violate the equitable principles enunciated in the Bancec case. 
In reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals noted that Linea's peripheral 
participation in the actions leading to the claim did not amount to an abuse of Linea's 
corporate form; Chilean government agents were able to use die airline in the execution 
of the tortious act upon which the Plaintiffs brought suit. However, the court felt that this 
contact between Linea and Chile did not amount to the overwhelming governmental 
control seen in the Bancec case, as there was no evidence that Linea's separate juridical 
status was established to shield its owners from liability for their actions, or that Chile 
ignored ordinary corporate formalities in the operation of the airline. 
The holding in Lettelier is important because it confirms the Supreme Court's 
mandate that separate corporate existence is a presumption which should not easily be 
overcome; to be overcome a closer connection between instrumentality and State was 
needed, as when a corporation is run as the alter ego of its owner. 
The importance of alter ego analysis was explored in Hester International v. The 
Republic of Nigeria.69 In Hester, an American corporation (Hester) entered into a rice 
supply operation with a Nigerian company. When the operation failed, Hester filed suit 
in U.S. Federal Court, claiming that the Nigerian party caused the operation to fail. 
Hester named the Nigerian Government as a co-defendant, reasoning that the Nigerian 
party was the alter ego of the Government and thus the Government was legally 
responsible for the operation's failure. 
67 Id., at 629. 
68 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980). 
69 879 F. 2d. 170 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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In dismissing Nigeria as a party to the suit, the Court of Appeals first noted that 
Nigeria had never signed the agreement. Thus, for Nigeria to be held liable under the 
contract, there had to exist such an integrated relationship between it and the company 
that an obvious inequity would arise in denying liability. The court contrasted the facts 
of the case to those in Kalamazoo v. Ethiopia.10 In Kalamazoo, the court decided 
whether or not Ethiopia's involvement in a domestic company was so extensive as to 
allow Kalamazoo's damages from Ethiopia's expropriation, which Kalamazoo sought to 
raise as a counterclaim in a suit by the domestic corporation. 
Answering the question in the affirmative, the court in Kalamazoo noted the close 
factual similarities between that case and the Bancec case (i.e. government expropriation 
of defendant's property, a domestic plaintiff involved in the illegal government 
expropriation and defendants desire to set off government damage in the form of a 
counterclaim). After noting that Ethiopia had exerted direct control of the domestic 
company after taking defendant's capital holdings in the company, the court concluded: 
"[that] to continue to recognize the separate legal status of [the domestic 
company] would insulate the [Ethiopian Government] from liability for its 
expropriation of [defendants] property interest in [the domestic company], while 
pennitting [Ethiopia], through [the domestic company], to profit from its 
commercial activities in the United States and to even assert a claim against 
[defendant] to recover payment for assets [the domestic company] sold in the 
country... The Court concludes that maintenance of the suit against [Ethiopia] 
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."71 
Kalamazoo, as the only case where liability was imputed to the instrumentality, is 
striking given its almost exactly similar fact situation to that in the Bancec case. The fact 
that liability was imputed only in such a similar case further confirms that U.S. courts 
have been quite hesitant to create an exception to the general rule of separate identity for 
government instrumentalities. 
Unlike Kalamazoo, the court in Hester concluded that the facts did not warrant a 
holding that the domestic corporation was so extensively controlled as to be an alter-ego 
of the government. This is significant because the Government owned 100% of the 
domestic corporation and solely appointed the members of the board of directors. 
2. The United Kingdom 
English courts follow a rule similar to the general rule in U.S. courts; English courts 
recognize the separate juridical status of foreign government entities. The English courts, 
however, have not deviated from this general rule, as indicated by the three English cases 
70 616 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Mich. 1985). 
71 Id., at 666. 
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cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bancec.72 Although these cases do not involve a 
setoff, they do involve government entities with many of the same characteristics as the 
Cuban state trading corporation Bancec. For this reason, it is submitted that the cases are 
indicative of how English courts might handle similar issues, if and when they are 
confronted with them. 
In Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria,11 the court considered 
the relationship between the Central Bank of Nigeria, a government entity, and the 
Nigerian government. The Nigerian government had instituted import controls on cement 
to alleviate shipping congestion in Nigerian ports. Pursuant to these import controls, the 
Central Bank of Nigeria refused to honor its obligations under various irrevocable letters 
of credit to Trendtex, a Swiss corporation that was to supply the cement to an English 
trading company. One issue in the case was whether the Central Bank of Nigeria was an 
alter ego of the Nigerian govenunent and therefore immune from suit under the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity.74 The court of first instance found that the functions of the bank 
were essentially functions of the state of Nigeria and, for that reason, held that the bank 
was a department of the state and thus not a separate entity and therefore immune from 
suit in England. 
The Court of Appeal, however, reversed this decision.75 Lord Justice Stephenson 
found that the Central Bank of Nigeria Act established the bank as a separate entity, not 
as a government department. Since the bank had many of the duties of a bank and was 
capable of suing and being sued, Lord Justice Stephenson ruled that the bank was not a 
department of the Nigerian government but a separate entity and thus could not claim 
sovereign immunity. 
Lord Justice Shaw concurred in this decision. He emphasized thai the Nigerian 
government had established the bank as a separate entity, that the bank's functions were 
indicative of this separate status, and that those dealing with the bank would presume it 
was independent, and concluded that the bank was a separate entity from the government. 
The English Court of Appeal reconsidered the relationship between a government 
entity and the government which created it in C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Centralia Handlu 
Zagranicznego Rolimpex.16 In this case, the Polish state enterprise Rolimpex contracted 
to sell sugar to C. Czarnikow Ltd., an English company. When the Polish Minister of 
72 The Supreme Court cited the tliree cases discussed below, i.e. Trendtex, Rolimpex and I Congreso del 
Partido, 102 S. Ct. at 2600, n. 18. 
73 Trendtex (1977) 1 Q.B. at 560. The facts of the case described below are as set forth in the case report. 
74 Generally speaking, questions concerning the possibility to pierce the corporate veil of state enterprises 
are intimately linked with state immunity considerations. This is particularly true with respect to Germany, 
France and Switzerland, cf. p. 52 et seq. Tltis notwithstanding, immunity is treated separately below, in Section 
VI, since different considerations do after all apply. 
75 Trendtex, 1977 1 Q.B. at 580. 
76 Rolimpex, 1979 A.C. 351.—For comments on this case, see eg. BECKER, The Rolimpex Exit from Inter-
national Contract Responsibility, 10 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1978), and 
LESSER, Rolimpex: A Sweet Solution to Legal Success, 128 New Law Journal (1978) 591. 
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Foreign Trade and Shipping banned the export of sugar, Rolimpex was unable to meet 
its contractual obligations. Rolimpex claimed that the force majeure clause in the 
contract, which excused performance if prevented by government intervention, released 
it from liability for nonperformance of the contract. The English company contended 
that because Rolimpex was a Polish state enterprise, the actions of the Polish 
government could not be separated from those of Rolimpex; therefore, the government 
intervention was not beyond the seller's control, as required for the force majeure clause 
to be effective. The court ruled, however, that Rolimpex and the Polish government 
were not the same entity and that Rolimpex could therefore rely on the force majeure 
clause. 
The House of Lords affirmed the decision.77 It considered that while Rolimpex was 
subject to the direction of a government minister, it did have a separate personality, 
making its own decisions on commercial activity, such as choosing with whom and on 
what tenns to do business. The state treasury was not responsible for the financial 
obligations of Rolimpex, and Rolimpex was not responsible for those of the state. 
Relying on these facts, the court ruled that Rolimpex and the Polish government were 
not so closely connected so as to preclude Rolimpex from relying on the sugar export ban 
by the government. Rolimpex was thus released from liability because of the force 
majeure clause. This decision demonstrates the desire English courts to respect the 
independent status of government entities.78 
The most recent case dealing with the independent status of foreign government 
entities is Г Congreso del Partido.19 This case concerned a contract for the sale of 
sugar between Cubazucar a Cuban trading enterprise, and Iansa, a Chilean company. 
Mambisa, another Cuban state trading enterprise, operated the ships which were to deliver 
the sugar. The Cuban government exercised overall direction and control over Cubazucar 
and Mambisa and provided the funds necessary for their operation. The trading 
companies, however, made their own decisions regarding day-to-day commercial matters. 
The court recognized that these companies were very similar to the Polish organization 
Rolimpex. When the Cuban government ordered that the contract not be performed 
because of its intense dislike of the new Chilean government, Iansa sued Mambisa and 
the Republic of Cuba. 
The Admiralty Court held that it had no jurisdiction over Mambisa or the Republic 
of Cuba and therefore dismissed the actions.80 Referring to Cubazucar and Mambisa, 
the court stated that they were examples of independent state enterprises found in both 
Western and socialist countries. The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision 
77 Rolimpex, 1979 A.C. at 373. 
78 Rolimpex, 1979 A.C. at 361. 
79 (1980) 1 Lloyds L.R. 23 (C.A.). For comments, see e.g. FOX, H.: State Immunity: The House of Lord 's 
Decision in 1° Congreso del Partido, 98 L.Q. Rev. ( 1982) 94. 
80 1° Congreso, (1978) 1 Q.B. at 533. 
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and agreed that Cubazucar and Mambisa were not deparunents of the Cuban government, 
but rather were independent entities.81 
The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and held that Cuba 
could not plead sovereign immunity.82 It agreed, however, with the lower courts' 
treatment of the Cuban state enterprises. Lord Wilberforce stated: 
"State-controlled enterprises, with legal personality, ability to trade and to enter 
into contracts ofprivate law, though wholly subject to the control of their state, 
are a well-known feature of the modem commercial scene. The distinction 
between them, and their governing state, may appear artificial; but it is an 
accepted distinction in the law of England and other states."83 
Thus, while the various English courts disagreed on whether Cuba could plead 
sovereign immunity for actions having both political and commercial aspects, the courts 
did agree that these state trading entities should be considered independent from their 
governments. 
Generally speaking, English courts, when faced with questions on the status of 
foreign government entibes, have demonstrated a policy of allowing such entities to 
maintain their autonomous status, linlike the U.S. Supreme Court in Bancec, the English 
courts have not yet allowed the circumstances of a particular case to override this policy. 
3. Germany 
Since the Federal Constitutional Court's 1963 decision in the Iranian Embassy Casez,84  
it is undisputed that the Federal Republic follows the theory of restrictive immunity. 
Likewise, German courts continue to apply the separate entity rule.85 
In the Central Bank of Nigeria Cases?6 the plaintiff attached funds belonging to the 
bank in aid of a breach of contract claim based on a letter of credit. The bank pleaded 
immunity, arguing that its activities were regarded as sovereign under Nigerian law. 
81 1° Congreso, (1980) 1 Lloyds L.R. at 36. 
82 1° Congreso, 1983 A.C. at 279. 
83 Id. at 258. 
84 Judgement dated 30 April 1963, 16 BVerfGE 27 (1964). This case—which arose out of repair works done 
at the Iranian Embassy in Germany—is still the leading case concerning the separate legal status of state entities, 
sovereign immunity and related matters. The court concluded, inter alia, that a foreign state is immune only 
for activities of a sovereign nature and that the character of a foreign state's activities must be determined under 
municipal law. 
85 See e.g. ESSER, I.: Zur Immunität rechtlich selbständiger Staatsunternehmen, Recht der Internationalen 
Wirtschaft, (1984) 577, and MANN, F. A.: Staatsunternehmen in internationalen Handelsbeziehungen, Recht 
der Internationalen Wirtschaft (1987) 186. 
86 Frankfurter Landgericht, decisions dated 2 December 1975 and 25 August 1976, 1976 NJW 1044; 65 ILR 
131. 
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Applying German and international law, the court concluded that the bank was a separate 
legal entity, and went on to say: 
"The petitioner correctly points out that in accordance with general case law, 
legal publications and writings on international law, separate legal entities of a 
foreign state do not enjoy immunity."87 
In National Iranian Oil Co. Legal Status Case,88 the plaintiff obtained attachment 
orders and seized funds held in NIOC's name. NIOC appealed. The appellate court 
rejected NIOC's claim of sovereign immunity, emphasizing that NIOC had an 
independent legal personality and was concededly a commercial business enterprise 
whose shares were owned by Iran. The court then stated that under German and 
international law, "(c)ommercial undertakings of a foreign state which have been 
endowed with their own independent legal personality do not enjoy immunity".89 
In a related case, National Iranian Oil Co. Pipeline Contracts Case,90 the appellate 
court again applied the separate entity rule. The court stated that the property which had 
been seized was not state property, but that of the company; the fact that the state of Iran 
owned all the shares of the company was immaterial.91 NIOC appealed to the Federal1  
Constitutional Court, which affirmed this ruling, although on other grounds. 
4. France 
French courts today apply the separate entity rule and deny jurisdictional immunity to 
entities legally separate from a foreign state.92 Similar rules apply to immunity from 
execution.93 Generally speaking, the French separate entity rule functions as a 
presumption of non-immunity and, consistent with the theory of restrictive immunity, it 
is subject to an exception conferring immunity for sovereign acts. 
In Cameroon Development Bank v. Rolber,94 plaintiffs sued a bank owned by the 
state of Cameroon on bills of exchange that the state had issued and that the bank had 
guaranteed. The bank pleaded jurisdictional immunity, arguing that it had acted on behalf 
87 65 ILR at 134. 
88 65 ILR at 199. 
89 Id. at 202-203. 
90 65 ILR at 212. 
91 Id. at 213. 
92 See e.g. Société Nationale des Transports Routiers (SNTR) v. Compagnie Algérienne de Transit, Judgment 
dated 19 March 1971, 1979 Bull. Cass. IV80, and Société des Ets. Poclain & Cie d'Assurances la Concorde 
v. Morflot USSR, Judgment dated 1 February 1977, 1977 Droit Maritime Français 298. 
93 See e.g. Société SONATRACH v. Migeon, Judgment dated 1 October 1985, 1986 R.C.D.I.P. 527, and 
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Société Eurodif, Judgment dated 14 March 1984, 1984. J.I.L. 598. For comments, 
see PAULSSON, Sovereign Immunity From Jurisdiction: French caselaw revisited, 19 Int'l. Law (1985) 111. 
94 Banque Cameroanaise de dévelopement v. Société des établissements, Rolber, Judgment dated 18 
November 1986, 1987 R.C.D.I.P. 773. 
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of a foreign state. The Court of Appeal rejected the banks's plea of immunity. The bank 
appealed to the Court of Cassation. 
The Court of Cassation affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. The bank 
argued that the Court of Appeal had denied immunity "without examining whether the 
bank was acting on behalf of a foreign state in the interests of a public service".95 
However, the Court of Cassation stated: 
"Whatever the transaction underlying the bill at issue, the guarantee given by the 
CDB on behalf of the State of the Cameroon, since it was for the benefit of a legal 
person governed by private law, constituted an ordinary commercial act (acte de 
commerce) performed in the normal exercise of the CDB's banking activities and 
quite unrelated to the exercise of public power (puissance publique).96 
Even if the issue of jurisdictional immunity turned on the question of whether the 
activity in question was commercial or sovereign in nature, the case demonstrates the 
unwillingness of French courts to pierce the corporate veil of state-owned enterprises. 
5. Switzerland 
Swiss courts have traditionally applied a classic separate entity rule turning strictly on 
legal personality.97 
However, in Banque Centrale de Turquie v. Weston,9' the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
declined to apply the separate entity rule, thereby casting doubt on die rule' s continued 
validity. In that case, a Turkish bank contracted to repay a loan made by Lloyds Bank 
through the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. Lloyds's assignee, Weston, attached 
the Central Bank's assets in Switzerland. The bank, which was fifty-one percent owned 
by Turkey, appealed a denial of its pleas for iimnunity from jurisdiction and execution. 
The Federal Tribunal noted that a line of older cases had ruled that "entities with 
their own legal personality according to the law of their seat are not entided to invoke 
immunity".99 The court condnued to say that this classical separate entity rule "certainly 
is not free from doubt", observing that modem law did not necessarily prohibit a court 
from disregarding the corporate personality.100 However, the Federal Tribunal left the 
issue open because immunity was to be denied on odier grounds. 
95 Id. at 774. 
96 Id. 
97 See e.g. GMÜR, F.: Zur Frage der gerichtlichen Immunität fremder Staaten und Slaatsunternehmen, VII 
Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht (1950) 9. 
98 Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie v. Weston Compagnie de Finance et d'Investissement S. A., 
Judgment dated 15 November 1978, BGE 104 la 367. 
99 И. at 373. 
100 Id. 
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In a more recent case, the Federal Tribunal revisited the issue left open and resolved 
it in lavor of the separate entity rule. In Banco de la Nacion v. Banca Cattolica,m the 
plaintiff sought attachment in Switzerland of funds belonging to a state-owned Peruvian 
bank. The court of first instance ordered the attachment. The bank appealed. The outcome 
turned squarely on the issue on whether immunity should be denied on the basis of the 
defendant's separate legal personality. 
The Federal Tribunal in Banco de la Nacion applied the separate entity rule and, 
referring to the Weston case discussed above, concluded: 
"Thus, the view expressed in that case means that, as a general rule, organs with 
their own legal personality have no claim to state immunity, and that exceptions 
to this rule are conceivable only insofar as such entities have engaged in acts 
involving state power (jure imperii).102 
VI. Immunity 
(i) General 
The last hurdle that a Western businessman may have to overcome to execute an arbitral 
award against a Russian entity is immunity. The defense of-state immunity may typically 
be used by arguing that an FTC (or an FTO) which has been transformed into a joint 
stock company, is a state organization and that the property in its possession is state 
property and thus entitled to immunity. Immunity issues may also arise if the Western 
party has been successful in piercing the corporate veil of the FTO, and thus has, as a 
matter of principle, access to (all) property of the state; in such a situation the state may 
well raise the immunity defense. 
As will be described below, the Soviet Union always adhered to the theory of absolute 
immunity,103 as opposed to the theory of restrictive immunity.104 Generally speaking, 
101 Banco de la Nacion, Lima v. Banca cattolica de Venelo, Judgment dated 21 March 1984, BGE 110 la 43. 
102 Id. at 45-46. 
103 See e.g. BOGUSLAVSKY, M. M.: Immunitet Gosudarstva (1962); id.. Staatliche Immunität (1965); id., 
Mezhdunarodnoe chastnoe pravo (1989) 148-154, 178-182; KRYLOV: Mezhdunarodnoe chastnoe pravo (2nd 
ed. 1959) 197-206; LUNTS, L. A.: Mezhdunarodnoe chastnoe pravo, Osobennaia chast (1975) 77-91. 
104 Stated in a general manner the theory of restrictive immunity rests on the distinction between acta jure 
imperii and acta jure gestionis: a state enjoys immunity only for the first category of acts. In other words: if 
a state engages in commercial acts (acta jure gestionis) it does not enjoy immunity with respect to such 
activities. Much of the debate during the last decades has focused on how to distinguish between these two 
categories of acts. Even though the principle of restrictive immunity has been easy to formulate, there have 
always been borderline cases confusing the picture.—The topic of sovereign immunity is vast and the modern 
literature overwhelming. Suffice it to refer to the following works of a general nature: Sucharitkul, State 
Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law (1959); SINCLAIR, I.: The Law of Sovereign Immunity 
Recent Developments, in Recueil des Cours (1980, II), 113-284; В ADR: State Immunity. An analytical and 
prognostic view (1984); SCHREUER, Ch.: State Immunity: Some recent developments (1988); DAMIAN: Staa-
tenimmunität und Gerichtszwang (1985). 
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absolute immunity requires the consent of the state in question before jurisdiction and/or 
execution may be had against it, or its property. Consequently, the traditional Soviet 
position with respect to state immunity has the potential of being a source of aggravation 
in foreign trade. 
However, in practice this has not been the case, at least not since the Second World 
War. Indeed, discussion of immunity issues in Soviet foreign trade has typically been 
considered as an exercise reserved for the halls of academy. Even though Soviet lawyers 
have never at the theoretical level conceded that FTOs are precluded from pleading 
immunity, in practice immunity has frequently been waived by bilateral agreements or 
contractual provisions.105 For example, the 1972 US-USSR Trade Agreement contained 
the following, fairly comprehensive waiver: 
"Foreign trade organizations of the USSR shall not claim or enjoy in the USA, 
and private natural and legal persons of the USA shall not claim or enjoy in the 
USSR, immunities from suit or execution of judgement or other liability with 
respect to commercial transactions."106 
To the extent that such comprehensive waivers do not exist, immunity may present 
a problem, particularly when it comes to execution. Generally speaking, it has been long 
recognized that there exists a distinction between immunity from jurisdiction and 
immunity from execution, in so far as lack of immunity from jurisdiction does not 
necessarily entail lack of immunity from execution.107 
Although state immunity was traditionally only an academic problem with respect to 
FTOs, since arbitral awards rendered against them were always fulfilled, the situation is 
changing because FTOs and other state entities engaged in foreign trade will in all 
likelihood find themselves in situations where they cannot fulfill such awards. It is quite 
possible that they will then try to plead immunity in an attempt to avoid execution on 
their property. 
It is important to keep in mind that the theoretical foundation for absolute immunity 
in the case of the Soviet Union was primarily the then existing system of foreign trade, 
i.e. the state monopoly of foreign trade. The underlying philosophy was that the state 
105 Soviet treaty practice has by and large followed the theory of restrictive immunity, see e.g. Fourth Report 
by the Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission. A/CN 4/357, Yearbook International Law 
Commission (1982 II, 1) 224. 
106 66 Dep't State Bulletin 918 et seq. For a comment on the treaty see GRZYBOWSKY: United States-Soviet 
Union Trade Treaty of 1972, in Grzybowski (ed.), East-West Trade (1972) 3. It should be noted, however, that 
the Trade Agreement—which extended Most Favoured Nation status to the Soviet Union—never entered into 
force, because of the lack of political support in genera] and that of the U.S. legislature for such "unconditional" 
treatment as a Most Favoured Nation. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, East-West Trade Update, 79-30 Overseas 
Business Rep. (1979) 16. 
107 For a discussion of the rationale behind the distinction between immunity from jurisdiction and execution, 
see e.g. BADR: op. cit. at 107 et seq. 
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monopoly of foreign trade was but one expression of the economic role of the state in 
a socialist state. Furthermore, in a socialist state there was an objectively necessary unity 
between economic and political power, because socialist ownership of the means of 
production was the economic base of the state and constituted a distinctive feature of a 
socialist state. Under this theory, the economic activities of the state constitute an 
inherent component of exercising the sovereignty of a socialist state. Acceptance of the 
theory of restrictive immunity would thus—the argument continues—exclude the economic 
role of the state from the totality of its activity and thereby deprive the socialist state of 
one of its distinctive features. Therefore, die principle of state immunity must be 
universal with respect to a socialist state, i.e. encompassing all activities of such state. 
If, and to what extent, exceptions from this universal principle of immunity are to be 
made can be determined only by the state itself.108 It is clear that the traditional Soviet 
position on state immunity had political and ideological overtones. However, since the 
planned economy and the state monopoly of foreigh trade have now been abolished, this 
theoretical foundation for absolute sovereign immunity does not exist anymore. A 
consequence of this ought then to be that the Russian Federation should be more willing 
to accept the restrictive theory of state immunity, which—stated very generally—does not 
accept state immunity for commercial transactions (acta gestionis). So far, however, no 
official change in policy has been announced in this respect.109 
(ii) State immunity in Soviet theory and practice110 
Soviet theory is based on the idea of absolute state immunity. Underlying this theory is 
the assumption that the state, the sovereign, is always one: the state is always one single 
subject, although the manifestations of its legal personality may be manifold. 
108 See e.g. ENDERLEIN, F.: Tlie Immunity of state property front foreign jurisdiction and execution: 
Doctrine and practice of the German Democratic Republic, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1979) 
111. 
109 It may be that a reorientation was being signalled in the 1991 Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the 
USSR and the Republics. In Article 25:4 of the 1991 Fundamentals reference is made to a Law on State 
Immunity. As of yet no such law has been promulgated. The Fundamentals were adopted in May 1991 and 
scheduled to enter into force on 1 January 1992. However, as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
this did not take place. Interestingly enough, the 1991 Fundamentals were reinstituted by a decision on 14 July 
1992 by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation (published on 24 July 1992 in Rossiiskaia Gazeta). 
110 The following account is based on the sources referred to in note 1 supra, and, in addition, on: 
BOGUSLAVSKIJ, M. M.: Foreign State Immunity: Soviet Doctrine and Practice, Netherlands Yearbook of 
Internationa] Law (1979) 167; GUREEV: Prativopravnaia pozitsiia sudebnoi praktiki SShA v oblasti immuniteta 
gosudarstvennykli morskikli torgovykh sudov (The unlawful position of U.S. judicial practice in the area of 
immunity for state merchant ships) Soviet Yearbook International Law (1969) 934 and Kallistratova-Lesnits-
kaia-Puchinskii (eds.) Kommentarii к grazhdansko-protsessualnomu kodeksu RSFSR (Commentary on the 
RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure) (1976) 557. 
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For example, if a state concludes a contract with or makes a loan to another state, 
it does not thereby lose its sovereignty: it continues to act as a sovereign in the economic 
field. 
Pursuant to Soviet doctrine the absolute theory of state immunity, means that no suit 
may be brought against a foreign state without its consent. 
The consent of a state to a suit brought against it in the court of another state does 
not imply consent to the application of compulsory measures against it. Indeed, waiver 
of any applicable state immunity must be explicit, and may not be implied by conduct. 
This means that filing a suit is not tantamount to waiver of immunity from a counter-
claim filed by the respondent. Furthermore, failure to plead immunity does not constitute 
a waiver of immunity. By giving immunity this rather broad interpretation, and thus 
granting foreign states appearing in Soviet courts extensive privileges, it was hoped 
that—on the basis of reciprocity—the Soviet State, and its entities, would enjoy similar 
privileges abroad.'" 
For the application of compulsory measures—whether provisional attachment or 
measures for the execution of judgements and arbitral awards, it is necessary to obtain 
an express consent of the defendant state in each specific case. 
The application of the rules of immunity does not mean that disputes with a state 
may not be mied at all. A suit against a state may be brought in the state's own courts, 
and in the courts of another country, provided that consent of the defendant state is 
obtained. Where consent is not given, the plaintiff may apply to his own govenunent to 
ask it to initiate diplomatic negotiations with the foreign state for resolution of die dispute 
in accordance with the principles of international law. In Soviet foreign trade practice, 
however, immunity from jurisdiction has very seldom been a problem, since Soviet FTOs 
have almost invariably included arbitration clauses in their contracts. 
The distinction between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis underlying the 
restrictive theory of immunity, is characterized by Soviet lawyers as a dualistic approach 
dividing the law into "public" and "private" law, respectively."2 Advocates of the 
absolute theory have suggested that the very assessment of a state act by a court of a 
foreign state has to be considered as a violation of sovereignty."3 Therefore, they 
argue, the restrictive theory conflicts with the obligation to respect the sovereignty of a 
foreign state, and the principle of non-interference in die internal affairs of that state. 
Under this theory, it is a sovereign right of every state to determine the principles of the 
organization of its social and economic system, and these must be respected by other 
states. The socialist state, as a sovereign, is vested not only with political, but also with 
economic power, and because of this unity of political and economic leadership the 
socialist state itself fulfills economic activities. It is impossible to divide the socialist state 
into two subjects: a sovereign power and an entity subject to private law rules. As already 
111 Cf. e.g. KALLISTRATOVA LESNITSK.AIA PUCHINSKII, supra noie 8 at 557 and 560. 
112 BOGUSLAVSKIJ, M. M.: supra note 8 at 169. 
113 Id. 
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underlined, the approach is that the state is one, but the expressions of its activity are 
manifold. For example, in the official commentary to the RSFSR Civil Procedural Code, 
the following statement is made: 
"Judicial immunity is not limited to instances where the foreign state fulfills acts of 
public administration. It applies also to relationships arising from private law acts of the 
state, in particular to commercial transactions concluded by the state."114 
The principle of absolute immunity has been laid down in Soviet legislation. These 
rules became law with regard to foreign state property for the first time in a joint decree 
of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the 
USSR of 14 June 1929, "On the procedure for the seizure of and levy of execution on 
property belonging to a foreign state".115 Article 1 of this Decree states that "the seizure 
of and levy of execution on property belonging to a foreign state, may be carried out only 
with the prior consent of the Council of People's Commissars in each specific case". This 
rule was subsequently included into the codes of Civil Procedure of the Republics 
forming part of the Soviet Union. 
In 1961, this rule on immunity was included in the Fundamental Principles of Civil 
Procedure of the USSR and the Union Republics,"6 and repeated in Art. 435 of the 
RSFSR Civil Procedural Code, which reads: 
"Bringing a suit against a foreign state, provisional attachment and the levy of 
execution against the property of a foreign state located in the USSR, is permitted only 
with the consent of the competent agencies of the state in question."117 
According to the above-mentioned provision of Soviet municipal legislation, foreign 
state property enjoyed immunity in the USSR even in those cases in which it was in the 
possession or under the control, of a person not enjoying immunity itself. Immunity 
must be granted in all cases, regardless of what acts of a foreign state are under 
discussion, but the law does provide for the possibility of consent by the competent 
organs of the corresponding state to commencement of a suit, provisional attachment 
and execution. 
However, Soviet theory emphasizes that consent to the commencement of a suit 
does not imply consent to provisional attachment or compulsory execution. Separate 
consent is required to perform of each of these acts. The commencement of a suit by 
a foreign state is not considered in Soviet theory as consent to a counter-claim being 
brought against it in the same litigation. The court is not entitled to accept such a 
counter-claim without the direct consent of the foreign state if it is the plaintiff in the 
main action. 
114 KALLISTRATOVA-LESNITSKAIA-PUCHINSKII, supra note 8 at 557 (my translation). 
115 Sobranie zakonov SSR 1929, item 345. 
116 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Sovieta SSSR 1961, No. 50, item 526. 
117 The RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure is translated in The Soviet Codes of Law (Simons ed.) 23 Law in 
Eastern Europe (1980) 543. The comments below on Art. 435 are based on KALLISTRATOVA-LES-
NITSKAIA-PUCHINSKII, supra note 8. 
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The legal status of Soviet state merchant vessels is often said to require separate 
treatment.118 According to the provisions of Soviet legislation, merchant vessels are 
state property.11' Because of this merchant vessels are allowed special status in the 
Merchant Shipping Code of the USSR. According to Article 20 of this Code no 
attachment or execution may be levied on vessels owned by the Soviet state without the 
consent of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Thus, Soviet legislation embodies the 
principle of absolute immunity not only for warships but also for state merchant vessels. 
By contrast, on the international level it would seem generally accepted that state-owned 
ships—excluding war ships and other public ships—may be subject to arrest and execution 
with respect to maritime claims.120 This follows primarily from the 1926 Brussels 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules concerning the Immunity of State-
owned ships.121 The Soviet Union never became a member of this convention. It did, 
however, accede to the other two leading conventions in this area, viz., the Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and the Contigous Zone122 and the Convention on the High 
Seas,123 both adopted at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 
Geneva, 1958. The USSR entered reservations to both conventions to the effect that all 
government ships enjoy immunity and that the consent of the flagstate is required before 
any execution measures may be taken with respect to such ships, thereby insisting on 
granting absolute immunity to state-owned merchant vessels. 
From a legal point of view, it is not apparent why merchant vessels require separate 
treaünent, since as a matter of principle all state property enjoys the same status under 
Soviet law. In other words, the state property which an FTO has under its operative 
management is not different from a merchant vessel. The explanation for the separate 
treaünent of merchant vessels is probably a very pragmatic one: since merchant vessels 
are frequently located outside the borders of the Soviet Union, they are typically much 
more exposed to potential claims as well as arrest and execution orders from foreign 
courts than other forms of state property. Hence the perceived need to have separate 
provisions on merchant vessels as far as immunity is concerned. 
The immunity of state merchant vessels under Soviet law does not mean that claims 
may not be made nor suits brought by foreign firms against such vessels. Claims may 
be made and suits brought, not against the Soviet state, as the owner of the vessel, but 
rather against the appropriate Soviet organization—typically a shipping company—in its 
capacity of "possessor" of the vessel. This attitude is explained by the fact that, state 
vessels, used for the carriage of goods, passengers, baggage and mail, are under the 
118 Cf. BOGUSLAVSKIJ, M. M.: supra note 8 at 172. 
119 Art. 19 of the Merchant Shipping Code of the USSR reads: "Vessels in the USSR shall be in the owner-
ship of the state or in the ownership of collective farms or other cooperative or social organizations". The 
Merchant Shipping Code is translated in The Soviet Codes of Law, supra note 14 at 1143. 
120 See generally, THOMMEN: Legal Status of Merchant Ships in International Law (1962). 
121 L.N.T.S. Vol. 176 (1937), No. 4062. 
122 516 UNTS 205. Art. 20(1H2). 
123 Id. 
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operative management of the Soviet organization in question.'24 Under Soviet law it 
is these organizations which are the "possessors" of the vessels. These organizations are 
separate legal entities and have independent financial accountability towards other 
organizations, including foreign organizations. The State, however, does not bear 
financial responsibility for the obligations of legal persons in such cases. Nevertheless, 
when a suit is brought, for example, against a Soviet shipping company, pursuant to 
Soviet law no attachment or execution may be levied on the vessel, by virtue of the 
principle of immunity, unless the consent of the Council of Ministers is obtained. 
The above-mentioned principle of immunity of state merchant vessels has been laid 
down also in some international agreements concluded with socialist states. For 
example, in the Agreement on Co-operation in Maritime Merchant Shipping, of 3 
December 1971, concluded between the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, the German 
Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, it is provided 
that "state-owned merchant ships flying the flag of one of the Contracting Parties will 
not be subject to attachment or seizure in the ports of other Contracting Parties in 
connection with civil law disputes" between their agencies, organizations or maritime 
174 
transport enterprises. 
A similar category of state property to that of merchant vessels is civil aircraft. It 
is similar because it is often located abroad within the reach of foreign courts, and 
because it typically represents significant values. Provisions on immunity in the area of 
civil aviation are found in the 1961 USSR Air Code,126 Article 5 of which stipulates 
that all Soviet civil aircraft are state property, and thus enjoy absolute immunity. This 
means that no execution may take place against a Soviet aircraft, without the express 
consent of the USSR Council of Ministers. It should be noted that Aeroflot was not a 
separate legal entity under Soviet law, but rather a department of the then USSR 
Ministry of Civil Aviation, which was charged with the general supervision of all civil 
aircraft.127 
(Hi) Soviet entities before Western Courts 
a. Introduction 
Needless to say, depriving the successful party in an arbitration of the results of his labor 
by allowing immunity from execution creates a very unsatisfactory situation: the 
124 Article 4 of the Merchant Shipping Code stipulates, inter alia, that the shipping company "shall exercise 
the right of possession, use and disposition with regard to property transferred to its operational management 
... on accordance with the goals of the shipping company, economic plan and designated use of the property 
in question." 
125 See BOGUSLAVSKIJ, M. M.: supra note 8. 
126 The USSR Air Code is translated in The Soviet Codes of Law (Simons, ed.) 23 Law in Eastern Europe 
(1980) 1073. 
127 Article 5 USSR Air Code. 
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successful party has typically spent considerable time and money, including legal fees, 
in the arbitration, and is left with an unenforceable award. In most Western countries the 
theory of restrictive immunity has been accepted in so far as immunity from jurisdiction 
is concerned. The negative consequences referred to above notwithstanding, Western 
courts have generally been unwilling to deny immunity from execution, unless there is 
an express waiver. In fact, the generally held view is still fhat a distinction must be made 
between immunity from Jurisdiction and immunity from execution.128 Stated generally, 
the rationale for this distinction is that execution, and other measures of constraint such 
as arrest and attachment, interfere more significantly with the sovereignty of a state than 
mere participation in litigation or arbitration.129 
As has been indicated above, traditionally there have been no known cases where an 
FTQ has refused to fulfil its obligations under an arbitral award rendered against it. In 
recent times, however, there have been a number of situations where this has occurred 
and the Western party has tried to enforce the award, typically in the Russian Federation. 
As of present there are no reported cases from major Western jurisdictions concerning 
enforcement of arbitral awards against Russian entities. Guidance must then be sought 
in the statutory enactments of the Western jurisdiction in question and from (general) 
case law developed under such enactments.130 
Generally speaking, in light of the Soviet theory of absolute immunity, relatively few 
cases in the West have dealt with the immunity of Soviet entities and organizations. This 
is to a large extent explained by the numerous bilateral treaties which have been signed 
by the Soviet Union. Generally, these treaties allow for suit being brought against state 
entities and also provide for enforcement of final judgments and awards.131 In addition, 
virtually all contracts signed by FTOs contain arbitration clauses, which means that 
questions of immunity from jurisdiction never arise with respect to such contracts. 
Over the years, however, there have been a number of cases dealing with the 
immunity of the Soviet Union and Soviet organizations. In France, for example, there is 
a string of cases before the Second World War known as the "Soviet cases" dealing with 
128 See e.g. CRAWFORD, J.: Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity, AJIL 75 (1981) 854; 
METZGER: Immunity of Foreign State Property from Attachment or Execution in the USA, NYIL 10 (1979) 
131, 136 and SINCLAIR, I.: The Law of Sovereign Immunity (1980) 218. 
129 Even though pleas of immunity have occasionally been made before arbitral tribunals they are bound to 
fail—which is the case with all such pleas that have de facto been made—since there is nothing to be immune 
from. Participation in an arbitration does not involve submission so the exercise of state authority of another 
state: the arbitral tribunal is appointed on the basis of an agreement between the parties and the arbitrators do 
not—and cannot—exercise any state authority. Immunity issues may arise in the course of an arbitration, however, 
in so far as the parties seek the assistance of the courts of a particular jurisdiction. See generally BOUREL: 
Arbitrage international et immunités des Etats étrangers, Revue del' Arbitrage (1982) 119; DELAUME, G.: 
State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration, AJIL 75 (1981) 784; WETTER: Pleas of Sovereign Immunity 
and Act of Sovereignty before International Arbitral Tribunals, Journal of International Arbitration 2 (1985) 7. 
130 See p. 59 et seq. Infra. 
131 See e.g. CRAWFORD, note 23 supra. 
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the immunity of the Soviet Trade Delegation in France.132 The first case in this series 
of cases was Société de Gostorg et la Représentation Commerciale de l'URSS v. 
Association France-Export.133 In that case the Cour de Cassation made a distinction 
between acta jure gestionis and acta jure imperii and allowed an attachment of the funds 
of the Trade Delegation. 
In the United States there is a small number of cases dealing with the definition of 
agency or instrumentality under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act with respect to 
Soviet entities.134 One case was against the Soviet press agencies TASS and Novos-
ti.135 TASS was characterized as an organ of the state while Novosti was regarded as 
an agency or instrumentality, primarily on the ground that the state owned 63 per cent 
of the properfy held by Novosti. In another case Intourist—the then state tourist 
organization of the Soviet Union—was classified as an agency or instrumentality.136 In 
a rather unusual case, the Soviet Union was denied immunity on the basis of an alleged 
breach of international law, which is one of the exceptions from immunity provided by 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.137 The case, von Dardel v. USSR138 was 
brought for the unlawful seizure in 1945, imprisonment and possible death of the well-
known Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg. 
In Gennany, a recent case was brought against the USSR in the wake of the Chernobyl 
nuclear accident. In a claim for damages, immunity was denied, inter alia, on the ground 
that the operation of a nuclear plant is by nature a private act (acta iure gestionis).139 
As has been stated above, today most Western jurisdictions accept the theory of 
restrictive immunity, albeit approaches and case law differ. A Western company trying 
to enforce an award rendered against a Russian entity in the West must then carefully 
review the legislation and case law of the jurisdiction in question. Generally speaking, 
however, it would seem to be difficult for Russian entities to successfully invoke the 
theory of absolute immunity before Western courts. 
132 See REISCH: The Slams of Stale Trading Entities in France, in Grzybowski (ed.) East-West Trade (1972) 
188. 
133 Judgment of 19 November 1926, (1929) D.P.I. 73, (1930) S. Jur. I. 49 (Cass. civ. Ire). 
134 There are a number of U.S. Court cases prior to the adoption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
in 1976, some of which deal with the attachment of Soviet merchant vessels. See GUREEV, supra note 110 
and BOGUSLAVSKIJ, id., at 174-176. 
135 Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, Tass et al., 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In an earlier 
British case, Krajina v. The TASS Agency and Another (1949 2 All E.B. 274), TASS had been characterized 
as a department of the Soviet state, even though a separate legal entity under Soviet law, cf. Butler, Immunity 
of Soviet Juridical Persons, Modern Law Review XXXV (1972) 189. 
136 Harris v. Intourist, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
137 See text, infra. 
138 623 F. Sup. 246 (D.D.C. 1985). 
139 Amtsgericht Bonn, reported in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift) 1988) 1343 and decision by Landgericht 
Bonn, reported in Praxis der Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht (1988) 351. See generally, 
GÜNDLING, Rechtsschutz nach Tschernobyl, Praxis der Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht (1988) 
338. 
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Below follows a brief overview of some major legal systems in the West, as far as 
immunity from execution is concerned. The overview is general in character and does not 
address all the specific issues which may arise in this connection, such as applicable law, 
waiver of immunity and the distinction made in certain jurisdictions between enforcement 
proceedings and execution proceedings.140 Yet another issue not specifically addressed 
below is pre-judgment attachment. In practice, pre-judgment attachment is often crucial 
since it secures, or attempts to secure, assets which may eventually serve as objects of 
execution. Generally speaking, traditional case taw in the West did not distinguish 
between pre-judgment attachment and execution. More recent codifications of state 
immunity, however, for example in the United States and the United Kingdom, prescribe 
more stringent requirements for pre-judgment attachment, presumably on the basis that 
courts typically have to take decisions of this nature without having entered into a 
thorough examination of the case on its merits, a fact which in turn increases the risk of 
frivolous arrests. 
b. Major legal systems: 
1. The United States 
In the United States Section 1610 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act contains a 
general rule of immunity from execution for the property of a foreign state.141 The 
general rule is then qualified by a number of exceptions in Sections 1610 and 1611.142 
140 Questions of applicable law may for example arise in connection with the classification of transactions as 
commercial or non-commercial and the determination of the legal status of state entities. With respect to the 
first issue German courts seem to have consistently applied lex fori, see e.g. SCHRUEUER, supra note 104, 
at 33. Concerning the latter issue it would seem clear that the law of the entity's home state (lex corporationis) 
will play a decisive role.—Given the distinctions till made between immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from 
execution, many legal systems require an explicit waiver of immunity from execution. For a discussion of arbit-
ration clauses as (general) waivers of immunity, see e.g. K.AHALE, Arbitration and Choice-of-law clauses as 
waivers of jurisdictional immunity, 14 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1981) 29 
and SULLIVAN, Implicit Waiver of Sovereign Immunity by Consent to Arbitration: Territorial Scope and Pro-
cedural Limits, 18 Texas International Law Journal (1983) 329.—In some jurisdictions a distinction is made bet-
ween immunity from jurisdiction in enforcement proceedings and immunity from actual execution measures. In 
the LIAMCO-case, for example, the Swedish Svea Court of Appeal—which is the court of first instance in enfor-
cement proceedings under the New York Convention—refused to grant immunity to the Libyan party in the enfor-
cement proceedings. However, this does not automatically mean that the arbitration clause in question would 
suffice as a waiver of immunity from execution, see e.g. Arbitration in Sweden (2nd rev. ed.) (1984) 18-20. 
141 Section 1609 reads: ___ 
"Subject to existing international agreements to which the Linited States is a party at the time of enactment of 
this Act the property in the United States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment, arrest and 
execution except as provided in sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter." 
142 Section 1610 reads: 
"(a) The property in the United Sates of a foreign state, as defined in section 1603(a) of this chapter, used for a 
commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execu-
tion, upon Judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if— 
Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards Against Russian Entities 299 
applies, property used for a commercial activity in the United States may be subject to 
execution. Other exceptions include waiver of immunity, property taken in violation of 
international law and immovable property located in the United States. It is noteworthy that 
execution on commercial property presupposes that the property is, or was, used for the 
commercial activity on which the claim is based. However, it remains to be clarified what 
the nature and degree of this link must be to allow execution on the property. 
It is also important to remember that all exceptions from immunity mentioned in the 
Act relate only to commercial property. Consequently, also the waiver exception may be 
applied only if the waiver relates to commercial property. 
Under the Act execution against agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign state is 
more liberal than execution against the state itself. Only property located in the United 
States of an agency or instrumentality which engages in commercial activity in the United 
States may be subject to execution, provided that the claim relates to an activity for which 
the agency or instrumentality does not enjoy immunity from jurisdiction.143 In this 
connection no distinction is made between commercial and non-commercial property; in 
other words also non-commercial property of the agency or instrumentality may be subject 
to execution. However, it is only the property of the agency or instrumentality in question 
which may be subject to execution, not that of another agency, or of the State itself.'44 
2. The United Kingdom 
Under the rather complex structure of the British State Immunity Act of 1978, it is 
Section 13 which contains the relevant provisions.145 The Act allows enforcement of 
(1) the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in aid of execution or from execution either 
explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the foreign state may purport to 
effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver, or 
(2) the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based, or 
(3) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property which has been taken in violation of 
international law or which has been exchanged for property taken in violation of international law or 
(4) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property^ 
(A) which is acquired by succession or gift, or 
(B) which is immovable and situated in the United States: Provided, That such property is not used for 
purposes of maintaining a diplomatic or consular mission or the residence of the Chief of such mission, or 
(5) the property consist of any contractual obligation or any proceeds from such a contractual obligation to 
indemnify or hold harmless the foreign state or its employees under a policy of automobile or other liability 
or casualty insurance covering the claim which merged into Judgment. 
143 See subsection (b) of Section 1610. 
144 This follows implicitly from the language of Section 1610 (b). See also House Report, ILM 15 (1976) 
1474. On the other hand this presupposes that it has not been possible to pierce the corporate veil of the agency 
or instrumentality, see discussion on p. 47 et seq., supra. 
145 Section 13 reads: 
"(1) No penalty by way of committal or fine shall be imposed in respect of any failure or refusal by or on 
behalf of a State to disclose or produce any document or other information for the purposes of proceedings to 
which it is a party. 
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an arbitral award if there is a waiver, and also against property which is for the time 
being in use, or intended for use, for commercial purposes. Section 17(1)146 defines 
"commercial purposes" by referring back to Section 3(3) of the Act, which contains the 
definition of "commercial transaction".147 This concept is the English equivalent of acta 
jure gestionis, and has proved as difficult to apply in England as in other jurisdic-
tions.148 
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) below— 
(a) relief shall not be given against a State by way of injunction order for specific performance or for the 
recovery of land or other property; and 
(b) the property of a State shall not be subject to any process for the enforcement of a judgment or arbitration 
award or, in an action in rem, for its arrest, detention or sale. 
(3) Subsection (2) above does not prevent the giving of any relief or the issue of any process with the written 
consent of the State concerned; and any such consent (which may be contained in a prior agreement) may be 
expressed so as to apply to a limited extent or generally; but a provision merely submitting to the jurisdiction 
of the courts is not to be regarded as a consent for the purposes of this subsection. 
(4) Subsection (2) (b) above does not prevent the issue of any process in respect of property which is for the 
time being in use or intended use for commercial purposes; but, in a case not falling within Section 10 above, 
this subsection applies to property of a State party to the European Convention on State Immunity only if — 
(a) the process is for enforcing a judgment which is final within the meaning of section 18 (1) (b) below and 
the State has made a declaration under Article 24 of the Convention; or 
(b) the process is for enforcing an arbitration award. 
(5) The head of a State's diplomatic mission in the United Kingdom, or the person for the time being 
performing his functions, shall be deemed to have authority to give on behalf of the State any such consent as 
is mentioned in subsection (3) above and, for the purposes of subsection (4) above, his certificate to the effect 
that any property is not in use or intended for use by or on behalf of the State for commercial purposes shall 
be accepted as sufficient evidence of that fact unless the contrary is proved. 
(6) In the application of this section to Scotland— 
(a) the reference to "injunction" shall be construed as a reference to "interdict"; 
(b) for paragraph (b) of subsection (2) above there shall be substituted the following paragraph-
ic) any reference to "process" shall be construed as a reference to "diligence", any reference to "the issue or 
any process" as a reference to "the doing of diligence" and the reference in subsection (4)(b) above to "an 
arbitral award" as a reference to "a decree arbitral"." 
146 Section 17 reads: 
"(1) In t Iii s Part of this Act— 
'the Brussels Convention' means the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Concerning 
the Immunity of State-owned Ships signed in Brussels on 10th April 1926; 
'commercial purposes' means purposes of such transactions or activities as are mentioned in section 3(3) above; 
'ship' includes hovercraft." 
147 Section 3(3) reads: 
In this section "commercial transaction" means 
(a) any contract for the supply of goods for services; 
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and any guarantee or indemnity in respect of any 
such transaction or of any other financial obligation; and 
(c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, industrial, financial professional or other similar 
character) in to which a State enters or in which it engages otherwise than in the exercise of sovereign 
authority. 
148 See e.g. LEWIS, State and Diplomac Immunity (2nd ed. 1985) 55 et seq. 
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As far as separate legal entities are concerned, they are immune under the Act only 
with respect to activities performed in the exercise of sovereign authority.149 To the 
extent that such entities do submit to jurisdiction with respect to sovereign activities, they 
will be granted the same immunity as the State itself.150 
3. Germany 
German courts have traditionally taken the view that separate legal entities do not enjoy 
immunity.151 In so doing the courts rely heavily on the status of the entity. The theory 
of restrictive immunity has been applied both to immunity from jurisdiction and from 
execution. Furthermore, immunity from jurisdiction and from execution have been treated 
as interdependent concepts. In the Central Bank of Nigeria case the court said, inter alia: 
"The restrictive immunity of the foreign state which applies to a suit on a debt in 
Germany applies also to the petition for a preliminary attachment which is sought by the 
petitioner. ... If exercise of jurisdiction is permissible, attachment of the local assets of 
a foreign state is also permissible."152 
A general exemption is made for property dedicated to the public service of the foreign 
state in question. This issue was addressed in the famous Republic of the Philippines-
case, in which the Federal Constitutional Court said inter alia: 
"... there is no sufficiently general practice, supported by the necessary opinio juris, 
to establish a general rule of customary international law prohibiting the state of the 
forum absolutely from compulsory execution against the assets of a foreign state situated 
in the state of the forum".153 
The case involved an attachment in execution of a default judgment against the 
Republic of the Philippines for unpaid rent. An attempt was made to attach funds in two 
bank accounts in the name of the Philippine Embassy. The funds were at least partly used 
for general Embassy purposes. The attempted attachment of the funds was declared void 
149 Section 14(2) reads: 
"(2) A separate entity is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom if, and only if— 
(a) the proceedings relate to anything done by it in the exercise of sovereign authority; and 
(b) the circumstances are such that a State (or, in the case of proceedings to which section 10 above applies, 
a State which is not a party to the Brussels Convention) would have been so immune." 
150 This follows from Section 14(3) which reads: 
"(3) If a separate entity (not being a State's central bank or other monetary authority) submits to the jurisdiction 
in respect of proceedings in the case of wltich it is entitled to immunity by virtue of subsection (2) above, 
subsections (1) to (4) of section 13 above shall apply to it in respect of those proceedings as if references to 
a State were references to that entity." 
151 See, for example the so-called Nigerian Cement case in which the Centra] Bank of Nigeria pleaded state 
immunity. Central Bank of Nigeria, Landgericht Frankfurt, decision of 2 December 1975, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift (1976) 1044. 
152 Id. 
153 In re Republic of the Philippines, 46 BVerfGE 342 (1977), reprinted in 38 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1978) 242. 
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because it was deemed impossible to investigate without interfering with the domestic 
affairs of the foreign state and its Embassy what proportion of the funds was actually 
used for sovereign purposes.154 
The above-described attitude of German courts was confirmed in a series of cases 
against the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). In one of the cases the Oberlandes-
gericht in Frankfurt stated that "commercial undertakings of a foreign state which have 
been endorsed with their own independent legal personality do not enjoy any immun-
ity".155 In another case involving NIOC's bank accounts the Federal Constitutional 
Court held that the issue of immunity with respect to separate legal entities of a state did 
not need to be decided since the bank account in question would not have been immune 
even if the foreign state itself had been its holder, because the funds in the account were 
used for non-sovereign purposes.156 
4. France 
French case law prior to 1945 favored absolute immunity from execution, also when 
there was no immunity from jurisdiction.157 Since then this position has been modified 
substantially, but is still not entirely clear. 
Englander v. Statni Bank a Ceskoslovenska]№ involved execution against funds held 
by the Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord in the name of the Czechoslovakian 
State Bank. The Court of Appeal granted immunity, but the Court of Cassation did not 
accept the lower court's decision. It held that the mere risk of detriment to state property 
was not enough to uphold immunity. By contrast in Clerget v. Representation Commer-
ciale de la Republique démocratique du Vietnam, the Court of Cassation stated that die 
funds in question could not be attached since their origin and destination had not been 
determined.159 
In another case against an Algerian public pension fund the Court of Cassation did 
not focus on the designation of the funds involved, but rather on the nature of the funds 
154 38 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1978) 275. 
155 Id., at 282. 
156 National Iranian Oil Company Legal Status, 1980, Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft (1980) 26. For 
general comments on the cases involving NIOC see e.g. GRÄMLICH, Staatliche Immunität und Zugriff auf 
iranische Konten in der Bundesrepublik, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1981) 2618, and STEINBERGER, 
Zur Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes zu Fragen der Immunität fremder Staaten, in Einigkeit und 
Recht und Freiheit, Festschrift für Carl Carstens, vol. 2 (1984) 889. 
157 See 3 Répertoire de la pratique française en matière de droit international publique (1965) 191, 206, 
210-210, 235. However, there is one notable exception viz., USSR v. Association France Export, reported in 
J. Droit Int'l (1929) 1042, where it was held that the USSR Trade Delegation's activities were commercial and 
where the Court of Cassation allowed attachment against the assets of the Trade Delegation, cf. note 30, supra 
158 96 J. Droit Int'L (1969) 923. 
159 99 J. Droit Int'L (1972) 267. 
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as separate from those of the Algerian State itself.160 Since the funds were separate, the 
pension fund was not entitled to immunity. 
In the so-called Ipitrade-case in 1978, the Tribunal de Grande Instance held that 
Nigerian bank accounts in France enjoyed absolute immunity in connection with the exe-
cution of an arbitral award rendered in Switzerland, referring to the absolute character of 
immunity from execution enjoyed by the Federal Republic of Nigeria.161 The same 
court has on two occasions vacated attachments against foreign state entities pending 
investigation of the precise purpose of the funds in question. One of these cases was the 
well-known LIAMCO-case.162 In this case money owed to the Libyan Arab Republic 
was attached in satisfaction of an arbitral award. Libya and the Central Bank of Libya 
pleaded absolute immunity from execution for foreign states. In its decision the court 
said: 
"Since no distinction could at the time be made between funds resulting from 
sovereign activities and those resulting from commercial activities the mere invocation 
of immunity was enough to justify lifting the attachments."163 
In 1984 the Court of Cassation was again called upon to address issues of immunity 
from execution. The EURODIF-case involved prejudgment attachment of Iranian funds 
in France.164 Attachment was granted by the court of first instance. The Court of 
Appeal, however, stated that Iran was entided to immunity from execution, since the 
funds attached were public funds to be transferred back to Iran for use at the discretion 
of the Iranian state. It went on to state that once the nature of the funds had been 
determined, it was not necessary to investigate whether the activity in question was 
sovereign or commercial. The Court of Cassation stated that the Court of Appeal should 
have determined the exact nature of the activities in question in order to deal with the 
question of immunity from execution. In discussing this issue, the Court of Cassation 
looked both at the nature of the funds in question and at the nature of the activity in 
question. The court held that immunity from execution is the main rule, but that 
exceptions must be made when the property against which execution is sought is intended 
to be used for the state's commercial activity on which the claim is based. In the opinion 
of the Court of Cassation the following three requirements must be met in order to deny 
immunity from execution: 
— the activity of the state must be commercial, and 
— the funds in question must have a commercial nature, and 
— the funds must be used for the activity on which the claim is based. 
160 Caisse d'Assurance Vieillesse des Non-Salariés v. Caisse Nationaie des Barreaux Français, reported in 67 
Rev. Critique Droit Infi . Privé (1978) 532. 
161 Ipitrade International SA v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 106 J. Droit I n f i . (1979) 857. 
162 Procureur de la Republique v. Société LIAMCO, 106 J. Droit Int'l (1979) 859. (The other case is 
Corporacion del Cobre v. Braden Copper Corporation, 100 J. Droit Int'l (1973) 227.) 
163 Id. at 861. 
164 EURODIF Corporation. Islamic Republic of Iran, reported in Semaine Juridique (1984) II, 20205. 
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5. Switzerland 
Like so many other states Switzerland applies the theory of restrictive immunity, which 
practice is based on case law in the absence of statutory enactments. In other words, 
immunity may be enjoyed only for acta jure imperii and not for acta jure gestionis. In 
addition to the state itself, instrumentalities of the foreign state may enjoy immunity, 
provided they exercise sovereign authority. 
Swiss courts—in contrast to the courts of many other countries—have consistently 
taken the position that there is no distinction between immunity from jurisdiction and 
immunity from execution. This means that if a state does not enjoy immunity from 
jurisdiction it is not entitled to immunity from execution either. The underlying 
philosophy is being that execution is the logical consequence of jurisdiction.165 It should 
be emphasized however, that in practice the application of this principle is limited by the 
so-called Binnenbeziehung requirement, that is to say that there must be a territorial nexus 
between the legal relationship in question and Switzerland. The consequence of this 
requirement is that it is not enough to locate appropriate funds for execution in 
Switzerland. Sufficient territorial nexus would seem to exist if the contract on which the 
claim is based was signed in Switzerland or if it was wholly or panially performed 
there.166 The requirement that there be a territorial nexus may in practice undoubtedly 
severely restrict the possibility to enforce an award on property, such as bank accounts, 
located in Switzerland. While it remains unclear what the reasons for this requirement 
are, it would seem likely that it is based on public policy considerations, in that the Swiss 
state is prepared to allow execution against foreign state property located in Switzerland 
only if there is a sufficient link to its territory. However, it is possible that the 
Binnenbeziehung requirement may not be applicable when an arbitral award is covered 
by the New York Convention.'67 
165 This position has been taken by the Federal Tribunal in a series of cases, see e.g. Griechenland v. Julius 
Bär, 1956 BGE 82 I 75; United Arab Republic v. Mrs. X, 1960 BGE 86 I 23; Banque Centrale de la 
Republique de Turquie v. Weson Compagnie de Finance et d'Investissement SA 1978, BGE 104 la 367; Arab 
Republic of Egypt v. Cinetelevision Internationa] 1979, Sehn JIR 37 (1981) 206; Libya v. LIAMCO, 1980 BGE 
106 la 142. 
166 See e.g. BUCHER-TSCHANZ, International Arbitration in Switzerland (1989) 176. 
167 Id. at 179; as pointed out therein, however, this issue does not appear to have been decided by the Federal 
Tribunal, as of yet. 
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The Effect of the Dissolution of States 
on Treaty Obligations 
in Central and Eastern Europe 
In the period following the Second World War an important number of new independent 
States were bom and entered the international community as a consequence of the 
disintegration of colonial empires. In our days new States have come into being in the 
Central and East European region due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Czecho-
slovakia and Yugoslavia.' 
These events have once again raised the question: how will the territorial changes of 
States affect the validity of international treaties concluded previously? The answer to this 
question is closely connected with two theoretical problems: the notion of the identity of 
States and that of the succession of States. 
a) It is a well-known fact that international law does not propose any norms that 
would regulate the consequences of territorial changes with regard to the legal personality 
of the States concerned. The State subsisting with a diminished territory may aspire to 
being recognized as identical with the formerly existing one affected by the territorial 
change, while other parts, separated from the latter, form new States. Political 
considerations of the protagonists of international life (in the States concerned or in 
others) determine whether and how far the territorial modification of a State implies a 
change of its personality? 
b) If a State becomes divided into several parts without the survival of the formerly 
existing State, the problem to be solved is that of State succession. This means the 
1 For details see BEBLER, A.: Das Schicksal des kommunistischen Föderalismus. Sowjetunion, 
Tschechoslovakei und Jugoslavien im Vergleich. Europe Archiv, No. 47/13. 1992. pp. 375-386. 
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replacement of a State (predecessor State) by another (successor State) in the responsi-
bility for the international relations of a territory. It is therefore evident that in this case 
also the problem of treaties previously concluded by the predecessor State is to be faced. 
In the past there were no generally accepted customary rules in international law that 
would have attached legal consequences to the territorial changes of a State, no rules 
according to which the successor State would "inherit" in all cases and uncondi-
tionally—thus automatically—the rights and obligations of the predecessor Slate. 
Although the Convention, adopted in Vienna in 1978 on State succession in respect 
of treaties has not come into force yet, we can examine—on the basis of experience 
gained in the course of the disintegration process of States in our region—the eventual 
impact of this Convention on the validity of previously concluded treaties. 
Our examination will be limited to the problems of international treaties—without any 
attempt to outline here historical and political circumstances having generated this process. 
1) The dissolution of the Soviet Union 
On 8th December 1991, Belarus, the Russian Federation and die Ukraine founded in 
Minsk the Commonwealth of Independent States, and eight other republics joined this 
Community on 21st December 1991 in Alma-Ata. All these republics—with the exception 
of the Russian Federation—considered themselves continuations of the Soviet Union and 
declared their commitment to observe, in conformity with their constitutional rules, 
obligations deriving from international treaties and agreements concluded by the former 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
When examining the consequences of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, we have 
to draw up a very nuanced picture. Clear distinctions have to be made, taking into 
account the differing situation in the different republics of the ex-USSR.2 
a) The Russian Federation 
This State declared to the UN its intention of "continuing" the membership of the Soviet 
Union in the Security Council and in the other organs and organizations of the United 
Nations system.3 The maintenance of its right to membership—and to its permanent 
membership in the Security Council—was accepted by the international community. 
Evidently, political considerations connected with international security played a decisive 
role in this acceptance.4 
2 For details see: BOETHE, and M. SCHMIDT, Ch.: Sur quelques questions de succession posées par la 
dissolution de l'URSS et celle de la Yougoslavie. RGDIP 1992/4 pp. 811-842. 
3 31. I. L. M. 138/1992. 
4 See in this sense: TICHY, H.: Two recent cases of State succession. An Austrian Perspective, Austrian Y. 
Publ. Int. Law 44 (1992) p. 130. 
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As regards the continuous validity of international treaties, on January 13th, 1992 the 
Russian Federation informed the diplomatic representations accredited to Moscow about 
its intention of maintaining the validity of treaties concluded by the Soviet Union. 
However, a distinction has to be made between multilateral and bilateral treaties. 
The Secretary General of the UN, depository of a great number of treaties, simply 
made Russia figure in place of the Soviet Union in the register of these treaties.5 
Depositories of other treaties (e.g. the Swiss Federal Council) acted in the same way.6 
Nevertheless, the validity of bilateral treaties is not automatically maintained in spite 
of the fact that the Russian Federation has been recognized by international organizations 
as the continuation of the Soviet Union. Negotiations are going on e.g. with Hungary and, 
to my knowledge, also Germany and Austria insist on the necessity of regularizing the 
situation. 
b) Belarus and the Ukraine 
These States are in a specific position: prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union they 
had already possessed a limited legal personality which has become extended after the 
disintegration of the USSR. The treaties concluded by these two states—on their own 
behalf—before the dissolution of the Soviet Union are, without any doubt, still valid. 
As to the other treaties concluded by the Soviet Union and applied earlier also on the 
territory of these two States, the succession problem is still to be solved. 
Hungary e.g. was informed by Ukraine about the latter's intent to recognize the 
continuous validity of all treaties which are not contradictory to the constitution and 
interests of the Republic. Hungary is carrying on negotiations with both republics in the 
aim of regularizing by mutual agreements the future of treaties concluded with the ex-
Soviet Union. 
c) The Baltic States 
These States regained their independence in August 1991—i.e. before the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. They have declared themselves identical—in respect of international 
law—with the three States having been incorporated in 1940 by the Soviet Union as soviet 
republics.7 It is a historical fact that an important number of States refused to recognize 
this annexation. 
Consequently, the Baltic States have affirmed that the treaties concluded by the 
Soviet Union after 1940 are not valid with regard to them, while those which they had 
concluded before the annexation, i.e. before 1940, would be revitalized. 
5 See e.g.: Human Rights Journal. Vol. 14. No. 1-2. pp. 62-70. 
6 CAHDI (92) 26. point 15. 
7 For details see: La reconnaissance internationale des Etats Baltes. RDGIP 1992/4 pp. 843-872. 
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A very interesting position was taken in this respect by the Committee of Legal 
Advisers on International Public Law created within die Council of Europe: "The Baltic 
States should be dealt with in a pragmatic manner in order to avoid a different approach 
by those States which have not recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States into the 
Soviet Union (and therefore did not consider the Baltic States to be successor States to 
the Soviet Union) and other States, which had recognized this incorporation (and 
therefore did consider the Baltic States to be successor States to the Soviet Union). 
Consequently, for practical reasons, it would be preferable for States to accept that 
suitable treaties made by the Soviet Union should continue to apply to the Baltic States 
if these treaties were still suitable under the changed circumstances".8 
Practice concerning treaty obligations has not yet crystallized. According to date we 
already possess, the Baltic States are still not being treated uniformly as successors of the 
Soviet Union. Independence regained after 51 years has not automatically led to the 
revitalization of all treaties concluded before 1940 between them and other States. At the 
same time, treaties concluded by die Soviet Union after 1940 may serve, in many cases, 
as a basis for negotiations aimed at clearing up their contractual ties. 
d) The other republics 
All the other republics—including Georgia which, initially, has not become a member of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States—are successors of the Soviet Union. 
A meeting held in Moscow in 1992 widi die aim of examining the problems of State 
succession proposed to draw up a list of bilateral and multilateral treaties concluded by 
the Soviet Union in order to facilitate for all republics to take a stand on the validity of 
these treaties.9 
2) The dissolution of Czechoslovakia 
This State was divided in two parts: the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are 
the successor States. Both have taken the same stand: in principle, they wish to 
maintain the validity of treaties concluded by the predecessor State—while reserving the 
right of carrying on negotiations with the parties concerned. Such is e.g. the case of 
Hungary. 
3) The dissolution of Yugoslavia 
This tragic case calls for studying bodi problems mentioned at the beginning of diis 
paper: that of the identity and that of the succession of States. 
8 CAHDI 92/2 rev. point 30/e. 
9 CI-DI-DEMO 92/1 pp. 4-5. 
The Effect of the Dissolution of States on Treaty Obligations in Central and Eastern Europe 309 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the so-called "Little Yugoslavia" (comprising 
Serbia and Montenegro), claims to maintain the international personality of former 
Yugoslavia. A letter expressing this viewpoint was sent by its government to the 
president of the Security Council. However, neither the other republics nor the great 
majority of the international community have recognized its identity with the former 
Yugoslav State. Having taken a position in the matter, the Security Council stated that 
the former Yugoslavia ceased to exist and the new Federal Republic has to apply for 
admission in the UN as a new State.10 
The standpoint of many States refusing to recognize the identity of "Little 
Yugoslavia" with the former Yugoslav State has been motivated by political considera-
tions: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia asking its admission in the UN will have to 
prove that—in conformity with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations—it pursues 
a peaceful policy, that it has put an end to hostilities and re-established normal 
conditions. 
In respect of treaty obligations, the problem has been clarified only in those republics 
where the situation has already become normalized. First of all in Slovenia and—to a 
certain measure—also in Croatia. These two States have made several declarations of 
succession concerning treaties concluded under the auspices of the UN. 
As far as bilateral treaties are concerned, both States have notified their partners, e.g. 
Hungary, that they intend to become successors of the treaties concluded by ex-
Yugoslavia, but this would not be automatic succession either. Negotiations are to be 
carried on with their partners in order to define the set of treaties which would remain 
in force. 
Conclusions 
1) Having surveyed the practice followed with regard to the future of international 
treaties in the States of the region affected by the disintegration process, we will examine 
this practice in the light of the Convention on the succession of States in respect of 
treaties. 
Although this Convention is not yet in force, the practice followed by the States 
concerned seems to be in harmony with some of its dispositions. 
We have to examine first of all whether and how far the main rule o f Article 34 (1), 
"the principle of continuity" is being applied. 
It could not be affirmed that all treaties of predecessor States have in actual fact 
remained valid with regard to successor States. Yet a clear trend can be observed in 
favour of the continuity of old treaties, even if this continuity is not automatically 
acknowledged, but is observed with the common consent of th e parties concerned. 
It has to be mentioned in this respect that Article 34 (1) does not contain a rule 
claiming absolute validity. According to Article 34 (2) the principle of continuity does 
10 Res. No. 777/1992. 31. I. L. M. pp. 1473-1474. 
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not apply if the parties concerned come to a different agreement (point a), or if the 
application of the treaty with respect to the successor States were incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the treaty, or would radically change the conditions for its 
execution (point b). 
While a clear trend toward applying treaties in conformity with the principle of 
continuity can be observed in the states of the region, a distinction has to be made 
between treaties of general interest, those concluded between a limited number of states, 
and the bilateral ones. 
a) With regard to treaties of general interest—especially those concluded under the 
auspices of international organizations of universal vocation—the practice followed in our 
region reveals a new feature as compared with the above-mentioned Convention. When 
the States concerned make a notification of their succession in order to be considered as 
parties to general conventions, Article 17 of the Convention is applied instead of Article 
9, the former bearing on new, independent States which have come into existence as a 
result of decolonization. This implies that the keeping in force of old treaties by successor 
States does not require the consent of those States which are parties to the same 
conventions. 
This new feature fully corresponds to the spirit of conventions of general interest 
adopted under the auspices of the UN—expressing the global interest of the international 
community. We have in mind first of all the conventions on the protection of human rights. 
b) Treaties concluded between a limited number of States as well as bilateral treaties 
constitute a different case. Their validity can be maintained by the mutual consent of the 
parties. 
2) More has to be said about regional treaties affected by the dissolution of several 
States in our region, especially about the 1948 Belgrade Convention on the regime of 
navigation on the Danube. 
a) The Republic of Moldova, as one of the successor countries of the Soviet Union, 
applied for admission to the Convention. At the same time, in 1 Ikraine's standpoint, the 
participation of the Republic of Moldova as a full-right member (i.e. as a riparian 
country) cannot be decided upon before Ukraine and Moldova come to an agreement on 
the demarcation and delimitation of boundaries between the two States: namely, when it 
will become clear that the Republic of Moldova fulfils the conditions stipulated in the 
disposals of Article 44 of the Belgrade Convention. 
b) As to ex-Czechoslovakia, two successor States have to be taken into account, 
both having a different status with respect to the Belgrade Convention. 
They have agreed on the succession of the Slovak Republic in the Belgrade 
Convention and on its participation in the Danube Commission. At the same time, the 
Czech Republic—although not a riparian country anymore—insists on participating in the 
Belgrade Convention as a successor State, referring to the fact that its territory is a part 
of the Danube water reservoir. Its interest in participating in the Convention seems to be 
well founded also in view of the plans aimed at the establishment of a European 
navigation system; according to these plans, the system would affect a part of its 
territory. 
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c) Croatia considers itself successor of Yugoslavia in the Belgrade Convention (and 
also depository of this State). 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—the so-called "Little Yugoslavia"—holds that 
Croatia cannot participate in the above-mentioned Convention in any capacity until 
boundaries are contested. 
d) Taking into consideration all these controversial problems, a proposition has been 
made by several riparian States, according to which the Republic of Moldova, the Slovak 
Republic as well as the German Federal Republic should be allowed to participate with 
a "de facto" status in the work of the Danube Commission. 
Without any doubt, the problems concerning the Danube Convention and the Danube 
Commission can be solved only with the common consent of all States concerned. At the 
same time, in my opinion, a more extensive international regulation will become 
necessary with the establishment of the European navigation system. Riparian States will 
not be the only ones interested in such a regulation; henceforth, the participation of two 
States which are not riparian countries anymore (the Russian Federation and the Czech 
Republic) have to be also reckoned with. 
With regard to the future of other regional treaties, such as those concluded under 
the auspices of the ex-COMECON, this problem cannot be solved without the common 
agreement of the States concerned. 
3) In summing up, it can be stated—on the basis of experience gained in the Central 
and East European region—that there is a clear mend towards maintaining contractual 
relations, even if sometimes occur some modifications. This assertion is valid in cases 
when, after the dissolution of a State, one of the parties identifies itself with the formerly 
existing State, but also in cases when all parts of the formerly existing State establish 
new, thus successor States. The States having maintained their identity with a diminished 
territory, are making efforts to adapt these treaties to die new circumstances. Not to break 
off contractual relations with die other States is in the interest of all successor States. 
It is obvious Ihat the restoration of peace and stability is die sine qua non condition 
of regularizing treaty obligations in die whole region. 
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Vanda LAMM Liability for Nuclear Accidents Affecting 
the Environment 
On 26 April 1986 the worst accident in the history of nuclear industry occurred at the 
Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the former USSR. According to the official reports the 
Chernobyl accident caused injuries to more than 200 plant and rescue workers, 
approximately 30 of them died within a short time.1 The radioactive material released 
by the accident spread over the whole northern hemisphere, and contaminated large areas 
of land. Scientific investigations carried out prove that some effects of the radiation may 
develop a long time after the accident. Without entering into the statistical data one can 
state that the Chernobyl accident caused enormous and in some respect unmeasurable 
environmental damages. This accident proved the statement of a distinguished French 
scholar, René Rodière, made in the late 1950s, that "Les accidents dus à l'utilisation 
même pacifique de l'énergie atomique nous transportent dans un monde ой l'espace se 
trouve démesurement élargi et le temps extrêmement distendu".2 It is well known that 
no compensation at all to States or victims abroad was paid either by the Soviet State or 
by the Soviet operator of the installation. I have to add that the USSR was not a 
contracting party to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 21 
May 1963, which is the only treaty of a universal character regulating the liability for 
1 Cf. GONZALEZ, Abel J.: The Radiological Health Consequences of Chernobyl, in: Nuclear Accidents, 
Liabilities and Guarantiees. OECD, Paris, 1993. p. 27. 
2 RODIÈRE, René: Responsabilité civile et risque atomique, in: Aspects du droit de l'énergie atomique. 
Tome I. CNRS, Paris, 1965. p. 2. 
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nuclear damages.3 Some victims suffering damages from the Chernobyl accident on the 
ground of general tort law brought actions against the Soviet operator both before their 
respective domestic courts (in Austria and Gemany) and before Soviet courts. However, 
these actions were unsuccessful, and they were dismissed, especially because the USSR 
was deemed to be the operator of the nuclear power plant and could invoke jurisdictional 
immunity.4 It should be emphasised that had the Soviet Union been a party to the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage at the time of the Chernobyl disaster 
and had it been possible for the victims to receive compensation by virtue of the 
Convention, compensation could have been paid to a very small fraction of the victims.5 
The nuclear liability regime and the provisions of the Vienna Convention were rather 
modem and acceptable at the begining of the '60s, however, since that time nuclear 
industry developed, there is a wider use of radioactive materials and the number and 
capacity of nuclear installations increased. The need to revise the Vienna Convention has 
engaged the attention of experts for more than two decades, and, indeed it would be 
difficult even to enumerate the writings and conferences that have discussed the problems 
connected with the amendment of the Vienna Convention over the past decades, but 
before the Chernobyl disaster the States were reluctant to revise the Convention. Still the 
terrible tragedy of the Chernobyl accident must have occurred for international public 
opinion to finally arrive at an undestanding of the impossibility to delay the revision of 
the Vienna Convention. The tragedy of Chernobyl brought to light, inter alia, the 
following: 
a) There are in operation across the world, and in some East-European countries, 
nuclear power plants which by reason of their type, pose greater than usual danger. The 
dangers arising from outmoded technologies are only increased by the failure of some of 
the countries involved to spend, for lack of funds, any significant amount of money on 
3 The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage was concluded on 21 May 1963 and entered 
into force on 12 November 1977. 
4 Cf. PELZER, Norbert: Inadequacies in the Civil Nuclear Liability Regime evident after the Chernobyl 
Accident: The Response in the Joint Protocol of 1988. in: Nuclear Accidents... p. 156. 
5 The basic provisions of the Vienna Convention are the following: 
a) no-fault and exclusive liability of the operator of the nuclear facility: i.e. the operator is liable to pay 
compensation for damages regardless of his culpability (Art. II and IV); 
b) the limitation in time of the operator's liability, which is, in principle, ten years from the occurrence 
of the damage (Art. IV); 
c) the limitation of the amount of liability to not less than 5 million US dollars for any one nuclear 
accident (Art. V, para. 1); 
d) the liability is channelled onto one person, namely to the operator, meaning that the operator is 
exclusively liable to compensate for nuclear damage, regardless of whether the injury has been due to his 
activity or to that of a partner (Art. II. IV, X); 
e) the duty of the operator to maintain, through insurance or other financial guarantees, financial security 
for the fulfilment of his financial obligations arising from his liability for nuclear damage (Art. VII); 
0 the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of site of the accident in all cases of claims based on the same 
accident (Art. IX, XIV). 
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the safety equipment of nuclear power plants. Moreover, the operators of many 
installations pay little attention to safety rules and often fail to observe them. 
b) Under the rules of customary international law on State responsibility, foreign 
victims of a nuclear accident are practically unable to receive compensation for damage 
from the installation State. 
c) Had the former Soviet Union been a party to the Vienna Convention at the time 
of the Chernobyl disaster and had it been possible for the victims to receive compen-
sation by virtue of the Convention, compensation could have been paid to a very small 
fraction of the victims. 
Shocked by the Chernobyl accident, the International Atomic Energy Agency General 
Conference and the Board of Governors put on the agenda the revision of the Vienna 
Convention and in the debates the prevailing view was that the existing nuclear liability 
regime, which was based on civil liability, should be revised and international state 
liability should be the keystone of the future system.6 Pursuant to the Board's decision, 
a working group started to work late in May 1989. During the intervening period of over 
five years the governmental experts addressed the question of the revising the Vienna 
Convention as well as of improving and strengthening the existing regime of liability. At 
the negotiations the delegates have reached broad general agreement on the need to 
improve and strengthen the existing regime, however they hold widely differing views 
on what is to be understood by improving and strengthening the existing regime and how 
far to go in amending the Convention or what new provisions to insert in it. 
It is well known that the whole regime of nuclear liability was developed on civil law 
basis and in the second half of the 50's the States started to regulate the liability of 
nuclear operators for nuclear damages.7 Since that time the object of the regulations was 
to regulate the consequences of nuclear damages due to the nuclear activities of the 
operators in different countries and it was quite normal that the regulation was based on 
the rule of strict or "no-fault" liability already widely applied in the field of torts in 
municipal law of many countries.8 Later on the States realized that nuclear damages 
could have transboundary effects and they elaborated the international conventions for 
nuclear damages, first the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy (I960)9 and than the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage (1963). These documents were based on the achievements and experiences of 
municipal laws and as a consequence they contained practically the same legal principles 
as the municipal laws on nuclear liability of different States. In these Conventions and 
6 Cf. IAEA, Gov/2306, p. 2. 
7 Cf. DUPUY, Pierre-Marie: La résponsabilité international des états pour les dommages d'origine techno-
logique et industrielle. Éditions A. Pedone, Paris, 1976. pp. 105-106. 
8 Cf. LOPUSKI, Jan: Civil liability for nuclear damage: Selected questions connected with the revision of 
the Vienna Convention, in: Nuclear Accidents... p. 184. 
9 Revised in 1964 and 1982, and supplemented by the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris 
Convention of 29th July 1960 (1963). 
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in the municipal laws the nuclear third party liability was regulated as an ultra-hazardous 
activity, an objective "no-fault" liability with very limited possibilities of exonerations. 
According to commentators on the nuclear liability Conventions the established system 
was convenient both to the nuclear industry and to the potential victims, and these norms 
established a certain kind of equilibrum between their interests. As Professor Lopuski 
from Poland points out, a rational allocation of the risk is necessary in order not to stunt 
the technological progress and placing of the financial burden of full reparation of every 
consequences of a risk-creating activity on the person undertaking that activity, may delay 
the development of certain branches of industry where the technological progress is 
essential.10 However, with the growing of nuclear industry the above-mentioned equilibrum 
have disappeared and the defenceless of the potential victims was increasing. Nowadays, 
because of the public fears about nuclear power, prospects for future growth in peaceful 
nuclear industry are seen to depend upon reassuring the public that nuclear power plants are 
safe, and that victims will be fully compensated in the event of an accident." 
It is sure that—in view of iinmence consequences of a nuclear accident12—the full 
compensation of the potential victims of a nuclear accident is impossible without the 
contribution of the State. This is reflected in the municipal law of different States, and 
practically in all legislations on nuclear third party liability the State assumes a certain 
kind of liability for nuclear damages, and above certain amount the State indemnifies.13 
Under the existing nuclear third party liability Conventions the compensation by the 
installation State is not excluded, and widiin the context of a civil liability arrangement, 
such as the Brussels Supplementary Convention at a certain level their is "State inter-
vention", which means that in the case of damage beyond a certain amount the Brussels 
Supplemantary Convention requires payment of a second tier up to 175 million SDRs by 
the government of the liable operator. In the municipal law of different States we can 
found similar kind of "State interventions", which are voluntarily entered into obligation 
of States and thus subject to any stipulated limits and exceptions. That "State inter-
vention" is completely different from the concept of international State liability what 
denotes an obligation of States to render full compensation upon the occurrence of a 
nuclear accident. The international State liability is a direct outgrowth of territorial 
10 Cf. LOPUSKI, loc. cit. p. 185. 
11 De La FAYETTE, Louise: Towards a New Regime of State Responsibility for Nuclear Activities, in: 
Nuclear Law Bulletin, 50. p. 14. 
12 In this connection I wish to refer to the fact that after the Chernobyl accident according to the informations 
collected from various sectors of the European part of the Soviet Union showed that radioactive releases from 
the Chernobyl plant had an effect on radiation situation not only close to the plant but also at significant dis-
tances from it. Cf. ILYIN, L. A. and PAVLOVSKIJ, O. A.: Radiological consequences of the Chernobyl 
accident in the Soviet Union and measures taken to mitigate their impact, in: IAEA Bulletin, vol. 29, No. 4. 
p. 18. 
13 See Third Party Liability, NEA, OCDE, Paris, 1990. p. 279. 
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sovereignty, an obligation encumbent upon States to ultimately guarantee the full 
compensation for nuclear damages.14 
The major conceptual problem discussed at the Vienna talks were connected with the 
transformation of the existing civil liability regime to a system of State liability. Among 
the partisans of the State liability regime we can found very different States, there are 
some very poor developing countries as well as industralised States, like Australia, or 
Italy. Most of them are all so-called non-nuclear States. 
The suggestions on the introduction of international Stale liability are completely in 
line with the fact that today, especially after the Chernobyl accident, the compensation 
of victims of nuclear accidents has become a primary concent and there are strong efforts 
to provide full compensation to the victims. The introduction of State liability would 
mean that the States are liable for the transboundary damages caused by dangerous 
activities excerted by private persons or companies on its territory. In connection with 
the introduction of State liability, we should not forget that nowadays there is no 
international instrument which stipulate the objective liability of the State for the 
transboundary damages caused by dangerous activities excerted by private persons on its 
territory. In this connection some authors try to refer on the analogy of the liability of 
States for space activities and the Antarctica treaty, however, this is not convincing 
because these treaties are providing State liability for State activity or activities under the 
supervision of the States.15 The partisans of the principle of State liability for nuclear 
damages are emphasizing that the full compensation of victims, the unlimited liability in 
amount, the preventive efforts by States could be secured only by the introduction of 
State liability. At the negotiations in Vienna first of all the non-nuclear states are very 
much infavour of the introduction of State liability and there were often taken up 
proposals for introduction of elements of State liability in the Vienna Convention, litis 
notwithstanding, the majority of delegates appear to oppose the inclusion of the principle 
of State liability in the Convention. With all probability the future system of the Vienna 
Convention would be based also on the civil liability regime, but—following the exemples 
of the municipal law of industralised Western countries and the Brussels Supplementary 
Convention-with some complementary elements of State intervention. 
The on-going negotiations in Vienna are characterised by the effort to improve the 
situation of the victims. That can be seen in the extention of the territorial scope of the 
Convention, the extention of the notion of damage, the extention of time of limitation etc. 
However, it should not be forget that all these suggestions increase the number of the 
victims, or the number of those who are entitled for compensation. If we take into 
consideration that the nuclear liability regime is based on the limited liability of the 
oparators—irrespective of how high is the ceiling of the liability—the same amount of 
14 Cf. HANDL, Günther: Liability as an Obligation Established by a Primary Rule of International Law, in: 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law. 1985. pp. 76-78. 
15 See REYNERS, Patrick: Responsabilité objective des Etals en cas d'accident nucléaire. NUCLEAR 
INTERJURA'91 (Congrès de l'AIDN, Bath, 22-26 septembre 1991) (manuscript) p. 15. 
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money should be distributed to more victims, and as a consequence the situation of a 
victim as an individual is getting worsen. As Professor Pelzer from Germany points out 
by discussing the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention 
and the Paris Convention,16 for the same cake we have more guests, and if there are 
more guests to eat from the cake there must be a bigger cake.17 
The problem of State liability or civil liability and the question of environmental 
damages (or precisely the compensation for environmental damages) are very closely 
linked. During the last two decades an increasing concent for the environment has been 
established both nationally and internationally. And when we discuss die elaboration of 
a revised regime concerning liability and compensation for nuclear damage, problems 
related to the protection of the environment must be regarded as being of paramount 
importance. The Chernobyl accident proved that damage to the environment, economic 
loss, and costs of preventive measures and consequential losses are likely to constitute 
the major part of the damage following a nuclear accident.18 
In the actual wording of die Vienna and the Paris Conventions for the coverage of 
damages to the environment the whole matter is leaved to national law.19 The exposé 
des motifs on the Draft of the Vienna Convention says "...the question whether damage 
other than death, personal injury, loss of or damage to property give rise to civil liability, 
and the related quesdons of who may claim compensation, are left to the applicable 
national law. This concerns principally such items as moral damages and indirect damage 
or loss of profits. It does not appear necessary or indeed feasible to establish unifonn 
international rules for such remedies".20 In other words there is no restricdon in Vienna 
Convendon preventing the coverage under the Convendon regime of damage to the 
environment, however, the Convendon would not appear to require such coverage. This 
approach of the Convendon challenges the principle of equal treatment of vicdms, since 
it would depend on the place of the incident and the law of die competent court whether, 
or at least to what extent, other loss or damage than death or personal injury or property 
16 The Joint Protocol was signed in 1988, it establishes a link between the two Conventions allowing victims 
of a nuclear accident in a Party to one of the Conventions to benefit from the compensation regime established 
by the other Convention and vice versa. It entered into force on 27 April, 1992. Despite their common basic 
principles, there existed no relationship between the Paris and the Vienna Conventions and both were operating 
in isolation from each other, as a consequence to some situations nether Convention applied, in other cases 
conflicts of law could arise. Cf. BOULANENKOV, V. and BRANDS, В.: Nuclear Liability: Status and 
prospects, in: IAEA Bulletin, vol. 30. No. 4. pp. 6-7. 
17 See PELZER, Norbert: Inadequacies in the Civil Liability Regime Evident after the Chernobyl Accident: 
the Response in the Joint Protocol of 1988. In: Nuclear Accidents... op. cit. p. 167. 
18 See OECD, NEA Aide-Memoire No. 2. International nuclear civil liability issues under discussion by the 
IAEA Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, pp. 14-15. 
19 See Art. I. k) (ii) of the Vienna Convention. 
20 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Official Records, International Conference, Vienna, 29 April 19 May 
1963. IAEA, Vienna, 1964. p. 71. 
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damage would be compensated out of limited funds in case of an icident with trans-
boundary effects.21 
At the negotiations in Vienna the coverage of damages to the environment came to the 
surface in the context of the notion of nuclear damage. The delegates submitted several 
drafts concerning the notion of nuclear damage. Some proposals expressis verbis referred 
to the compensation of damages to environment (on that respect the most comprehensive 
was the proposal submitted by Australia)22 other draft texts covered environmental 
damages only by implication. The majority of the delegations have emphasized that in 
some cases it is a problem the quantifiability of damage to the environment and thus it 
is unclear how the compensation for suth damages would operate in practice. They 
argued that environmental damage is not itself a damage to the property and these 
damages cannot be easily assessed in monetary terms, because e.g. the marine environ-
ment does not have a market value as such. An other question was who has locus standi 
in those cases, in other words who would be entitled to claim compensation for damage 
to the environment. The Standing Committee following the examples of other third party 
liability Conventions e.g. 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
and the 1971 Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage, and the jurisprudence of some countries adopted as a draft 
Article the following: 
"Nuclear damage" means: 
(i) loss of life or personal injury; 
(ii) loss of or damage to property; 
(iii) loss of or damage by contamination to the environment, provided that compen-
sation for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such impairment 
shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or 
to be undertaken;..." 
It is regrettable that the Standing Committee leaved out the definition of the "impair-
ment of the environment" despite the fact that Germany submitted a definition which 
reads as follow: "'Impairment of the environment' means a considerable and lasting 
adverse impact on nature and landscape by contamination." The above cited provisions 
mean that compensation for the impairment of the environment—other than loss of profit 
from such impairment—should be limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement 
21 RUSTAND, H.: Updating the concept of damage, particularly as regards environmental damage and 
preventive measures, in the context of the ongoing negotiations on the revision of the Vienna Convention—some 
comparative aspects, in: Nuclear Accidents... p. 227. 
22 Australia suggested that 
"Nuclear damage" means— 
(iii) loss of profit arising directly out of damage to the environment; 
(iv) the cost of reasonable measures of reinstatement of the environment to the status quo ante actually 
undertaken or to be undertaken; 
(v) damage to the environment within the limits of national jurisdiction of States other than the 
Installation State where there has been no reinstatement to the status quo ante. 
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actually undertaken or to be undertaken. According to a number of delegations with the 
use of the test of reasonableness it is possible to exclude abusive claims. 
The compensation of the damages to the enviromnent is more difficult and complicated 
than the above cited Article reflects and that provision does not resolve the problems of 
compensation too environmental damages. One of the difficulties lies in the fact that in 
connection with the environmental damages one can differentiate between three kinds of 
impairment of the environment The first one is the impairment of the environment of 
private property that covers any area which may be subject to proprietary rights such as 
land, forest and, even some water areas; the other environmental damages are impairing 
those areas where States have sovereign rights like air space, territorial sea, but these are 
not subject of proprietary rights, and the third one is the impairment of areas beyond the 
jurisdiction of States, the res communis omnium usus, like the high sea, air space, etc. 
these areas are not property of anyone, damage to it falls outside the scope of third party 
liability regimes. According to Professor Lupuski from Poland it is not clear the relation 
between damage to the environment and damage to property, and whether the impairment 
of the environment of private property should be compensated under the heading "loss 
or damage to property" or as damge to the environment?23 He holds the view that in the 
case of the impairment of the environment of private property the damage should be 
considered as damage to the property, and the compensable damage in that case would 
not be restricted to the costs of reinstatement measures but in accordance with general 
rules of the law of damages would cover the reduction in value of the property and the 
loss of profit caused by the impairment of the environment.24 
It should be rocognised that this approach covers wider scope of environmental 
damages than the draft article elaborated by the .Standing Coimnittee, however, a great 
part of the environmental damages remain uncovered, since that will exclude form the 
scope of compensation the major environmental damages, because these could not be 
connected with any property or personal damage. And than the question rises whether the 
approach adopted by the delegates of the Standing Coimnittee concerning the compen-
sation for environmental damages is in conformity with Principle 22 of the Stockholm 
Declaration in which States pledged to co-operate to develop further international law 
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental 
damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction and control of states to areas beyond 
their jurisdiction. 
23 Cf. LOPUSKI, Jan: Liability for Nuclear Damage, an international perspective. National Atomic Energy 
Agency, Warsaw, 1993. p. 29. 
24 Ibid. p. 30. 
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siavko BOGDANOVIC Legal Aspects of Danube Waters 
Protection" 
1. Introduction 
This paper focuses on some specific issues of the legal regime for the protection of 
waters in a part of the Danube basin, namely, in the region of the former Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), from the national and international aspects. It 
is an attempt at identifying the most important premises for the development of an 
international law regime of protection of the Danube basin waters, based on sustainable 
management of natural resources as the common heritage of mankind. 
2. Protection of Waters in the Legal System of the SFRY 
In the legal system of the SFRY, the protection of the Danube basin waters was 
regulated on the basis of federal regulations and those in force in the six republics and 
two provinces that made up the federation. The regulations brought at the level of the 
SFRY related to interstate and interrepublic watercourses and served to regulate the 
fundamentals of the regime of running, spring, underground and stagnant interrepublic 
waters of interest to two or more republics and the basic principles of international 
water regimes. 
» This paper is a result of the researching within die Project THE DANUBE ... FROM WHOM AND TO 
WHAT, funded by the Equipe Cousteau, Paris, 1992. The author would like to diank to Prof. dr. Vojin 
Dimitrijevic and Prof. dr. Jelena Vilus for their support and valuable suggestions. 
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The federation was responsible for making a classification of interstate and inter-
republic watercourses according to their use and quality levels, while the competent 
republic and provincial authorities were responsible for categorization of watercourses 
according to the established classification and in line with international treaties. In 
addition, federal regulation ban the discharge of hazardous and harmful substances into 
the waters that are under the jurisdiction of the federation. 
Federal legislation regulated several other legal aspects of the protection of waters 
as well as prohibition of water pollution by physical and legal persons, ban on the trade 
in sufficiently non-degradable substances, the enactment of specific measures against the 
pollution of water from ships, etc. 
The regulation of the protection of the other waters in the Danube basin on the 
territory of the SFRY was within the jurisdiction of the republics and provinces—members 
of the federation. The monitoring of the quantitative and qualitative changes in the inter-
republic and international watercourses was within die jurisdiction of several federal 
bodies, which however had no competence to act directly. This was so because the 
federal state had no instruments to directly implement its regulations, but rather the 
executive functions of the federation in the field of water protection were carried out 
through the administrative bodies of the republics and provinces. In practice, this type of 
organizations of the federal executive authority proved extremely inefficient, so that even 
in case of grave accidents of pollution in the Danube basin (for example, the Sava river) 
there was no adequate institutional response either in respect to identifying the causes of 
pollution and responsible polluters, or in regard to the elimination of the consequences 
of the pollution. 
This institutional aspect, which was not adequately resolved in the legal system of 
the SFRY, due to disintegration of the SFRY and creation of new states in the part of 
Danube basin on that territory, attained international dimensions. In addition, for the time 
being no initiatives exist for starting negotiations on the regulations of these and other 
very important issues in respect to waters on the international level. Likewise, it may be 
noted that the legislation of these states relating to the protection of waters are mutually 
harmonized, at least in the scope within which the regulations of the republics and 
provinces within the SFRY were coordinated. 
3. Protection of Waters in the Legal System of the FRY 
The 1992 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) establishes the state 
ownership of natural resources (waters included). This constitutional concept of state 
ownership over water resources needs a theoretical approach to define what kind of state 
ownership is the most appropriate. Namely, in a civil society, the role of the state in 
water administration (or management) could be defined as the role of the "trustee for its 
citizens", steward or guardian. This role is naturally rooted in the state's sovereignty over 
water resources, regardless of whether they are declared to be state ownership or a type 
of public domain or public ownership. But, this role of the state does not necessarily 
mean the obligatory implementation of the administrative instruments usually used in 
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ordinary, or classical, state functions (such as military or interior functions, or foreign 
relation functions etc.), i.e. ius impérium. 
Taking on the role of a trustee, steward or guardian actually means surrendering the 
water administration to public control. This is basically what the principle "public-right-
to-know" means. Moreover, this concept implies the wide involvement of the public and 
of the local autonomous bodies in the decision making process. 
The rigid state concept of ownership over all natural resources, without including the 
democratic involvement of the public and local communities in the process of water 
administration and decision making process was characteristic for the former socialist 
states and is now characteristic for the newly bom states on the territory of former 
Yugoslavia as well. The state's organs are now the key and only spiritus movens, using 
the supreme power in the name of the state (or in the name of people) and in the name 
of its citizens. This is why a theoretical elaboration of the state's ownership modalities 
is necessary. The ultimate goal is developing a theoretical water resources, law and 
administrative blueprint, suitable for modem civil society. 
A careful analysis of the constitutional principles in the FRY indicates that the federal 
state is responsible for establishing the policy and adopting and implementing regulations 
which related to the protection of the watercourses which constitute boundaries or are 
intersected by the boundaries between the FRY and neighbour states. 
In the FRY, the environmental protection policy was brought at the federal level and 
it contains the policy on the protection of waters, while the Law on Basic Principles of 
Environmental Protection and the Law on the Water Regime are under preparation. These 
laws will fully regulate all issues connected to the protection of waters, among others, 
those relating to the implementation of supranational law norms. 
4. International Law Aspect 
4.1. International agreements 
When speaking of the international law aspect of the protection of the Danube basin 
waters, it should be noted that, up to now, no law binding international agreement or 
other act that exclusively regulates issues connected with the protection of waters have 
been concluded.1 These questions have more or less been regulated by several interna-
tional law documents which have as their basic subject other issues such as fishery or 
navigation. 
1 An exception is true for a part of the Danube river basin, i.e. The Agreement on the River Tisza and its 
Tributaries Water Pollution Protection, signed 1986, between SFRY, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and 
USSR. 
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4.1.1. Agreement between the Governments of the Peoples Republic of Hungary and the 
Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia on water management issues1 
The Agreement states that its provisions relate to the protection of the boundary waters 
or watercourses intersected by state border against pollution.3 A Joint commission was 
formed,4 and its Statute being an integral part of the Agreement. On the VIII session of 
the Commission a Subcommission was formed to deal with water quality issues. The 
Subcommission has been active since 1966, periodically measuring the water quality of 
the Mura, Drava Danube and Tisa rivers, evaluating the results, and assessing the 
tendencies of water quality changes. Within the activities of this Subcommission the 
States cooperate on preventing radioactive pollution, the pollution due to warming and 
accidental pollution.5 
4.1.2. Agreement between the Government of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia 
and the Romanian Peoples Republic on hydraulic systems and boundary watercourses 
or those intersected by states boundaries 
The Agreement deals with hydraulic issues, measures and functioning on the hydraulic 
systems, watercourses and valleys that form states boundaries or are intersected by states 
boundaries and which could influence the change of the water regime and quality.7 A 
Joint Commission was formed under this Agreement. This Commission enacted a Code 
on its proceeding,8 which was the legal ground9 for the forming of the Subcommission 
for water quality. 
It is within the jurisdiction of the Subcommission'0 to evaluate the results of the 
water quality measuring, made following the Declaration of the Danube basin countries 
on water management issues and especially on the protection of its waters against pollu-
tion, and following the Agreement on the river Tisa and its tributaries water protection 
against pollution, and those made under the jurisdiction of the Yugoslav-Romanian 
Commission for the Iron Gate hydraulic system. 
2 Signed in Belgrade, on August 8di, 1955. 
3 Art. 1. 
4 Art. 4. 
5 Jugoslovensko-Madarska komisija za vodoprivredu, pp. 109-114. 
6 Signed in Bucharest, on April 7th, 1955. 
7 Art. 1. 
8 Enacted at the First session of the Joint Commission, held from March 11-18, 1956. 
9 Art. 7. 
10 Set up by the Yugoslav delegation's president, 1990. 
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4.1.3. Agreement on fishery in the Danube waters, signed between the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, the Peoples Republic of Bulgaria, the Romanian Peoples Republic and the 
USSR" 
According to the Agreement, the member parties will analyze all the sources of pollution 
as well as activities on the protection of the Danube waters against pollution by industrial 
and municipal waste waters and other dangerous substances discharged into this river, 
which could be dangerous for fishes and other aquatic organisms.12 
The Danube waters, which this tripartite Agreement bears upon to, embrace the 
estuary and the tributaries influenced by the waters of the Danube, lakes, deserted river 
beds, permanently or temporarily connected with the Danube as well the alluvium plains 
of the Danube river.13 
4.1.4. The Convention on the Danube navigation regime14 
In this Convention there are no provisions pertaining to water protection. However, the 
Danube Commission, set up to implement the Convention, launched its Recommendations 
on the water pollution control of the Danube caused by the navigation.15 
The Recommendations deal with the protection of the Danube waterways and waters 
in the Danubian ports and other unloading and loading locations.16 Newly built vessels, 
and those that are repaired and modernized have to meet the requirements stated in the 
Recommendations. Technical equipment must be available to prevent water pollution by 
oils, and/or waste waters.17 
The proposed measures state that it is forbidden to throw, release or discharge in any 
form objects, substances or oil products which could thwart or endanger navigation or 
pollute waters. All kinds of litter should be stored on board and unloaded in special port 
installations or incinerated.18 
11 Signed in Bucharest, on January 29th, 1958. 
12 Art. 7. 
13 Art. 3. 
14 The Convention was signed in Belgrade on August 18th, 1948, between the USSR, the Peoples Republic 
of Bulgaria, the Hungarian Republic, the Romanian Peoples Republic, the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic, 
the Czechoslovakian Republic and the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia. 
15 Doc. CD/SES 44/23. 
Approved by the decision made on the 54th session on April 21st, 1968. 
The Recommendations are based on the documents of die Danube Commission, on die opinions, regulations 
and provisions of the Danube basin countries, on documents of die working group for transport by waterways 
of the Inland Transport Committee of the UN ECE, relating to die water pollution control in waterways caused 
by navigation.—Resolution No. 21 and its annexes I and III—TRANS/SC 107, Annex 1. 
16 Art. 1.1.1. 
17 Art. 1.1.2. 
18 Art. 2.1. 
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Although an attempt was made by the federal Law on interrepublic and interstate wa-
ters" to regulate several issues of this kind, it must be seen only as an initial positive 
impulse, later not supported by the participation of the SFRY in the Danube Commission 
Recommendations on the water pollution control of Danube river waters caused by the 
navigation.20 
4.1.5. Agreement on the River Tisza and its Tributaries 
Protection Against Pollution Signed Between the Governments of the SFRY, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and the USSR21 
In this Agreement there are several obligations which the States have to fulfil. They 
should: 
1) bring their programs into accord and implement a uniform monitoring program and 
methodology for conducting water quality analysis and evaluating the state and changes 
of the water quality of the river Tisa and its tributaries at the border profiles;22 
2) make a list of the border profiles and the water quality parameters;23 
3) monitor the quality of the waters according to the uniformed programs and 
methodology.24 
The sessions of the States representatives in charge of the issues are to be held when 
necessary, but at least once in two years. The issues they do not resolve will be brought 
out before the representatives of the States.25 
4.1.6. Other Agreements 
There are also several more Agreements, dealing with water protection signed by the FPR 
of Yugoslavia, as follows: 
1) Agreement between the FPR of Yugoslavia's Government and the Austrian 
Government on water management questions;26 
2) Agreement between the FPR of Yugoslavia and Austria on water management issues 
relate to the Mura border sector and the waters of the river Mura;27 
3) Agreement between the FPR of Yugoslavia and 1 lungary on fishery in state boundary 
waters; 
19 It is not in force any more, and the draft of new one is under the preparation. 
20 Yugoslav representatives in the Danube Commission did not accept the Recommendations. 
21 Signed in Segedin, on May 1986, under the aegis of CMEA. 
22 Art. 4. st. 3. 
23 Art. 4. st. 4. 
24 Art. 4. 
25 Art. 9. 
26 Signed in Geneva in 1954. The Interstate commission set up under this Agreement dealt with the protection 
against pollution of the river Drava. 
27 Signed in Vienna in 1954. A permanent commission was in charge of dealing with water pollution issues. 
28 Signed in Belgrade in 1957. 
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4) Agreement on water management issues between the FPR of Yugoslavia's 
Government and the Government of Bulgaria;29 
5) Agreement between the Government of the FPR of Yugoslavia and the Government 
of Romania on fishery in state boundary waters.30 
4.2. Present initiatives 
At the moment, initiatives have been launched to adopt two conventions pertaining to the 
water protection of the Danube River. 
4.2.1. Convention on Water Management Cooperation for the Protection of the Danube 
River31 
According to this Draft Convention the Parties shall strive on achieving the goals of an 
environmentally sustainable, sound and equitable water management, including the 
conservation and the rational use of the Danube River and of the waters within its 
catchment area. 
The Draft comprises articles which stated the scope and form of international 
cooperation, measures for the prevention, control and reduction of transboundary impact, 
the norms on emission limitation, water quality objectives and criteria, emission 
inventories, action programs and progress reviews, supplementary measures, monitoring 
programs, exchange of information and consultations, information to the public etc. 
It is planned to set up an international commission for implementing the objectives 
and provisions of this Convention. 
4.2.2. Danube Basin Ecological Convention32 
The purposes that are to be attained through adoption and implementation of this 
Convention and related Agreements, include the wish of Parties that technologies created 
by mankind in the Danube basin will not endanger human health and safety, air, water, 
soil, climate, landscape, flora, fauna and living communities, including their biological 
diversity and possible role as bioindicators, as well as other environmental elements like 
subsurface water resources or their interactions. 
Besides the articles regulating institutional agreements (Conference of the Parties, 
Sei. Council, Secretariat), monitoring of environment, environmental impact assessment, 
R & D etc., the Draft contains several worthwhile items. It is foreseen that, in order to 
achieve the purposes of the Convention, the Parties shall adopt related Agreements on 
29 Signed in Sofia in 1958. 
30 Signed in Timisoara in 1961. 
31 Draft of this Convention was prepared by Austria in 1991. 
32 Draft of this Convention was made by the Temporary Secretariat of the National Authority for Nature 
Conservation of the Hungarian Ministry for the Environment and Regional Policy, 1991. 
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detailed control and regulation of (among others) agriculture, forestry, industries (like 
mining, processing of row materials, energetics, metallurgy chemical, glass, food pro-
cessing, textile, leather, paper and pulp), infrastructure including water management) and 
transport It is foreseen that the Parties adopt related Agreements on cooperation in basic 
research, environmental monitoring and environmental impact assessment, as well. 
Moreover, in an article it is stated that Parties shall—gradually, if necessary—introduce 
controls, limitations or bans on the technologies utilized by the activities referred above, 
which have an adverse impact or risk of an adverse impact, according to the specific 
environmental conditions of each subregion of the Danube basin. 
This Draft Convention is very interesting as an effort to achieve a wide inter-
connection between the Danube basin states and to establish sectorial regional cooperation 
based on the principles defined in an ecological convention. This ambitious Convention 
we could call "umbrella convention". 
4.3. An example on the "soft law" instrument 
In the consideration of the methods for the establishment of international law on 
environmental protection, the fact should be borne in mind that the existing methods are, 
as pointed in theory, "slow, vague, expensive, uncoordinated and insufficiently defined". 
New methods are proposed for the establishment of international law, and preference is 
increasingly being given to "soft law".33 
The effectiveness of such an approach is illustrated by the Declaration of the Danube 
basin countries on water management issues and especially on the protection of its waters 
against pollution.34 The representatives of Danube basin countries have stated among 
other in the Declaration that preventing the pollution of the Danube waters and 
controlling the quality of these waters is an inseparable part of national policies in the 
environmental field. In view of the fact that the Danube waters are used for supplying 
drinking water, the Declaration expresses the commitment of the Governments of these 
countries to take measures to prevent the pollution of the Danube river, in the interest of 
present and future generations, in accordance with their existing national legislation, and 
within their technical-economic possibilities. In this context, special attention should be 
devoted to the prevention of pollution with hazardous and radioactive substances and to 
a gradual reduction of pollution levels, taking into account the ecological conditions of 
the Danube River. 
Unlike international agreements, conventions or treaties,, this Declaration is not 
legally binding. This is a document expressing the good will of the Danubian countries 
Governments to undertake measures and activities designed to produce tangible results 
where the protection of the Danube waters against pollution is concerned. However, 
33 Sir PALMER, G. p. 259. 
34 Adopted in Bucharest, on December 13th, 1985, after more than ten years of the preparation. 
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although it is of the "soft" law character, it was only after the signing of the Declaration 
Ihat the continued monthly monitoring of the Danube water quality in border areas, 
applying similar analytical methods, was introduced for the first time ever (as of 
1989).35 
4.4. Activities of international and transnational organizations 
A number of international organizations, such as UN ECE, as well transnational 
organizations, such as ILA, are intensively studying the international law aspects of water 
resources. The results of the often long-term activities of these organizations are a 
valuable basis for regulating international relations in the field of water protection. 
Certain organizations, like professional NGO's in the Rhine basin, have been developing 
the new cooperative relations. 
4.4.1. Code of Conduit on Accidental Pollution of Transboundary Inland Waters36 
This Code of Conduit is the first collective response by ECE member Governments to 
the need to reinforce international cooperation in preventing and combating accidental 
pollution, which have occurred in the ECE region resulting in adverse impacts on inland 
waters and aquatic ecosystems often extend beyond the country of origin. The emergency 
situations which developed have in many cases revealed a degree of unpreparedness at 
both national and international levels. Their occurrence has underscored gaps in existing 
legislation or lack of measures and procedures to cope efficiently with emergencies and 
their transboundary environmental impacts.37 
The Code intended to guide Governments in the protection of transboundary inland 
waters against pollution resulting from hazardous activities in case of accident or natural 
disasters and in mitigating their impacts on the aquatic environment. It deals especially 
with transboundary effects of such pollution. It is aimed at the harmonization of national 
measures to be taken in this field and at the formulation of basic frames of international 
cooperation. Its objective is also to increase the state of preparedness to respond 
efficiently to such incidents.38 
One of the basic functions of the Code is to serve as a reference point, particularly 
until such time as countries have entered into relevant bilateral or multilateral agree-
ment.39 
35 HOCK, В.: Administrative Aspects of the Water Quality Management of the Hungarian Danube; Rhine-
Danube Workshop, University of Technology Delft—According to Ijjas, p. 6. 
36 Adopted by the Economic Commission for Europe at its 45th session (1990) by decision c(45). The Code 
was prepared under the auspices of the Senior Adviser to ECE Governments on Environmental and Water 
Problems and funded under ECE/UNEP Project FP/5201-87-04. 
37 CODE OF CONDUIT ..., p. iii. 
38 P. 1. 
39 Ibid. 
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4.4.2. The work of ILA 
As it is well known ILA adopted The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of Inter-
national Rivers.40 According to Helsinki Rules, a "basin State" is a state the territory of 
which includes a portion of an international drainage basin,41 and the term "water 
pollution" refers to any detrimental change resulting from human conduct in the natural 
composition, content, or quality of waters of an international drainage basin.42 
A basin State must prevent any new form of water pollution or any increase in the 
degree of existing water pollution in an international drainage basin which would cause 
substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin State, and should take all reasonable 
measures to abate existing water pollution in an international drainage basin to such an 
extent that no substantial damage is caused in the territory of a co-basin State.43 
In elaboration of Helsinki Rules there were approved several articles on water 
pollution in an international drainage basin.44 So, there were, among others, approved 
provisions according which States shall not discharge or permit the discharge of sub-
stances generally considered to be highly dangerous into the waters of an international 
drainage basin,45 and shall enact all necessary laws and regulations and adopt efficient 
and adequate administrative measures and judicial procedures for the enforcement of 
these laws and regulations.46 Basin States shall consult one another on actual or po-
tential problems of water pollution in the drainage basin so as to rich, by methods of their 
own choice, a solution consistent with their rights and duties under international law.47 
An article applies to the international administrative machinery for the entire basin, 
aimed to coordinate or pool scientific and technical research basin states programs to 
combat water pollution, to establish harmonized, coordinated, or unified networks for 
permanent observation and pollution control, and establish jointly water quality objectives 
and standards for the whole or part of the basin.48 
4.4.3. International non-governmental organizations in the Rhine basin 
International (non-governmental) organizations of water agencies (RIWA, ARW, AWBR 
and their umbrella association IAWR), have had a positive experience with activities 
aimed at remedying die widely reported pollution of the Rhine River, which was at its 
peak between 1950 and 1975. These organizations set up an extensive network of water 
40 Approved at the 52nd Conference, held in Helsinki, 1966. 
41 Art. III. 
42 Art. IX. 
43 Art. X. 
44 Approved on the 60th Conference held in Madrid, 1982. 
45 Art. 2. 
46 Art. 3. 
47 Art. 6. 
48 Art. 7. 
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quality measuring at all relevant points, established close cooperation with national 
Governments, EEC, chemical industry, etc. In cooperation with other organizations 
engaged in water protection, these activities proved a great success, as the water quality 
of the Rhine River clearly shows.49 This example is certainly a formula to emulate the 
protection of the Danube catchment area waters as well. 
4.5. New tendencies concerning state sovereignty over natural resources 
In legally regulating the protection of the Danube waters at the international level, the 
fact should be acknowledged that environmental protection problems transcend state 
borders, i.e. the confines of absolute sovereignty of states over natural resources. 
Awareness of this and the increasingly frequent need for harmonized and coordinated 
action by states in addressing global and regional problems, also require new approaches 
to certain traditional institutes of international law. 
For instance, the theory of intergenerational equity, the cornerstone of which is a 
global ethos making it incumbent on present generations to treat all natural systems as 
the coimnon heritage of mankind to be managed in a sustainable manner in the interest 
of present and future generations. This requires a change of the traditional perception of 
state sovereignty over natural resources and its relaxation to meet intergenerational equity 
requirements. Under this theory, every generation has the right to use natural resources 
within state sovereignty, but not to destroy, every generation has the right to use natural 
resources within state sovereignty, but not to destroy them and make them useless for the 
coming generations.50 
This requirement to respect the rights of future generations entails the responsibility 
of states for the exercise of their sovereign rights over the natural resources they possess, 
responsibility for their own future generations is only one dimension of the overall 
responsibility involved. But, given the oneness of natural systems and their mutual 
(transboundary) interconnection, that responsibility features an international law dimension. 
Hence the traditional perception of state sovereignty set out in Harmon's well-known 
doctrine, is increasingly seen as a factor limiting and slowing down the development and 
application of the finest civilization concepts of sustainable development of nations. States 
are accordingly expected to waive their sovereignty to a certain extent to the competent 
supranational organizations in the interest of present and future generations with a view 
to the more efficient, sustainable, management of natural resources.51 
49 JUELICH, p. 3. 
50 WEISS, p. 290. 
51 Sir PALMER, G. proposed the creation a new specialized UN agency, or extending UNEP functions, 
p. 280. At the 1968 Buenos Aires ILA Conference, CAPONERA, D. pointed out that "an international 
administration was necessary in order to secure the integrated development of international drainage basins, 
deciding on priorities among various projects, settlement of disputes, implementation of investment and 
reimbursement policies, allocation of benefits deriving from international water resources development and 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
The international law regime pertaining to water protection in the Danube basin should be 
looked into and carefully analyzed again, since several former countries in the basin do 
not exist anymore while new ones are now in existence. What more, there is also an urgent 
need for the joint and coordinated response of all the member states in the Danube basin 
regarding the water protection issues. 
When regulating these issues between the states on the territory of former Yugoslavia 
and in the entire Danube basin as well it is important to bear in mind: 
— that environmental pollution issues have been overgrowing the borders of only one 
state; 
— the interest of future (as well as present) generations demands the ever greater 
responsibility of the state when managing its national resources and passing on its respon-
sibilities to supranational entities which would ensure the better management of 
transboundary natural resources; 
— the importance of international cooperation and the inter-regional linking of 
countries; 
— that professional NGOs could achieve important results in the field of environmental 
protection through linkage at the regional or subregional level. 
It is also important to make use of the results achieved by international and trans-
national organizations concerning the study of the relevant law and administrative aspects 
of international water resources. When choosing the methods for regulating these issues, 
it is a suitable way to use not only the traditional methods but also the advantages of the 
"soft law". And last, but not least important, all the interested states must be included into 
the process. 
6. Proposal for Future ILA Activities 
Bearing in mind what has been said so far, one can conclude that there are serious reasons 
for a comprehensive analysis concerning all the national codes and international bilateral 
and multilateral agreements relating to the water protection in the Danube basin. Such an 
analysis done by an ILA working group, for example, could be starting point in the 
development of a wide concept for regulating these issues in the Danube basin. Clearly, 
water protection problems should be seen as the part of a comprehensive Danube basin 
management policy. 
conservation activities, and for many other related aspects".—'The work of the International Law Association on 
the Law of International Water Resources, p. 166. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 
1993 35 AT 1-2, pp. 333-320 
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Tamás KENDE State Aid under the EC Hungary 
Association Agreement 
Article 92/1/ uses a fairly clear-cut wording in order to send aid provided by member 
states to economic actors into the world of semi-illegality: 
"Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State 
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens 
to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be 
incompatible with the common market. " 
This provision is indispensable in a liberal approach, while still being necessary in 
a socialist or socially sensitive economic policy.' The reason for this is obvious. If after 
the removal of trade barriers economic actors can still take advantage from aid provided 
from state treasuries-still nationally comparünentalized—treasuries will compete with each 
other through subsidized economic actors, while annihilating viable but unsubsidized 
producers. In a Community terminology the state's self-imposed limitation to interfere 
with the economic processes is a precondition for a level playing-feld. Unluckily, 
however, all member states feel that their restraint in subsidizing their economies would 
1 In 1990, the shadow Trade Secretary of the Labour Party was strongly criticized by the British Secretary 
of Trade, Nicolas Ridley, who claimed that the whole of the Labour Party's economic program amounted to 
an infringement of the EC rules on aid. However, it came to light only a couple of weeks after this accusation 
that the Conservative Government had spent huge sums in aid to facilitate the takeover of the Rover Group. 
See Alexander [1990], p. 21. 
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give an undue advantage to the producers of other member countries.2 For this reason 
all invent tricky subsidy schemes through which they ensure themselves the political 
support of the subsidized industries as well as the support of the trade unions. It is result 
of this escalation that member states spend in an average a 100 billion ECU on subsidy 
schemes.3 This is the Figure known from and made public in state budgets. There not 
even estimates exist to indicate the amount off hidden subsidies. Moreover, taking into 
consideration the policies followed by the Commission, supporting various types of state 
provided subsidies because they fit into the system of "compensatory justification" and 
the immense funds it spends itself on aid projects, Article 92 appears in a rather different 
context. The liberal, non-interventionist image suggested by the Treaty of Rome is 
replaced by the American approach that regards the Commission's economic inter-
ventions as countervailable subsidies. At fast sight though there is an interventionist 
practice and a non-interventionist legal picture. Our inquiry should look into how the 
Hungarian economy, with subsidy-thirsty liabilities like a declining industrial base, an 
ill-structured agriculture and a nascent service sector can fit into this picture. Our inquiry 
should first concentrate on the legal regime that joins—however loosely—Hungary to the 
Communities and that Hungary has to abide by. 
The provisions of the Europe agreement relating to state aid 
Article 62 or the association agreement concluded between the EC and Hungary,—entered 
into force in Article 32 of the Interim Agreement in March 1992 runs—provides for a 
comprehensive regulation in order to ensure undistorted trade between the Communities 
and Hungary.4 First it determines the three problems most likely to affect bilateral trade 
and then it determines a special mechanism that helps evaluate these primarily 
competition issues. First it prohibits concerted practices [para (1) i] and dominant 
positions distorting competition [para (1) ii] and then it outlaws state aids that distort or 
threaten to distort competition [para (1) iii].5 The language of Article 62 makes clear that 
the treaty constrains the actions of the Hungarian decision-makers and non-state actors 
to the extent their activities have an impact on bilateral trade. The Phillip Morris and the 
2 In Firma Steimke & Weinlig the Court rejected the contention put forward by the claimant, the German 
government, that very similar aid projects were being carried out in other Member States, which served as a 
justification for similar aids granted by the German government. The famous decision reached by the Court was 
phrased as follows: 'The effects of more than one distortion of competition on trade between Member States 
do not cancel one another out but accumulate and its (their) damaging consequences to the common market are 
increased'. See Supra p. 612. 
3 This estimate does not include aid provided to the agricultural and transport sector, or given by the 
Communities. This figure is put at 70 million ECU in A First Report on State Aids Survey, 1989, p. 70, and 
100 million ECU in Kent, P., European Community law [London. Longman, 1992], p. 257. 
4 It places outside the scope of state aid rules agricultural and fishery products and produce covered by Title 
III, and those products provided for in the ESCS Treaty and Protocol II to the Association Treaty. 
5 This provision contains a verbatim repetition of the provisions of Articles 92 and 85, 86. 
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Re Tubemeuse decisions of the Luxembourg court shed a different light on this apparent 
limitation. These decisions make obvious that on the one hand neither export nor domes-
tic subsidies are prohibited yet any fund provided in support of the economic activities 
may be qualified as affecting bilateral trade. Thus community law availed itself of no de 
minimis rule.6 The provisions of the Treaty dealing with state aid are of a symmetrical 
structure. In principle they proscribe both aid by the member states of the Communities 
to community producers and by the Hungarian State to the Hungarian economic actors.7 
As however, Hungary was not an equal partner at the negotiating table but a backward 
country aspiring for membership this symmetry is more apparent then real.8 
The Association Council is provided with a dual mandate by the association treaty. 
On the one hand it is to elaborate the implementing provisions of Article 62. On the other 
hand it is to serve as a primary forum of dispute settlement. In fulfilling this double 
function the Association Council and the parties have to take into consideration the 
following three phenomena: 
— Community practice relating to Articles 92-94;' 
— that Hungary at least for a period of five years is treated as a territory where the 
standard of living is abnormally low10 or where there is a serious under-employment;11 
— the reports provided at request or annually to the other contracting party in order 
to enhance the the transparency of aid projects or schemes. 
The first point raises immediately exciting problems. The first of them is that the 
language and even more the interpretation given to Article 62 locates Hungary in a 
particular position in the external relations of the Communities. As a consequence of this 
provision, it is the domestic set of EC rules on dumping and state aid that is going to be 
applied in the bilateral EC-Hungary relations and not the the Communities external rules 
on the subject. These external dumping and subsidy rules incorporating the GATT rules 
apply only in the background and subsidiarily—as we shall see—and primarily with regard 
to dispute settlement.12 A second question about this first point is whether on a true 
construction of this provision it instructs the Association Council to take into 
consideration both the practice of the Court and that of the Commission when it 
elaborates those implementing provisions. The answer is in the affirmative because 
6 See Supra. 
7 The inclusion of the territory of Hungary within the categories of Article 92(3)(a) has rendered the 
relationship slightly asymmetrical in this area, too. 
8 In fact, with respect to many of the provisions a strong asymmetry is noticeable. 
9 (It) clearly states that any practice contrary to the provisions of the article is to be evaluated in the light 
of Article 92. 
10 The average annual Hungarian GDP is estimated at $ US 3-5.000, which is trailing far behind the EC 
average, and even way behind the relevant figures of the poorest Member States. An excellent description of 
the discrepancies within the Communities is given by Wise and Gibb [1992]. 
11 In Hungary the unemployment rate was 12% at the time of writing. This figure reflects the number people 
entitled to unemployment benefit, which does not correspond to the number of those effectively out of work, 
though it takes no account of the illegally employed, either. 
12 For more details, see infra at the discussion of the European Community regulation. 
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without taking into consideration the Reports and Communications of the Brussels 
Commission it is simply impossible to establish the content of the Treaty provisions. If 
that is so, however, it means that an aid provided by the Hungarian government to small 
and medium size enterprises may not simply be evaluated in the light of Article 62[32] 
of the Europe agreement but Court and Commission policies attached to its Roman 
original may as well have to be examined.13 Yet, it is a difficult question—and this is 
exactly the third issues arising out of this first point—how these rules are going to be 
made in the Association Council. There is a complete set of Community legal norms and 
a pressing need for regulation in Hungary. Though the Communities may in lack of the 
common rules apply its external trade law and safeguard measures it is unlikely that this 
is going to be a preferred solution for the Communities. Therefore it will be in the 
interest of the Communities that the rules in the Association Council be set as soon as 
possible and be conform to Community law as much as possible.14 
The second aspect might seem rather unambiguous at first sight, but after a closer 
scrutiny its contents still requires further clarification. The fact that the whole territory 
of Hungary is treated as a seriously backward area pursuant to Article 92(3) of the EEC 
Treaty, apparently seems to bring about a situation where aid given by the Hungarian 
state to economic sectors covered by the Treaty will not be regarded by the Commission 
as a violation of the Treaty for a period of five years, even if as a result of the aids 
provided, Hungarian export into the territory of the Communities might be increasing. We 
can seriously question whether this interpretation presuming a five-year standstill period 
can be substantiated. Instead a different kind of approach enlisting Hungary under the 
same heading as the Italian Mezzogiorno would seem more plausible, focussing on the 
one hand on what may be regarded as legitimate regional aid in such a seriously 
underdeveloped area hit by unemployment, and what forms of aid are prohibited even in 
such a backward territory if we take into consideration the principle of cylicism discussed 
below, and the general prohibition regarding the provision of operating aid. Consequently, 
the state aid rules of the Association Treaty do not entail a five-year grace period, only 
the prospect of a more sympathetic discretion accompanied by the immediate application 
of these rules seems more likely. This would undoubtedly create an awkward situation. 
In order to ensure untroubled trade and political relations between Hungary and the EC, 
Hungary would have to comply with the strict requirements of a legal regime vaguely 
defined in substance. At the same time, this cannot be achieved without experiencing real 
frustration, since by signing the treaty we have also adopted the trial-and-errod5  
method which is applied in the course of the harmonization of the Hungarian rules of law 
13 The question that immediately arises, is how the concept of practice is to be construed here, and whether 
letters of interpretive character, etc. sent to Member States by the Commission are included. 
14 The travaux preparatiores not having been made public, the language of the Treaty does not state clearly, 
whether questions, if any, were raised about the possibility that through the establishment of rules of 
interpretafion and enforcement, Hungary may be allowed a period of adjustment by the Association Council. 
This problem is further elaborated in the following passages. 
15 I.e. 'the declaration of a legal injury followed by legal remedy'. 
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and EC practice. This situation, of course, is bound to generate constant confrontation 
between Hungary and the EC. 
Two further remarks can be made here, a) It is very likely that the evaluation of the 
Hungarian state aid policy will be judged differently at different Commission levels. In 
all probability DGIV is set on eradicating systematically any instances of Hungarian 
practice which run counter to EC law. On the other hand, we can presume that only 
"case-law" violations of state aid rules will be caught on the Commission level, since the 
Commission itself is genuinely interested at least in the partial political success of the 
Treaty, b) The harmonization of EC law and Hungarian law is made all the more 
complicated by the fact that for the most part EC law cannot be regarded as law in the 
strict sense of the word, but a cyclically applied exercise in the management of the 
economy, which is manifested not so much in rules of law but in codes of behaviour and 
policy papers. In addition, no serious limititations can be imposed on the economic 
management practice pursued by the Commission seeking to find a delicate equilibrium 
between the Member States. That is the reason why in every respect the Commission is 
invested with almost full discretion, in the case of which subsequent reasoning seems 
more feasible than a prognosis beforehand and which corresponds only to some general 
requirements from the legal point of view. 
In respect of the third aspect special emphasis must be put on the mutual trust the 
two parties had placed in each other when they announced that the Association Council 
would evaluate the reports on aid projects and schemes submitted annually or at request 
by the contracting parties. This pardy arises from the fact that if die application of these 
rules should be enforced by Hungary itself and not only against Hungary as an offender, 
the Commission or the Hungarian Competition Office would only be invested with 
regulatory extra-territorial jurisdiction16 and would not be endded to conduct an 
investigation. In spite of this it does not follow from this regulation diat the Commission 
and indirecdy the Association Council would ignore information supplied by economic 
actors and that such information could not serve as sufficient grounds for proceedings 
initiated by them. 
In critical situadons when the implementing rules adopted by the Association Council 
are not sufficient to settle the problem in a satisfying manner or if such rules do not 
exist,17 and the home industry of one of the parties is direatened by the other contracdng 
party; the necessary unilateral protecdonist measures might be taken in accordance with 
the GATT procedures after a 30-day cooling down period in the course of which the 
Associadon Council will serve as a forum for consultation. 
16 This was clearly demonstrated in the Woodpulp case, though a note should be taken of the fact that extra-
territorial enforcement jurisdiction may be extended to those valuables of the extra-territorial offender, which 
are situated within the Community. 
17 Such situations might occur prior to the expiry of the three-year period, or simply because those who 
formulated the rales of enforcement had not envisaged the occurrence of such circumstances. Should this be 
the ease, the Association Council might not borrow die relevant rules of die Communities in their entirety, since 
these rales form a complete system of rales in general. 
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Paragraph 6 of Article 62 of the Association Treaty has established a two-tier legal 
regime in respect of the areas covered by the Treaty between the two parties. Within the 
framework of this system the GATT rules play a decidedly subsidiary role in settling 
legal disputes in so much as they are only referred to in case the rules adopted by the 
Association Council do not offer a solution to the problem. As the Assocation Treaty has 
failed to provide a tabula rasa in Hungarian EC-relations, the GATT rules have remained 
in force in so much as they previously regulated bilateral relations, and in so far as the 
Association Treaty has not adopted new rules on these questions. 
Particularly in the area of state aids, but also in respect of issues related to competition 
and provided for in the Treaty, peculiar problems might arise due to the different legal 
status accorded to the Association Treaty and to Articles 85, 86 and 92-93 within the 
context of Community law and Hungarian law. It is essential to point out here that in the 
EC member States certain provisions of the Association Treaty with Hungary are directly 
effective in so much as the requirements of EC law in respect of direct effect are fully 
met. In practice it means that in relation to certain provisions and in the case of the 
fulfilment of certain conditions the EC competitors of Hungarian companies may initiate 
legal proceedings before their own national courts by direcdy referring to the Association 
Treaty. These provisions and conditions of the EC Treaty referred to above incorporate 
Articles 85, 86 and the last sentence of Article 93(3) without any further condition. Article 
92(1) also belongs here if it is enforced pursuant to Article 93(2) or Article 94.'8 The 
gradually unfolding practice" of the Court over the past 30 years has indicated that it 
tends to acknowledge within a member State the justiciability of certain provisions of the 
Association Treaty otherwise meeting the condition of direct effect, even if the law of the 
country in issue does not recognise the category of self-executing treaties. By contrast, Act 
25 of 1982 still in force in Hungary is the major impediment to the justiceability of the 
Treaty provisions including the rules on competition and state aids and, to the possibility 
that these provisions may be referred to before a Hungarian court. A draft bill submitted 
by the Hungarian government in October 1993 and a proposed amendment to the 
Constitution might bring about some slight improvement in this respect. Yet, Hungarian 
producers still feel compelled to lobby the Hungarian authorities in order to protect their 
own interests or are seeking legal protection in the home countries of their competitors, 
as Hungarian courts are not entitled to offer them legal remedy.20 
Another aspect of this problem would be the relatively efficient system of sanctions 
related to the set of rules on state aid, which however is not the subject of our present 
study. Almost without any exception the Court has ordered several big undertakings to 
18 Neither Article 92 nor 93 are directly effective. 
19 21-24/72 International Fruit Company 11972] E.C.R. 1219, p. 1239; 181/73 Haegemann [1974] E.C.R. 449, 
pp. 459^160; 104/81 Kupferberg [1982] E.C.R. 3641, pp. 3662-3663; 12/86 Demirel [1987] E.C.R. 3719, 
3752-4; The latter raised similar questions in respect of the Association Treaty between Turkey and the EC. 
20 For further information regarding this subject and Article 37 of the Treaty of Rome see COWNIE, Fiona: 
State aids in the eighties in E.L.R. 1986, pp. 247-267. 
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repay huge sums which had been granted to them in a breach of the rules on state aid.21 
In the light of the Court's opinion on extra-territorial jurisdiction concerning competition 
law22 it can be easily imagined that in respect of the Association Treaty certain issues 
related to Hungary will be brought before the Luxembourg Court In the next section a 
brief discussion of the subsidy rules of the ATT is followed by a closer examination of 
how these rules are to be applied/interpreted in EC-Hungarian relations. 
The GATT Rules 
The GATT rules make a clear distinction between export and non-export subsidies, and 
within the category of export subsidies different rules apply to raw materials and finished 
products. 
Article XVI of the GATT stipulates that Member States are under obligation to give 
notice of export subsidies and subsidies which are likely to result in the decline of 
imports. It concedes that granting subsidies could be detrimental/damaging to the market 
interests of other states, and whereas in regard to raw materials it makes the pursuit of 
the avoidance of subsidies compulsory for the contracting parties, in the ease of other 
products it prohibits any export subsidies bringing about such a situation where the export 
price of the product concerned is lower than the prices applied to similar products on the 
domestic market. 
In the Subsidy Code of the GATT, in which Hungary is not a participant,23 the 
signatories made a commitment to the effect that they do not impair/cause damage to the 
domestic industries of the other contracting parties through granting subsidies, do not 
severely harm their interests in that respect and do not annul those advantages/benefits 
to which the other parties are entitled to on the basis of the GATT. True to this spirit the 
signatories renounced their right to subsidization24 and obliged themselves to take pains 
in order to avoid causing damage to other Member States by granting non-export 
subsidies.25 
In case of a breach of rules/an infringement of rules two different procedures can be 
followed on the basis of the GATT. Procedure Track 1, which is based on Article VI (3) 
and (6) of the GATT, is also applicable to production, assembly and export subsidies and 
provides for the imposition of countervailing levies in compensation for subsidies which 
have already been granted. This option, of course, necessitates the exact estimation of the 
damage which has been or is likely to be incurred in consequence of the subsidy 
21 Wyatt (1993) pp. 540-541. 
22 Butterworths (1993) p. 2. 
23 As the Subsidy Code forms a part of the EC law, which has been by and large directly integrated into the 
Association Treaty of Hungary through the Association Council, a very intriguing indirect 'transference of 
obligations' might occur. 
24 Article 8, para. 3. 
25 Articles 9(1), 10 and 11. 
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provided26. Procedure Track 2 is applicable to subsidies granted in violation of the Code 
to aids which are harmful to the economies of other countries or invalidate the 
benefits/advantages attained through the GATT. Should this be the case, countermeasures 
may be implemented with the consent of the parties concerned and even the withdrawal 
of the GATT treatment may be effected.27 The GATT, the GATT Rounds and the Sub-
sidy Code had failed to provide a proper conceptual definition of the term 'subsidy'. 
Article V of the GATT introduced the term without defining it and at a later stage neither 
the travaux préparatoires nor the 1961 Report submitted by GATT experts, or the Kennedy 
Round made any significant progress towards conceptual clarification. A special committee 
of experts have been entrusted with making further investigations into the subject, but they 
have seemed unable to come up with any results worthy of mention to date. 
Beseler argues that a subsidy falling within the scope of the GATT constitutes a) 
some form of governmental intervention, b) which is financed from public funds c) and 
offers some kind of advantage to those subsidized. In addition, another important element 
of the notion of non-export subsidy is that d) it is specific to certain sectors and, finally, 
e) causes damage. The American approach differs from Beseler's description in that it 
regards as countervailable subsidies not only state aids, but subsidies provided from 
private funds.28 Interestingly enough, it was the Americans who incorporated the test 
of sector-specificity into the definition.29 
It should be stressed here that the GATT rules are softer/weaker than the relevant EC 
rules, partly because of the gaps in them leaving huge areas uncovered, and partly as a 
result of the difference in treatment accorded to domestic and export subsidies, whereby 
they are bound to wind up in the dead-alley of input-subsidization. 
The non-export30 subsidy rules of the GATT deviate from the relevant EC rules not 
only in so far as—according to the Committee's judgement—the distortion of competition 
and the resulting damage is a precondition for the illegitimacy of domestic subsidy,31 
but also in that further differences can be detected in the handling of certain partial and 
sectoral issues. 
In 1982, for example, the United States and the EC were deeply embroiled in a bitter 
debate over bank credits extended to loss-producing steel companies. The Americans 
argued that these undertakings could have obtained credit only through state intervention, 
whereas the EC pointed out that the GATT does not make a distinction between 
recipients of credit on the basis of financial standing/creditworthiness. What really matters 
26 In this case the imposition of countervailing duties must be preceded by a preliminary review. 
Countervailing duties of temporary nature may be imposed even while the examination is still underway. 
27 In the course of a Track 2 procedure it is not necessary to prove the damage suffered by the home industry, 
but this procedure may only be applied after extensive consultations. 
28 19 USC 1202 et seq. 
29 Beseler (1986) p. 139. 
30 The GATT export subsidy rules are dealt with in the section on the external export subsidy rules of the 
EC. 
31 EEC Memoranda [July 9, 1982, and October 5, 1982] GATT Doc. No. SCM/35 [October 10, 1982]. 
State Aid under the EC Hungary Association Agreement 341 
in this case is whether interest terms correspond to real market conditions.32 As is 
evident from this, the EC did not apply the market investor principle.33 
In connection with public procurement the Americans likewise emphasized the 
principle of the market investor driven by the profit motive, while the EC argued that in 
certain situations share prices exceeding their real market value are justifiable on account 
of "the inherent value" of shares.34 
In the light of Article V of the GATT the subsidization of research and development 
qualifies as a countervailable subsidy in so far as it constitutes part of the production or 
manufacturing process. In American practice research and development is regarded as 
part of the production process, provided the final results of the research activity remain 
unpublished and become the exclusive possession of certain producers.35 This view is 
also endorsed by the European Community. 
The 1982 steel debate between the United States and the European Community, 
which focussed on regional aid, made no progress whatsoever in bringing closer the 
diametrically opposed views of the two parties on the subject. The EC negotiators insisted 
that regional aid is designed to cover the expenses run up by economic actors as a result 
of their transfer into an underdeveloped area, so by no means does the provision of such 
aid constitute a case of ensuring undue advantages. The Americans advocated the view 
that regional aids per definitionem are designed to divert trade and virtually manage to 
elicit such an effect, so they are to be regarded as measures affecting normal market 
conditions.36 
It will be obvious both from what has been said above and the section to follow that 
the GATT rules which are to be applied only subsidiarily though, in respect of 
Hungarian-EC relations, are built upon an entirely different conceptual system and 
consist of rules different from and even less lucid than the Community rules. 
The European Community regulation 
The European Community has created its own legal regime over the past 35 years. The 
functioning of this regime stands apart from the rules of international economic law, and 
it emphatically accords a different treatment to legal matters/facts which fall within and 
to those which fall outside its territory. It has adopted its own rules for governing state 
aids, which are enforced only within the Community, that is, these rules are applied when 
producers within the Customs Union are given undue advantages by their states through 
circumventing or violating the rules of play. The EC rules cover export and domestic 
32 EC Memorandum GATT Doc. No. SCM/35 [October 21, 1982). 
33 See the passages below dealing with the problem of definition. 
34 See Note 32, supra. 
35 Fresh Cut Roses from Israel, 45 Fed. Reg. 58516 (1980); Liquid Optic Level Sensing Systems from 
Canada 44 Fed. Reg. 58616 (1980); see also Note 32, supra. 
36 Certain Steel Products from Belgium 47 Fed. Reg. 39304. 
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subsidies alike, however, there exists another level of rales which provide for relations 
between the Customs Union and third countries. These relations are governed by the 
GATT rules,37 the so-called Subsidy Code38 and the Council's Regulations on dumping 
and subsidies. As pointed out above,39 countries having joined the Europe Agreement 
have found themselves in a peculiar position, since it is the special rules adopted in the 
Association Council pursuant the EC regime and not the GATT rules which are to be 
applied in their relations to the Community. Thus, Eastern Europe has moved into the 
inner circle in the external relations of the European Communities, where only the 
members of the European Economic Area established by the EC and the EFTA states, 
occupy a more favorable position, the innermost section within the circle. 
Rules for State Aids and Subsidies in the External Relations of the European 
Communities 
It would require a study of considerable length to take under close scrutiny the rules for 
state aids and subsidies in the Communities' association practice therefore the focus of 
this section centres around four of the association treaties: the Mediterranean treaties, that 
is, the treaties with Turkey, Malta and Cyprus, and the Polish Treaty, which falls within 
the same category as the association treaty signed between Hungary and the EC. 
In Article 16 of the Association Treaty with Turkey40 the contracting parties agree 
that the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome "must be made applicable in the 
bilateral relations of the two parties"; while Articles 12-14 state that in regard to the 
freedom of movement, establishment and services, the relevant provisions of the Treaty 
of Rome will serve as guidelines for achieving these objectives in bilateral relations. 
Article 15 has made the extension of the rest of the (EC Treaty) provisions not included 
in the Association Treaty conditional upon die improvement of the Turkish economy. 
Strangely enough, the Association Treaty with Turkey does not comprise any (other) rules 
which could be linked to dumping or state aids. 
Using identical phrasing The Association Treaty with Malta41 and The Association 
Treaty with Cyprus'2 both refer disputes over dumping and subsidies to the Association 
Council for further consultation and allow the application of Article V of the GATT. The 
agreements make no attempts whatsoever at approximating the legal systems of Cyprus 
and Malta to EC law either in this or any other respect, which means that in spite of 
having signed the association treaties, both Malta and Cyprus will continue to be "third 
countries" in essence. 
37 Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, vol. IV. Geneva 1969. 
38 Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 26tli Supplement, Geneva 1980. pp. 56 et seq. 
39 See on page 4. 
40 J.O. 3687/64 [December 29, 1964]. 
41 J.O. L 61/1 [March 14, 1971] Article 8. 
42 O.J. L 133/2 [May 21, 1973] Article 8. 
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The Interim Agreement partially implementing the Association Treaty with Poland43  
uses practically the same wording in relation to state aids, as the Association Treaty 
concluded between Hungary and the EC. 
As is evident from the treaties discussed above, the Communities have already 
concluded one agreement, namely the one with Turkey, not on state aids, though, but in 
other fields, which, after making references to/evoking the relevant articles of the Treaty 
of Rome, leaves it to the future or rather to the Association Council to elaborate further 
details related to the subject. In contrast with the two agreements signed in the 70's, the 
treaty concluded between Poland and the EC, as well as the rest of the treaties signed 
with other countries, delegate the associate members to a special inner circle, through 
which they have been brought in some respect closer to the Communities than the 
Mediterranean countries excepting Turkey. A thorough analysis of the Turkish association 
treaty could provide interesting examples of legal harmonization, which might be useful 
from the point of view of Hungary's association. 
The structure and ftinctioning of the EC regulation 
The EC rules for state aids operate on several levels, but from the point of view of 
security in law, or rather rule of low, this regulation is far from being satisfactory. 
Articles 92-94 of the Treaty of Rome provide only a wider framework. The normative 
limitation contained in Article 92(1) is followed by the enumeration of exceptions in 
paragraphs (2) and (3). Article 93 mostly deals with procedural rules for the notification 
of aid schemes and judicial review. This article establishes a special legal basis for 
judicial proceedings, and also delegates individual and normative powers of decision to 
the Council and to the Commission. Article 94 which invests the Council with special 
legislative powers has never been put in practice, which partly explains the relative 
insignificance of legislation through regulations and directives. The Commission is 
allowed to exercise a relatively wide margin of discretion, which is kept within bounds 
by the the Commission itself in such a way that in the communications and policy papers 
issued, it gives advance warning of what kind of decision might be expected and what 
policy it is likely to be pursue in certain situations. It is to be noted however, that these 
policies are not justiciable. A major limitation on the Commission exercising its 
discretion is imposed by the right to initiate legal proceedings pursuant to Articles 93(2), 
173 and 175, since the criteria (discretionary limitations) laid down in Article 92 may 
also be subject to discretionary interpretation.44 Under the above-mentioned articles the 
Court may conduct a judicial revision of the Commission's decisions, primarily from the 
43 O.J. Ll 14/8 [April 30, 1992] Article 33. 
44 MORTELMANS, K.: The compensatory justification criterion in the practice of the Commission in 
decisions on stale aid in: 21 C.M.I.. Rev. p. 405, 1984; ROSS, M.: Challenging State Aids: the effect of recent 
developments in: 23 C.M.L. Rev. p. 867, 1986; SLOT, P. Y.: Procedural aspects of state aids: the guardian 
of competition v. the subsidy villains in: 27 C.M.L. Rev. 1990 pp. 741-760; SLOT, P. J.: Procedural and 
substantive compliance required in: 16 E.L.R. pp. 38—47, 1991. 
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aspect of procedure and to some extent from the point of view of substance. One of the 
procedural limitations on the Commission is that it may not infringe the procedural rules 
by which it is also bound, and it is required to ensure fair hearing and give a reasoned 
opinion of its decisions. There are certain limitations, not too many though, which 
influence the substance of decisions. Although the Court, which considers the 
Commission having all information relevant to the case, the most competent and suitable 
organization for making decisions, and which does not impede the Commission in taking 
its discretionary decisions, still requires the Commission to provide a reasonable 
explanation for its decision when the case is brought before it. In the Intermills case for 
instance, the Commission was required to prove before the Court in relation to an 
emergency aid granted that the winding up of the undertaking in question was more 
favourable in terms of competition than its restructuring.'15 In the same case the Court 
held that when evaluating the aid the Commission had ignored its potentially favourable 
effects on competition terms, so it judged the reasoning of the Commission to be 
insufficient.46 In the Belgian textile case, in contrast, the Court approved of the principle 
on grounds of which the Commission accorded a different treatment to areas specified 
in Articles 92(3)(a) and 92(3)(c).47 
The definition of state aid 
Instead of giving a clear definition of state aid, Article 92(1) of the Rome Treaty48 
simply circumscribes it by stating that state aid must be granted by the state, is 
incompatible with the common market and must affect trade between member states.49 
The Court of Justice held that Article 92(1): 'refers to the decisions of Member States 
by which the latter, in pursuit of their own economic and social objectives, give by 
unilateral and autonomous decisions, undertakings or other persons' resources or 
procure for them advantages intended to encourage the attainment of the economic and 
social objectives sought.50 
Although the definition of the Court and the article make it clear that 'state aid' 
constitutes a particular situation in which effective advantages are granted to undertakings 
or private parties, the replies given by the Commission to the Written Questions 
submitted in the Parliament,51 the confidential Commission documents, the Survey 
45 See the section on survival aid below. 
46 11984) E.C.R. p. 3832. 
47 248/85 Germany v. Commission [1987] E.C.R. p. 4013. 
48 See the text on p. 3. 
49 In 173/73 Italy v. Commission, the Court made it clear that it is immaterial what reasons led to the 
granting of aid. [1974] E.C.R. p. 709.49 
50 61/79 Amministrazione delle finanze dello stato v. Denkavit [1980] E.C.R. p. 1205. 
51 J.O. 1963, 2235; quoted by Quigley [1988] 13 ELR p 242. The reply to a Written Question gives a list 
of numerous forms of aid including direct subsidies, exemption from duties and taxes, exemption from 
parafiscal charges, loan guarantees on especially favorable terms, making land and buildings available 
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Reports and Policy Papers of the Commission have jointly managed to clarify the concept 
of state aid by providing lengthy enumerations.52 
Precluding the possibility of a taxatíve approach, for those who favour a normative 
definition against an enumerative description, several attempts have been made at clearing 
up the exact status of state aid.53 These definitions have highlighted three important 
elements of state subsidies: 
a. state aids ensure undue advantages to the recipient; 
b. they are granted from public funds; 
c. they are provided in a selective manner or to certain sectors (sector specificity). 
ad a) 'Advantage' as a conceptual element cannot be subject to dispute,54 but 
ambiguity arises when the advantage appears in the from of granting short-term credit, 
manipulating interest rates or in some kind of investment.55 
ad b) Furthermore, the advantage given to certain undertakings or sectors must result 
in a debit to the state budget. If it is not so, there can be no question of granting a state 
aid, which is true, for example, in case of floor prices, where it is the consumers who are 
affected by the measure.56 
Aid not granted through state resources was the focus of the Steimke & Weinlig57  
and Buy Irish58 cases. In Steimke <& Weinlig state revenues from duties were transferred 
to a statutory but non-state organization, which in order to promote German agricultural 
interests, spent the funds on market research and advertising. In Buy Irish the subject of 
dispute was centred around a promotion campaign in Ireland which aimed at persuading 
Irish customers to purchase Irish goods instead of foreign products. The promotion 
campaign was supported by a private company, which, however, had received very 
generous financial support from the state on several occasions. Aid has been granted 
through regional or local governments in a number of cases.59 In Commission v. France 
(Caisse nationale de credit agricole) the Court ruled that the favourable credit terms 
extended to agricultural producers had not been based on the independent decision of the 
financial institution which had granted the credit, therefore the payment qualified as a 
gratuitously or on especialy favorable terms, provision of goods and services on preferential terms and 
indemnities against operating losses. Wyatt also quotes a subsequent document on this subject issued by the 
Commission. [Doc. 20.502/IV/68 of December 1968]. 
52 The Commission conducted three consecutive surveys in 1989, 1990 and 1992 of State aid and published 
a catalogue of policy guidelines. [Competition Law on the European Communities, Vol. II: Rules applicable 
to state aids.] 
53 Quigley (1988); Dony-Bartholme (1993). 
54 6 & 11/68 France v. Commission [1969] REC p. 526; 173/73 Italy v. Commission [1974] REC p. 709. 
55 See infra 
56 [1982] E.C.R. p. 25. 
57 78/76 Firma Steimke und Weinlig v. Germany [1977] E.C.R. 595. 
58 249/81 [1982] E.C.R. 4005. 
59 For more details on the expansion of the content of state within the contect of direct effect see Prêchai, S.: 
Remedies after Marshall in 27 C.M.L.R. pp. 451^»73. (1990). 
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state aid.60 In Alfa Romeo, on reviewing the support given to the car manufacturer by 
the IRI holding company, the Court found the IRI was not an independent undertaking, 
but an economic entity operating under strict state control, therefore the absence of the 
ability to make autonomous decisions was beyond any doubt.61 
Though the Court had failed to lay down precisely what other instances qualify as an 
act of state, it pointed out that, 'In applying Article 92 regard must primarily be had to 
the effects of the aid on the undertakings or producers favoured and not the status of the 
institutions entrusted with the distribution and administration of the aid'. Relying on this 
conclusion, the Court stated that the grantor of aid is of little consequence, if the origin 
of the payment can be traced back to public funds.62 
The decision in Buy Irish considerably contributed, not to the convergence though, 
but to the approximation of the practices of the two key GATT negotiators, that is, the 
European Community and the United States in establishing the range of agents or 
organizations whose support is to be regarded as state aid. The American practice is 
different in that it classifies subsidies provided by private persons, even if such payments 
lack the character of state aids, under the rubric of countervailable subsidies. 
ad c) The definition in Article 92(1) prohibits only those aids which favour certain 
undertakings or economic sectors. It would follow from this that general policy measures 
and aids aiming for economic recovery and rehabilitation may be permitted. 
Unfortunately, it immediately raises the problem of where the line should be drawn 
between specific and general measures. This is one of the issues to be discussed under 
the title to follow. 
The problematic nature of defining state aid 
The inclusion in the category of state aids of such forms of payment as direct transfers, 
special financial constructions ensuring tax benefits, preferential loans, and credit 
guarantees posed no serious problems for the Commission and the Court. Yet, there 
remained several definition problems which required further clarification.63 Neither the 
Commission nor the Court has been able to 
(a) draw a clear line between state aids general economic policy measures, 
(b) determine the exact nature of money infusion given to undertakings struggling 
with difficulties through state "purchases", 
60 290/85 [19851 E.C.R. p. 439. 
61 C-305/84 Italy. Commission [1991] E.C.R. 1-1603. 
62 The so-called Transparency Directive may be of use to the parties concerned seeking to find out in the 
cobwebs of red tape if an aid can be traced back to such sources. Dir. 80/723, O.J. 1980 L195/35 as amended 
by O.J. 1985 L229. 
63 In die Italian textile case it became obvious that an aid granted in compensation tor higher social 
contributions may not be justified, since 'in the application of Article 92(1) the point of departure must 
necessarily be the competitive position existing witlrin the common market before the adoption of the measure 
in issue'. 173/73 Italy v. Commission [1974] E.C.R. 709. 
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(c) give a satisfactory answer to the question raised by the de minimus rule, 
(if) find an acceptable legal solution to the problem related to the treaünent of 
preferential pricing and the provision of services, 
(e) provide an unchallengeable answer to the problem of support granted to state 
undertakings, 
(J) offer reliable guidelines for the dilemma of cyclical application. 
ad a) The Freedom of the conjunctural policy of the state 
It is clear that Article 92 does not prohibit economic intervention by the state in general, 
neither does it disallow devaluation and comprehensive economic measures aiming at 
improving/enhancing the competitiveness of domestic industry. It is the economic union 
to be established pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty that will impose restrictions on such 
measures. In numerous cases, however, it still remains unclear what constitutes a general, 
that is, permitted and what should be looked upon as a specific, that is, prohibited 
measure. The American practice has introduced the test of sector-specificity according 
to which "aid" constitutes support "accorded to an individual company, a sector of 
industry, a discrete group of companies, or a special group of industries by the state or 
under the inspiration of the state".64 The GATT rules appear to be reflecting the same 
principle,65 which immediately raises the question why in Commission v. France (6 & 
11/69) the Court held that a preferential export bank discount applying to all exported 
domestic products constituted an aid.66 This reasoning played an even more significant 
role in Deufil where the plaintiff insisted that a support of 3 million DM granted to an 
undertaking was to be regarded as such a measure which the state is entitled to introduce 
under Article 103 providing for conjunctural policy measures. This argument was rejected 
by the Court on the grounds that individual undertakings had benefited from the 
measure.67 By contrast, in Fediol the Court came to the conclusion that a special 
financial scheme involving 27 agricultural products was to be regarded as a general 
measure aiming for the stimulation of the economy as a whole. In this case the 
judgement did not seem to have applied the test of sector specificity in regard to 
agriculture.68 
In another case the Commission stated that an across-the-board social security 
package to be implemented by the Italian government step by step, but only in the area 
of industrial production at the first stage, should be considered a measure of general 
64 Section 1312 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 
(1988). 
65 Adamantoupulos pp. 438-440. 
66 According to the decision of the Court the credit given on more preferential terms had given undue 
advantages to national manufacturers exporting their products. 
67 The so-called Task Force set up to review the aid policies applied in the Member States, also dealt with 
this issue. XVllth Rep. on Competition Policy. 
68 187/85 FEDIOL v. Commission [1988] E.C.R. 4155. 
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character. The dilemma here was whether this measure would be divested of its general 
character by the fact that the initial stage of the social security scheme involved only a 
special branch of the economy.69 Similarly, the Commission held that a special measure 
issued by the Dutch government and granting tax reduction/concession to buyers of 
environmental-friendly motor-cars, constituted a general measure. The appraisal of the 
Committee pointed out that the fact that tax relief was equally applicable regardless of 
the origin of the products, and each car manufacturer seemed technically capable of the 
installation of such equipment, served as a solid basis for the reasoning of the 
Commission that the measure in issue was of general character.70 
The issue of social dumping has always been the subject of heated debates within the 
Community, nevertheless this issue has never been and will probably never be brought 
before the Court of Justice. Here we are dealing with a special kind of aid given by the 
United Kingdom to its own economic actors and foreign, mainly Japanese producers 
established within the territory of the United Kingdom. Since during the years of the 
Thatcher era the British 'rolled back' or 'impeded' social legislation,71 the British Isles 
have turned into an investment paradise for investors hungry for lower rates and taxes. 
This resulted in the migration of numerous big French and German investors transferring 
their production capacity to Albion, which sparked off noisy protests from Jacques Delors 
among others. If should be noted here that this type of support is not prohibited. 
In summary, it can be ascertained that the Community law has failed to create a clear 
definition by which a clear division line could be drawn between specific and general 
measures. 
ad b) Money infusion and state purchases 
The decisions of the Court in Intermills,72 Leeuwarder73 and later in Re Boch'4 
declared state aids granted in the form of capital infusion illegal, provided an investor 
driven by the profit motive had refused to buy shares in the undertaking in question due 
to the low dividends or profit he could earn from the purchase.75 This approach/inter-
pretation was later reinforced by the decisions taken in Italy v. Commission (C-303/88 
[1991]) and Italy v. Commission (C-305/89[1991]),76 and a similar approach was 
69 First Survey, Point 14. 
70 XXth Report on Competition, Point 199. 
71 The United Kingdom opted out of the Social Chapter (Protocol?) of the Maastricht Treaty. 
72 Internulis v. Commission [1984] E.C.R. 3809. 
73 296 & 381/82 Leeuwarder Papierenwarenfabriek v. Commission [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 380. 
74 Belgium v. Commission [1986] E.C.R. 2321. "In the case of an undertaking whose capital is almost 
entirely held by the public authorities, the test is, in particular whether in similar circumstances a private 
shareholder having regard to the foreseeability of obtaining a return and leaving aside all social, regional 
policy and sectoral considerations, would have subscribed the capital in question. " 
75 For more details see Hellingmann (1986) pp. 111-133. 
76 C-303/88 [1991] E.C.R. 1-433; & C-305/89 [1991] E.C.R. 1-1603. 
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adopted in the Communication of the Commission to the Member States in respect of the 
application of Articles 92 and 93.11 In the above cases it is rather the Italian reasoning 
rejected by the Court than the decision itself that deserves particular attention. The 
Italians were trying to persuade the Court that within the undertaking in question large 
privately owned holding companies were also carrying out money transfers which were 
not expected to yield profits either in the short or medium term.78 The Court discarded 
this argument by maintaining that a reasonable return for the money invested was 
required at least in the long term, otherwise the capital injection granted free was nothing 
but a camouflage of aid.79 With regard to Hungary80 the second case8' related to the 
privatization of the Rover Group might command considerable interest. In the course of 
the privatization of the Rover Group the British government wrote off some of Rover's 
outstanding debts in an attempt to improve the financial standing of the company. On 
examining the case the Commission stated that there was absolutely no reason why in the 
course of the takeover of the seriously debt-ridden Rover Group by British Aerospace, 
the Group should be sold as free from encumbrances, and why a further 800 million 
pounds should be given to British Aerospace for the purpose of debt management. This 
was all the more unjustifiable if the generally high indebtedness of the companies in the 
motor car industry was taken into consideration. A similar problem was encountered in 
Volvo Car Corporation, where the loss-making Dutch plant of Volvo was sold to 
Mitsubishi in such a way that the total cost of closing down was passed to the debit of 
the Dutch state, a shareholder in the company. Afterwards the Dutch state sold its shares 
77 O.J. 1991 С 273/2; The Preamble to the Transparency Directive confirms litis principle by stating: 
"Whereas such transparency in respect of public undertakings must make it possible that a clear distinction be 
made between the role of the state as a public authority and its role as a shareholder. In June 1989 the 
Commission approved of a capital infusion by the Dutch government into Fokker, a Dutch company whose 
shares had been purchased by the state at the then market price. When the British government purchased shares 
in the Rover Group with the purpose of enabling the company to write off its debts towards the state, the 
Commission persuaded tlie British government to decrease the amount it had intended to write off from 800 
million to 469 million pounds. See also Ross (1989) p. 172. 
78 BERLIN, D.: L'adoption du régime des enterprises publiques aux normes internationales et 
communautaires in: RTDE p. 232, 1983, vividly exemplifies that even investors keeping in view the market 
investor principle, might decide on further capital investments upon finding that the winding up of the company 
might prove to be more costly than its maintenance. For another excellent example of the reasoning of the 
Communities at the GATT talks on this issue see supra Note 34. 
79 See Adamantoupulos pp. 447^148 for more details on die external aspects of the problem. 
80 The Hungarian practice can boast of several cases involving writing off or forgiving debts, or die 
conversion of debts into equity participation, which would undoubtedly arouse the interest of the Commission. 
In Hungary it is the rules on annual settlement accounts that reveal to some extent such interventions by the 
state. In Enclosure No. 8 to Act LXII of 1992, the Hungarian Parliament approved of the conversion of state 
aid to equity participation in the case of 22 public undertakings. Out of a total of 3000 million Hungarian 
Forints specially allocated for this purpose, Ganz Danubius was granted 1153 million, while Suzuki's share 
amounted to 700 million. Only a thorough examination could Irring to light/unmask whether these instances of 
state intervention in the summer of 1991 had been carried out in die spirit of die market investor principle. 
81 89/58 EEC, July 13, 1988 in: 1992 1 C.M.L.R. pp. 876-892. 
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to Mitsubishi at a bargain price, and even extended a long-term interest free credit worth 
7 million Dutch gulden to the Japanese. Under Article 93(2) the Committee initiated 
proceedings on account of the transaction.82 
ad c) The problem of the de minimis rule 
In its decisions in Deufil,83 Philip MorriS4 and later Re Tubemeuse85 the Court made 
it clear that it was unwilling to overlook the granting of smaller subsidies and the support 
given to undertakings carrying less weight marketwise by employing some kind of de 
minimis rule. This meant that the Court had gone to such lengths that it virtally ignored 
the clause: 'in so far as it affects trade between member States' in Article 92(1), and it 
just stopped short of saying that any aid was automatically illegal or automatically 
affected trade between Member States.86 That the Court was not willing to apply de 
minimis rule by adopting the analogy of Article 85, was due to the fact that in the 
Court's opinion the contribution of the state to the distortion of market conditions was 
more threatening than that of the non-state actors on the market.87 In light of this it 
would seem surprising that in a letter addressed to the Member States, the Commission 
emphasized that it did not raise any objection to the notification of new aids88 with an 
intensity of less than 7.5% provided the recipient employed less than 100 workers and 
the turnover of the undertaking did not exceed 10 million ECU.89 
82 O.J. C105 [April 25, 1992]. 
83 In 310/85 Deufil v. Commission [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 553 Advocate General held the view that "Undersuch 
circumstances, aid in the form of investment/equity participation decreasing the production costs of a producer, 
is bound to have an impact on the competitive position of all the other producers both within and outside the 
common market, and therefore also on trade within the Communities. " Having been granted an aid of 3 million 
DM, 3 Deufil succeeded in doubling its market share on a saturated market within a year. 
84 In Philip Monis Holland v. Commission 730/79 [1980] E.C.R. 2671, pp. 2688-89 the Court noted that. 
"When financial aid strengthens the position of an undertaking as compared with other undertakings competing 
in intra-Community trade the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid. " In this case aid had been given 
to a huge company, which created only an significant number of jobs, while at the same time its production 
for export increased considerably. 
85 In C-142/87 Belgium v. Commission [1990] 1 E.C.R. 959 the Court rejected the contention put forward 
by the Belgian government that the 5 per cent principle should be applied in relation to state aids. 
86 Wyatt (1933) supra p. 527. 
87 Ross (1989) p. 170. 
88 SC. (85) D/2611 of February 28, 1985. 
89 The letter nded out the granting of such aid falling within the category of operating aid, export subsidies 
and special political considerations (guidelines). Ross (1989) pp. 171-172 refers to Case 258/85 France v. 
Commission, where the intensity of the disputed aid granted to the textile sector did not exceed 5.5%, yet it 
was regarded as an infringement of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. For more details on the Commission's 
policy on aid to small and medium-sized undertakings see Community guidelines on state aid for small and 
medium-sized enterprises [O.J. C213, August 19, 1992]; Communication to the member States on the 
accelerated clearance of aid schemes for SMEs and of amendments of existing schemes [O.J. C213, July 19, 
1992). 
State Aid under the EC Hungary Association Agreement 351 
ad d) Preferential schemes (systems) and services 
In spite of the fact that preferential price systems are relatively easy to "catch", they pose 
serious procedural problems both for the Commission and the Court. In Cofaz, for 
instance, the French complainants (competitors) first took their case involving a 
preferential price system specially applied in Holland in favour of Dutch producers of 
chemical fertilizers before the Commission. Being unsatisfied with the decision reached 
by the Commission upon closing the file, the complainants were practically bogged down 
in lengthy and tedious procedural battles in order to prove their locus standi to challenge 
the Commission decision before the Court. Only after their point had been proven, was it 
possible for the Court to examine the restructured but still two-tier Dutch gas-price system, 
which led die Court to the conclusion that the support given to Dutch producers through 
the price system was such that it created in an impossible situation for French producers 
not only abroad but also on the domestic market.90 In addition to the problems caused 
by the role of the state in making energy,91 land92 or buildings93 available to economic 
actors at favourable prices, instances of economic intervention by central state holding 
companies and other economic authorities have also captured the Commission's attention. 
The privatization process which was launched by Treuhandanstalt at the Eisanach Trabant 
plant and which involved a significant improvement in the infrastructure of the plant 
including the building of an industrial railway, a sewage system and the general 
rehabilitation of the whole area in order to make it more attractive for its potential buyer, 
the Opel Works, constituted illegal aid according to the appraisal of the Commission.94 
The official response to a Written Question95 submitted in the European Parliament 
and general state practice in this field both indicate that the rules for state aids do not 
provide adequately for public projects carried out by states with the aim of luring 
investors to certain regions or cutting down the start-up costs of investments.96 In its 
reply the Commission formulated the policy guidelines in relation to this issue by 
pointing out that the traditional financing of the improvement of infrastructure from state 
or local government budgets cannot be regarded as aid under Article 92, as opposed to 
those "projects which are purposely carried out in the interest of one or several 
undertakings or certain types of products", and which are therefore caught by Article 92. 
90 Cofaz (Compagnie française de l 'azote) SA and others v. Commission; 169/84 [1986] E.C.R. 409. 
91 67, 68 and 70/85, Kwekerij Gebroeders van der Kooy BV, Johannes Wilhelmus van Vliet, the 
Landbouwschap & Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Commission [1988] E.C.R. 219. 
92 The Derbyshire County Council sold a piece of land to Toyota far below the market price. Bull EC. 
7/8-1991 1.2.74. 
93 Daimler Benz and Sony purchased buildings located on Potsdamer Platz also well below the market price. 
Agence Europe, April 15, 1992. 
94 O.J. C68 [March 17, 19921. 
95 J.O. 1967, 2311, quoted by Wyatt (1993) p. 525. 
96 The case concerned the provision by the public authorities of a system for the purification water which 
would have rendered the building of such a system by the American chemical factory unnecessary. 
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In consequence of this rather feeble attempt by the Commission at laying down the rules 
for aids of such character, this has become another of those areas where no consistent 
policy has been formulated and pursued.97 
ad e) Public undertakings 
In spite of the significant structural differences in the economies of Western countries, 
it is generally true to say that state property, govenunent contracts and public 
undertakings under Article 90 of the Rome Treaty, or undertakings having the character 
of a monopoly or possessing other exclusive rights constitute a determining factor in all 
these economies.98 The Commission has been seeking to address this problem through 
the principle of. market investor and by issuing the Transparency Directive.99 The 
Transparency Directive aims at screening first and foremost those financial ties between 
public authorities and public undertakings which involve the granting of direct or indirect 
access to public funds and the effective employment of such funds by the favoured 
companies. When conducting its investigations the Commission is trying to establish 
whether i) the money granted makes up for operational losses; whether ii) working capital 
is made available to the recipient; whether iii) a grant or a preferential loan is provided; 
whether iv) any financial advantage is ensured by retaining profits, or by forgiving debts 
or normal interest rates; and whether v) undue advantage is given to the recipient by 
waiving (forgiving) rates and taxes. 
Now it seems that the Commission's endeavour to attain a higher degree of 
transparency has been futile, since financial relations between the state and public 
undertakings have not become more transparent than before.100 The decision reached 
in Landbouwshap101 is usually looked upon as a milestone in this field. GASUNIE, the 
gas works introduced special rates for the provision of natural gas for agricultural 
producers growing hothouse vegetables. In its judgement the Court held that the Society 
of Agricultural Producers.(Fanners) and GASUINE concluded a separate price agreement, 
97 The Hungarian government is seeking to attract foreign investors by granting them tax relief or providing 
services on preferential terms or free. Act XXIV of 1988 provides for tax allowance and tax exemption for 
start-up companies. Article 12 of Act CIV of 1992 on corporate tax guarantees a maximum tax concession of 
60% in the case of direct investment of foreign capital. 100%) tax concession for a period of ten years may also 
be grantedTo large scale foreign investments, as it has happened in the case of Suzuki and General Motors: 
[Gov. Decree 62/1990 (23 March], Ford: [Gov. Decree 10/1990 (24 July)], Bank Leumi [Gov. Decree 
1019/1990 (13 August)], and Agroferm [Gov. Decree 3/1990 (17 April)] in the past years. 
98 This is particularly true in the case of France, although if Sweden and Austria also join the Communities, 
this problem may become even more relevant. 
99 Dir. 80/723 O.J. 1980 LI95/35: Commission Communication to the Member States applying the 
requirements of the Transparency Directive to public undertakings in the manufacturing sector O.J. 1991 
C273/2; See also Article 222 of the Treaty of Rome and Dony-Bartholme (1993) pp. 410-412. 
100 Wyatt (1993) Giapter 19. 
101 67, 68 and 70/85, Kwekerij Gebroeders van der Kooy BV, Johannes Wilhelmus van Vliet, the 
Landbouwschap & Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Commission [1988] E.C.R. 219. 
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during which GASUINE did not possess full "contractual freedom", as half of its shares 
was held by public authority bodies. For companies operating in the industrial assembling 
sector, the adoption of a separate decision was thought to be necessary by the 
Commission.102 
On the whole it can be ascertained that the Commission has been taking steps to 
manage problems concerning public undertakings, but in spite if this effort monetary 
movements between public undertakings and the state have still remained unregulated 
from the legal point of view. 
ad f ) The Commission's approach related to cyclical (temporal) application arises 
from perspicuous political considerations, but even so it undermines conceptual clarity. 
The Commission considers its policy on state aid as part of its activity aimed at 
maintaining the mechanics of the market. It approves or rejects the provision of aid 
in certain sectors depending on the prevailing economic conditions in the sector in 
question on the saturation of the market, and on whether there is consequential 
overproduction, etc. Naturally, in certain sectors sweeping changes may occur over a 
relatively short period of time. In 1973, for example the Commission endorsed British 
government plans for shelf mineral oil and natural gas mining, because in those days 
of critical oil shortage the newborn industry promised rich supplies for the future. 
However, by as early as 1976 the market had reached the point of saturation, and the 
Commission was no longer prepared to tolerate any support granted to the oil industry 
under Article 92(3). In the Belgian textile-aid case 84/82 [1982] the Advocate General 
held that given the then market conditions the Commission was not entitled to approve 
an aid package designed to support the textile sector.103 The system of cyclical 
(temporal) application is otherwise logical and follows (logically) from the nature of 
the Commission's task, but on the other hand it amounts to dealing a mortal blow to 
"security in law". 
The system of exceptions In EC law 
The Treaty of Rome contains several exemptions from the strict categorical prohibitions 
laid down in Article 92(1). At the first level of exceptions the Treaty creates ex lege 
further exceptions. These can be divided into six groups, to which a seventh group can 
be logically linked. Article 92(2) enlists three categories: 
102 Commission Communication to the Member States—application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty 
and of Article 5 of Commission Directive 80/723/EEC to public undertakings in the manufacturing sector [O.J. 
C273, December 31, 1991]. 
103 84/82 Germany v. Commission [1982] p. 1504. 
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a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such 
aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the produets concerned; 
b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional 
occurrences;105 
c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany 
affected by the division of Germany, in sofar as such aid is required in order to 
compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by that division.106 
Article 42 contains special provisions in regard to agricultural production. 
d) Article 42 itself suggests that the prohibition of aid does not apply in the 
agricultural sector at all, but Regulation 26/62107 adopted by the Council also extended 
the applicability of the rules for aid to this sector.108 
e) Articles 77 and 80 widen the scope of permissible aids in the area of transport. 
0 Article 90(2) imposes restrictions on the application of Article 92(1) in regard to 
public undertakings. 
g) By and large, different rules are to be applied in the coal and steel industry. 
h) Although there are no special provisions in this respect, aids granted by the 
Commission and the institutions of the Community also fall outside the prohibitions 
under Article 92(1), similarly to the exemptions granted by the Council under Article 
92(4). 
In addition, Article 92(3) invests the Commission with the power to decide in relation 
to five other categories whether an aid granted may be considered to be lawful or not 
"The following may be considered to be compatible with the common market: 
i) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is 
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment [92(3)(a)]; 
104 An example of this would be the granting of subsidies to manufacturers of basic foodstuff in order that 
the prices may be maintained. This could be detrimental to competition terms since it would exclude or restrict 
the distribution and sales of similar foreign substitutes. When in 1975 producers of hard wheal were subsidized 
in Italy, the Commission ruled that the maximized producers' price of pasta could not have been otherwise 
maintained, and that imports of pasta into Italy were insignificant. Comp. Rep. Points 160-129. 
105 In 1976 following the earthquake in Friuli-Venezia Giulia low interest loans were given to those affected 
by the disaster, and similar loans were provided in 1977 after the devastating floods in Liguria Comp. Rep. 
1978, Point 164. The category of exceptional occurrences is not applied in practice, though Wyatt (1993) p. 
528 argues that aids provided in compensation for acts of terrorism could be dealt with under tills rubric. The 
United Kingdom has created a special insurance mechanism providing full indemnity for victims of IRA 
terrorism. This issue has not been addressed by the Commission to date. 
106 Following the unification of Germany the Commission has been seeking to eliminate this provision. Comp. 
Rep. 1990, Point 178. It is widely believed that after the unification the scope of the provision should have 
covered the whole of the territory of the former GDR. 
107 O.J. 1962 L993. 
108 Dec. 81/608 [O.J. 1981 L220/37] is quoted in Cowney, p. 256; in this sector subsidized petrol and heating 
fuel rates for land cultivation and animal husbandry have been the subject of a lot of controversy. The 
Commission has attempted to handle the problem by issuing certain guidelines. 
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j) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest 
or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State [92(3)(b)J; 
k) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent 
contrary to the common interest [92(3)(c)j; 
1) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect 
trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the 
common interest [92(3)(d)];109 
m) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council acting 
by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission [92(3)(e)]."° 
It would be highly interesting to make a comparison between Article 92(3)(a) and 
92(3)(c), which on the surface seem to be referring to the same thing. (It is interesting 
to note here, that there seems to be a considerable overlap between Article 92(3)(a) and 
Article 92(3)(c).) In spite of the similarities at first sight, there are essential differences 
not only between the two paragraphs, but also between the regions mentioned in these 
articles as 'cumulatively handicapped (underdeveloped) regions' and 'regions which are 
to be developed'.1" 
1. Whereas aid under Article 92(3)(c) may be permitted insofar as does not lead to 
the distortion of competition, Article 92(3)(a) fails to recognize even the occurrence of 
the distortion of competition as a disqualifying condition. 
2. In case of 92(3)(a) the Commission favours a regional approach"2 while under 
92(3)(c) it tends to focus on smaller regions and to employ a sectoral approach.113 
3. Article 92(3)(a) is often referred to in order to 'justify' such industrial or 
agricultural projects which might as a result create more jobs or improve the standard of 
living in an otherwise economically depressed region. The issues examined by the 
Commission covered both the regions of economic depression and the likely/potential 
effects of the subsidized activity."4 Under Article 92(3)(c) the Commission is 
empowered to approve sectoral aid granted by Member States to certain national 
industries. This kind of exception has become the most significant of all, because it 
permits—while taking under close scrutiny solely the potential improvements unfolding in 
the subsidized sector concerned as a result of the provided aid—the granting of state aid 
109 This provision was inserted by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. 
110 This article, which was originally Article (d) in the EEC Treaty, became Article (e) in the Maastricht 
Treaty. On the basis of this article, 8 directives concerning aid to shipbuilding have been adopted, which could 
not have been accepted on grounds of Article (c), as it specially covered operating aids. 
111 These categories were introduced by Wishlade (1993) p. 144. 
112 It deals with the so-called NUTS II regions which roughly correspond to the Italian region or the German 
Land. See Wishlade (1993) p. 144. 
113 It uses die NUTS III region, the equivalent of the British county or the French dépertement as a territorial 
unit. Wishlade (1993) p. 144. 
114 Philip Morris Holland; Dec. 80/1157 Re Investment Aids at Antwerp O.J. 1980 L343/38; and 296 & 
318/82 Leeuwarder. 
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to the following areas: shipbuilding and repair, the textile industry, the production of 
synthetic fibres, car manufacturing, and the computer industry, etc. 
4. The Commission measures against a Community standard when it permits aid 
under Article 92(3)(a), but in cases of 92(3)(c) aid a national standard is employed, 
through which support given to particularly backward, underdeveloped areas within a 
country is also made possible."5 
Considering this system of exemptions it should not come as a surprise that state aids 
amount to a total of 100 billion ECU annually. Hence it should be even less surprising 
that repeated communications issued by the Commission in which they express their 
conviction that this problem should be handed over (to) the past as soon as possible, are 
generally received with mixed feelings. A good example of this is the Sixteenth Report 
on Competition Policy which runs as follows: The Community's efforts aiming at the 
completion of the internal market by 1992 attach special weight and significance to the 
enforcement of the rules on competition and particularly to that of the rules on state 
aid.116 
Compensatory justification 
In the light of the of rules discussed above there exists a seemingly strict prohibition 
which is toned down by vaguely defined criteria such as e.g. the reference to whether aid 
"affects trade between Member States". This is supplemented by a system of exceptions 
which—on the basis of certain often elusive criteria defying any attempts at formulating 
a precise definition—empower the Commission to elaborate and adopt any appropriate 
regulations and exercise its powers of discretion in these categories of aid. It should be 
noted that the Commission formulated such policies which are legally controlled, but 
enable it to exercise its quasi-discretionary powers, and which impose either absolutely 
no limitations or only within a narrow range on its activity to macro-manage the 
economy of the Community partly through centralized subsidy targets and partly through 
centrally provided aids. 
The Commission supervises the application of Article 92(2) and controls the system 
of exceptions in Article 93(3): 
"(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living 
is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment; 
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest 
or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a member State; 
115 Comp. Rep. 1989, Point 133; 24/85 Germany v. Commission [1987] E.C.R. 4013; Wyatt (1993) 
pp. 531-532; Wishlade (1993) p. 144. See for more details under regional aid. 
116 XVI Report on Competition Policy, 198 p. 135, and Completing the internal market COM (85) 310 
pp. 39-^t0. 
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(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent 
contrary to the common interest." 
In the course of its practice the Commission was gradually giving shape to the 
so-called system of compensatory justification."7 This system ensues from the approach 
of the Commission according to which any state aid per se is to be regaded as illegal, 
except in cases where some special circumstances justify the contrary. The notion of 
illegitimacy springs from the underlying perception of the Commission that any state aid 
must be inevitably harmful to competition, consequently the Commission may permit aid 
on condition that some special consideration or some greater benefit ensuing from—and 
made possible by—the provided aid makes up for the injury to the conditions of 
competition that has been caused even though the reasons for the granting of aid have 
been justifiable. It follows from this that the detailed study of each particular case is 
required whether it concerns already existing or prospective aid. The requirement of 
compensatory justification first appeared in the Commission's opinion in Intermills,118 
and this statement has become the pillar of state aid policy for the whole Community. 
A Comparative Analysis of State Aid in European Community and 
Hungarian Law 
Although it is beyond the scope of our present study to perform an exhaustive 
comparison between the relevant legal institutions, taking into consideration the normative 
rule and the practice associated with it a comparison of the EC rules and Hungarian rules 
on aid seems inevitable in some crucial areas. First we have attempted to classify 
different forms of aid on the basis of logic and the rules of law which however 
sometimes seem to defy logic. After the classification we are going to embark on a more 
difficult task, that is, a comparative analysis covering the most significant areas. 
It seems a logical necessity to categorize different forms of aid according to a) 
direction depending on whether the aid is intended for the domestic or export market; and 
b) according to function depending on whether it is designed to maintain, sustain or 
transform the recipient. The classification employed by the international trade rules 
(САТГ) recognizes mainly two categories: direction (export or domestic) and sector 
(agriculture, transport, coal, textile and synthetic fibres), while in the Community practice 
certain preferred aims such as environment protection, regional development, research and 
development play a vital role in the appraisal of aids. It must be pointed out that these 
categories are artificially imposed and mutually overlap. In practice the simultaneous 
inclusion of all categories in the assessment of one particular case is far from being an 
isolated incident. This is what happened on account of the support given to the seriously 
depressed N I T II. regions, when the Commission did not exclude the permissibility of 
117 Mortelmans (1984). 
118 323/82 [1984] ECR 3809. 
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granting aid to such huge labour absorbing industries as the textile sector, which were 
otherwise going through a critical time."9 
I. Aids grouped according to direction 
Export subsidies120 
In Community rules on export subsidies a crucial distinction is made between external 
rules and inner rules. Export subsidy rules relating to third countries are to be found in 
the GATT, in the Subsidy Code and in Council Regulation 2423/88.121 Unfortunately, 
none of them provide clear definitions of what should qualify as an export subsidy, since 
Article VI(3) of GATT makes only vague references to.it, while the Subsidy Code refers 
to subsidies "dependent on the export activity". The Subsidy Code offers an impressive 
list122 of definitions which specify the range of export subsidies. This list was also 
included in Council Reg. 2176/84 and in ECSC Decision 2177/854, and is described in 
detail below: 
1. Direct export subsidies provided e.g. by Brazil to help export women's shoes123 
and certain steel products.124 
2. Certain foreign exchange regulations which enable the exporter to change the 
earnings from export to its own currency at a conversion rate higher than the official rate 
reported to the IMF. 
3. Transport subsidies which generally force transporters to apply lower rates for 
exports and ensure them some kind reimbursement in return. 
4. The provision of goods and services at favourable rates are generally considered as 
subsidies when these are made available for the exporter below the domestic and world 
market prices. The maintenance of a double price system may have such consequences e.g. 
in the petrochemical sector where the raw materials may be sold at various prices on the 
domestic market. At the same time this type of subsidy is difficult to catch. The main 
reason is that if it is not specifically the subsidized product that is exported, it is very 
difficult to prove that the subsidy has been provided in order to boost export.125 
5. The exemption of a product from direct or indirect taxes and the refund of import 
costs raise rather complicated assessment problems. The refund of a direct tax shall be 
119 See for example in connection with Mezzogiorno. 
120 Adamantoupulos gives an excellent analysis of the external aspects of export subsidies and aids to home 
industry (producers), pp. 442-446. 
121 Council reg. on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the 
European Community O.J. NO. L. 209/1. 
122 It means that the list is not laxative or exhaustive, and other activities may also qualify as subsidies. See 
Beseler p. 133. 
123 Dec. 81/911/EEC O.J. L327/39 [January 14, 1981]. 
124 Ree 2129/83/ECSC O.J. L205/29 [June 29, 1983]. 
125 Beseler p. 133. 
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considered as an explicit subsidy, whereas indirect taxes qualify as subsidies insomuch 
as the refund exceeds the amount of tax which has been actually paid. The refund of 
direct taxes may extend to embrace the direct taxes levied on the ingredients incorporated 
in the price.126 
6. Export credit guarantees and warrantees qualify as subsidies provided the system 
can obviously no longer sustain its economic viability from its earnings and can be kept 
in operation only through the provision of state aids. 
7. Export credits are regarded as subsidies insofar as the government transfers such 
credits to third parties at a lower price or interest rate than the prevailing interest on the 
international money market, and thus the maintenance of the credit system entails further 
budgetary expenditures.127 These rules may be applied in the relations of Hungary and 
the Communities insofar as the Association Treaty is not applicable.128 
The inner rules on export subsidies, that is the rules to be applied within the the 
Customs Union, sharply deviate from the external rules. This can be revealed from a 
letter sent by the Commission to the Member States in 1987, in which they were warned 
not to continue the practice of exporting their products to 'dummy' phoney companies 
in third countries in such a way that the products in question were shipped back on paper 
to the country of origin, which in reality they had never even left. Thus this practice 
amounts to the circumvention of the prohibition provided for in Article 92(1). The rules 
on export subsidies within the Community contain explicit and unambiguous prohibitions 
in this respect.129 In most cases, Greece has occupied the centre stage in the battles 
fought over this issue. After the accession of Greece, the other Member States were 
supposed to have discontinued the subsidization of exports to Greece. When some 
Member States failed to comply the Commission initiated proceedings against 
France.1^ After its accession Greece itself was obliged to eliminate export subsidy 
schemes concerning export from Greece to the other Community Members only by 
1990.131 However, in 1991 the Commission commenced proceedings before the Court 
on account of an export subsidy provided by Greece in the form of direct tax refund.132 
In the Commission v. France 6 & 11/69 cases referred to earlier, the Court declared a 
preferential export discount rate illegitimate aid. 
126 The GATT has adopted special rules to address this problem. [Guidelines on physical incorporation 
adopted by the GATT Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures/GATT Doc. No. SCM/68, October 
31, 1985). The EC practice is also very extensive. See Ree. 375/83/ECSC O.J. L45/11, which states that the 
depreciation of investment goods is not included/incorporated in the cost of the product and therefore it cannot 
be refunded/reclaimed. 
127 See the opinion of OECD on this question, OECD Doc. No. TD/Consensus/82.41. 
128 For more details see the regulations excluded from the application of Article 62 of the Association Treaty. 
129 Xlth Report on Competition Policy, Point 247; XVIth Report on Competition Policy, Point 257. 
130 Xlth Report on Competition Policy, Point 247; XVIth Report on Competition Policy, Point 258. 
131 XVIth Report on Competition Policy, Point 258. 
132 XlXth Report on Competition Policy, Point 202, XXth Report on Competition Policy, Point 276. 
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Depending on the rules to be adopted in the Association Council, Hungary may not 
be allowed at all or may be permitted within certain limits though, to grant subsidies to 
its producers in order to boost exports to Community countries, unless a mechanism very 
similar to the one adopted in the case of Greece is going to be elaborated for Hungary. 
This, of course, equally holds for exports from the European Community to Hungary. 
II. The classification of aids according to function 
Aids can be categorized on the basis of the purpose they are designed to serve, which has 
proved to be an underlying principle in the approach applied both by the Court and the 
Commission in their evaluation of aid. Those subsidy schemes which are solely intended 
to cut the operating costs of the subsidized economic entity without making the granting 
of aid conditional upon a better adjustment to the market conditions or upon a revision 
of the operations and that of the inner structure of the undertaking in question, are called 
operational aids. Other aid projects assisting companies in adjusting to the market are 
regarded as aids granted for the purpose of restructuring. There exists a third group of 
aids, named emergency or survival aids, which are employed to prevent a company in 
serious crisis from going bankrupt. An analysis of how these different types of aid are 
treated in Community law is the subject of the sections to follow. 
Operational aid 
The provision of operational aid has received perhaps the strongest criticism from the 
Commission, since "it produces immediate effect on operating costs and pricesThe 
Commission has refused to accept references to either cyclical or conjunctural difficulties 
as sufficient grounds for this type of intervention in the market, and holds the view that 
operational aids work to the definite disadvantage of economic actors on the market, 
since such aids pre-empt any willingness to adjust to the market situation. The 
Commission has remained adamant that aid is unacceptable even if the recipient goes 
broke in its absence but it has shown more flexibility towards certain regional aid 
projects granted to areas of serious economic deprivation and areas suffering most from 
recession and viewed such aids as legitimate.134 
Aid granted for (restructuring) authorized to promote economic recovery 
If the parties reason that aid granted to individual companies and certain products will 
be instrumental in furthering the efforts of the recipient to adjust to the changed market 
133 Commission Dec. 82/744 of October 11, 1982, O.J. 1982 L315/23 on p. 24, quoted by Evans on p. 93. 
134 O.J. 1988 C212/2 quoted by Evans on p. 94; Tlie XVIIItli Report on Competition Policy by die 
Commission (1989) p. 147 notes: "... given tlie particularly grave situation/developments these regions are 
facing, tlie Commission has decided to permit the provision of operating aids in certain situations". 
State Aid under the EC Hungary Association Agreement 361 
conditions, the Commission seems more willing to grant approval than in the case of 
operational aids. At the same time ample proof of the company's efforts at restructuring 
must be provided for the Commission with special emphasis on the situation of the 
relevant sector or region which necessitates the restructuring by launching new products 
of higher quality on the market and by decreasing the market share. When the Belgian 
government decided to grant 400 million Belgian francs in aid to Noviboch, a company 
manufacturing sanitary goods the Commission approved the aid on the grounds that the 
aid in question had promoted the company's efforts at introducing fundamental structural 
changes in an industry suffering from serious overproduction, and also because "the 
output of the restructured company was bound to be 20-30% less than that of its 
predecessor".135 In Leewarder the fact that the aid had been granted in order to 
facilitate the restructuring of the company, weighed heavily on the final appraisal of the 
Commission, which considered the decline in output effected brought about by the 
granting of aid as sufficient proof of the recipient's reasoning.136 By contrast, in 
Executif Regional Wallon & Glaverbel SA v. Commission137 the Court did not accept 
the arguments of the recipient which claimed that the provided aid constituted aid for the 
purposes of restructuring for the simple reason that it enabled the company through the 
introduction of new technology to enhance its competitiveness on the market and to 
emancipate itself from its unilateral dependence on Japanese technology. 
Survival (Emergency) Aid 
In a letter sent to the Member States on January 24, 1979, the Commission laid down the 
essential prerequisites for the justifiability of emergency aid.138 According to this letter 
survival aid constitutes financial support given to a company in a critical economic 
situation for remedial purposes so that the company can be kept alive, so that the 
operation of the company can be maintained until the crisis has been properly tackled. 
Even if these conditions are met, this type of aid—povided it has been previously notified 
to the Committee—may be legally granted only for a maximum period of six months, at 
the normal interest rate, and in the form of cash, on the condition that the support 
provided does not have an unfavourable impact on the economic situation of the other 
economic actors operating in the same sector. In Intermills, as the evaluation of the 
Commission noted, an aid granted by the Belgian government to a paper-making firm 
was used partly for restructuring and partly for remedial purposes. The Commission held 
that the first type of aid was well-grounded due to fierce competition from foreign 
companies, but prohibited the provision of survival aid. The European Court approved 
135 Com. Dec. 87/423 O.J. 1987 L228/39, p. 40. 
136 296 & 318/82 Kingdom of the Netherlands & Leewarder Papierwarenfabriek BV v. Commission {1985J 
E.C.R. 809, p. 825. 
137 Cases 62 & 72/87 [1988] E.C.R. p. 1753. 
138 Quoted by Evans on p. 96, and see also Boussac Saint Frères O.J. 1987 L352/42, p. 48. 
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the complainants' claim that the Commission had been unable to prove during the 
proceedings that "... the market activity of the complainants ... may have such an 
unfavourable impact on trading relations, which renders the disappearance of the firm 
more favourable than its salvage".119 
In 1987 another decision concerning a credit by the Greek government made it clear 
that survival aid is intended to serve as a remedy to alleviate the temporary difficulties 
of otherwise economically viable undertakings. The provision of such aid may under no 
circumstances create such a situation in which the market position of the recipient is 
considerably strengthened, and in which through the provision of aid, the company in 
question fares better than it would have otherwise done if the crisis had not occurred. 
III. The classification of aid according to its aim/purpose 
The following sections make a parallel study of the Community and Hungarian rules 
currently in force. Four different target areas are to be discussed below: regional 
development, the alleviation of the unemployment problem, the promotion/encouragement 
of the research and development activity, and finally the support of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises which has already been covered above in connection with die 
de minimis rule. Before embarking on categorizing aid according to the intended 
objective, which, of course, in many respects overlaps other the approaches detailed in 
the preceding sections, one particular, factor unmentioned in our study so far, but 
consistenly recurring in the Commission's opinions, needs to be treated with special 
care/needs to be given special attention. The Commission Beats these areas as aims which 
need to be supported on the grounds that in these cases the impossibility of the market 
situation, that is the inability of the market to attain the desired results, makes the 
permission of state intervention absolutely necessary.140 On establishing the necessity 
of aid, what remains to be done is to decide which category of aid under Article 92(3) 
it belongs to. This is only a problem of secondary significance, though. 
Regional aid 
a) Regional aid or (regional development aid)141 raises serious problems for the 
Commission which has to take into consideration both the principles of free market 
competition and those of solidarity when taking decisions on these issues. The 
Commission is obliged to build up the market, allowing for and definitely encouraging 
the adoption of regional policies, while at the same time watching out for any attempts 
139 [1984] E.C.R. 3809, p. 3832. 
140 See infra p. 27. 
141 The Commission's view is oullined in Principles of Coordination for regional aids [O.J.C. February 13, 
19791. 
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at disguising operational aid as regional aid.142 This task is rendered even more difficult 
by the fact that traditional industries, but even microchip manufacturers, which are 
increasingly dependent on raw materials, are usually concentrated in certain regions, 
which means that any aid given to these regions amounts to sectoral aid granted to 
certain industries and vice versa. The regional aid policy of the Commission was very 
similar to the American approach for over a considerable period of time, and Brussels 
conceded that regional aid might lead to the dislocation of investment and the distortion 
of competition terms by improving the return rate of the recipient simply because an 
undertaking had previously established itself in a certain region. While the American 
view has remained unchanged143 and considers the entire regional policy of EC as 
countervailable measures, unless it concerns areas which correspond to Greece, South 
Italy, Spain or Ireland in size; the perception of the European Community in respect of 
regional aid has undergone a complete change.144 
The policy guidelines applied by the Commission in these areas are to be found in 
three of the Commission's Communications, in a Resolution of the Representatives of the 
Member States,145 and the Commission's Annual Report on Competition Policy also 
contains additional information on the subject. However, it should be emphasized here 
that these guidelines (rules) above are not rules of law, hence they are not legally binding 
on the Commission. The following aspects of the Commission's policy on aid can be 
outlined stressed on the basis of the Communications: 
i) Almost all kind of operating/operational aids are prohibited. This policy is 
consistently pursued by the Commission and the 1978 Communication demanded the 
freezing of the provision of this type of aid. In spite of this, since the mid-eighties 
marked changes have come about in the treatment of operating aids.146 As the 
Commission itself publicly announced "... the accession of Spain and Portugal, following 
Greece ... necessitates that the Commission reconsider its policy on regional aid."'41 
142 Wise & Gibb, Single Market to a Social Europe, The European Community in the ene [Longman, Essex 
1993] pp. 232-236. 
143 Adamantoupulos p. 450. 
144 The external rules of both the United States and the EC concur/are in agreement in that a review of each 
individual case is required in respect of regional aid. See US Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
Sec. 1312 and the EC Commission: Soya meal from Brazil O.J. 1985 L106 [April 18, 1985). p. 19; The 
American Department of Commerce views aids given by the European Investment Bank and the European 
Regional Development Fund as countervailable subsidies, see Adamantoupulos p. 449. As regards the inner 
rules of the EC, Advocate General holds the view that "... it depends on the case in issue..." what decision the 
Commission is going to arrive at. 
145 Resolution of the Representatives of the Member States on general systems of regional aid of October 20, 
1971 J.O. 1971 C l l l / 1 ; Communication of June 23, 971 [J.O). 1971 CU1/7 ) Communication on Regional aid 
systems [O.J. 1979 C31/9), Commission Communication on the method of Application of Art 92(3)(a) and (c) 
to regional aids [O.J. 1988 C212/2). These rules overlap to a great extent and also modify one another. 
146 In respect of Article 92(3)(a). 
147 XVIth Report on Competition Policy 1987, p. 178. 
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In reviewing its policy the Commission went so far as to to accept the granting of 
operational aid in areas where that constituted the only means of rectifying the 
abnormally low standard of living and unusually high employment rate.148 What is 
highly significant is that the standards of living and employment were to be measured 
against a Community-wide standard. 
ii) In the Commission's view such aids must be made transparent or must not be 
allowed to continue.149 Those aids which cannot be measured by currently used 
methods or cannot be expressed in terms of numbers are not considered transparent by 
the Commission.150 The Annex to the Communication enlists methods for measuring 
job creation, loan guarantees, etc. to facilitate easy comparability. 
iii) The principle of regional specificity is defined in Article 9 of the Communication 
which sets out the criteria for establishing regions eligible for aid: 
a. The region concerned may not constitute the whole national territory of a country 
excepting Ireland and Luxembourg. 
b. The aid regimes must provide a clear definition of the limits of the area to which 
the aid is granted. 
c. Aid may not be given to smaller isolated areas having virtually no impact on the 
development of a region. 
d. The state aid must be adapted in form, intensity and duration to what is required/ 
to the sought-after result. 
e. It should be clearly indicated how the intensity of the aid varies in respect of the 
different areas within the region. 
f. Support given by the EBRD and the provision of state aids must be 
coordinated.151 
iv) Aids must be granted with regard to their possible sectoral repercussions.152 
As pointed out above, the Commission is authorized on the basis of Articles 92(3)(a) 
and 92(3)(c) to pursue regional policies or permit national projects for regional develop-
ment. Aid under Article 92(3)(a) may be given to areas of serious economic depression, 
whereas Article 92(3)(c) covers areas with more general development problems. The 
granting of aid for the purposes of Article 92(3)(a) is subject to the proviso that in 
respect of the NUTS II. regions concerned the per capita gross domestic product in terms 
of buying power does not exceed 75 percent of the Community average for three 
consecutive years prior to the granting of aid. In these regions the ceiling of aid intensity 
may amount to 75 percent of the total (initial) investment. Regions falling within the 
ambit of Article 92(3)(c) are measured in terms of national indicators: the per capita 
gross domestic product153 must be at least 15 percent below and the unemployment rate 
148 This mainly concerns the Italian Mezzogiorno. 
149 Vlth Report on Competition Policy 1976, Points 194 and 206. 
150 Butterworths Vlll [243]. 
151 See infra for more details. 
152 Butterworths VIII [245]. 
153 This is in fact a GDP/GVA/gross value added ratio. 
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be at least 10 percent above the national average. In order to view the region from a 
Community perspective, at the next stage the Commission gives an evaluation of the 
situation of the region in relation to the national norms and the Community standard on 
the basis of several mathematical indicators.154 The Commission's judgement is based 
on the policy (principle) of wider disparity, that is, the principle of double discrepancy, 
which means that the most underdeveloped regions of the more developed EC countries 
must be relatively worse off in relation to the national standard than regions in the 
peripheral and most backward countries.155 The evaluation of the Commission also 
takes account of the structure and trend of unemployment, as well as the direction of 
demographical changes, although the application of these methods of measuring aid is not 
compulsory. In the event that all the above criteria apply, the Commission may authorize 
an aid of maximum 30% intensity for regions with general development problems. 
The Commission's interpretation of aid for the purposes of Article 92(3)(c) is well 
illustrated in the Germany v. Commission case,156 in which the Commission examined 
the legality of an aid project for North Rhine-Westphalia. The Commission argued that 
an aid may be regarded as legitimate, provided that "the aided region is struggling with 
such economic difficulties which are relatively serious when measured against a 
Community standard; in the absence of the aid granted to the region the market forces 
would not be able to eliminate these difficulties; and the granting of aid does not disturb 
competition in certain sectors to a greater extent than necessary",157 The Commission's 
evaluation clearly demonstrated that the economic status of the aided region was rather 
satisfactory compared with other regions within the Community and the unemployment 
rate was not high either.158 
The Commission policy concerning Article 92(3)(a) and to some extent Article 
92(3)(c) has always been the subject of heated debates. 
a. The eligibility of certain areas and territories for aid is unduly determined by 
strictly quantitative criteria, and thus certain areas obviously badly in need of support 
have no access of such remedy. If there is an exodus of labour force from an agricultural 
region, for example, the region is not likely to have any unemployment problems, and 
the GDP indicators might not show any significant deviation from the norms, as was 
shown in the case of France. On such grounds instead of supporting the southern region 
of the country, France ought to provide aid to the county of Ile-de-France struggling with 
154 See the 1988 Communication for more details. 
155 XVIII Report on Competition Policy 1989, p. 148. 
156 248/84 [1987] E.C.R. p. 4013. 
157 An example of this would be [Vlth Report on competition Policy) Sicily, a region " where the net income 
per capita ranges from 54% to 66% of the national average ... and between 35% and 42% of the Community 
standard ... The population figures have dropped ... the rate of migration from the region is higher than in any 
other province in Italy ... the unemployment situation is poor...". See Commission Dec. 88/318 [March 2, 1988] 
on aid to Mezzogiorno O.J. 1988 L143/36, p. 40. 
158 On the basis of per capita GDP and structural unemployment figures. 
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a high unemployment rate due to the influx of immigrants and pushed into the 
background by French regional policy.'5' 
b. When specifying areas with general development problems, the NUTS III. regions 
are not suitable for the management of industrial difficulties. It is obvious that that the 
plight of certain isolated industrial areas smaller in territory than the NUTS III. region, 
cannot be assessed within this framework on account of the compensatory impact of the 
region unaffected by the crisis. 
c. Even if an area meets the requirements for eligibility for aid on a purely numerical 
basis, the Coimnission still retains the right to exercise its discretionary powers in respect 
of the permissibility of the aid in question. This leads us to the conclusion that the 
normativeness of the whole legal regime/system based on the Commission's communica-
tions, guidelines and letters can be seriously questioned and the indicators serve rather 
as a means of justifying approval or rejection.160 
d. Another important feature of the regional aid policy is that the regional policy of 
the Communities and the national aid policies are not coordinated. 
In practice this means that in respect of regional policy, the limits of areas qualifying 
for aid under points 1, 2 and 5b, and those of the areas specified in Article 92(3)(a) and 
(c) do not coincide, and thus the areas eligible for aid granted by Member States do not 
quite correspond to the territories which are the focus of the Community's regional 
policy. A major consequence of this discrepancy may be that certain areas are aided only 
within the framework of the Community's regional policy, while others are supported 
from state funds, or in extreme instances some areas might be accorded financial 
assistance from both sources or by neither of them, which in itself might entail a 
senseless waste of resources.161 
vi) The policy pursued by the Commission in respect of the appraisal of regional aid 
is underlined by the so-called coordination of interests principle. An illustrative example 
of this is the approach adopted by the Commission in connection with an aid project for 
the Miesbach area, when it observed:162 "... it can be presumed that in none of the 
labour market regions will the aid to be granted affect, if it should have any effect, 
commercial revenues from the tourist trade contrary to the common interests". (In none 
of the labour market regions will the aid to be granted have an impact, if any, contrary 
to the common interest, on commercial revenues from the tourist trade.)'63 
Within the ambit of regional policy attention must be paid to regional aid projects 
granted with the declared purpose of job creation by way of tax relief. As pointed out 
in the Sixteenth Competition Report such aids do not encounter any opposition from the 
Commission.164 The Commission also made it manifest that an aid cannot be regarded 
159 Wishlade (1993) p. 145. 
160 Wishlade (1993) p. 146. 
161 Wishlade (1993) pp. 146-149. 
162 Commission Decision 87/15 O.J. 1987 L12/17, pp. 25-26. 
163 Evans p. 100. 
164 See p. 138. 
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as legitimate on the sole grounds that the aid project itself has contributed to the 
maintenance or creation of jobs.165 
Talking of regional policy, aid granted to spur investment, investment zones and the 
so-called "general aid projects" also need to be discussed here. On these issues the 
Commission does not seem to have a clearly defined policy to follow. Generally, in the 
majority of cases the Commission shows no willingness to approve comprehensive aid 
schemes and by so doing give its preliminary consent to each single aid plan, but rather 
it comes to a decision on the basis of a separate appraisal of each subsidy instead. After 
the notification of an aid plan the Member State is required to notify any further plans 
to grant aid on each single occasion.166 In recent times "company face-lifting" related 
to privatization has been under strict scrutiny by the Commission.167 
In 1991 the Commission made a thorough examination of aid accorded by 
Treuhandanstalt to the vehicle industry and the Carl Zeiss Jena Works partly for the 
purpose of preventing and eliminating damage to the environment and partly in the form 
of the remission of liabilities incurred during the Honecker era. In this case the 
Commission held that such aids may be permitted since none of the economic actors 
involved are given undue advantages. Furthermore, the Commission stated that it 
demands notification of any open tender for the acquisition of a company not being 
awarded to the highest bidder. 
The Greek privatization process which was stopped at the end of October, 1993, had 
previously won the approval of the Commission in 1991 which permitted aid in the form 
of remission of debts and conversion into shares. It laid down as a rule that the 
privatization of an undertaking must take place by way of an unconditional and open 
165 In 1982 the Commission endorsed a British subsidy scheme for a time sharing program, (Xllth Rep., Point 
197), and partly supported a French initiative aiming at creating and maintaining jobs, but the maintenance of 
jobs was found to be unlawful by the Commission (Xllth Rep., Point 196). In 1983 a British subsidy scheme 
to provide training for juveniles was permitted to continue by the Commission for a year (XIHth Rep., Point 
268), and the Commission partially approved an aid plan marking out special employment zones and granting 
tax exemption for a period of 15 years to companies establishing themselves within these areas (XIHth Rep., 
Point 296). In 1985 the Commission approved of the extension of the British youth training program (XVth 
Rep., Point 226). In 1986 it permitted an Italian subsidy scheme for the prevention of unemployment within 
cooperatives (XVIth rep., Point 254), and after some hesitation, though, it supported a Dutch aid scheme to 
decrease social security tax (contribution) to be paid by undertakings taking on those who had been out work 
for a considerable length of time. In 1990 the Commission accepted the extension and modification of this aid 
scheme (XlXth Rep., Point 197). In 1991 it approved a German indemnification scheme providing financial help 
to the long-time unemployed, and also a Spanish project for retraining (XXth Rep., Points 282-283. See also 
Evans, p. 108). 
166 For instances of this see XVth Report on Competition Policy, Point 202; XVIth Report on Competition 
Policy, Points 205-209; XVII Report on Competition Policy, Points 206-210; XlXth Report on Competition 
Policy, Point 163; and XXIst Report on Competition Policy, Points 240-248. The opposite of this is well 
exemplified by the XVIIIth Report on Competition Policy, Point 219, where the whole scheme had been 
approved in advance, as the sums to be distributed within the framework of the scheme were so irrelevant that 
they could not have a significant impact on the common market. 
167 XXIst Report on Competition Policy, Points 248-250. 
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tender based on transparent terms and by involving independent experts in the assessment 
of the submitted bids. In addition, the Commission must be specially notified of the 
privatization of major undertakings.168 
A) The Hungarian rules on aid for regional development169 specify the areas eligible 
for aid primarily on the strength of unemployment figures.170 To qualify for aid the 
unemployment rate of the area concerned must be two times higher than the national 
average171 or the restructuring plans of the government's new economic policy must 
entail the threat of job losses on an enormous scale. The provision of aid is approved 
when it is targeted on the creation of new jobs, investments in infrastructure, and such 
development projects which stimulate entrepreneurial activity and encourage restricting 
efforts in the rural areas. Aids are designed to supplement local resources, are limited in 
intensity,172 and the economic viability of the prospective investment is also taken into 
account before the aid plan is approved.173 
The most significant form of regional aid is provided through local governments to 
serve as a target grant. Local governments may submit their applications for funds 
allocated by the Parliament for special purposes. Local governments also bear the ultimate 
responsibility for the distribution and management of the money granted by the state.174 
The Personal Income Tax Bill provides for tax relief for backward areas of economic 
depression,175 and the rule on the Central Technical Development Fund requires a lower 
contribution from economic entities applying for support from state funds and being 
located in regions of serious deprivation.176 The so-called Road Fund]77 accords a 
preferential treatment to backward regions. Private initiatives aiming for regional 
development programs such as the modernization of the drinking-water supply, the 
establishment of the foundations of infrastructure, etc. may also qualify for state aid.178 
In 1993 the Employment Fund presided over 1500 million HUF from contributions by 
employers and from budgetary contributions. The granting of aid for job creation is made 
conditional on the number and stability of the jobs created, and on meeting the 
requirements concerning the initial costs per workplace. Even so the support may only 
168 XXlsl Report on Competition Policy, Point 251: in the course of the Portuguese privatization process 
practically similar conditions prevailed. 
169 Act LXXXIII of 1992 and Gov. Decree 75/1991 of June 13, in the Hungarian Official Journal 64/1991. 
170 Article 51/4/ of Act LXXXIII of 1992 empowers the Parliament and the Government to specify areas 
which are to participate in the regional aid scheme. 
171 This figure is approx. 22%. 
172 Aid may amount to max. 20-50% of the total investment and to approx. 500.000 HUF/per job at the most. 
173 The 1993 state budget allocated 20 million HUF!!!, that is, $US 20.000 for regional aid, the equivalent 
of the cost of creating 40 jobs. In 1991 this amount was granted to the county of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén. 
174 Act LXXXIX of 1992; Act XXXIV of 1992; Act LIV of 1992; Act XXI of 1992. 
175 Act LXXXIX of 1991; Act CIV of 1992. 
176 Enclosure 2 of Act IX of 1988. 
177 Act XXX of 1992. 
178 Law-Decree 28 of 1977 on water management companies and Gov. Decree 89/1991 of July 12. 
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be provided as a supplementary device. For start-up small- and medium-sized enterprises 
loan guarantees are provided by the Development Fund for Small Enterprises.119 
On the whole Hungarian rules on state aid should not give cause for particular 
concern as they do not seem to be exhibiting any notable deviation from the effective 
European Community law in this respect. It cannot be mied out, of course, that in 
practice serious conflicts may occur/ensue (due to differences in interpretation). 
Environmental Protection 
At the outset the Commission envisaged that over a six-year period of transition state aids 
towards environmental protection will be accorded but on the expiry of this period such 
aids will be treated along the same lines as other prohibited forms of aid. This approach 
was enunciated in the Guidelines issued by the Commission with transitionary effect 
which unequivocally emphasized the necessity for fully implementing "the polluter pays" 
principle within the shortest possible time, so the exceptions to this principle were in fact 
considered only temporary.180 The Commission clearly views the protection of the 
environment as one of the common European interests which need to be defended and 
is even more ready to approve aids of such character than aids designed to serve other 
purposes. According to the Single European Act "The Community act towards 
environmental protection is based on the principle that preventive measures must be 
taken so that the damage is possibly repaired/made good at the source of its origin and 
that the polluter shall pay." Within this legal framework the Coimnission has adopted the 
principle of "the polluter shall рау"ш and has applied it with strict consistency in 
practice unless it was revealed that in consequence of the inadequacy of the market and 
in the absence of aid the economic actors would have had to encounter great difficulties 
in their efforts at making the necessary adjustments.182 The Commission Guidelines 
indicate that only already effectively operating companies may qualify for support, so 
new undertakings must be established in compliance with the relevant standards. The 
provision of aid must be degressive, spread over a period of certain length, and must be 
covered by such a rule of law which specifies what kind of investment is required for the 
179 Gov. Decree 98/1992 of June 17. 
180 IVth Report on Competition Policy (1975) p. 180. The force of tlie guidelines was extended in 1980/Xth 
Report on Competition Policy 1981, pp. 157-158, XVIth Report on Competition Policy 1987, pp. 171-172, 
176; The "Community framework for state aid towards environmental protection" [Letter SG(93) D/709, January 
18, 1993] extended the force of the relevant mles for another six months. See also tlie replies to the written 
questions submitted by MPs Bertrand, Jahn and Cousté [O.J. 1975, C28/24; O.J. 1975, C86/40-41; O.J. 1978, 
C164/24-25J. 
181 This principle is further underlined in the Fourth Program of Action on the Environment [O.J. 1987, 
C328/1 and p. 4]. Grabitz (1989) pp. 438—439 suggests that the phrasing/definition of the Sinle European Act 
not allowing for/accommodating any exception would/might have rendered any exception unlawful. He notes, 
however that neither the guidelines nor the other Commission acts may be regarded as legal acts, they should 
be seen as preliminary indicators of the Commission's reaction instead. 
182 Evans p. 103; Grabitz (1989) p. 430. 
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protection of the environment.183 The latest Commission Guidelines imply that environ-
mental aid may be granted under Article 92(3)(b) in the form support given to promote 
projects of common European interest, on condition that 
a) it contributes to further development and to the implementation/introduction of new 
standards for the protection of the environment,184 
b) it is granted as a supplement to local resources, where the intensity of aid may not 
exceed 15 percent of the value of the aided investment,185 
c) if is accorded to undertakings already in operation at least for two consecutive 
years prior to the day when the relevant standard takes effect, 
d) it guarantees that the polluter shall pay for the damage inflicted and that the aid 
will not have a favourable effect on the polluter's competitive position by allowing him 
to pay not only the costs related to the protection of the environment, but also the normal 
costs of replacement as well as the operating costs".186 
The subsidiary legislation of the Council and that of the Commission seems to 
harmonize with the approach of the Commission Guidelines. The EEC Council's 
Directive 75/439 concerning the storing oil residues authorizes aid for collecting refuse 
oil.187 The Council Recommendation 77/123 was designed to ensure the supportability 
of reasonable energy consumption.188 
B) In Hungary Chapter IV of Act No. LXXXIII of 1992 provided for the setting up 
of the Central Fund for the Protection of the Environment, the funds of which are made 
up of pollution fines, taxes on environmentally hazardous activities, product fees189 and 
budgetary contributions. The Fund provides support in the shape of direct remittance, 
loan guarantee and survival (emergency) aid.190 Although the principle of "the polluter 
pays" is not plainly manifested in this rule, it incorporates other principles outlined below 
occupying a central place in the Commission's Guidelines. 
One of the principles underlines that the provided aid must be supplementary in 
character (the recipient's own resources must reach 30-60% of the prospective aid), while 
183 See Guidelines Bull EC 11 1974, Point 2115, and Cownie (1989) p. 257. 
184 The IVth Report on Competition Policy even stipulated that the implementation of new and costly 
environmental standards must constitute the grounds for the justification of the provision of aid. See also 
Grabitz (1989) p. 431. 
185 The IVth Report permitted an intensity of 45%, but the total amount was to be spent on purchasing 
brand-new and more environment-friendly equipment, filters and other equipment specially designed for the 
purpose of environmental protection/ and other equipment specially designed to protect the environment. 
186 Xth Report on Competition Policy 1980, p. 16, Member States are obliged to notify such aids annually. 
187 O.J. 1975, L 194/31. 
188 O.J. 1977, L 295/3-4. 
189 For instance fuels and packing; the article by Grabitz quoted earlier proves the permissibility of exactly 
these kind of fees. 
190 Article 31(a). 
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the other emphasizes that the aid must promote progressive development and economic 
recovery.191 
A major difference between the Hungarian and the Commission's approach in this 
respect is that the Hungarian law has not adopted other aspects of the Commission's 
Guidelines, and even favours support given to new undertakings against fully operating 
companies.192 Significantly, Hungarian rules on aid prohibit the granting of operating 
aid disguised as aid provided for the purpose of environmental protection.193 
Research and Development 
In sharp contrast with its approach to regional aid, from the very beginning the 
Commission assumed a positive attitude towards the granting of aid for research and 
development. Since then it has accepted several such aid projects within the meaning of 
Article 92(3)(b) on the grounds that they serve a common European interest. A similar 
reasoning induced the Commission to accept the HD-TV (high definition television) 
project and AIRBUS, a combined design and manufacturing project for building 
passenger aircraft, both of which as the Commission's evaluation pointed out, signi-
ficantly contributed to the promotion of further technical development.194 However, in 
the case of an aid provided to the car manufacturing company, Peugeot by the French 
government for the production of new type of assembly lines and that of a new gear-box 
20% lighter than previously, the Commission ruled that regardless of the fact that the 
French government's failure to notify the aid would have rendered it illegal in any event, 
the provided aid in question was unlawful. The Commission demonstrated that the aid 
in question could not be brought within the ambit of any of the provisions in Article 
92(3), as the conditions provided for in the article did not simply apply in the 
circumstances. On examining the complainant's arguments insisting that the support was 
aimed for innovation, which was a proclaimed common European interest, the 
Commission emphasized that neither the promotion of French industrial interests nor the 
partial streamlining of an economic sector may be regarded as a common European 
interest. The Commission's inquiry also revealed that the so-called newly and only partly 
implemented innovations financed from the provided aid, had been embraced by 
Peugeot's European competitors years before, so the changes had brought little benefits 
from the point of view of quality or automation. Still the provided aid enabled Peugeot 
191 This means that a conservative investment may not be financed in such a way. 
192 Article 35(3); Article 35(16) cannot be interpreted as a restriction. 
193 Article 35(2). Several forms of tax concession are designed to support environment protection or activities 
directly related to it. Act LXXIX of 1991 provides for tax concession to land cultivation aiming for land 
amelioration. [Art. 6 A 7]; and 17/1992 of 17 June [by the Min. of Agriculture); Act LXXXII of 1992 provides 
for customs and tax concession to motor cars using unleaded fuel (Art. 8]. Gov. Decree 100/1989 endorses the 
^cultivation of oak forests devastated by bacterial contamination. 
194 XVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1989, p. 151. 
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with controlling shareholdings in Citroen to increase its total European market share from 
11.4% to 13.1% within eighteen months.195 
C) In the area of research and development the Hungarian legislation established three 
separate funds, namely the Central Technical Development Fund (CTDF),196 the 
National Scientific Research Fund}1" and the Fund Closing up with European Higher 
Education,198 Contribution to CTDF is a compulsory for each economic entity, is very 
similar to tax in character, but is levied in a different way. The money raised in such a 
way, is spent on activities loosely connected to technological research and covering such 
a wide variety of issues as the establishment of infrastructure for scientific research, the 
practical implementation of scientific results, standardization and legal protection.199 
The fund also gives support to researchers and research institutes through offering 
wage-like benefits, scholarship grants, and investment in laboratory equipment. 
IV. Sectoral aid 
In their study on state aid Evans and Martin argued that a clear distinction should be 
made between the granting of sectoral aid within the framework of Community policies 
and the intervention by the state in those sectors where the Commission may not act as 
the enforcer of Community policies. Although in the former case it is not always clear 
how the Community policies and the relevant system of national measures, which are in 
principle designed to facilitate the implementation those policies, are related. For this 
reason regulations adopted on recoimnendations from and by the Commission in respect 
of several economic sectors, such as the coal and steel industry,200 agriculture,201 
fishing,202 and transport by road, rail and inland waterways203 have rendered the 
rules on aid more transparent. 
In the latter case, where no parallel policies exist, the Commission confined itself to 
formulating legally non-binding non-mandatory principles204 extending state aid to the 
textile)205 and synthetic fibres206 industry, motor vehicle industry,207 and to public 
195 98/305 Com. Dec. concerning aid from the French government to an undertaking in the motor vehicle 
sector—Peugeot SA. O.J. 1989 L123/52-58. 
196 Act IX of 1988 as modified (on several occasions). 
197 Gov. Decree 99/1990 of December 3. 
198 Act LXXX of 1992. 
199 In essence it is in line with the relevant EC policy. 
200 3484/85 Dec. |O.J. 1985 L340/1), 2064/86 Dec. [O.J. 1986 L177/1). 3855/91/ECSC Dec. establishing 
Community niles for aid to the steel industry [O.J. 1991 L362[ Dec. O.J. 1992 [31 July, 1992]. 
201 Council Reg. 797/85 O.J. 1985 L93/1, Council Reg. 355/77 O.J. 1977 L51/1. 
202 Council Reg. 101/76 O.J. 1976 1.10/19; Guidelines for the examination of state aids in the fisheries and 
acquaculture sector [O.J. C152. June 17, 1992]. 
203 Council Reg. 1107/70 J.O. L130/1. 
204 Advocate General Damon's opinion expressed in 310/85 Deufil [1987] E.C.R. 901, p. 914. 
205 The first such aid was implemented in 1971. See Evans and Martin (1991) p. 92. 
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undertakings in the air transport and the manufacturing (assembling) sectors.208 The 
general (characteristics) features of Community policy in the textile and synthetic fibres 
industry also appertain to other sectors to a certain extent. After having been modified 
on several occasions since 1971, the Community policy has focussed on restructuring 
on the one hand, and on job creation on the other. Regarding both industries the 
principles adopted by the Commission attribute paramount importance to a radical 
cutback in the total quantity in output, a complete change in the product (profile) range 
of former textile and synthetic fibres producers and to research and development.209 
The Commission realized that within one particular sector the situation of certain 
sub-sectors may be diverse and therefore authorized the granting of 'high-priority' aid 
to these sub-sectors.210 As soon as the industries in question were beginning to show 
signs of improvement, the Commission realized its vigilance, but when in the early 90's 
new problems emerged, in a Communication to the member States, the Commission 
made its position clear by announcing that no aid aimed for increase in production 
(capacity) would (will) be endorsed.2" Shipbuilding is one of the sectors being given 
a special (treatment) treated separately. As the shipbuilding industry of the Communities 
would not be competitive in the absence of aid on the world market, the Council has 
adopted several directives authorizing aid to promote restructuring in sofar as such aids 
effectively ensure the long-term viability of the shipbuilding sector without having to 
apply for further support. The eighth and the latest directive to date regarding this sector 
was adopted by the Council in 1992.212 
The Commission's assessment of a concrete case of sectoral aid mostly depends on 
the condition of the market.213 In times of economic recession the Commission might 
206 Commission notice on the extension of the code limiting aid to synthetic fibres industry [O.J. C179 July 
16, 1992); Aid to the synthetic fibres industry; Commission Communication [O.J. C186, July 18, 1991]; Code 
on aid to the synthetic fibres industry [O.J. C346. December 30, 1992]. 
207 See Evans and Martin (1991) p. 92 on the prehistory; Aid to the motor-vehicle industry: Community 
framework on state aid to the motor vehicle industry was published on March 26, 1991 [O.J. C81]; Community 
framework for state aid to the motor vehicle Industry appeared on February 2, 1993, extending the force of 
previous regulation. 
208 Commission Communication to the member States—application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty 
and of Article 5 of the Com. Dir. 80/723/EEC to public undertakings in the manufacturing sector [O.J. C273. 
December 31. 1991]. 
209 Butterworths (1993) VII [288]. 
210 Vlth Report on Competition Policy 1976, Point 233. 
211 O.J. [1991] С186/11 ; A summary of detailed rules related to other sectors are to be found in Butterworths 
(1993). 
212 Council Dir. 90/864 [O.J. L380/27 of Dec. 31, 1990] as modified/amended by Council Dir. 92/68 [O.J. 
L219 of August 4, 1992]. 
213 Manfred Caspari, leader of DG IV was quoted by Bermann (1993) p. 886 as saying: "In the current 
economic situation the Commission is beginning to view with growing concern investment aid granted to 
sectors already struggling with overproduction ... In the past few years the subsidization of the synthehc fibres 
industry has been almost entirely forbidden/prohibited, and ... [the Commission] ... has also taken a hard line 
on the textile and clothing industry." 
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seem more inclined to permit aid, in case it ensures smooth adjustment214 and 
contributes to the furtherance of the Communities' economic and social objectives.215 
The criteria216 employed by the Commission in analyzing sectoral aid are well-defined 
and highlight on three different aspects: 
As the Commission seems unable to prevent protectionist economic policies by 
Member States, it has to content itself with placing restrictions on them to a certain 
degree. It will entirely depend on the interplay between the dominant political forces, 
in what way the Association Council will have to apply the restrictive rules pursued in 
sectoral policies. 
Conclusions 
It is difficult to determine the impact of the state aid provisions of the Europe 
Agreement, concluded between the then European Communities and the Hungarian 
Republic on Hungarian economic policy. The impact will certainly depend on how the 
vessels of the Hungarian economy as well as the aircraft-carrier of Europe will fare on 
the waters of the international economy and how the regulatory technics of the European 
Union will change. It is very difficult to formulate an academic view, let alone an 
educated guess about these conditions. Yet, three factors may already be anticipated. 
The first is that it is open to debate when Hungarian state aid rules and practice would 
have to conform fully to the requirements of the European Commission. 'This paper 
argues that these rules require immediate compliance. Though this requirement may be 
mitigated taken into consideration the backwardness of the Hungarian economy, yet it 
would be foolish to hope that Hungary may—on the basis of this agreement—peacefully 
subsidize for another half decade and the Commission will tolerate this. The depth of 
the duty to harmonize incurring by Hungary uner the Europe agreement is also open to 
debate—and that is the second factor that has to be settled urgently. This is a question 
of major importance as the Association Council will have to take into consideration—in 
carrying out its harmonization activities under Article 62 of the Europe Agreement—not 
so much legal rules but soft law or fully discretionary Commission measures. The third 
factor is that Hungary should posess a clear strategy about the positions it is going to 
take in the Association Council on the direction of the legislative activities to be carried 
out in the framework set out in Association Agreement. This strategy should address the 
question how short and long term Hungarian interests may be reconciled. It is in the 
214 Com. (78) 221 Commission Communication (o the Council of May 25, 1978 on the general policy 
regarding sectoral aid. 
215 Evans p. 93; Cownie p. 253 maintain that in case the market is not able to attain the set objectives or if 
the fulfilment of these objectives requires an unacceptably long period of time, the provision of aid be permitted 
even if its effect is obviously detrimental to the market forces. 
216 VII 1th Report on Competition Policy 1978, Point 128. 
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long term Hungarian interest to portray Hungary as an easy and reliable partner capable 
to comply immediately and to a large extent with all community rules. 
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Anthony P. QUINN Developments in the National and 
International Protection of Copyright 
Do existing laws and procedures adequately protect copyright owners in this technological 
era? Mass use of copiers in offices and libraries facilitates the abuse of reprographic 
rights, i.e. facsimile reproduction in paper form. This paper outlines how the new Irish 
Copyright Licensing Agency, a joint initiative by authors and publishers, has devised 
collective licensing and royalty collection procedures to protect the interests of authors 
(publishers and facilitate educational institutions and other users of copyright printed 
material.1 International aspects are also outlined. 
Background 
"To every cow her calf and to every book its copy". 
"Le gach bo a buinin, agus le gach leabhair a choip". 
(From Irish language, Gaelic, version) 
So held Diarmaid Mac Cearrbheoil, High King of Ireland, finding in favour of the 
plaintiff in the historic case of St. Finnian of Maigh Bhile v. St. Colmcille, 560 AD. The 
plaintiff demanded return of a Gospel book and its copy made secretly by the defendant 
without consent. In his judgment, Diannuid rejected plaintiffs arguments that the copy 
was his property. Copyright was an exception to the general principle of the Brehon laws, 
1 The Irish Copyright Licensing Agency What it is and What it Does: Information Leaflet, Irish Writers 
Centre, 19 Parnell Square, Dublin 1, Ireland. Phone (01) 729090 
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the ancient Irish legal code, that property such as land belonged to the clan.2 Thus even 
in ancient times a right to fruits of literary efforts was recognised. The principle in 
Finnian v Columcille was enshrined widely in jurisprudence (not necessarily on the basis 
of that Celtic precedent) to protect intellectual property rights by copyright (Modern Irish 
law derives from common law and equity, rather than from ancient Irish celtic laws such 
as the Brehon code. European Community law and civil law concepts are now 
influencing Irish law.) 
Legal systems generally try to achieve a balance between two public interests: reward 
for the personal ingenuity of owners of rights and organised society's demands for access 
to printed information. In Sayre v Moore, a case of 1785 re the copying of maps, Lord 
Mansfield referred to the need to reconcile the rights of creators and users.3 
Copyright and Creativity 
The relationship between copyright and creativity was explored by US Judge Richard A. 
Posner.4 There is an analogy with primitive agriculture in a society without property 
rights where anyone could reap the benefit of others' efforts. Work shifted to more 
rewarding activities. The position of authors' creativity is more complex. As Judge 
Posner explains, authors write for reasons other than money. Inner satisfaction, hope of 
immortality, prestige or fame may be the spur. Copyright law was not so necessary in the 
past when printing was licensed. It was so time-consuming and expensive to copy a book 
that it would be more economical to buy an original volume and directly reward the 
author. 
Legislation 
The first English Copyright Act was passed in Queen's Ann reign, 1709 (8 Anne c. 19). 
That legislation was narrower than modern Acts and it did not protect translations from 
foreign languages. Protection was mainly for booksellers who then were also publishers. 
Much classical literature from the nodder Homer to the plagiarist Shakespeare was 
created prior to copyright Acts. The Irish Copyright Act 1963 (the 1963 Act), provides 
in s. 7 (1) that copyright in a work is the exclusive right to do, or to authorise other 
persons to do, certain acts in relation to that work which in the relevant provisions are 
designated acts restricted by the copyright in a work of that description.5 Restricted acts 
include not only the obvious e.g. publication and public performance or broadcast as 
appropriate, but also reproducing the work in any material form. To put readers on 
2 Murdoch, H., A Dictionary of Irish Law. Topaz, Dun Laoghaire. 
3 Sayre v Moore. 1785, quoted in Clarke, Hadley A Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd. UK (CLA), pamphlet, 
Collective Administration of Literary Works, Principles and Practice: The British Experience 1991, London, 
UK. 
4 POSNER, Law and Literature A Misunderstood Relation Harvard Univ. Press, 1988. 
5 Phonographic Performance Ltd V Somers [1992] ILRM 657. 
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notice, most modem publications refer to rights reserved and also prohibit photocopying 
and recording without copyright holders' permission. No formal registration is required 
to establish copyright. 
Ss. 12 & 14 for fair dealing exceptions e.g. research, private study, criticism or 
review, lack the detailed provisions of s. 29, UK 1988 Act. Irish Law is inadequate for 
modem purposes. In Ireland, students may copy within limits (10% of a work) for strictly 
personal research or study but multiple copying without permission is illegal. Widespread 
copying by individuals on the instructions of educational institutions is arguably 
stretching fair dealing to the point of illegality. 
Infringement and emedies 
S. 7 (3) of the Irish 1963 Act provides that copyright is infringed by any person who, not 
being the owner of the copyright, and without licence of the owner, does or authorises 
another person to do any restricted acts. Infringement of copyright is actionable at the suit 
of the copyright owner. Part IV, ss. 22-28 1963 Act, provides for remedies. Different 
remedies may be appropriate: injunction, an order for account, damages, action for 
conversion; criminal sanction under the Copyright (Amendment) Act 1987; and Anton 
Pilar order for search and seizure of documents.6 
Controlling copying under copyright law 
Existing copyright law may seem too restrictive or too expansive depending on the 
interests involved. Even allowing for fair dealing exceptions, existing law is being widely 
abused by offices, educational users and libraries. Warnings at the start of books clearly 
assert legal rights and try to prohibit unauthorised photocopying. (Even without such 
warnings, rights exist.) Unauthorised copying is illegal and enforcement actions are a 
threat to individuals and bodies flouting the law. In a recent landmark decision, Texaco, 
a New York Federal District Court held that copying journal materials for employees use 
was not fair use, and that permission and compensation were required.7 It may be 
difficult to produce evidence of infringement by copying.8 
The Irish copyright licensing agency (ICLA) 
As photocopiers are commonplace, it is difficult for individual copyright holders to 
prevent abuse of their rights. Control by a special agency is the effective solution 
6 Anton Pilar KG V Manufacturing Process Ltd. [1976] 1 All ER 779-784. 
7 American Geophysical Union el al. v Texaco quoted in The Bookseller 3177/1992 &. Publishers Weekly 
New York 3/8/1992. 
8 Antocks iMim v Bloohn [1971] FSR 490; Sifam Elec. v. Sangamo Weston [1971] FSR 337; [1971] 2 ALL 
ER 1074. 
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matching concepts of copyright as a multiple bundle of rights which can be assigned or 
licensed together or separately. The ICLA is an non-profit making company limited by 
guarantee, recently incorporated with equal representation on its board and in its 
membership by authors and publishers. The articles of association provide that the board 
be chaired in alternate years by a publisher and author nominee. Publisher Michael Gill 
is chairman and author Eilis Dillon is secretary. (She visited Hungary a few years ago 
on a writers' exchange and spoke on Budapest radio. Exchanges are being negotiated 
between the Irish and Hungarian Writers' Unions.) Muireann O'Briain, barrister, advises 
the Agency board. The ICLA will operate through mandates from writers and publishers. 
Authors' unions support the initiative. ICLA will exercise sensible control over 
photocopying and provide users with an easy means of obtaining permission to copy.9 
ICLA will act as a clearing centre for dealings between owners and users of copyright 
material. Users such as schools, universities, tutorial centres, commercial firms, 
Government Departments and agencies, public bodies, professionals and individuals will 
be able to comply with copyright law through the ICLA. 
New licensing system 
ICLA will licence the photocopying of brief extracts from published works. The limits 
are 5% of a book or an entire poem story not exceeding ten pages. Libraries and other 
heavy users will have to keep records or agree to a survey system. ICLA will collect 
appropriate fees from users and income will be passed on to publishers and authors. 
Carte blanche unrestricted copying will not be allowed. Limitations and conditions of 
copying will be clearly stated to all licensees. Publishers will be relieved of unproductive 
work such as individual correspondence. 
International dimension 
The ICLA system mirrors collection agencies abroad. A reciprocal arrangement is being 
signed with the UK agency. ICLA hopes to negotiate with other members of the Inter-
national Federation of Reproduction Rights Organisations (IFRRO) so that payment for 
Irish-published works can be collected abroad. An encouraging precedent is that the 
Australian Copyright Agency Ltd., having negotiated royalties from the Federal 
Government for press cuttings circulated in the civil service, is now focusing attention 
on abuses in the educational sector.10 The Declaration of Human Rights, article 27, 
1947, asserts both sides of the copyright coin: individuals' cultural rights and authors' 
rights to protect their moral and material interests." 
9 ICLA Information Leaflet, 1 supra. 
10 European Intellectual Property Review National Reports vol. 14.11.92, Sweet & Maxwell, ESC. 
11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art. 27. 1947, referred to in Clark, Photocopying from Books & 
Journals, pamphlet, British Copyright Council, 1990. 
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Many countries, including Ireland, are members of the Berne Copyright Union and 
or the Universal Copyright Convention.12 In countries other than that of origin, 
authors are given not only rights of domestic laws of those countries but also rights 
granted by the Union. Works published in any country of the Berne Union or Universal 
Copyright Convention (UCC) are protected in the Irish Jurisdiction as if the works 
were first published in the State.13 UCC formalities require the use of the symbol (c) 
on all published copies of works, plus copyright owner's name and year of first 
publication. 
EC aspects & law reform 
EC harmonisation initiatives in the Intellectual Property field, aimed at removing 
impediments to the free movement within the Internal Market, are a spur to reform of 
national copyright law. Differences between such laws impede progress.14 Access of 
Member States to various international conventions facilitates approximation of laws. The 
common law copyright concept, as known in Ireland and the United Kingdom, contrasts 
with civil law continental concepts, especially droit d'auteur. The latter, which evolved 
from the enlightenment and the French Revolution, relates to authors' absolute control 
over creations of the mind. Copyright law, based on economic arguments, is more suited 
than the abstract droit d'auteur to protecting computer software. Common law regimes, 
such as Ireland and the UK, are becoming more conscious of authors' moral rights i.e. 
non-economic rights of paternity and integrity in their work. 
Other Rights 
There are also neighbouring rights e.g. of performers and moral rights to the creative 
integrity of literary works. A proposed EC Council Directive aims at harmonising the 
protection of authors, performing artists, broadcasters and film producers, regarding rental 
and lending rights and certain other rights.15 Member States may derogate from the 
exclusive lending rights for cultural reasons but not affecting the obligation to remunerate 
12 Berne Copyright Union: Universal Copyright Convention. 
13 Copyright (Foreign Countries) Order 1978 (S! 132/3 of 1978). 
14 Prof. John N. Adams (Director, Common Law Institute of Intellectual Property), Harmonisation of EC 
Intellectual Property Law: An Overview Irish Centre for European Law, (1CEL), Trinity College, Dublin, 
(TCD), conference, November 1992. 
15 EC Commission Document COM (90) 586 final Syn 319 (OJ No. C. 53, 28. 2. 1991, page 35) and EC 
Bulletin 12. 1990, referred to in EC Brief 3, 58 & 115, 1992 update, Gregg Myles, solicitor, Locksley Press, 
Lisburn, BT28 3BG, Northern Ireland Textbooks: Coppinger & Skone James, Copyright, Sweet & Maxwell 
Laddie, Modem Law of Copyright, 2nd ed. Butterworths, 1987 Stewart, International Copyright <t Neighbour-
ing Rights, Butterworths, London, 1983; Intellectual Property Paul Coughlan (ed.), Irish Centre for European 
Law (ICEL), Trinity College, Dublin, 1993; Intellectual Property <S Internal Market of EC Groves, Martino, 
Miskin & Richards. Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff. 
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authors equitably. The Irish Department of Enterprise and Employment, through the 
Controller of Patents who has powers under the 1963 Act would deal with reform of Irish 
copyright Law taking EC studies and measures into account. The Irish copyright Acts 
1963-87 should be replaced by a modem Act, providing for fair dealing by libraries, as 
under s. 29, UK 1988 Act 
European Dimension 
Europe, of course, is wider than the EC. There is a vibrant Europe of the Danube. The 
changes in Eastern and Central Europe have made the EC Member States and citizens 
more aware of the greater Europe. The Council of Europe Recommendation No. R.(90) 
11 of the Committee of Ministers suggests that States should consider facilitating 
voluntary licensing schemes in the course of assisting those who own rights to enforce 
them, as well as helping users to obtain permission to copy. Therefore, writers should 
look forward to developments of protection and reciprocal arrangements throughout 
Europe. 
Ireland, Hungary and EC 
A Treaty between two imperial powers: United Kingdom (then consisting of Great Britain 
and Ireland), and Austria-Hungary on the other side, signed at Vienna on 24 April 1893 
provided for reciprocal arrangements to protect authors of literarty or artistic works and 
their legal representatives, including publishers. The course of history has dictated that 
the relevant Imperial high contracting parties would lose their Empires. Ireland (the 
Republic, excluding Northern Ireland which remains part of the United Kingdom) and 
Hungary are now independent States with freedom to co-operate for copyright and other 
purposes. Ireland's membership of the European Community, to which Hungary also 
aspires, does involve some loss of sovereign rights. The Association Agreement between 
Hungary and the EC in 1991 is relevant. Hungary has been spurred to prepare new 
intellectual property laws e.g. harmonising its patent laws. 
An example of cultural co-operation is the exchange system between the Writers 
LJnions in Ireland and Hungary which is being developed further. In Budapest, I 
understand that there is an Irish-Hungarian Society. There is also an Irish-Hungarian 
Economic Association, the President of which is H. E. Dr. István Pataki, the Ambassador 
of Hungary to Ireland. Irish companies, especially in the semi-State sector are involved 
in joint ventures with Hungarian enterprises, for example the Irish Electricity Supply 
Board International and ETV, engineering consultants. Telecom Eireann's feasibility 
study on die financing of Hungarian telecommunications led to active involvement in new 
arrangements. Co-operation in the intellectual property area, especially on copyright and 
reciprocal arrangements, would be a logical progression in Irish-Hungarian relations, 
building on historical parallels, including Celtic strands. Similar links regarding 
intellectual property could be developed with other Central and East European countries 
and with EC Member States. 
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Conclusion 
It is a long time-span from the unauthorised copier, Clumcille, famed in ancient Irish 
history, to modern copying machines. The universal need to protect individuals' rights 
to literary efforts has spurred modern initiatives at global and national level. The Irish 
Copyright Licensing Agency (ICEL) provides a practical solution to the problem of 
widespread abuse of authors' and publishers' rights by unauthorised copying. Users of 
copyright material in libraries, education, administration and the professions should be 
aware of developments and in their own interest co-operate with the ICLA licensing 
system. Co-operation with agencies in other countries would be to the mutual advantage 
of authors' rights, developed within a modem code of intellectual property law. 
Thank you for your attention. While asserting my rights to this paper, I am open to 
sharing my information in response to questions or comments from my receptive 
audience.16 
16 Thanks to: my colleagues at the Bar of Ireland, Law Library, Four Courts, Dublin 7, James Bridgeman and 
Muireann O'Briain, for their help during my research, and to Dr. István Pataki, Ambassador of Hungary to 
Ireland and Ms. Lynn Hunt, of the Hungarian Embassy, Dublin. 
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Relating to the Vienna Convention on 
International Sale of Goods 
Thanks to the role assumed by the late Professor Gyula Eörsi, as one of the promoters1 
of the UN Convention signed on 11 April, 1980, Hungary too was among the first 
signatories of this Convention which has been in force in Hungary since 1 January, 1988. 
Nevertheless, in Hungary, just as in other countries, some time was needed until decisions 
worth interest were in fact taken. We are going to deal here only with two of those 
related to the forming of contracts. 
I. Orders made by telephone: the applicable law 
The German plaintiff and the Hungarian defendant were in commercial relations since a 
certain time, the plaintiff having furnished goods on a series of orders. A bill was left 
unpaid and the Hungarian defendant pretended that he have not ordered the goods in 
question. The order was made by telephone without any further written confirmation. 
As a matter of fact Hungary signed the Vienna Convention with the reservation 
provided in Article 96 of the Convention. In conformity with this Article, the rulings of 
Article 11 of the Convention, concerning the validity of contracts not concluded in 
writing, are not applied in Hungary.2 
1 Tlie Diplomatic Conference in Vienna wax presided by him. EÖRSI, Gy.: A propos for the 1980 Vienna 
Convention on Contracts for tlie International Sale of Goods. The American Journal of Comparative Law. Vol. 
XXXI (1983) No. 2. pp. 336 et seq. 
2 Tlie dispositions of Art. 12 of tlie Convention. 
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However, in its decision taken on 24 March, 1992,3 the Municipal Court of Budapest 
stated that the order made by telephone was valid, and consequently ruled that the 
defendant should pay the amount charged on the invoice. 
In fact, the Court's opinion was that, the case fell under the rules of Hungarian 
private international law. According to Sec. 25 (a) of the Hungarian Code on 
International Private Law4 in respect of contracts for sale, the seller's right is to be 
applied. Consequently, in the case under discussion the rules of German law are to be 
applied with regard to the validity of a contract made by telephone. 
As provided by Sec. 147 (1) of the German Civil Code (BGB), contracts orally 
concluded are valid, and therefore, in the present case, the validity of the contract cannot 
be contested. 
After having taken a position on this issue, the Court referred to the Vienna 
Convention by applying Article 9, paragraph 1 of the latter, which rules that the Parties 
are legally bound by the practice established between them, namely that one in 
conformity with the terms of Article 14, paragraph 1, the goods, their quantity and price 
were implicitly determined in consequence of the Parties' continuous commercial 
relations. 
Since it was also proved that the buyer had received the goods delivered, he also had 
to pay the amount of their price in conformity with the terms of Article 53 of the 
Convention. 
Taking into consideration that the Convention does not regulate the amount of the 
interests, and in conformity with Sec. 213 (1) of the German Code of Civil Procedure, 
according to which the Court is bound to take a position on all petita, German law, 
namely Section 352 (1) of the Commercial Code (HGB) providing a 5 per cent interest, 
was applied also in its decision on the interests. 
The decision of the Municipal Court was final. Our observations: 
With our respect to the international law, the legislators yielded in fact to the 
insistence of the ex-USSR5 when forming Article 12 of the Convention. The former 
Hungarian régime, having made reservations regarding the terms of Article 96, acted on 
the one hand under Soviet influence6 and, on the other hand, took into consideration the 
specific conditions of a socialist economy. It is only to be hoped that once the 
privatisation of national economy has made sufficient progress, Hungary will change its 
standpoint on this issue.7 
3 See the comments of Vida (relying on an article in Hungarian by Székely) Zur Anwendung des UN-Kauf-
übereinkommens in Ungarn. IPRax 1993. pp. 263 et seq. 
4 German translation in Brunner, Schmid and Westen: Wirtschaftsrecht der osteuropäischen Staaten. 
Baden-Baden 1991, Ungarn X. 1. et seq. 
5 Schlechtriem (Editor), Kommentar zum einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht. München 1990, Art. 12. CISG, 
Note 1. 
6 The USSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, etc. acted also in this way. 
7 More categorically VÉKÁS, L.: Das internationale Kaufrecht im "Ostgeschäft" in Hoyer and Posch. Das 
Einheitliche Wiener Kaufrecht, Wien, 1992. pp. 215, 222. 
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Also in the Hungarian literature dealing with the subject, preference seems to be 
given to the solution adopted by the Court: if, as a consequence of the reservation 
provided by Article 96 of the Convention, the latter should not be applicable, it should 
be replaced by national international private law.8 
Our last observation concerns the Code of International Private Law: when 
establishing the régime of the seller's right, the rules of Section 24 (a) of the Code 
were motivated by the Hungarian legislator's wish to find a linkage point correspon-
ding to the most characteristic element of the contract for sale—taking into consider-
ation the typical economic, social and juridical context of this kind of contracts. 
Schnitzer and Savigny had already argued for such a regulation9—adopted by the 
Hungarian legislator. 
2. Imprecision of the offer: invalidity of the contract 
The American plaintiff Pratt and Whitney (P and W) asked in his request the 
establishment of the fact that the contract negotiated with the Hungarian defendant, the 
MALÉV air company, had been formed validly. 
Since the case was of major importance, the plaintiff, after having brought the request 
before Court, launched a press campaign to which the defendant gave an answer on his 
turn. Before dealing with the decisions taken, we give a short account of the facts as 
reported by the press. 
The defendant envisaged to buy jet engines for its No. 737-200 Boeing fleet of 
aircraft and entered into negotiations with the plaintiff in September 1990. The latter 
addressed to the defendant an offer of 15 pages on 9 November, 1990 and, on 14 
December, added to it complements advantageous for the defendant. The offer contained 
the conditions of delivery, guarantee, maintenance, the training of employees and 
payment. The purchase price was about 50 million dollars. 21 December, 1990 was the 
deadline of acceptance for the defendant. 
On the last day the defendant addressed a letter to the plaintiff, saying they had the 
pleasure to inform P and W that MALÉV had chosen the PW4000 engines as jet engines 
for their fleet of aircraft. In the same letter the defendant asked the plaintiff to treat the 
transaction confidentially until a joint press conference be organised. A few months later, 
when the director general of the defendant travelled to New York, he confirmed the 
engagement of MALÉV to P and W offer. 
However, two weeks after this second declaration the defendant informed the plaintiff 
in writing that they would send invitations for a new tender of supplies. Thereafter the 
defendant said to have made only a declaration of intention and that no contract had been 
concluded; shortly after they even signed a contract with General Electric on the delivery 
of jet airline engines. 
8 VÉKÁS op. cit. p. 223. 
9 MÁDL, F. and VÉKÁS, L.: The Law of Conflicts and Foreign Trade, Budapest, 1987, p. 224. 
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On 10 January, 1992 the Municipal Court of Budapest took a decision—in fact a 
partial oner-judging that the contract had been concluded validly.10 In this partial 
decision no position was taken on the restitution of the costs of discovery procedure 
(USD 64,816,20), but only on the conclusion of the contract. As to the applicable law, 
the Court applied the Vienna Convention." 
Considering the statements referred to in the press, we simply observe in respect of 
this point, that in spite of the defendant's request demanding the Court to apply American 
law—that of the State of Connecticut in this special case—as envisaged in the offer, the 
Court adopted the Vienna Convention, based on the fact that both Hungary and the 
United States were members of the latter. (It is to be mentioned that this standpoint was 
confirmed by the Supreme Court.) 
As a result of the appeal lodged by the defendant, the Supreme Court took as a first 
step the decision that, since the conditions established in Section 213 (2) of the Code of 
Civil Procedure regarding partial decisions were not given, it was necessary to judge on 
all aspects of the case. The Supreme Court later stated that the contract had not been 
formed validly, and that only a declaration of intention had been signed by the defendant. 
Consequently the claim was rejected by the Supreme Court.12 
As regards the legal assessment of the facts, the supreme Court referred to Article 
14, paragraph 1 of the Convention which provides that an offer should be sufficiently 
precise. This was not the case here, since neither the object of the supply nor the price 
were described with sufficient precision. In consequence of the imprecise offer, the 
plaintiff's declaration did not constitute an acceptation either. Thus, one had to do only 
with a declaration of intention for a contract.13 
The Supreme Court also pointed out that although Article 2, item e of the Convention 
does not apply to the sale of aircraft, this exclusion concerns only complete aircraft but 
does not apply to their parts.14 
Commenting on the divergent results to which the first and the second instance have 
arrived at, we can simply remark that while the decision of the first instance was 
motivated by considerations regarding the ethics of sales negotiations, the Supreme Court 
strictly observed the law. 
General conclusions 
A certain number of lawsuits in which the Vienna Convention is being applied are 
before the Municipal Court of Budapest and also before the Arbitration Court of the 
10 Magyar Nemzet of 11 January 1992, p. 5. 
I t Kurir of 11 January 1992, p. 3. 
12 Népszabadság of 26 September 1992, p. 5. 
13 MAGNUS, Aktuelle Fragen des UN-Kaufrechts. Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 1993. No. 1. p. 
86. 
14 Magnus: op. cit. pp. 84 et seq. 
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Hungarian Chamber of Commerce. The practice of applying a unified law is getting 
established. 
In this respect decisions taken in other countries and even those pronounced under 
the old régime of the Hague Convention can constitute valuable points of orientation 
also for Hungarian jurisprudence, even though Hungary has not been a member of 
this latter. 
Thus jurisprudence is taking important steps towards the internationalisation of 
law—goal wished for since a long time. 
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